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The International Conference Libya between History and Revolution: Resilience and New Narrations of 
Berber Identity convened at the University of Naples “L’Orientale” from the 15th to the 17th January 
2018, was dedicated to the contemporary history of Libya. Its purpose was to understand a reality that 
is for the most part little known to the vast majority of the Italian public, and this despite colonization, 
its consequences, and the relations that have always existed between the two countries. Conversely, 
first the promotion of the colonizers’ rationale, then the rhetoric of Qadhafi’s regime, and finally the 
current representations closely related to terrorist emergencies, immigration, and war within and 
outside the Islamic world, are all well-known and documented.
 This volume Libya between History and Revolution: Resilience, New Opportunities and Challenges for 
the Berbers brings together papers by the scholars (from both Italy and abroad) who took part in the 
conference. The aim of this collection is to provide insights into a range of crucial issues that affected 
the country as a consequence of its colonial history and informed the uprisings of 2011; the volume 
looks in particular at the role of the Berbers in Libya through the prism of the new opportunities 
and challenges that face them today and which were discussed during the three-day international 
conference. 
Anna Maria Di Tolla is Associate Professor at the University of Naples “L’Orientale”. She teaches Berber 
Language and Literature and Contemporary History of Berbers in North Africa. Since she got her PhD in 
African Studies, AMD has studied the issue of minorities and identity claims in North Africa, with special 
reference to the Berber Identity Movement. She is the author of several books and essays. Among her 
most recent publications is the edited volume Percorsi di transizione democratica e politiche di riconciliazione 
in Nord Africa, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2017. AMD is co-editor of the volume Emerging Actors In Post-
Revolutionary North Africa. Berber Movements: Identity, New Issues and New Challenges, Studi Maġrebini, XV, 
Napoli, 2016-2017.
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Fulbright visiting scholar at the University of Colorado, Boulder. She earned her PhD at the École Pratique 
des Hautes Études in Paris in 2015, with a dissertation on Siwi Berber. She has conducted fieldwork in 
Siwa (Egypt), where she has collected a large corpus of texts, which are contributing to the documentation 
of the Siwi language. Some folktales and narrations were published in her book Berber Texts from Siwa. 
Including a Grammatical sketch, Köppe, Köln, 2017.
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Libya between Revitalisation New Opportunities 
and Challenges for the Berbers 
 
 
The International Conference Libya between History and Revolution: Resilience 
and New Narrations of Berber Identity convened at the University of Naples 
“L’Orientale” was dedicated to the contemporary history of Libya. Its purpose was 
to understand a reality that is for the most part little known to the vast majority of 
the Italian public, and this despite colonization, its consequences, and the relations 
that have always existed between the two countries. Conversely, first the 
promotion of the colonizers’ rationale, then the rhetoric of Qadhafi’s regime, and 
finally the current representations closely related to terrorist emergencies, 
immigration, and war within and outside the Islamic world, are all well-known and 
documented. 
Between the early nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, Western studies of 
Libya were firmly rooted in the colonial mentality of the time. This gave rise to a 
number of obstacles in the development of Libya as a modern country. First, 
colonial-era studies tended to consider the country somewhat extrinsically, in terms 
of a “passage” between the Arab East and the Maghreb, or as an outpost of the 
Ottoman Empire, and thus as a country “absent from history”.1 Moreover, 
colonialism and nationalism not only had a profound influence in shaping the 
political and social life of the country, but they also generated concepts and 
theories that underscored their rhetorical legitimacy. 
The unique specificities and internal dynamics of Libya that would have 
favored a more natural development process in the country, have received scarce 
scholarly attention. Colonial historiography and nationalist analyses of modern 
Libya have focused overwhelmingly on Qadhafi, ignoring Libyan society and 
culture. However, Islamic Sufism, Ibadism, tribal military organization and oral 
traditions were crucial aspects in the fight against colonialism: the resistance left a 
powerful political and cultural heritage, which strengthened Libyan nationalism 
and reawakened strong ties with Islam and a range of social and cultural traditions. 
                                                          
1 R. Mantran, La Libye des origines à 1912, in G. Albergoni, et al., La Libye nouvelle. Rupture et 
continuité, CNRS, Paris, 1975, 15. 
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External factors have certainly influenced the country’s internal developments 
over the past two centuries, but Libya has nonetheless had a history of its own, 
distinct from that of other neighboring countries. Italian colonialism constituted a 
break with the country’s past with the creation of a liberal regime by the 
colonizers, which however did not bring any advantages to the colonized society. 
After World War II, Idris was recalled after escaping into exile, and the figurehead 
of the Sanusiyya was transformed into a monarch, with the express purpose of 
safeguarding the interests of the Western powers that emerged in the post-war 
period under the auspices of the United Nations. Cyrenaica, a rural society based 
on nomadism, was instrumental, under the banner of Islam and through the 
cohesion of the Sanusiyya, in allowing the country to achieve independence, albeit 
in an unusual manner. Tripolitania, even though it was an urbanized society, failed 
to provide a political structure to the country, also due to the social divisions that 
traversed the region, and to the presence of Ibadism. 
The somewhat a priori solutions offered by the framework of nationalism are 
not enough to gain an understanding of all the aspects that were involved in 
producing Libya’s independence. For example, the response of the Libyan 
populations to colonial occupation was for a long time analyzed primarily from the 
perspective of the Sanusiyya, considered the only organized opposition to the 
Italian invasion. Hence, this confraternity emerged as the fulcrum of Libyan 
nationalism and as a point of reference connected to the continuity of the anti-
colonial struggle that led to independence. By contrast, for example, the role of the 
Republic of Tripolitania that was established in 1918 and its influence on the 
independence process were not taken into consideration. 
Pelt2 has underlined the historical importance of the fact that without the 
Republic there would not have been the conditions for either the Sirti agreement 
(which sanctioned the union with Cyrenaica) nor the bay‘a (offered to the leader 
Idris of Sanusiyya), on the basis of which the fundamental principles for the 
unification of the country were established.3 The failure of European countries to 
recognize the Republic of Tripoli, and its disappearance after only a short amount 
of time have largely erased its existence from history. While the Sanusiyya 
brotherhood was rewarded for its collaboration with Great Britain in Egypt with the 
recognition of its leadership in the country after the Second World War and Evans-
Pritchard dedicated an interesting hagiographic text on the Sanusiyya (The Sanusi 
of Cirenaica), the “Republic of Tripoli”, on the other hand, was left with neither 
                                                          
2 A. Pelt, Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned Decolonization, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1970, 27. 
3 This is the el-Acroma agreement of 1916. To attempt a more diplomatic pacification in some 
areas of Cyrenaica, a fragile compromise was proposed, despite its ambiguity in proposing a modus 
vivendi between Italians and Libyans. However, this agreement succeeded in establishing, although 
for a relatively short time, a certain degree of tranquility in the region (A. Del Boca, Gli Italiani in 
Libia. Tripoli Bel Suol d’Amore, Mondadori, Milano, 1993, 334-341). 
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political power nor any apology in western literature. The short existence of the 
Republic of Tripoli, however, has proved to be very instructive, in Anderson’s 
view, because it testifies to the historical tradition and foundations of European 
imperialism, as well as to the roots of Arab nationalism in Libya today.4 
The popular claim that the Sanusiyya was the center of modern nationalism in 
Libya has in fact yet to be fully verified. Pelt has argued that the Libyan monarch, 
Idris, did not believe in Arab nationalism. In 1920, as part of the al-Rajma 
agreement, Idris was proclaimed amir (Prince) and recognized by Italy as regent of 
an autonomous territory in Cyrenaica after several years of negotiations. Del Boca 
argued that the event, rather than a triumph of anti-colonial nationalism, constituted 
in fact the complete denial of the ideals of the Sanusiyya for which Idris had fought 
for three generations.5 
It is also often argued that the anti-colonial struggle united the tribes of 
Cyrenaica under the collective identity of the Sanusi, and led to their re-
configuration as a state-like entity. Italian conquest and colonial expansion was a 
source of constant external pressure which provided the impetus for the previously 
headless tribal societies of Cyrenaica to merge into the (sedentary) state-like 
organization of the religious order of the Sanusi. However, such arguments may 
prove misleading in light of the fact that the fusion of the tribes of Cyrenaica with 
the Sanusians had already occurred during the second half of the 19th  century – a  
transformation which was therefore already complete before the colonial period.6 
Instead, many of the aspects and functions of the state were constituted directly 
by Idris al-Sanusi through diplomacy and collaboration with foreign powers - first 
Italy and Great Britain, and later, after the Second World War, with the active 
support only of Great Britain. Idris, unable to find a solution to the dilemma of 
extending the emirate of Cyrenaica to Tripolitania and aware of a compromise with 
the Italians, wishing to avoid exposure, left Libya in 1923 to seek refuge in Egypt. 
Guerrilla insurgencies began again soon after, and the rebels continued their 
struggle, albeit in a disorderly manner, until their only military leader, al-Mukhtar, 
was captured. The above should not be read as diminishing the importance of the 
role played by Idris, since without him independence would not have been granted 
quite so immediately; instead, the aim of the above is to emphasize the 
complexities that lay behind Libya’s anomalous colonial experience. 
                                                          
4 L. Anderson, The Tripoli Republic, 1918-1922, in E. Joffe & K. McLachlan (eds.), Social and 
Economic Development of Libya, E. London, 1982, 43-65. 
5 With the agreement signed in er-Règima, about thirty kilometers east of Benghazi, the Italian 
government “delegated to the Emir es-Senussi the status of head of the autonomous administration of 
the oases of Augila, Gialo, Cufra and Giarabub, with the right to adopt Agedabia as its capital for the 
administration of these territories” (Idem, 415). 
6 E. Evans-Pritchard writes that “the long struggle accentuated the political functions of Sanusiya” 
(E. Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, Oxford University Press. Oxford, 1949, 104); J. 
Roumani, The emergence of Modern Libya: Political, traditions and colonial change, Ph.D. thesis, 
Princeton University, 1987, 12. 
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For most Libyans, colonialism, like for many others who suffered colonial rule, 
was a traumatic experience. As is stated by Kedourie,7 there is no doubt that 
Europe was the origin and focal point of an immense obstacle that was produced 
wherever Europeans established their colonies, bringing deeply consequential 
divisions, imbalances and violence to the traditional societies that had existed in 
Africa. It is of interest to understand how the Libyans reacted to this obstacle and 
how the country’s political traditions changed as a result of the colonial regime. 
These are difficult questions to answer, as it is impossible for us to conceive of the 
colonial experience. According to some studies, many Libyans implemented an 
anti-colonial policy by forming the resistance, and by becoming increasingly 
defensive of their traditions. This conservative attitude on the part of the Libyans, 
as Ahmida put it,8 was in fact the indicator of the awakening of a national 
consciousness. 
The resistance lasted twenty-one years out of a total of thirty-two of 
colonization (1911-1943) which also saw two world wars that had important 
repercussions for both the colonizers and colonized. In Libya, there was certainly 
not very much time for a nationalist elite to emerge and articulate a cohesive 
answer to colonization, as was instead the case in the neighbouring North African 
countries of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. As is argued by Ahmida,9 the French 
were able to transform the segmentary North African societies they encountered, 
re-stratifying their original social structures, educating new elites, creating a new 
and disinherited urban and rural proletariat, and undermining traditional structures. 
In the exceptional case of Libya, the Italian colonizers conducted themselves in the 
country as if the indigenous other did not exist; this approach was further 
exacerbated with the arrival of the fascists, who put into practice the parallel 
development of the territorially integrated colony as an Italian province, while the 
local populations were completely abandoned to themselves. In this sense, Libyan 
society escaped the brunt of colonial impact, but was nonetheless embroiled in 
fundamental political changes, which affected the country’s traditions and were of 
great significance in beginning the process of modernization. The problem we are 
faced with is the scarcity of theories produced from within to interpret the specific 
changes10 that took place in Libya. Compared to other countries, only a handful of 
studies have been published on the colonial experience and its consequences in the 
political development of the populations of Libya. 
 
The tribal systems of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania have always been unique for 
the region in terms of the type of segments involved, of the degree of segmentation 
and decentralization, and of the intensity of political competition between 
                                                          
7 E. Kedourie, Nationalism in Asia and Africa, World Publishing Company, New York, 1973, 23. 
8 A. A. Ahmida, op. cit., 2. 
9 Idem, 3-4. 
10 J. Berque, De l’Impérialisme à la décolonisation, Les Éditions de Minuit, Paris, 1965, 15. 
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individuals and tribal groups. These specificities are crucial in the distribution of 
power, in maintaining the leadership model, and in managing political interests and 
tribal relations. 
Historically, as Lacher and Labnouj11 have argued, the key to understanding the 
Jebel Nafusa is the relationship between the Berber and Arab communities. Most 
Muslims in Libya belong to the Sunni Maliki tradition, but, primarily in 
Tripolitania, the Berbers are Ibadi Muslims. The Arabization of Amazigh 
communities has advanced more rapidly in Libya than in any other country of the 
Maghreb. The Berbers, who call themselves Amazigh, meaning “free man” and 
“noble man”, comprise about ten percent of the Libyan population. They have a 
cultural heritage that pre-dates the Arab conquest of the seventh century A. D. and 
have developed a culture distinct from any Arab identity. 
The Berbers, since ancient times, have been sedentary farming communities, 
while Arab tribes like the Zintan and Rujban proudly boast of their recent past as 
semi-nomadic pastoral tribes. While Arab communities have defined their identity 
and organization through tribal genealogy, in the Amazigh cities the notion of tribe 
simply refers to individual villages and the concept of tribal leadership is not used 
in local politics.12 The Imazighen insist on their origins in North Africa, though 
some Berber groups trace their descent from the Arab tribes that arrived in North 
Africa with the Hilal invasion. These genealogies have evolved for centuries, with 
Amazigh groups associating politically and economically with the Arab tribes, 
often adopting the names and myths of the latter. Genealogy and identity are still 
important political aspects today. For example, the Zintans are a confederation 
formed by two large groups: the Awlad Bu al-Hui and the Awlad Dwaib. While 
most of the Zintans claim to be descendants of the Bani Salim Arabs, in the 1950s 
the Awlad Dwaib claimed instead to have Amazigh ancestors. Amazigh activists 
claim that Zintan, Rujban and small Arab tribes like the Harabas are in fact 
Arabized Imazighen.13 The Arab communities consider “Amazigh” the 
communities that inhabit the mountain of Nafusa, a labelling that replaces the 
pejorative notion of jbaliya (“the mountain people”), which is instead used to 
counteract the recognition of the millenary history and culture of the Berbers.14 
The social and cultural differences between the Arabs and the Berbers, 
however, have never led to fractures and fundamental political divisions between 
Amazigh and Arabs in the history of Jebel Nafusa. Alliances between the two 
communities were often based on common interests. In the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, Arabs and Berbers clashed repeatedly over land and political 
                                                          
11 W. Lacher - A.  Labnouj, Factionalism resurgent: The war in Jabal Nefusa, in P. Cole - B. 
McQuinn (eds.), The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath, Oxford University Press, New York, 2015, 
258. 
12 Idem, 259. 
13 Ibidem. 
14 Ibidem. 
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supremacy, often allying themselves with external powers in their struggles. But 
such alliances and conflicts have always cut across divisions between Arabs and 
Berbers. The dynamics of the relations between Arabs and Berbers help to explain 
why the conflict that has been ongoing since 2011, has not involved these opposing 
communities, Arabs and Amazigh, as such. 
Since the first years of Qadhafi’s rise to power the Berber identity was 
considered a “vestige of imperialism”, a question that prompted the division of the 
Arab world and for this reason he took several decisions aimed against the 
Berbers.15 He claimed that the Berbers and Tuaregs were of Arab origin and spoke 
Arabic dialects, so had a policy of Arabisation which was strongly discriminatory. 
As Baldinetti argued, Arabic was instrumental in forging a Libyan national 
identity, and it was a power tool used by Qadhafi’s regime.16 Among 
discriminatory measures, place names were systematically Arabised, books in 
Berber and about Berbers were burned; law 24 forbade the Amazigh, including the 
Tuaregs, from giving their children non-Arab names, and cultural celebrations were 
banned. Under his regime, Amazigh activists were imprisoned or exiled.17 The 
Amazigh communities joined in the National Front for the Salvation of Libya 
(NFSL), plotting to depose Qadhafi’s regime. In 1984 the plot was discovered18 
and many Amazigh activists continued their opposition to the regime from abroad. 
Although the regime had local followers in the Jebel Nafusa, the Amazigh 
community has always been considered the stronghold of the opposition. 
Since the fall of Qadhafi in 2011, Libya’s non-Arab minorities, including the 
Berbers and Tuaregs, have begun to insist more intensely on the recognition of 
their identity. Since 2012, many new local associations have emerged with the aim 
of promoting the rights of the Amazigh peoples, and have played an essential role 
in many waves of political mobilization in the country.19 
                                                          
15 A. M. Di Tolla, I Berberi del Gebel Nefusa tra rivoluzione e identità culturale, in A. M. Di 
Tolla - E. Francesca (eds.), in La rivoluzione ai tempi di internet: il futuro della democrazia nel 
Maghreb e nel mondo arabo, Il Torcoliere, UNIOR, Napoli, 2012, 79-91; A. M. Di Tolla, I Berberi 
tra rivendicazioni, riconciliazione e transizione democratica in Nord Africa, in A. M. Di Tolla (ed.), 
Percorsi di transizione democratica e politiche di riconciliazione in Nord Africa, SEI, Napoli, 2017, 
179-243. 
16 A. Baldinetti, Languages in Libya: Building Blocks of National Identity and Soft Power Tools, 
The Journal of North African Studies, 23/3, 2018, 418-439, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2017.1391947 
17 Berberism & Berber Political Movements. Berbers of Libya, Temehu, n. d.: 
https://www.temehu.com/imazighen/berberism.htm; S. Chaker - Ferkal, M. Berbères de Libye: un 
Paramètre Méconnu, une Irruption Politique Inattendue, Politique Africaine, 125,  2012, 105. 
18 W. Lacher - A.  Labnouj, op. cit., 261. 
19 A. M. DI Tolla, Berber-Amazigh Movements in North Africa: Identity, New Issues and New 
challenges, in A. M. Di Tolla - E. Francesca (eds.), North Africa Transition and Emerging Actors. 
Berber Movements In North Africa: Identity, New Issues and New Challenges, Studi Maġrebini, XV, 
Il Torcoliere, Napoli, 2017, 30-31. 
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While Qadhafi absorbed a large number of Tuaregs into his army as 
mercenaries during the uprising, many continued to endure the same historic 
marginalization as other minority groups. 
After playing a fundamental role in the overthrow of Qadhafi in November 
2011, the Amazigh were not offered any ministry positions within the National 
Transitional Council. In July 2012, a few Amazigh were elected to serve in the 
Libyan General National Congress (GNC), but the government rejected official 
recognition of their indigenous and Ibadi identity and of the Tamazight language, 
and showed little consideration for the status of Amazigh culture. 
There is then a profound divergence between Libya’s historical reality and its 
representations. The purpose of this Conference has thus been to investigate the 
reasons behind such unsolved/unsaid issues and to reveal the profile and 
morphology of a truly peculiar country which is however not yet perceived in its 
authenticity. What is emerging today is that history is seemingly repeating itself, as 
we are witnessing unprecedented reprisals in all regions of Libya, with the country 
torn apart by a multitude of militias, tribes and rival local groups that have emerged 
since the 2011 revolution and claim territory, oil and arms through the use of force, 
and all in spite of the initial promise of democratic governance.20 Further 
investigation is necessary for a better understanding of Italy’s role in the future of 
Libya in the broader context of the Mediterranean. Could this approach open up 
new lines of research? The Berber issue will offer a significant benchmark to test 
this suggestion. 
This volume brings together papers by the scholars who took part in the 
conference which aim to provide insights into a range of crucial issues that have 
been inherited from colonial history and that affect contemporary events in Libya, 
as well as into some of the new challenges that face the country’s Berbers. 
The volume therefore offers a series of insights into a country, the political 
decisions that have shaped it, and the different ways these elements have been 
represented both from an internal and an external point of view. One of the key 
contributions of the book is to push the reader towards an interdisciplinary 
reflection on the Berbers in Libya and, more generally, in North Africa. Of all the 
countries in the region, Libya is the least studied. In addition, the Amazigh 
communities of Libya have traditionally received less attention than those of other 
neighbouring countries. To fill this gap in knowledge, the volume combines a set 
of historical contributions focused on colonial and postcolonial experience; a set of 
                                                          
20 W. Lacher, Families, Tribes and Cities in the Libyan Revolution, in Middle East 
Policy, 18/4, 2011, 140-154; W. Lacher, The Libyan Revolution and the Rise of Local 
Power Centres, Mediterranean Politics. Maghreb, 2012, 167-170, 
http://www.iemed.org/observatori-en/arees-danalisi/arxiusadjunts/anuari/med.2012/lacher_en.pdf; 
S. Merabti, Ruling in the Name of the Revolution: The Local Grounding of Non-State 
Armed Groups in Western Libya, Inter disciplinary Political Studies (IdPS), 5/1, 2019,  
89-114. 
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contributions focused on the mobilization policy during the 2011 revolution; and, 
finally, a set of linguistic and literary contributions. The book also has the aim of 
bringing together researchers from various fields in order to address several 
questions concerning Libya, from history to international relations, from 
sociolinguistics to literature. The volume pays special attention to the role played 
by the Berber communities before and during colonization, and in the events which 
shook up the previously relatively stable countries of North Africa beginning in 
2011. 
The preparation process of this volume included one round of peer reviewing by 
anonymous readers to whom we are very much obliged for helping us in the 
difficult task of editing a book. Some differences in the spelling of names have 
been maintained where it seemed important to respect the individual character of 
each contribution. Our thanks are also due to Valentina Schiattarella, postdoctoral 
research fellow at the Department of Asian, African and Mediterranean Studies 
(DAAM), who helped us in the editing of the volume. We want to thank David 
Ginsborg and Sarah Pinto for their competence and patience in revising the English 
and French languages throughout the volume. 
 
Contents of the volume 
The book includes a number of contributions that cover some key aspects of 
Libya’s history from the colonial period until the uprisings in 2011; in particular 
the role of the Berbers in Libya through the prism of the new opportunities and 
challenges that face them today and which were discussed during the three-day 
international conference Libya between History and Revolution: Resilience and 
New Narrations of Berber Identity. 
The first two contributions offer some notes and witnesses from Libya, so to 
speak, from the ground, with the contributions by Francesco P. Trupiano (Libya 
between History and Revolution. The Fall of Colonel Khadafy and the Western 
Military Intervention in Libya) and Fathi Ben Khalifa (The Political Situation of 
the Imazighen in Libya Imazighen Before and After 2011). The latter is extremely 
valuable insofar as it adds a new perspective to a phenomenon – “the Arab Spring” 
– which is often understood as “Arab” in an exclusively ethnic sense. 
The following section is on Libya and the Construction of a Political Identity: 
Chiara Pagano in her contribution, titled Shall we speak of an Arab-Berber Libya? 
Towards an Interconnected History of Tripolitania’s Social Groups (1911-1918), 
offers a critical approach to the colonial narrative produced on the history of 
Tripolitania’s social groups during the so-called “liberal period” of Italian 
colonization, and refutes the Arabs vs Berber dichotomy. Federico Cresti in his 
paper, titled Sulayman al-Baruni in Italy (1919-1920): From the Dream of the 
Berber Principality to the Italo-Tripolitanian Brotherhood, and Antonio M. 
Morone (Libyan Intermediaries on the Eve of Country Independence: The Case of 
the Bin Sha‛ban family), show how the positioning of Libyan actors with regard to 
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the development and enforcement of Italian colonial and post-colonial policies was 
marked by a spirit of intermediation, which provided more than one actor with a 
mechanism to cope with the transformed political situation and safeguard their 
positions of power. In her paper, Anna Baldinetti (The Idea of a United Libya: 
Sulayman al-Baruni, Pan-Arabism and National Identity) analyses the emergence 
and construction of a Libyan nation and nationalism, based on archival sources and 
the Arabic press of the time. In the section on Libya and the Italian Colonisation, 
the contribution by Maria Grazia Negro (La colonisation italienne : une narration 
impossible) analyses postcolonial literature in the Italian language and its 
uniqueness compared to the literary output of other countries, such as France and 
England. The total absence of a Libyan postcolonial production in the language of 
the former rulers has effects also on contemporary Italian identity, deprived of an 
important historical reservoir of memory and a narration of resistance to the mono-
cultural colonial policy; In her contribution, Laura Trovellesi Cesana (Journalisme, 
journaux et journalistes dans la construction du premier discours public sur la 
Libye) discusses how the elitist character of the Italian participation in the “game” 
of the partition of Africa, reserved exclusively for the ruling classes, did 
nonetheless not prevent the propagation of a much broader popular consensus in 
favor of the war for the conquest of Libya. The dynamics that Italy experienced in 
building up public opinion in favor of the war are not detached from the creation of 
a first public discourse on Libya itself, nor from the formation of the idea of a 
nation-in-itself, reinforced by the representation chosen to define the Other. Silvana 
Palma in The Role of Libya in the Construction of Italy’s Collective Self-Portrait 
claims that Libya represented a sort of laboratory where colonial culture and Italian 
national identity could take shape, influencing and reinforcing each other over 
time. In his contribution (L’évolution de la carte de l’Afrique du nord-ouest 
antique. Le poids de l’histoire et de la géographie), Mansour Ghaki, in the section 
of the volume dedicated to the history and representations of Amazigh Libyans, 
proposes a new reading of the historical development of the vast territory of Libya. 
To grasp the evolution in time and space of this vast region, it is necessary to resort 
to the most precise terminology possible and to a periodization that takes into 
account a regionalization that was sometimes pushed to the point of bursting. 
Marisa Fois (Les ennemis de la Nation arabe. Les Berbères en Libye entre histoire 
et représentations) suggests putting Libyan Amazigh claims into perspective and 
understanding how the national ideological discourse has challenged the concept of 
identity and Amazigh militancy. Ali Bensâad, in his contribution  on the transition 
period in Libya (Libye, les rentes d’une transition inaboutie), discusses how the 
excessive prolongation of this period created the possibility for actors to take 
advantage of the uncertain context and take possession of the transitionary 
structures, turning them into instruments for furthering their own power. The 
article explains how the state of “permanent transition” has also allowed various 
militias to take root; these militias are not completely autonomous actors, but are 
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instead in a relationship of interdependence with both local political actors and 
foreign powers, and remain very permeable to extrinsic political developments and 
pressures. 
In the final section of the volume, Socio-political and linguistic aspects of 
Libyan Berber, Luca D’Anna (nəḥne kull-na yad wāḥda: The Mobilization of 
Amazigh Libyans in Revolutionary Rap) investigates one of the lesser-known 
expressions of political dissent and revolutionary thinking during the Arab Spring, 
rap music. In his paper titled Linguistic Unity and Diversity in Libyan Berber 
(Amazigh) Lameen Souag offers an accessible introduction to internal variation in 
Libyan Berber and its broader implications. The paper A Literary and Linguistic 
Analysis of Nafusi Berber Based on Past Works is a co-authored by Anna Maria Di 
Tolla and Valentina Schiattarella. This study analyses the Berber variety spoken in 
the Jebel Nafusa, describing how past sources can be used as a starting point for 
further analysis, especially with the increased availability of audio recordings of 
this language. The conclusion to the contribution discusses some of the possible 
linguistic and literary implementations of this study. These studies offer novel 
contributions to the literature on the Berber and Arabic languages of North Africa. 
The volume constitutes a rich body of contributions, and we hope that this book 
will be used as a springboard for broader historical studies, especially on the part of 
all those who are interested in Libyan societies, Berber or not, and we also hope 
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Libya between History and Revolution. 
The Fall of Colonel Khadafy and the Western Military 
Intervention in Libya 
 
 
The fall and tragic death of Muammar Khadafy have already been the subject of 
countless articles, editorials, books and seminaries; it is safe to say that all aspects 
of this subject have already been analyzed. 
I have, therefore, little to add but my personal experience of over five years 
spent in Tripoli as the Italian Ambassador to Libya, from November 2004 to June 
2010. An experience that I recounted in a book of memoirs published last year in 
Italian, by Greco&Greco, entitled Un Ambasciatore nella Libia di Gheddafi or, in 
English, “An Ambassador in Khadafy’s Libya”. 
During this long period spent in Libya, I observed, witnessed, and sometimes 
participated in a range of events and situations, and met many interesting persons. 
In other words, I was able to gain experiences that, perhaps, could help better to 
understand the causes and circumstances that led, after 42 years of absolute power, 
to the fall and death of the dictator, but also, unfortunately, to dramatic further 
consequences for Libya, for the Libyan people and for the neighbouring regions – 
consequences that endure in the present day. 
As with all stories, this one also needs to take a step back in time, to when the 
name “Libya” was not be found on any map. Under the Ottoman Empire, the 
territory of present-day Libya was divided into three vilayet: Tripolitania, 
Cyrenaica, and Fezzan. In 1934, however, under the pressure of the then Italian 
Governor Italo Balbo, the Italian Government decided to merge the two colonies of 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, naming the resulting territory Libya. 
The new name was suggested by literary professors and historians who, 
apparently, found references to a “land of the Libi” in the Odyssey and above all in 
Book II of Herodotus’ Histories. 
I will not venture on the question of the identity of the “Libi” because it would 
be too risky for me to do so in the presence of so many highly qualified experts on 
this specific matter. 
22 Libya between History and Revolution 
Instead, I will only briefly recall that it was from this historical reference to the 
“land of the Libi” that, only quite recently, in 1934, originated the new geographic 
and political name of “Libya”. 
Subsequently, after the Second World War, the new unitary name of the three 
former Ottoman vilayet was confirmed following independence, and was later 
inherited by the then Captain Muammar Khadafy after his successful coup – or, as 
he called it, his “Great Revolution”, in 1969. 
I have made this brief historic diversion to highlight the reason why, since the 
very beginning of his rule, maintaining the unity of his country was the main 
problem faced by the self-appointed Colonel Khadafy: maintaining unity among 
citizens most of whom thought of themselves principally as members of one of the 
hundreds of Kabilas and other more particular identities, and who, in any case, 
identified more as Cyrenaics or Tripolitanians than as Libyans. 
In order to forge some sort of Libyan unity, Khadafy extensively deployed an 
anti-colonial ideology and set of policies. More specifically, this ideology was one 
of marked anti-Italianism, exemplified by the glorification of Omar al Muktar and 
of the Libyan people’s heroic resistance against the Italian colonial forces, as well 
as by the continuous and vociferous compensation claims put forward for the 
damage inflicted to the Libyan people by Italian colonialism. 
In reality, for the duration of his 42 years in power, Cyrenaica was always a 
source of serious concern for Colonel Khadafy; to the point that he repudiated his 
first wife and married a woman belonging to one of the most important Cyrenaic 
tribes in order to overcome, through a political marriage, the persistent hostility 
directed against him. 
The origins of such resentment lay partly in recent historical events, as Khadafy 
had deposed from the Libyan throne King Idris, who was originally not only the 
political leader of Cyrenaica, but also the head of the orthodox Islamic sect of the 
Cyrenaic Senussia. There were also further economic, social and cultural 
differences that pushed the Colonel to always remain wary of Cyrenaica, to the 
extent that he had no hesitation in deliberately restraining the region’s economic 
and social development.  
In February 2005, on the occasion of my first visit to Bengasi, a senior local 
lawyer said the following to me: “Khadafy maintains Cyrenaica under his feet, but 
it is exactly here that the ground will slide away and throw him down”. 
At that time this sentence seemed to me little more than a fanciful wish: I did 
not realize that, really, it was a prophecy. 
A prophecy, however, that had some real foundation in the situation in Libya 
during that time. 
In a report that I sent to my superiors in June 2005, I wrote: 
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Behind a deceptive normality is hiding a dictatorial system based on a rigid and 
indisputable paternalism, aimed at self-perpetuation and, in any case, always ready 
to repress, from the very beginning, any form of dissent. A dissent that is due not 
only to the lack of basic freedoms but also to an increasing discontent which is 
spreading among large swathes of Libyan society. A discontent nourished by the 
continuous deterioration of the economic conditions of most Libyan families, 
increasing youth unemployment, and a new awareness of the external world due to 
access to international media and the internet. 
 
In any case, the old lawyer’s prophecy was already put to the test one year later, 
on the 16th of February 2006. 
On the afternoon of that Friday, at the end of the customary prayers, the 
regime itself had organized a protest march in Bengasi in reaction to the allegedly 
blasphemous anti-Islam t-shirt that had unfortunately been displayed by an Italian 
Minister. Taking advantage of this occasion, a furious rebellion exploded in 
Bengasi, and subsequently spread to other cities in Cyrenaica. The number of 
casualties was quite high: according to conservative official data, among the 
demonstrators there were 14 dead and 200 wounded, plus an unaccounted 
number of arrests. To this, one had to add the burning and destruction of Libyan 
public buildings and, what is more disturbing to me personally, the complete 
ravaging of the building holding the Italian General Consulate, that put at risk the 
life of the Italian Consul General and his wife, as well as of four more Italian 
employees. 
The regime was taken by surprise and was deeply shaken. In a few days, 
however, it was able to react, to reorganize its forces, and to restore its order. 
Khadafy, as usual, promptly attributed the responsibility of the events in Cyrenaica 
to the Italian provocation and to the hate held by the Libyan people against Italy for 
its colonial past and ongoing failure to pay due compensation for it. 
In reality, what happened in Bengasi was clearly an attempt to rebel against the 
dictatorial regime. A rebellion carried out by real Libyan political opponents, by 
unemployed and underpaid Cyrenaic young men, as well as by veteran Libyan 
Mujahidin returning from their Jihad in Afghanistan and Iraq. A rebellion which 
also saw the wide participation of foreign unskilled workers, ready to be engaged 
in whatever venture of protest and violence. 
Soon after, apart from the dismissal of Ministers and local authorities and the 
arrests and brutal repression of the most dangerous opponents, Khadafy tried to 
mend fences by calling “martyrs”, in the Islamic tradition, the demonstrators who 
had died during the rebellion, and by sending the wounded to hospitals abroad. 
However, the revolt put down in 2006 became a sort of tragic preview of the 
later one that, influenced and encouraged by the so called “Arab Spring” 
movements and revolts in Tunisia, in Egypt, and in other Arab countries, exploded, 
once again in Bengasi, on the 16th of February 2011, on the exact anniversary and 
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in commemoration of the previous one. And, this time, the old lawyer’s prophecy 
was fulfilled. 
With the substantial help of Western air bombing, this was a real revolution, 
whose final result was the fall and death of the hated dictator, but also, 
unfortunately, a civil war, the breakdown of the social structure of the country with 
the revival of the power of the various kabilas, the destruction of economic 
infrastructures, the penetration into the country of various groups of Islamic 
extremists, the disaggregation of the Libyan political and administrative structure 
with the appearance of various armed militias ruling their own territories and 
controlling all kinds of illegal traffics. 
Speaking of the fall and death of Khadafy and the developments of the Arab 
Spring’s revolution in Libya, I would like to concentrate on a specific point 
concerning the motivations and consequences of the international military 
intervention in Libya. 
On the back cover of my book of Libyan memoirs, the editor asks a 
fundamental question: How it’s possible that western powers intervened in 
Libya, with the clear although unconfessed aim of overthrowing Khadafy’s 
dictatorship, while totally ignoring the question of “what next”?. In other 
words, intervening militarily and not taking into any consideration what would 
happen in Libya following the sudden disappearance of Colonel Khadafy and 
his “stateless society” called Jamahiriya. How was it possible that the lesson 
taught by the disastrous experience of Iraq, with the improvident and 
counterproductive measures taken by the then American “proconsul” Paul 
Bremer, failed to be learned at all? 
And yet, Sarkozy, Cameron, Obama and, as far as Italy is concerned, 
Napolitano and Berlusconi, could not be unaware of Libya’s conditions. They 
could not ignore the fact that, unlike in the Tunisian case where the consequences 
of the fall of President Ben Ali could in some way be contained by the country, this 
would not be so in the case of Libya following the sudden, traumatic fall of a 
regime that had controlled and ruled the country for 42 years with no Constitution, 
no real Parliament and Government, no political parties, no independent judiciary, 
no efficient administration, no free press, no free civil society. 
Western political leaders could not have been unaware of the fact that, once 
Khadafy would suddenly disappear, total chaos would erupt in Libya, leading not 
only to the economic and social destruction of the country but also to inevitable 
wide repercussions for the stability and security of the North African, Sahel and 
Mediterranean regions. 
During my long diplomatic mission to Tripoli, I frequently signalled such 
serious risks. 
In March 2007, for example, I reported to my superiors the following 
considerations: 
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The Libyan system, lacking a real State structure, is so blocked institutionally and 
from the point of view of internal political balances, that any change at the top could 
intervene only after the disappearance, natural or political, of the Leader, who, 
although not holding any institutional office, is actually in possession of absolute 
power. But – I concluded – in the case of an unforeseen or unorganized 
disappearance of the sole Leader, the situation of the country is such that it is 
impossible to ensure an orderly change in power. 
 
Again, in June and July 2008, I was particularly insistent on this point, 
underlining that, in a medium-term perspective, the regime was showing serious 
fragilities which owed to the lack of a sound institutional and administrative system 
other than the untenable “Government of the Masses” called Jamahiriyya. 
Finally, in September 2009, when Khadafy celebrated 40 years in power, I 
reported the following to Rome: 
 
Although at this moment Khadafy appears still solidly in power, problems could 
arise from his sudden demise, whether forced or from natural causes. In such a case, 
the Libyan “stateless society” would be totally unprepared, and would risk being 
overwhelmed. The regime might chaotically dissolve into thousands of Kabilas, 
clans, and power groups fighting each other. The country might even risk breaking 
up. 
 
Certainly, I was not the only Ambassador in Tripoli to report in such terms on 
the situation in Libya. I am quite sure that my colleagues were doing the same. We 
have to presume, therefore, that the various Chanceries all over Europe and North 
America were informed and conscious of the situation. 
However, in spite of such information, the Western leaders, particularly under 
the pressure and activism of the then French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, decided to 
intervene militarily in Libya. 
The intervention, based on Resolutions 1973 and 2009 of the UN Security 
Council, was formally justified by the “necessity to protect the populations and the 
civilian zone threatened by Khadafy’s forces”. In theory, then, an intervention to 
defend human rights. In practice, putting aside the hidden agendas of the French 
and British Governments and, perhaps Sarkozy’s personal one, an intervention 
which, in the end, resulted in having as its sole political goal precisely the one not 
envisaged by Resolution 1973, which is to say the removal from power and, 
perhaps, the physical disappearance of the dictator. And all this, without envisaging 
anything at all for the day after. 
A “humanitarian war” the only certainty of which is that its primary victims 
have, in reality, been those same Libyans the UN Resolution proclaimed to want to 
save from Khadafy’s vicelike-grip. A “humanitarian war” that made the human 
rights situation of Libyan citizens even worse. 
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Immediately after the intervention, after the bombing, after Khadafy’s death, the 
international community forgot to defend the human rights of Libyans: what we 
witnessed instead was an escape from Libya. 
Now, apart from countless international meetings, statements, resolutions, in 
New York, in Bruxelles and in other capitals Libya has been, in actuality, 
irresponsibly abandoned. 
Abandoned to the absence of a real central power, to the lack of institutional 
and administrative preparation. Abandoned to its atavistic tribal struggles, to its 
antithetical private militias. Abandoned to the rapacity of a multitude of criminal 
gangs and traffickers in drugs, arms, oil, and human beings. Abandoned to the 
penetration of terrorism. 
Former American President Obama has already publicly admitted that the major 
failure of his Presidency was not having thought a plan for Libya after the anti-
Khadafy revolution. Perhaps, with regard to the other Leaders involved, it will be 
the Tribunal of History that will one day pass judgement on their responsibilities. 
For the time being, the sentence passed by Pope Francis in February 2016, when 
ideas were circulating concerning a second international military intervention in 
Libya, still appear as if cast in stone: 
 
On the matter of the Arab Spring, the West must look self-critically at its own 
responsibilities. What eventually happened could have been guessed in advance. It 
would be necessary to think first of Libya and then of a military intervention. 
Before, there was only one Khadafy, now, there are fifty! 
 
The heritage of Colonel Khadafy, who for 42 years ruled with an iron hand a 
“stateless society”, is today another “stateless society”, but, this time, without any real, 
strong central power. This persistent absence of a singular central power, authoritative 
and recognized not only at the international level but most importantly of all by the 
various Kabilas, opposing factions, and private armies, is the main factor in the chaotic 
instability and insecurity which reigns in the country. Instability and insecurity that 
affect North Africa, the Sahel, the Mediterranean, and therefore also Europe. 
Nowadays, the international community shows more interest and concern 
regarding Libya, and many international meetings and conferences are 
continuously convened on the subject. But, in actuality, this is the situation: the 
High Representatives of the UN are proposing plans and programs but, 
unfortunately, the Organization is powerless and increasingly less influential. The 
European Union is devoid of leadership and pervaded by new nationalisms and 
populisms. The Arab countries each continue to support one of the sides involved 
in the Libyan power struggle in accordance with their particular interests. Putin is 
deploying his new Mediterranean high diplomacy. Trump is sending tweets. France 
is playing its cards both in Tobruk and in Tripoli. 
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Finally, Italy. I have to admit that, particularly in the last two years, although 
practically abandoned by the international community and the European Union, 
Rome has displayed a greater awareness of the Libyan situation and of the serious 
risks for the security, stability and political, economic and social equilibrium of 
Italy itself and the Mediterranean region that this situation entails. Although with 
some delays, hesitations, and mistakes, the Italian Government has intensified its 
dialogue with both Prime Minister Serraj in Tripoli and General Haftar in Tobruk; 
it has taken measures to better coordinate the control of the migration routes that 
cross the central Mediterranean; it has decided to send a first military contingent in 
Niger and has opened an Embassy in Niamey; it has launched international 
initiatives to face the situation in Libya and in particular the enormous migratory 
flow through the central Mediterranean. Among these initiatives, the recently 
envisaged “Quirinale Treaty” between Rome and Paris could – I hope – be of 
particular importance, looking to the future. 
Today, however, apart from words of solidarity and praise, vague promises by 
the international community and the prospect of new agreements, the reality is 
that Italy is still alone in facing the Libyan crisis. However, a serious new danger 
has emerged recently: while the flux of migrants from Libya has been increasing 
again over the past few weeks, and a terrorist attack has hit the important oil 
terminal of Es Sider in Cyrenaica, and Tunisia is again embroiled in serious 
troubles, Italy appears to be primarily concerned with – and perhaps distracted by 
– one of the most polemical, controversial and uncertain electoral campaigns in 
recent history. And Italy, whatever Government sits in Rome, cannot afford to 
disregard Libya. 
As a conclusion, I have to admit that, given the situation, I am rather 
disillusioned and pessimistic. As of today, I fear, I am unable to see, at least in the 
short and medium term, any clear prospects for peace and civil, economic, and 
social progress for my beloved, unfortunate Libya. 
In 2018, I concluded my speech at the International Conference organized by 
the University of Naples “L’Orientale”, with a note of disillusion and pessimism on 
the future outlook of Libya. 
Since then, unfortunately, the Libyan crisis has not evolved positively at all. 
The country is still embroiled in a near endemic civil war involving, besides 
various private armed militias and criminal gangs, the two main political factions, 
headed respectively by Prime Minister Serraj in Tripoli, and by General Haftar in 
Tobruk, with their different extra-national supporters. 
The international community, apart from the usual conferences, formal 
declarations and vacuous promises, has in fact forgotten Libya. Italy, in theory the 
third party most closely affected by the Libyan crisis, seems to concentrate its 
attention only to the issue of migration, disregarding the more complex political, 
economic and security aspects of the situation. 
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The last Italian government was apparently satisfied with the substantial 
reduction of the number of illegal migrants arriving from Libya. Even the number 
of migrants who drowned in the central Mediterranean was reduced by 50% in the 
first eight months of this year: nevertheless, it remains hard to accept that, in the 
same period, “only” 640 persons have died at sea escaping from the war in Libya 
and from its atrocities. 
Maybe the publication of the proceedings of the Conference held in Naples in 
2018 is not the most appropriate occasion in which to update our impression of the 
Libyan crisis: this would probably require another special Conference at 
“L’Orientale”. In the meantime, I am forced to hold on to my gloomy pessimism 
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The Political Situation of the Imazighen in Libya 
Before and After 2011 
 
 
Most readers will, I assume, be to some extent already aware of the history of 
the Libyan Amazigh people over the last century. 
The Imazighen of Libya, were at the forefront of the resistance against 
European colonization. After decades of struggle, the new independent Kingdom of 
Libya was eventually established on December 24th 1951. 
The Kingdom’s Constitution, introduced in 1953, stated Libya’s close ties to both 
the Arab world and the African continent, and introduced Arabic as the country’s 
only official language; nothing within this Constitution mentioned the local identities 
contained in the country or recognized Libyan Tamazight language or culture. 
Arguably, this is common procedure in attempting to establish the legitimacy of 
a monarchic regime based on ethnic and religious affiliation. Accordingly, despite 
Libya’s location in North Africa, far from the Arabian Peninsula, its king could not 
but affirm to be the descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. 
The military coup carried out by Gaddafi on September 1st 1969 led to a period 
of increased political violence for the Imazighen. 
Under Gaddafi, the country had no constitution, and the State promulgated an 
exclusively Arab nationalist discourse, which created the context for a series of 
laws and policies that surpassed those of the most violent and repressive regimes 
that exist in the world today. 
The official name of the country was changed from that of the Kingdom of 
Libya to “Libyan Arab Republic”, and eventually to “Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”. 
None of Gaddafi’s speeches and statements recognized either the Amazigh 
presence or their rights. His speeches incited hatred, violence and discrimination. 
Moreover, they distorted both the history and the reality of Libyan identity and 
culture. 
Accordingly, the native Libyan language was banned; Amazigh leaders and 
intellectuals were arrested and killed, and the regime invested great sums in 
promoting a historical revisionism that would promote Arabism and present not 
only Libya, but the entirety of North Africa and the Sahara as uniformly Arab. 
30 The Political Situation of the Imazighen in Libya Before and After 2011 
Gaddafi’s speeches acted in lieu of a Constitution as the source of the laws he 
implemented. It was prohibited to speak, sing or study in Amazigh language, or to 
give Amazigh names to our children. Any child who carried an Amazigh name 
would be expelled from school until he or she took on an Arabic name. 
All Libyan citizens carried Arab nationality instead of Libyan nationality, 
following a policy of Arabization which Gaddafi pursued with the avail of his 
forces in the military and intelligence services, as well as of his allies among the 
country’s religious authorities. Unfortunately, a number of Amazigh also 
cooperated in helping to control and eventually break the Amazigh human rights 
movement. 
Officially, Libya was an Arab state, a member of the Arab League, whose 
citizens only spoke Arabic, and any Libyan who did not accept this would be 
deprived of his or her citizenship according to Law 18 of 1982. 
Therefore, as Libyan Amazigh speakers, we were faced with a choice: either 
accept the law, rejecting our Amazigh identity but earning the rights and status 
accorded to being a “good” citizen; or choosing to uphold our identity and 
language and lose all our rights as citizens. 
Some of us chose the second, arguably harder option. The Libyan resistance 
movement against Gaddafi thus included a strong Imazighen presence. 
Unfortunately, despite their contributions, all opposition projects further ignored 
Amazigh rights, confirming both the political weakness of the Amazigh and the 
prejudiced character of many members of the Libyan opposition groups. 
The same happened during and after 2011. Imazighen supported the revolution 
of February 17 since the very beginning, both politically and militarily. Hundreds 
died, many more donated money and other material support. As a result, the Libyan 
Imazighen became the targets of retaliation by Gaddafi’s forces: Imazighen 
communities were attacked and terrible crimes were committed. 
During the early stages of the revolution, the Imazighen contribution to the 
struggle against Gaddafi was widely praised by the Libyan opposition politicians 
and media, and even by politically involved singers. But as soon as the regime fell, 
there began to emerge worrying signs about the future of the community in the new 
Libyan political sphere. The first article of the temporary constitution of August 
2011 (which was promulgated while Amazigh forces were still fighting alongside 
the other Libyan rebels) stated that the Arabic language would be the country’s 
only official language. The official discourse of the revolution also changed, and 
the Imazighen came to be referred to as a minority who should fall in line with the 
will of the Arab majority. 
In a repeat of history, the Imazighen’s crucial military and logistical 
contribution was exploited, while their rights were politically marginalized. And 
again, the reasons were the political weakness of the Imazighen, and the 
widespread racism of the Libyan political classes. 
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The current situation of the Libyan Imazighen can be summarized as follows: 
 The Imazighen have boycotted parliamentary elections since 2014. 
 They also boycotted the elections for the Constitutional Commission of that 
same year. 
 Imazighen have been excluded from the political dialogue sponsored by the 
United Nations, and are out of the current government. 
Given the disastrous consequences of many of these elections and political 
initiatives, many Imazighen feel some pride not to have let themselves become 
involved in the chaos. 
Article 2 of the constitutional draft was supported by the UN and International 
community for submission to a referendum, again states: Libya is a part of the 
Arab world, the Arabic language being the only language of the State. Article 193 
stated that all articles of the Constitution may be changed in the future, except for 
article 2, which has apparently taken on a sacred aura of untouchability. 
In terms of the political status of the Imazighen in Libya, then, there is little 
difference between before and after the events of 2011. The principal reason for 
this, in my view, is that the fundamental principles of the hegemonic political 
mindset in Libya has not changed and new results cannot be expected for an 
experiment carried out with the same tools and conditions. 
Yesterday’s Libya is the mirror image of today’s; only the faces and names 
have changed. 
It is true that today’s Libya is under the threat of a new terror, that of al-Qa‘ida 
and ISIS, but Gaddafi and his regime were as terroristic as al-Qa‘ida and ISIS are 
today. 
Gaddafi trained terrorists from all over the world in camps inside Libya. He 
supported terrorist groups in Europe (including, for example, the Italian Red 
Brigades) with money and weapons. 
Civilian airplanes were hijacked and crashed in the 1980s on Gaddafi’s orders, 
and Bin Laden simply copied the same tactic for his attacks on September 11, 
2001. 
Gaddafi blew up cafes and night clubs in the streets of Europe, the same way 
ISIS did later on by planning and implementing vehicle-ramming attacks against 
defenseless civilians in Europe. 
Gaddafi and the Arabists and Islamists who control Libya today are thus 
arguably two sides of the same terrorist coin, reorganized under the slogan of 
“confronting colonialism and protecting the Arab nation and the Islamic religion”. 
It is also true that today’s Libya is rife with corruption and poor administration. 
This too is in continuity with the past: Libya has been and continues to be the 
victim of financial corruption and illegal dealings. Libya was, and still is, a 
marketplace for weapons smugglers, oil brokers, and international depredation of 
Libyan resources and finances. 
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In the past, the names of the culprits were associated with Gaddafi’s family and 
his supporters; today they are linked to the ruling elites and their international 
networks.  
This is something endemic to all Islamist, anti-democratic Arab regimes. 
Some may say that today the State is absent, and that it is the tribes that control 
Libya. This is also true, but Gaddafi also controlled Libya for 42 years by taking 
advantage of tribal dynamics and regional alliances. What is in place today is the 
Arab Islamist political method of control. It is enough to take one glance at the 
history of the region over the past few centuries to understand clearly how this 
game works. 
Some may further say that the country is facing a serious problem of illegal 
immigration. 
While this too is true, we should ask ourselves whether illegal immigration 
appeared in Libya only after 2011, or whether it was already preponderant earlier, 
in the 1990s, when Gaddafi exploited this human tragedy to put pressure on 
Europe, and by doing so was able to enter into highly advantageous negotiations 
with the former Italian government? We all remember the images of the former 
Italian Prime Minister kissing Gaddafi’s blood-stained hands. And this is not 
dissimilar from the way many Italian businesses are conducting themselves today 
by making deals with human traffickers and criminal militia leaders. 
As long as the world at large, and especially our historic neighbors – our 
Mediterranean neighbors – make deals with Libya while it remains a non-
democratic, ethnicist and Islamist, corrupted and violent regime; as long our 
neighbors continue to forget that the cultures native to North Africa, after millennia 
of relations, have more in common with their own than does Arab Wahhabism; and 
as long as they continue to think of Libya exclusively in terms of conflicts, 
ideologies, and terrorism that have their origin in the Middle East, they are bound 
to suffer the consequences of the current situation as much as we ourselves do, for 
these outlooks are at the root of all of Libya’s troubles. 
As long as the international community continues to fail to help Libya to exit 
this spiral, we will all continue to suffer from the consequences of terrorism, 
uncontrolled immigration, smuggling, and corruption. 
Libya is not solely an Arab country, nor is it a part of what they call the Arab 
world or Arab land, not in terms of history, not in terms of culture, nor of identity or 
geography: Libya is a Libyan country for all Libyan citizens. Islam in Libyan society 
is not like Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan. It is just Libyan Islam. 
The country needs help in overcoming the pitfalls of the Arabization of our 
culture, language, religion, and mentality, spurred on by the petro-dollars of the 
often undemocratic interests of the Gulf states. 
Helping Libya is paramount if we are to achieve peace both in Libya itself and 
abroad. 
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We are faced with a precious opportunity to make up for previous political 
mistakes, and ensure peace and the pursuit of common interests within a 
democratic and secular Libya. 
Today, the safest areas in Libya are those inhabited by the Imazighen; in part, 
these overlap with the wider strategic relevance for Italy, in terms of energy 
resources, of Western Libya, but also with the most important transit corridors for 
illegal immigration. The Imazighen communities are willing to engage with this 
matter, but lack the resources to do so. Furthermore, the Imazighen have not 
offered safe harbor to terrorist groups such as al-Qa‘ida and ISIS. This is without 
doubt due to the respect that the Imazighen have for their land. Others have 
forfeited their culture, language and religion, becoming tools for the 
implementation of the policies of Arabism promoted by Wahhabi regimes. Recent 
history has shown them to be the enemies of peace and democracy, and to be bent 
on the eradication of local native Libyan culture. 
What might be the solution to all of this? 
As far as we can think of the situation in terms of a political crisis, the solution 
is to create a new democratic Libyan political road map, an agreement based on the 
recognition of Libya as a North African Mediterranean state that should be willing 
to respect the rights of citizenship, secularism, freedom, and of a free economy. We 
are currently working on a political movement based on Libyan identity and 
culture. 
We simply ask the world to listen to our analyses, ideas, and views. We believe 
this is the right choice for all those who really want to help to bring Libya forward 
into the 21st century, and to ensure the stability of the region as well as 
international peace. 
  























Shall we Speak of an Arab-Berber Libya? Towards an 




Berber studies and the construction of the “colonial library” on the Maghreb 
Historically, research conducted by primarily European scholars on the complex 
relationship between Arab and Berber practices of belonging has been considered 
crucial in understanding North African societies. However, such research has also 
proved to be politically biased, as it developed within what Mudimbe has called the 
“colonial library”, the writings on Africa produced by Westerners during the 
colonial era, which also consistently affected Africans’ construction of their own 
knowledge of themselves.1 With regard to the Maghreb, production of the “colonial 
library” began around 1830, with the French military occupation of Algeria.2 At 
that time, European orientalists supported their respective governments’ drive for 
colonial expansion by providing purportedly scientific justification for the 
production of an “imagined” Orient, described as an irrevocably “other” sum of 
actual or potential societies characterized by being backward, pre-modern, and 
inherently conflictive.3 These adversarial descriptions of the internal plurality of 
African societies proved instrumental in governing complex local structures and 
dynamics of power. 4  Local cultures were studied and mobilized in order to 
emphasize difference, rather than to understand the multiple declinations of local 
                                                        
1 V. Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa. Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge, 
Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1988. 
2 S. Chaker, Réflexions sur les études berbères pendant la période coloniale (Algérie), Revue de 
l’Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée, 34, 1982, 81-89. 
3 E. W. Said, Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient, Penguin Books, New York, 1991 
[1st ed. 1978]. 
4 P. Tiyambe Zeleza, The Inventions of African Identities and Languages: The Discursive and 
Developmental Implications, in O. F. Arasanyin - M. A. Pemberton (eds.), Selected Proceedings of 
the 36th Annual Conference on African Linguistics: Shifting the Center of Africanism in Language 
Politics and Economic Globalization, Cascadilla Proceedings Project, Somerville, 2006, 14-26. 
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societal functioning, accordingly providing European colonial governments with 
what Mamdani has called “authoritarian possibilities”.5 
One of the truisms that constituted the European “colonial library” on the 
Maghreb concerned the supposedly inherent opposition between the Arab and 
Berber groups that inhabited the region. This truism was sustained, among other 
things, by recalling classical Greek and Roman historiography in order to retrace 
the pre-Islamic origins of North African societies, and identify its native peoples. 
This served the purpose of justifying colonialism in the Maghreb both in terms of a 
“return” to former Roman territories, and as the liberation of subjugated North 
African native peoples from Arab and, later on, Ottoman invader. 6  European 
scholars’ and travelers’ understandings of North Africa accordingly led to the 
development of a “paradigmatic history” predicated on binary oppositions, and 
therefore “negate[d] the possibility of a plural rationality and history”. 7  The 
fostering and later development of the field of Berber Studies contributed to this 
process. After having retraced the historical ties linking the 19th century 
descendants of the populations of pre-Islamic North Africa to the European heirs of 
the Roman Empire, the champions of the European “colonial library” reified “the 
existent differences between Berbers and Arabs in language, social organization 
and religious praxis in order to promote a divide and rule policy”.8 
The polarization of North African societies along the Arabs versus Berbers 
binomial axis was a by-product of the wider European colonial experience in 
Africa, which implied “radically new types of discourses on African traditions and 
cultures” that transformed “non-European areas into fundamentally European 
constructs”.9 By defining ethnic belongings in racial terms, often coupled with 
considerations concerning religious sectarianism, the field of Berber studies was 
                                                        
5  M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Colonialism, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996, 21. 
6 See, among others, M. Galley - D. R. Marshall (eds.), Actes du premier Congrès d’études des 
cultures méditerranéennes d’influence arabo-berbère, Société nationale d’édition et de diffusion, 
Algiers, 1973; C. R. Ageron, Du Mythe kabyle aux politiques berbères, in AA. VV., Le mal de voir. 
Cahiers Jussieu/2. Université de Paris VII, Contributions to Orientalisme, africanisme, américanisme, 
Conference (9-11 May 1974), and Ethnologie et politique au Maghreb, Conference (5 June 1975), 
Union Générale d’éditions, Paris, 1976, 331-348; K. E. Hoffman - S. G. Miller (eds.), Berbers and 
Others. Beyond Tribe and Nation in the Maghreb, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2010; B. 
Maddy-Weitzman, The Berber Identity movement and the Challenge to North African States, 
University of Texas Press, Austin, 2011. 
7 V. Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa…, 280. 
8 B. Maddy-Weitzman, Is the Ethnic Genie out of the Bottle? Berbers and the ‘North African 
Spring’ Five Years on, in A. M. Di Tolla - E. Francesca (eds.), Emerging Actors in Post-
Revolutionary North Africa. Berber Movements: Identity, New Issues and New Challenges, Special 
issue of Studi Maġrebini, Nuova Serie, voll. XIV-XV, Napoli, 2016-2017, Tomo II, 243-263. 
9 V. Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa…, 14. 
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mobilized by colonial authorities in order to negate the existence of changing 
practices of group and individual identity-building, and to sideline the multiplicity 
of strategies that had informed the distribution of power and influence among 
group actors at a regional level prior to the advent of colonialism.10 
As demonstrated by recent studies, Italian orientalists and colonial functionaries 
working in colonial Tripolitania were no exception to this trend: they followed the 
French precedent in describing the colony’s historical inhabitants by drawing an 
opposition between Arabs and Berbers in ethnic and racial terms. The promotion of 
Berber studies by the Italian colonial authorities in the immediate aftermath of the 
occupation of Tripoli was certainly no coincidence. 11  This led to a forcibly 
polarized representation of Arab and Berber practices of belonging, which were 
actually complementary and syncretic, as was also the case for the rest of the 
Maghreb. 
As articulated by Desai, the development of the “colonial library” was not a 
reflection of colonialism, but rather a constitutive aspect of the latter, and implied 
an “epistemological colonization”12 that eventually engendered what Zubairu Wai 
considered the paradox of the invention of Africa: the power regimes that emerged 
from the colonial structure, not least through the mobilization of European 
knowledge capital, continued to affect Africans’ own “notions of self-identity, 
discourses of otherness and ideology of alterity”, even when questioned by 
Africans themselves, long after the end of colonialism.13 Not surprisingly, every 
political articulation of Berber belonging has continuously generated anxiety 
among Libyans throughout history. 
The Amazigh militias who took part in the civil war that began in February 2011, 
together with all the other anti-regime forces, progressively came to perceive the 
                                                        
10  G. Boëtsch, Arabes/Berbères. L’incontournable lecture raciologique du XIXe siècle, in H. 
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berberi, Special issue of Studi Africanistici. Quaderni di studi berberi e libico berberi, 4, Unior, 
Napoli, 2015, 171-196; C. Pagano, Emergere ed evoluzioni di un discorso etnico nella Tripolitania 
coloniale: la questione berbera (1911-1923), Ph.D. Thesis, “Roma Tre” University, Rome, 2018. 
12 G. Desai, Subject to Colonialism: African Self-Fashioning and the Colonial Library, Duke 
University Press, USA, 2001, 4. 
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colonial library, International Journal of francophone studies, 18/2-3, July 2015, 263. 
40 Shall we Speak of an Arab-Berber Libya? 
 
ethnic variable as playing an increasingly relevant role in shaping the process of 
rethinking the national fabric of post-Qadhdhafi Libya. The Berber issue, therefore, 
became a concern for the authorities of the new State.14 What had emerged as a 
colonial instrument of divide and rule has therefore continued to generate social 
fractures that have denied the option of conceiving Libyan society as an Arab-Berber 
one. The idea of an Arab-Berber Libya turned out to be incompatible with the 
homogenizing rhetoric which permeated public discourse after independence, both 
during Idris’ monarchical regime and, later, during al-Qadhdhafi’s pan-Arab 
regime.15 Furthermore, Libya’s nationalist elite, especially after al-Qadhdhafi’s coup, 
systematically strove to channel Berber groups towards a homogeneous national 
identity, based on a combination of Arab, Islamic, and national territorial elements, 
with Berber culture relegated to the status of folklore, and Berber political claims for 
recognition accused of being the by-product of colonialism.16 
The persistent role of ethnic categories originating in colonial domination in the 
hostile (re)shaping of Libya’s political equilibriums requires us to critically re-
examine the emergence of the Berber issue in Tripolitania’s colonial history. It is 
necessary to think outside of the power-knowledge regimes of the “colonial 
library”, and to challenge the sharp segmentation that results from binary 
representations of North African societies. With this in mind, this article will 
historically retrace what Katherine Hoffmann has defined as “Arab-Berber contact 
zones”,17 investigating the role played, and the political strategies displayed by 
both Arab and Berber group actors in colonial Tripolitania, prior to the Fascist 
suppression of all kinds of anti-colonial resistance. 
Placing a novel emphasis not on the study of the history of Amazigh 
communities themselves, but on their interactions with State authorities and other 
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local, regional, and international social forces, it is possible to shed light on the 
contribution given by Tripolitania’s Berber groups to the regional anti-colonial 
struggle, together with their Arab allies. Accordingly, the idea that Tripolitania’s 
Berber groups have historically been a somewhat intrinsically separate minority, in 
perpetual contrast with the Arab majority, can be refuted. I will argue that the 
Arab-Berber co-participation in organizing anti-Italian resistance proved instead 
strategic in laying the basis for the imagining of an autonomous and self-governing 
Tripolitania. I will also point out that, even when displayed within the framework 
of the so-called “Berber policy”, the Italian colonial policy for coopting local 
leaders always eventually addressed either resistance, or intermediation fronts, 
which included both Arab and Berber colonial subjects. Accordingly, the 
emergence and subsequent abandonment of an ethnic rhetoric in a composite Arab-
Berber colonial Tripolitania will be understood as an instrument of local political 
agency, either in terms of intermediation or resistance. 
 
The internal plurality of Tripolitania’s social space: from the Arab conquest 
to colonial penetration 
Prior to the advent of Italian colonialism, Tripolitania had witnessed the gradual 
influx of Arab and Muslim groups from the Arabian Peninsula over the course of 
twelve centuries. From the 7th century onwards, the rise of Islam led to a rapid 
Islamization of Tripolitania, though this was not necessarily accompanied by an 
equally marked Arabization. A decisive acceleration in the Arabization process 
only occurred in the 11th century, when the Banū Hilāl tribes migrated to North 
Africa, soon followed by the arrival of the Banū Sulaym and Banu Ma‘qil.18 
Already in pre-Islamic times, the Libu people mentioned in the historical accounts 
of Herodotus and Polybius were comprised of a plurality of local groups, often 
hostile to each other, such as the Getuli, Messili and Massesili, Numidians, Maures 
and Garamantes. Most of these peoples were only sporadically united in 
autonomous kingdoms, and often maintained pseudo-feudal relations with their 
Punic or Roman conquerors.19 The kingdom of the Garamantes, which dominated 
central Sahara between 900 BC and 500 CE, constituting the first State in the 
history of the Libyan region, constituted an exception.20 
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The responses of the local populations to Arab occupation starting in the 7th 
century ranged from fierce resistance on one extreme, to integration in the ranks of 
the Arab armies on the other, as the latter swept across North Africa and over the 
Strait of Gibraltar into the Iberian Peninsula. Though frequent revolts did occur, 
pre-Arab North African dynasties also participated in establishing Islamic states 
and empires in the region.21 In the case of Tripolitania, these Berber groups were 
able to escape complete political submission to the Arab caliphate, and often 
sought to maintain their autonomy by converting to Ibadi Islām rather than to the 
majoritarian Sunni doctrine. As a result, such groups were either confined to the 
Nafūsa mountains, or to the coastal city of Zwāra. Competition for pastures and 
access to markets among nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists increased, 
opposing the newcomers to pre-existing local populations. However, a 
complementary relationship eventually developed between the pastoral economies 
of some groups, mostly in the lowlands (Jafāra), and the farming economy of the 
communities that inhabited the mountains. 22  The results of the processes of 
Arabization and Islamization, therefore, allowed for the continuation of certain pre-
existing cultural specificities. It is possible to explain the survival to the present 
day of bilingualism in Tripolitania’s Jabal (where Tamazight dialects coexist with 
Arabic), as well as of Ibadi Islam,23 in this light. Ibn Khaldūn, in his Kitāb al-‘Ibar, 
had already provided an account of the complex and changing dynamics of mutual 
exchange that characterized the Arab-Berber peoples of North Africa, showing a 
wide spectrum of practices of identity conversion, which were by no means 
unidirectional, but ranged instead from the Arabization of Berbers to the converse 
process of Berberization of Arabs.24 
By the 15th century, the age of the North African Berber dynasties had come to 
an end, and in 1551 Tripolitania came under Ottoman rule. Throughout this period, 
the Arab-Berber populations that inhabited Tripolitania’s hinterland, including 
those of the Jabal Nafūsa, maintained a de facto autonomous status, which only 
began to be seriously questioned in 1835, with the start of the second period of 
Ottoman occupation. Even then, the Ottoman Empire was forced to confront 
protracted resistance against its rule, led in the Jabal by Ghūma Bin Khalīfa al-
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Mahmūdī, and by ‘Abd al-Jalīl Sayf al-Nasr in the Fezzan, which was overcome 
only in 1858.25 The North African provinces of the Ottoman Empire had always 
functioned as a regionally integrated system articulated in terms of “self-managed 
communitarism”, which persisted during the 19th century as a legacy of ancien 
régime Ottoman cosmopolitanism. 26  Therefore, prior to Italian occupation, the 
Berber groups of Tripolitania were in fact segments of a stratified Arab-Berber 
society that, after 1835, was gradually absorbed into the political and institutional 
structures of the new Ottoman Nation-State. As explained by Nora Lafi, Ottoman 
imperial subjects were at the time provided with the administrative and institutional 
means to influence central policymaking: 
 
The old system was the object of strong collective investment, which reveals 
both the importance of the old channels of communication and of the mediation 
process for accommodating the new.27 
 
The status of Berbers in relation to the Arab groups living in the same region 
was therefore determined by the proximity of their leaders to Ottoman power, and 
depended on political or religious considerations (Ibadi vs. Sunni Muslims) rather 
than on ethnic considerations – not dissimilarly from what determined the power 
relations between Arab groups.  
 
The Berbers sharing of Maghreb’s reformism and the anti-colonial movements 
Starting from the second half of the 19th century, competition between the 
European imperial powers in Africa coincided with the Arab Renaissance (al-
Nahda) and with the spread of the ideas of Salafi reformism throughout the 
Maghreb. Both were in opposition to, on the one hand, European colonial 
expansion, and, on the other, the uncritical acceptance of the dominant paradigm of 
Islam conveyed by the Ottoman Empire.28 
Reformists in the former Ottoman provinces in North Africa, and also in 
Tripolitania, were thus able to confront the spread of European colonialism by 
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relying on complex “trans-imperial networks”.29 Ibadi groups, including the North 
African Berber élites, were actively involved in this process, in which pan-Islamic 
reformism was interpreted as a means of anti-imperial resistance.30 Starting in the 
mid-1880s, Tunisian and Tripolitanian reformists, together with Algerian exiles in 
Tunisia, took advantage of the ambiguities characterizing the French protectorate’s 
sovereignty to promote the birth of a pan-Islamic and anti-imperial regional 
network that was able to strengthen its ties with the reformist movements that had 
developed in Egypt and in the Muslim world at large.31 
Young Maghribi Ibadis, educated in Tunisia’s most important learning 
institutions, took an active part in the political and intellectual activities promoted 
by the Salafi groups that were gaining increasing momentum within the 
Protectorate. Among them, the future Ibadi leader of Tripolitania’s resistance 
against Italian colonial penetration, Sulaymān al-Bārūnī, had the chance to 
experiment with anti-colonial themes and strategies targeting the authorities of the 
French Protectorate, long before the Italian occupation of Tripolitania.32 The ideals 
of Salafi reformism not only strengthened the connection between Ibadi groups 
from the Maghreb, ‘Omān, and Zanzibar, but also their connection with reformist 
Muslims, both Sunni and Shiite, in the Maghreb and beyond.33 
Al-Bārūnī’s adhesion to Salafi reformism, and his Ibadi political activism, also 
made him the target of the Hamidian regime’s repression, costing him five years’ 
imprisonment in 1900. 34  However, after the Young Turks’ coup of 1908, his 
participation in the pan-Islamic and pan-Ottoman reformist movement earned him 
the election to representative for the Jabal Nafūsa in the newly reinstated 
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Parliament in Istanbul.35 ‘Abd al-Hamid II’s decision to make Tripolitania, and 
especially its hinterland, the principal destination for reformist exiles, had in fact 
“exposed the [Arab-Berber] provincial population to the intellectual, political, and 
cultural avant-garde of the Empire, who brought to Tripoli the liberal ideas 
introduced elsewhere in North Africa”.36 By adhering to the call of Ottoman pan-
Islamism, through the variant of Islamic reformism, North African Ibadi 
intellectuals had welcomed the Salafi theorists’ plea for the abolition of the 
madhāhib (the different schools of Islamic law), and for the launching of a new 
phase of ijtiād (the effort for interpreting the sacred texts of Islam). These 
initiatives had the aim of eliminating or minimizing sectarian differences, in 
support of the unity of the ‘Umma. 37  Al-Bārūnī played an active role in this 
process, and when the Italian interests in colonizing Tripolitania became clear, he 
returned from Istanbul to the Jabal Nafūsa with the aim of conscripting local 
soldiers to support the Ottoman Army in confronting the Italian invasion.38 These 
events confirmed the commitment of the North African reformist forces to 
reinforce and make concrete the Ottoman reformists’ vision concerning the future 
of the Empire in early 20th century.39 In fact, in the aftermath of the Treaty of 
Lausanne of October 1912 – which marked the end of the Italian-Ottoman war over 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica – the leaders of the Tripolitanian front met in al-
’Azīziya to discuss whether to submit to Italy or continue resisting.40 While some 
Arab and Berber notables opted for submission and started intermediating with 
Italian colonial authorities, Sulaymān al-Bārūnī decided to continue fighting 
against Italy. He could benefit from the support of local Berber leaders, but also of 
Arabic chiefs.41  
Relying on the decree issued by the Ottoman Caliph two days before the 
signing the Treaty of Lausanne, which had granted autonomy to both Tripolitania 
and Cyrenaica, al-Bārūnī and his followers proclaimed the birth of a Tripolitanian 
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Emirate, whose Emir was Sulaymān al-Bārūnī himself. The decision was 
immediately notified to the Foreign Ministries of all the principal European 
governments: 
 
J’ai l’honneur de Vous informer que le Gouvernement Ottoman a donné 
l’autonomie absolue aux tripolitains. Maintenant les montagnards et le sud ont 
décidé de continuer la lutte pour leur indépendance à outrance. J’ai l’honneur de 
me designer comme chef du Gouvernement indépendant provisoire que nous 
avons formé. Je Vous prie, Monsieur le Ministre, d’admettre la réalité de notre 
Gouvernement et de m’adresser toute affaire concernant les régions suivantes  : 
Vourfella et le Sud de la Tripolitaine, les habitants de la côte, littoral Adjilat 
jusqu’aux frontières de la Tunisie et tous les montagnards.42 
 
The activities of the Italian military occupation that began in December 1911 
along the coast and in the immediate hinterland of Tripoli had indeed aimed at 
obtaining control of some of the major caravan trade junctions so as to jeopardize 
the support brought by the pan-Islamic network to local resistance fighters. By the 
time the Italian-Ottoman peace agreement had been signed, the Jabal had remained 
the last channel linking the Tripolitanian rebels with Tunisia,43 and thus became the 
pivotal center for Arab-Berber resistance in Tripolitania. Furthermore, the leaders 
of the Tripolitanian resistance profited from the Jabal’s strategic positioning not 
only in obtaining the support of clandestine pan-Islamic networks that smuggled 
weapons and provisions across the border to aid anti-Italian resistance, but also in 
attempting to draw some advantage from the competition between the Italian and 
French colonial projects.44 
For instance, reacting to the Italian decision not to recognize the Tripolitanian 
Emirate, al-Bārūnī assured his allies that had the Italian colonial authorities not 
changed their mind, he would have asked the French Government for recognition, 
and that he was willing to accept a French protectorate over Tripolitania if it meant 
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ousting the Italians.45 This strategy succeeded in convincing the Italian Minister for 
the Colonies, Pietro Bertolini, to open negotiations with the Tripolitanian 
resistance front. Al-Bārūnī’s deftness in dealing with international and trans-
imperial equilibriums of power allowed him to convince the Minister for the 
Colonies to conduct these talks between Tunis and Marseille, instead of in 
Tripolitania.46 
As noted by Amal Ghazal, al-Bārūnī represented a paradigmatic model of the 
cosmopolitan Muslim reformist of the early twentieth century. Educated in Tunisia, 
Egypt and Algeria, elected to the Ottoman parliament in Istanbul, he returned to 
Tripoli to fight the invading Italians. He was indeed a member of the minoritarian 
Ibadi sect, but he was also a modernist reformer, a pan-Ottomanist, and would later 
become a pan-Arabist.47 It was no coincidence that the requests for recognition of 
the Tripolitanian Emirate presented by al-Bārūnī’s spokesmen, Mūsā Qrāda and 
‘Alī al-Shanta, to Bertolini’s emissaries in Marseille, Gianbattista Dessì and Count 
Sforza, transcended the areas inhabited by Ibadi and Berber groups. These included 
economically and politically strategic territories, traversed by the trans-Saharan 
trade routes that, starting from Ghat and Ghadāmis, crossed Tripolitania to reach 
the Mediterranean.48 In fact, the anti-Italian revolt aspired to underline its ability to 
transcend the borders of the Jabal Nafūsa, reaching out to include the whole region. 
To further demonstrate this, in early January 1913, al-Bārūnī sent a new telegram 
to the French and English consuls in Tripoli, attaching a letter in which five 
notables of the Warfallah groups, from the eastern part of the region, declared their 
loyalty to the autonomous Emirate of Tripolitania, and reaffirmed the desire to 
defend the independence of the region alongside the Nafūsa rebel groups.49 
Despite it being evident that both the Tripolitanian resistance front and the 
colonial intermediaries included Arab and Berber local groups and leaders 
simultaneously, the fact that the leadership of the Tripolitanian resistance front fell 
to al-Bārūnī, and that the Jabal Nafūsa was the front’s main stronghold, made it so 
that, in Rome, the requests for Tripolitanian autonomy were categorized as part of 
a Berber and Ibadi agenda. 
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The elaboration of the Italian “Berber policy” 
The Italian authorities’ tendency to label the rebellion in Tripolitania in ethnic 
terms was consistent with the interpretative categories that had been produced until 
then within the scope of the European “colonial library” on North Africa. While 
the pan-Ottoman and trans-imperial mobilization against European colonialism 
was in the making, the development of colonial knowledge worked instead towards 
countering this ongoing process of Imperial integration by cataloguing the colonial 
society according to closed and mutually adversarial groups. The participation of 
Italian orientalists in the European debate concerning the origins of the North-
African peoples dated back to the end of 1880s,50 and had led to their participation 
in the production of the European “regime of truth” 51  concerning the hostile 
relation between Arabs and Berbers in the region. At the same time, and especially 
between 1884 and 1905, the Italian military repeatedly started to develop plans for 
the “Libyan venture”,52 promoting preparatory initiatives of economic, diplomatic 
and geographic intervention in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.53 
It has been argued that Italy was extremely unprepared to exercise colonial rule 
over the populations of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica when its navy landed in Tripoli, 
since it lacked the necessary preliminary knowledge of these territories. 54 
Nonetheless, archival documents show that by 1902 the Office for Colonial Affairs 
of the Italian Foreign Ministry, directed by Giacomo Agnesa, together with the 
Army and in coordination with the General Consulate in Tripoli, was in fact 
actively collecting information and intelligence on the Libyan territories and their 
populations,55 as well as on the strategies adopted by the neighboring colonial 
powers in their efforts to control their respective territories of influence.56 
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All these initiatives were organic to the colonial project and, together with the 
participation of Italian orientalists in the European scientific networks working on 
the North African colonies, also resulted in the regional circulation of colonial 
strategies first experimented by French colonial administrators in Algeria. The 
latter had promoted a pro-Berber ethnic policy, thought to be integral to divide and 
rule strategies, and were taken up as an example by Pietro Bertolini, the Italian 
Minister for the Colonies, when confronting the resistance in Tripolitania in the 
aftermath of the treaty of Ouchy. In particular, in late 1912, the idea of promoting a 
“Berber policy” emerged as an extension of Minister Bertolini’s “indigenous 
policy”, also referred to as the “chief policy”. From Bertolini’s perspective, the 
Italian “Berber policy” aimed at involving al-Bārūnī and his followers in a 
decentralized administrative system, which was being elaborated in order to govern 
the colony by relying on the cooperation of indigenous chiefs, alongside Italian 
“local residents”. In so doing, Bertolini was once again inspired by the system of 
the contrôleurs civils that had been adopted by the French authorities in 
Protectorate Tunisia.57 
The possibility of elaborating a strategy centered around ethnicity, however, 
was already implicit in Francesco Beguinot’s involvement in documenting the 
Berber dialects of the region, starting from Zwāra. The work of the Italian Semitist 
preceded the occupation of Tripoli. Beguinot had in fact started studying the 
Berber languages of Tripolitania while working as a member of the archeological 
mission organized by the Italian Foreign Ministry in 1911, led by Salvatore 
Aurigemma.58 In 1913, right after the emergence of al-Bārūnī’s resistance front, 
Beguinot was appointed director of the first Italian class of Berber studies, which 
was inaugurated by the Ministry for the Colonies immediately after it had assumed 
control of the “Istituto Orientale di Napoli”.59 These developments followed the 
Abadhia report, penned by Prime Minister Giolitti’s adviser, Enrico Insabato, who 
was writing from Cairo at the end of 1911.60 The report retraced the origins and 
peculiarities of Ibadi Islam.61 According to Insabato, because the majority of the 
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Berber groups in Tripolitania were Ibadi Muslims, Italy could have profited from a 
fatwa issued in 1895 by Mohammed Kamel, the son of the Mufti of Tripoli, which 
had labelled “the inhabitants of Tripoli and of the mountains of Barberia” as 
“heretics”.62 The Italian colonial authorities could have used the so-called Fatwa 
Kamelia to indirectly undermine local resistance, pushing the local Sunnis to raid 
the Ibadis in case of war. In fact, since the latter were among the most important 
supporters of the Young Turks in the region, this would have provided Italy with 
both an opportunity to weaken Ibadi resistance, and with a way into the logics that 
actually governed the local competition over power.63 Insabato’s suggestion was 
thus intended to provide the Italian government with a tool to promote the policy of 
a specific religious minority that could be considered instrumental in countering 
the anti-Italian resistance in Tripolitania at large. This did not contrast with the pro-
Islamic policy that Italy had previously fostered with anti-British and anti-French 
purposes. Insabato, in a draft of a report concerning the Italian “Islamic policy”, 
wrote that Ibadi groups “are of strict interest to what we can define as the local 
Islamic policy of France and Italy”, whose aim was “to know, comprehend, and 
pander to the multiple local declinations of Islam practiced by colonial subjects”.64 
He concluded that “specific formulation of a pro-Islamic policy” would have 
allowed Italy to finally obtain its “Place in the Sun”.65 Use of the Ibadi-Sunni 
divide thus immediately came to the fore in colonial strategies for controlling 
Tripolitania. Within this context, Tripolitania’s Berber groups also progressively 
emerged as a politically relevant ethnic minority in Italian colonial strategies of 
divide and rule. In particular, the strategic area of the Jabal Nafūsa became a sort of 
laboratory in which a plurality of intermediation strategies were experimented 
with, leaning on what Ahmida has defined as Tripolitania’s state of latent civil 
war.66 This resulted in presenting local political and social conflicts as resulting 
from historically deep, perpetual ethnic conflicts. 
 
The transformative role of Indigenous agency 
As al-Bārūnī himself specified to the colonial Governor of Tripolitania, Ottavio 
Ragni, the region’s local conflicts did not reflect a dichotomous opposition 
between Arabs and Berbers, but rather a regional competition for the control of 
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strategic areas, such as the Jabal Nafūsa, and the coastal city of Zwāra. Historically 
retracing the practices of self-government that had characterized the history of 
Tripolitania’s hinterland, ever since the pre-Islamic era, al-Bārūnī attributed the 
claims to autonomy propounded by the Tripolitanian resistance, to regional 
specificity, rather than to an ethnic agenda linked to an alleged inherently Berber 
attitude of rejection of central authority. According to al-Bārūnī, the advent of the 
second period of Ottoman domination had led to the integration of the Jabal into 
the broader politics of Tripolitania: 
 
Most of the peoples of these districts and especially those of the Jabal have long 
inhabited Tripolitania, and enjoyed independence most of the time. The only 
government that could dominate them was, for religious reasons, that of the 
Ottomans, who alone had managed to conquer this country in a definitive way, 
which is why historians assert that Tripolitania belongs to Turkey.67 
 
While recalling the pre-Islamic origins of the settlement of some of the most 
important families of the plateau in the rebellious region, al-Bārūnī further 
explained: 
 
Writing such things is not in opposition to our purpose, because while they are 
private historical accounts, the [resistance] war is a service that is made to the 
public instead, and through which we intend to defend the rights of 
Tripolitania’s people.68 
 
Notwithstanding al-Bārūnī’s declarations, and even though Arab and Berber 
groups jointly organized Tripolitania’s local resistance, Italian colonial authorities 
continued to work towards using ethnic strategies to fragment the rebellious front.  
However, more than simply an external factor in the control and management of 
the local equilibriums of power, the Italian indigenous policy eventually proved to 
be instrumental to local notables’ strategies for competing with their regional 
adversaries. Claiming ethnic specificity, for instance, could provide those groups 
that were able to appropriate the vocabulary of the colonial authorities with 
bargaining tools through which to obtain control over a given locality. Governor 
Ragni realized these potential repercussions of Bertolini’s “ethnic policy”, and he 
feared that these might serve al-Bārūnī’s interests better than those of the Italian 
authorities.69 Therefore, he suggested that the only viable solution to the problem 
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of the “Berber element” would be military.70 Ignoring Bertolini’s agenda, Ragni 
then sent General Lequio’s troops to Assàba, on March 1913, quashing al-Bārūnī’s 
autonomist movement.71 Al-Bārūnī then sought refuge in southern Tunisia, where 
other refugees from the Jabal also converged.72 
It was only then that the Ibadi leader of Tripolitanian resistance openly 
appropriated the rhetoric of ethnicity which had been at first employed by the 
Italian colonial authorities to describe Tripolitania’s resistance movement: he 
needed a new strategy to bargain for local control over the Jabal Nafūsa from a 
position of weakness.  
In April 1913, al-Bārūnī sent the Italian consulate in Tunis his conditions for 
accepting Italian authority over Tripolitania. As was the case during the prior 
negotiations in Marseille, he continued to ask for either regional autonomy, or for a 
special administration (idāra mukhtāra) to be established in the lands of 
Tripolitania, which included “Surmān, Ajilāt, Zwāra, the Arabs of Najade, those of 
al-Haūd, al-Assal‘a, until Uazin, and from Mizda to Gadames; the Orfella, Fezzan 
and Ghat”.73 Had the colonial authorities welcomed these conditions, al-Bārūnī 
would have been ready to accept an Italian protectorate over Tripolitania. He also 
requested a certain degree of fiscal autonomy from Italian control; the opportunity 
to recruit local administrative and military personnel without Italian interference; a 
guarantee of Italian non-interference in religious affairs, and the exemption from 
taxation for the inhabitants of the Sahel and Jabal for a two-year period. None of 
his requests had any strong connection with a specific ethnic or religious 
belonging. However, during his negotiations from Tunis, al-Bārūnī began to refer 
to the territories whose independence he was negotiating as “Berber territories”. 
And yet, the resistance leader also continued to explicitly include territories that 
were also inhabited by Arabs. No direct reference was made, instead, to the Ibadi-
Maliki divide in the sense of granting the Ibadis a special status, but on the 
contrary, the request was made for the two religious groups to be treated equally, 
and al-Bārūnī identified “Arab and Italian” as the official languages for the 
autonomous territory, not even mentioning the Berber language.74 
                                                        
70 ASDMAE, ASMAI, Africa II, Situazione generale a tutti il 5 febbraio [1913], Report from 
Ragni to the Ministry of Colonies, cit. by F. Cresti, Due volte minoranza…, 35. 
71 ASDMAE, ASMAI, Africa II, 122/1-6, Clemente Lequio to Minister of the Colonies, Relazione 
sull’azione politica esercitata durante le operazioni della Colonna del Gebel e sulle condizioni 
politiche del paese attraversato, 12.5.1913. 
72 ASDMAE, ASMAI, Africa II, 125/2-18, A. M. Sforza to Ministero delle Colonie, 30.11.1913. 
73 Archives Nationales de Tunisie (ANT), E550/30-15, dossier 175, J. B. Dessis, Gouvernement 
Tunisien Sureté Publique, Note 17.5.1913. 
74 ASDMAE, ASMAI, Africa II, 150/14-55, Giovan Battista Dessì a Pietro Bertolini, 29.4.1913, 
X. 
Chiara Pagano 53 
 
Despite all of this, Bertolini chose to pursue the negotiations he had begun with 
the Tripolitanian refugees in Tunisia in keeping with the ethnic policy he had 
devised. He decided to ask Francesco Beguinot to join the Italian emissaries in 
Tunis, 75  who eventually accepted al-Bārūnī’s conditions. The Minister for the 
Colonies, in fact, considered that “an unsuccessful attempt [to defeat al-Bārūnī’s 
rebellion], or even an only partial success, would put” the Italian colonial 
authorities “in an even more regrettable position than the present one in 
Tripolitania, in Italy and abroad”.76 
Once again, defeating the local rebellion in Tripolitania was thought to be 
necessary within the frame of the Italians’ competition with the French colonial 
authorities in neighbouring Tunisia, and accordingly, of their efforts to claim a 
position as a colonial power in the Mediterranean for Italy. The promotion of a 
“Berber policy” was inspired more by the circulation of colonial models at a 
regional level, than by a real assessment of local dynamics of power in the colony. 
This would result in giving local notables wide margins for appropriating the 
themes and vocabularies of the “indigenous policy”, and for them to pursue their 
own strategies by intermediating with the colonial power, wherever this might have 
been seen as the best option for obtaining resources and power. 
 
The First World War and the Arab-Berber vision of a self-governing Tripolitania 
On the eve of the First World War, the appropriation of the “Berber policy” by 
indigenous agents had started to produce consequences that had not been foreseen 
by the Italians. By the fall of 1913, the French, British and Italian intelligence 
forces began documenting how, while negotiating with the Italians in keeping with 
Bertolini’s Berber agenda, al-Bārūnī had actually taken advantage of his temporary 
exile in Tunis to intensify his contacts with prominent representatives of the Young 
Tunisians movement (most notably ‘Abd al-Azīz al-Thālbī, Muhammad al-Jaībī, 
but also Muhammad and ‘Ali Bash Hanba); he had also been able to leverage on 
the support of Ibadi groups from the Algerian Mzab and from the Tunisian island 
of Jarba, who at the time were highly active participants in the anti-colonial groups 
of Protectorate Tunisia.77 These events reconfirmed how the Maghrebi reformist 
and anti-colonial movements continued to follow the political line set in Istanbul; 
but they also highlighted the constant involvement of key personalities in the local 
resistance movement from both the Arab and Berber communities in Istanbul’s 
strategies for restoring Ottoman influence in the region. These events have often 
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been underestimated in the literature. The new phase of the North African uprising 
against the forces of the European Entente has most often been described purely as 
a result of the international crisis engendered by the First World War.78 Contrary to 
such a reading, the reorganization of Tripolitanian resistance preceded the outbreak 
of the First World War by about a year, and it was certainly independent of the 
Italian decision to join the War, which occurred only in May 1915.79 Moreover, 
this new phase of armed uprising, which eventually came to include also most of 
the groups that had previously accepted Italian rule, was never just an 'Arab revolt', 
but was instead comprised of Arab-Berber armed groups from the outset. In fact, 
when the Ottoman Empire proclaimed the jihād against the Entente Forces, on 
November 1914, it also sanctioned the political and conceptual equation between 
pan-Islamism and anti-imperialism, managing to involve a plurality of local forces 
by mobilizing either religious belonging and/or anti-colonial instances.80 
Tripolitania, together with Tunisia, and Egypt, became strategic in the 
promotion of regional pan-Islamic mobilization, to the extent that recent studies 
have begun to speak of Libya as part of the “Southern front of the Great War”.81 
The crucial role of Tripolitania in these dynamics should in fact not be surprising, 
given that its anti-Italian mobilization, as Anna Baldinetti has argued, had 
historically constituted the first example of an anti-colonial resistance movement 
expressly and entirely inspired by the discourse of Pan-Islamism.82 
By the summer of 1914 the Italian army had managed a series of victories 
against the local resistance, leading to the “Miani expedition” and to the occupation 
of new outposts in the Fezzan. These successes persuaded the Italian authorities 
that they had once again successfully strengthened their position in the region.83 
However, the rebellion in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica’s had not actually been 
defeated. Rather, the leaders of the anti-Italian resistance had dissimulated their 
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reorganizational efforts by distracting the colonial authorities with exhausting 
negotiations. Meanwhile, Ottoman authorities had encountered many difficulties in 
attempting to reaffirm their influence, however indirect; nonetheless, they 
continued to constitute an alternative interlocutor for most of Tripolitania’s local 
leaders. Sulaymān al-Bārūnī, considered by the contemporary historiography as the 
head of the Berber resistance on the eve of the Great War and throughout the 
conflict, instead ensured that the movement continued to adhere to a strongly pan-
Islamic and pro-Ottoman line. 
In July 1914, Istanbul had hosted a pan-Islamic congress whose participants, al-
Barūnī included, voted to take advantage of the war to reignite an anti-Italian jihād, 
by supporting the spread of the Sanusi call for resistance in Tripolitania through the 
Fezzan.84 The leader of the Tripolitanian resistance was therefore able to lean on 
pan-Islamic rhetoric in order to coordinate the local Arab-Berber forces more 
effectively, also including the Sanusi groups of Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, to the 
detriment of Britain, France and, above all, Italy.85 
These events followed the reigniting of the rebel groups’ attacks against Italian 
garrisons in Tripolitania’s hinterland. This forced the new Minister for the 
Colonies, Ferdinando Martini, to decide to withdraw the Italian Army from the 
Fezzan at the beginning of November 1914, with the aim of employing all the 
armed forces in maintaining control of the coastal areas of Tripolitania.86 This gave 
the Tripolitanian element of the new pan-Islamic insurrectional movement the 
opportunity to reoccupy the Jabal Nafūsa in December 1914. A new autonomous 
government was then established, under the leadership of Shaykh Sūf al-Mahmūdi, 
and with the support of Arab-Berber groups of both western Tripolitania and 
eastern Tunisia.87  
Al-Bārūnī instead remained in Cyrenaica, in an attempt to persuade the Sanūsi 
leader, Ahmad al-Sharīf, to join the Ottoman-sponsored jihād.88 The reactivation of 
the pan-Islamic network was also made possible thanks to the logistic, military and 
diplomatic support obtained by Wilhelmine Germany.89 Its mobilizing force was 
such that the Sanusi forces of Fezzan and Cyrenaica, by November 1915, finally 
welcomed Istanbul’s call to join the pro-Ottoman forces against Italy, which had 
officially entered the war by May 1915 on the side of Great Britain and France.90  
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This came as a surprise to the Italian colonial authorities. The provincialization 
of Tripolitania’s resistance, its interpretation in ethnic terms, together with the 
Italian belief that, following the peace of Ouchy, the vaster Italian-Ottoman 
conflict had been replaced simply by a conflict against localized resistance groups, 
prevented the colonial authorities from fully understanding the revolt in 
Tripolitania. They failed to realize how that local rebellion was part of a broader 
trans-imperial, pan-Islamic and anti-colonial network that had continued to 
recognize in the Ottoman imperial authority the guarantor of its unity. 
Starting from 1915, the leader of Nalūt, Khalīfa Bin ‘Askar, drawing on pan-
Islamic ideas rather than on ethnic solidarity, led a number of Arab and Berber 
notables from western Tripolitania and from the militarized territories of southern 
Tunisia in promoting a new wave of uprising against the authorities of the French 
Protectorate. This uprising lasted until 1918,91 and in the meantime, revolt quickly 
spread to eastern Tripolitania as well. Following the battle of al-Qardabīya, a 
number of deserters from the irregular forces of eastern Tripolitania, guided by 
Ramadān al-Shatāwī al-Suwāhīlī, openly sided with the rebel front.92 In the area 
around Misrāta, starting from 5 August 1915, al-Suwāhīlī inaugurated the third 
attempt at autonomous self-government in Tripolitania following those of 
Muhammad al-‘Abīd in Fezzan, and of Shaykh al-Sūf in the Jabal.93  
 
The civil war in Tripolitania and the metamorphosis of the use of ethnicity 
Following an initial stage of resistance against the Italian colonial authorities 
which saw all the forces taking part in the rebellion unite under the banner of pan-
Islamism, by early 1916 the competition for political offices in the new self-
proclaimed autonomous government of the region among Tripolitania’s local 
notables eventually re-emerged. This resulted in a new phase of regional civil war, 
involving primarily the Jabal Nafūsa and Zwāra. Some of the Jabal’s local 
notables, such as the Berber leaders Sassi Khzām and Yūsuf Karbīsh, and also a 
number of Arab groups, such as the Nuwā’il, began to oppose al-Mahmūdī’s 
leadership, claiming a role of leadership in the new autonomous government.94 
This led to a new displacement crisis in Tripolitania, which once again had its 
fulcrum in the Jabal. The flux of refugees was not only directed towards Tunisia 
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but also toward the Berber-majority coastal town of Zwāra.95 The Arab-Berber 
forces hostile to the al-Mahmūdī government sought refuge in the city, and asked 
the Italian authorities to provide them with the military and logistic support they 
needed to reverse the balance of power in the Jabal to their own advantage. The 
local leader of Zwāra, Sultān Bin Sha‘bān, had sided with the Italians, allowing 
them to occupy the town in May 1916. 96  For Bin Sha‘bān, obtaining Italian 
military support proved instrumental in overcoming his local rival, the anti-Italian 
rebel ‘Issa Abū Sahmīn already in 1912. Accordingly, he continued to oppose the 
anti-Italian forces’ attempts to occupy Zwāra.97  
Nevertheless, it would be misleading to interpret the alliance between Bin 
Sha‘bān and Sassī Khzām as a proof of the existence of a compact “Berber front” 
that would also include Khzām’s allies, Mūsā Qrāda and Yūsuf Kharbīsh. In fact, 
apart from al-Bārūnī, another important Berber leader from the plateau, Khalīfa 
Bin ‘Askar, was instead a strong supporter of al-Mahmūdī’s government and of the 
North-African jihād, and was therefore imprisoned by Khzām and Bin Sha‘bān’s 
ally, Muhammad al-‘Abīd, in December 1915. 98  The objective of the alliance 
between Khzām and Bin Sha‘bān was thus to regain control over territories that the 
two notables perceived as their respective appurtenance, to the detriment of local 
rivals. 
Nevertheless, the new Governor of Tripolitania, Giovanni Ameglio, resorted 
again to the “Berber policy” to approach the so-called “Zwāra front”. Already in 
the autumn of 1915, Ameglio suggested to the Ministry for the Colonies to 
subscribe to the French periodical Les Archives Berbères, published in Rabat, in 
order to send copies of it to the Government in Tripoli. He considered it imperative 
to study “the Berber issue” more deeply, so as to be able to “examine to what 
extent and how the existing dualism between the Arab and Berber races can be 
exploited to our advantage”.99 
In the spring of the following year, Ameglio explained his understanding of the 
pro-Berber strategy to the Ministry for the Colonies as follows: 
 
Continuing support for the Berber-Ibadi party, centered in Zwāra, aiming at 
indirectly governing, for now, all Berber countries through [the support] of loyal 
chiefs, salaried by us. 
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[…] We will provide the Jabal’s notables with what they have requested from us 
from Zwāra, essentially, ammunition and funds for the payment of shuyūkh and 
irregular gendarmes […]. Since the strength of the Berbers lies in the degree of 
their unity, and the results so far obtained by their war-effort […] should be 
ascribed to their compactness, the government will try to avoid provoking any 
further division by only strengthening […] Sassī Khzām’s party.100 
 
These archival documents display an undeniable transformation in the Italian 
colonial authorities’ understanding of the “Berber policy” after Italy’s joining of 
World War I. Previously intended as an instrument for coopting al-Bārūnī 
resistance’s front, the new Berber policy became instead an instrument for 
maintaining the support of the intermediaries based in Zwāra, during a period in 
which Tripoli’s government had lost all control over the hinterland.  
 
The Tripolitanian republican experience 
In late 1916 al-Bārūnī returned to Tripolitania, heralding a message of pan-
Islamic unity and anti-colonial struggle from the Sultan, with the aim of ending the 
regional conflict that was tearing apart the rebel front in western Tripolitania and 
the Fezzan.101 Because the intrinsic universalism of such a pan-Islamic appeal was 
essentially incompatible with particularistic requests for the recognition of a 
special status for Ibadis and/or Berbers, al-Bārūnī abandoned any rhetoric centered 
around ethnic or religious minority status. In December 1916, he proclaimed the 
establishment of a second government in the Jabal, which replaced the one led by 
al-Mahmūdī.102 He also conferred government offices to Muhammad Fākīnī and al-
Hādī Ku’bār, who had previously sided with the Italians with the aim of countering 
the Barunian leadership, but had also held institutional positions in the previous 
Ottoman administration. Moreover, following Istanbul’s call for the jihād, they had 
once again fallen in line with the anti-Italian forces.103 The pan-Ottoman nature of 
al-Bārūnī’s second government demonstrates how previous leveraging of Berber or 
Ibadi status had in fact been used as a political tool for negotiating local privileges 
with the Italian authorities, within the frame of a larger dynamic of regional 
competition for power. 
Nevertheless, the new Minister for the Colonies, Salvatore Colosimo, also 
decided to pursue the “Berber policy”: in early 1917, he commissioned Beguinot 
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with a “History of the Berbers”.104 Furthermore, in a report sent to the ministry for 
the Colonies we read that Beguinot had come to believe that “the Berber element 
[…] can be usefully opposed to the Arabic element, according to the old adage 
“divide and rule”. 105  The Italian scholar accordingly advised the colonial 
authorities that promoting the “Berber policy” would have required the colonial 
administration to take all the “necessary measures to reinvigorate [the Berbers’] 
ethnic consciousness, and especially the use of language”.106 
Such a policy was however never adopted by the Italian colonial administration, 
because it was incompatible with the policy of limiting indigenous schooling to 
primary education.107 Nevertheless, after the end of the First World War Italian 
orientalists did not abandon the idea that it was necessary to culturally sustain the 
promotion of an ethnic policy. Indeed, the post-war Commission charged with 
examining the state of education in the colonies proposed to favor the study of the 
Berber language in Tripolitania’s Berber-majority areas.108 The colonial authorities 
of the time however had to reject this proposal because al-Bārūnī himself, when 
questioned about the proposed creation of schools for the study of the Berber 
language, answered that it would have been useless since “the Berbers themselves 
are uninterested in the study of their language as they find it more useful to learn 
Arabic”.109 
Al-Bārūnī, in fact, had fully appropriated the international pan-Islamic rhetoric 
that also inspired Tripolitanian patriotism. Accordingly, in the aftermath of the 
conflict, the experiments in self-government that had emerged during the war in 
Tripolitania found a regional synthesis in the first Republican experience of North 
Africa: the Republic of Tripolitania (al-Jumhūrriyya al-Tarābulsiyya). As a matter 
of fact, al-Bārūnī was among the chiefs that, during a meeting held in el-Qussbat 
on the 15th of November 1918, proclaimed the birth of the Republic. 110  The 
prospect of reuniting the entire regional resistance front in order to claim autonomy 
for Tripolitania had always been the only consistently shared objective of the 
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various articulations of the revolt movement. It also proved instrumental in 
overcoming internal disagreements, and countering the strategies of ethnic, 
religious and tribal divide and rule experimented by the colonial power.111 
In the aftermath of First World War, the Peace Conference held in Versailles 
sanctioned the decline of a number of century-old Empires, including the Ottoman. 
This laid the basis for the articulation of a new proto-nationalistic rhetoric in the 
former Ottoman North African provinces, in which no space had been given to 
ethnic distinctions. Before the idea of a Libyan nation emerged, the Tripolitanian 
Arab-Berber jihād that had taken place between 1912 and 1918 had already 
identified Tripolitania as the common waṭan (“the homeland”) that it was 
necessary to fight for. 
 
Conclusions 
Examining both the emergence of the ethnic issue in colonial Tripolitania 
during the “liberal” phase of Italian colonization, and the vicissitudes that the 
rebellion in Tripolitania underwent in the same period, allows us to grasp the 
complexity of the local social and political scenario. The Arab-Berber elites of the 
time proved to be able to orientate subsequent metamorphoses of their anti-colonial 
rhetoric by placing more emphasis on different elements within a wide spectrum of 
political logics at different times, depending on the contingent strategy they 
considered more convenient at any given juncture. Ethnic and religious identities 
were intermittently and functionally displayed within more complex regional and 
trans-imperial dynamics of both solidarity and competition. This was also true for 
the Italian authorities’ strategies of colonial control. Even in the post-war years, the 
latter continued to resort to ethnicizing strategies in order to fragment and then 
destroy that same Arab-Berber political elite, which was in fact the first to imagine 
Tripolitania in terms of an autonomous homeland, whose independence it was 
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This paper offers a critical approach to the colonial narrative produced on the history of 
Tripolitania’s social groups during the so-called “liberal period” of Italian colonization, and 
refutes the Arabs vs Berber dichotomy. The interactions among local group-actors, both in 
their reciprocal relations, and in those involving colonial authorities, will be analysed 
without emphasizing cultural differences, focusing instead on the political interests of these 
groups and/or their leaders. The paper will make clear how ethnic and religious identities 
were intermittently and functionally displayed within more complex regional and trans-
imperial networks of both of solidarity and competition. Accordingly, the paper will argue 
that Tripolitania ought to be considered a shared Arab and Berber milieu, in which 
representing in ethnic and religious terms the conflicting dynamics that characterized the 
social and political landscape was instrumental to both the colonisers’ efforts for 
controlling the colony, and the colonized’s strategies of political mobilisation. 
  











Sulayman al-Baruni in Italy (1919-1920): 




Introduction and biographical notes (c. 1870-1919) 
Sulayman al-Baruni played a particularly important role during the first decade 
of the colonial occupation of Libya: from the landing of the first Italian troops in 
Tripoli (on October 5th 1911) until the end of the First World War, he was one of 
the main animators of the resistance against the Italian occupation. 
The figure of al-Baruni is a keystone in the historiographical myth of Libyan 
nationalism established during Gaddafi’s rule: together with the other members of 
the quadrumvirate of the Tripolitanian Republic of 1919 (Ramadan al-Shitiwi al-
Suwayhili, ‘Abd al-Nabi Bilkhayr and Ahmad al-Murayid ), he was considered one 
of the “lions” of the anti-colonial resistance and one of the fathers of the republican 
ideal, to which the Libyan jamahiriyya made direct reference.1 
A brief overview of al-Baruni’s life provides the context in which to understand 
the documents analyzed below.2  Sulayman al-Baruni was born in the Adrar n 
Infusen (in arabic Jabal Nafusa or Jabal al-gharbi, the Western mountain range 
inhabited by Berber groups, called Gebel by the Italians) of Tripolitania, and 
specifically in Jadu, around 1872. 3  A member of one of the most prominent 
families of the religious intelligentsia of the region, and a follower of Ibadism, he 
began his studies under his father ‘Abdallah, and later traveled to Tunisia, Egypt 
                                                          
1 Shortly before the outbreak of the last Libyan revolution, his portrait was displayed in the hall of 
heroes of the Libyan nation inside the National museum (mathaf al-saraya al-hamra) in Tripoli, not 
far from the relics of ‘Umar al-Mukhtar (see fig. 1). 
2  On the life of al-Baruni, see in particular M. Custers, Sulaymān al-Bārūnī, an Ibāḍī pan-
Islamist, MA Thesis, University of Leiden, 1972, very precise until 1908. 
3 “Verso il 1872 [around 1872]” (F. Corò, Suleiman El Baruni, il sogno di un principato berbero e 
la battaglia di Asàaba [1913], Annali dell’Africa italiana, I, 3-4, 1938, 958). In the entry dedicated to 
him in the second edition of the Encyclopédie de l’Islam (Brill, Leiden-Paris, 1965, 1070-1071), L. 
Veccia Vaglieri omits the date of birth. The date of reference for his biographers varies between 1870 
and 1872. 
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(where from 1892 to 1895 he studied at al-Azhar in Cairo) and Algeria.4 A crucial 
part in his education was played by a stay in the Algerian M’zab, a group of 
Saharan oases about six hundred kilometers south of Algiers, a region inhabited ab 
antiquo by a majority of Berber population. 
Upon his return to Tripolitania, at the end of the nineteenth century, al-Baruni 
was accused by the Ottoman government of subversion and conspiracy. Following 
a number of trials, he was incarcerated for the first few years of the 20th century, 
then released but sentenced to confinement, part of which he spent in a guarded 
residence in Tripoli, and was then eventually amnestied. But in light of new 
suspicions on the part of the Ottomans, in 1906 he took refuge in Egypt, where he 
opened a printing house and published a newspaper whose distribution was 
forbidden in the Ottoman provinces.5 
A particularly important phase of his political career began in 1908 following 
the rise to power in Istanbul of the Ittihad-ve teraqqi gemiyyeti (Union and 
progress committee) which forced Sultan Abdülhamit II to reinstate the 
Constitution. Parliamentary elections were held that same year, and all the 
provinces of the empire sent delegates to Istanbul. Sulayman al-Baruni was elected 
to represent the Berber mountain district and, since the Constitution explicitly set 
out understanding Turkish as an essential requirement for sitting in parliament, he 
later claimed to have learned its rudiments in a very short time. 
During his parliamentary stint in Istanbul, al-Baruni came into contact with the 
members of the Union and progress committee: he became closely connected to the 
group, to the point of asserting in 1911 that he was its representative in Tripolitania. 
In those years he pleaded in parliament for the reinforcement of the military 
defenses of the Libyan provinces, threatened by an ever-looming Italian 
intervention. 
He was in Jadu at the time of the first landing of the Italian troops in Tripoli, 
and in close connection with the commanders of the Ottoman garrison, he 
organized the resistance of the Libyan population and the recruitment of volunteers, 
who were trained with the help of Turkish officers.6 On the 26th of October 1911, 
he was among the commanders of the volunteer forces at the battle of Sidi al-Hani, 
following the attack to the Italian lines at Shara al-shatt and the massacre of some 
detachments of Bersaglieri. During the period of the Italo-Turkish war, which 
officially ended with the peace treaty signed in Ouchy on October 18th 1912, Al-
Baruni tightened relations with one of the main representatives of the Union and 
                                                          
4 L. Veccia Vaglieri, La partecipazione di Suleimàn el-Barùni alla guerra di Libia, L’Oltremare, 
VIII, 2, February 1934, 70. The source of the biographical information reported by Veccia Vaglieri is 
al-Baruni himself, in an interview granted to a Damascus newspaper. 
5 Ibidem. 
6 See fig. 2. 
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Progress Committee who he had already met in Istanbul, Enver Bey, who was then 
commanding the Imperial troops against the Italians in Cyrenaica. 
Another important chapter of al-Baruni’s political activity began following the 
Peace Treaty of Ouchy. 
On the basis of the declaration issued as a preliminary act of the treaty, stating 
the recognition by the Ottoman sultan of the autonomy of the Libyan provinces,7 
on the 8th of November 1912 al-Baruni proclaimed the birth of a National 
government (hukuma wataniyya, or Republic of Yefren, from the name of its 
capital, located in the Berber mountains), whose territory included the Berber 
region and much of Western Tripolitania. The republic’s existence was rather brief, 
ending with the occupation of Yefren by Italian troops on the 27th of March of the 
following year.8 
Refusing to accept the occupation, al-Baruni crossed the border into Tunisia 
accompanied by part of the Berber population. He spent some time in the south of 
the country, and then in Tunis, from where he left for Europe and later for Istanbul, 
where the Ottoman government had appointed him a senator. In August of that year, 
the Teshkilat-ı mahsusa (Special Organization) was established in Istanbul, 
reporting directly to Enver, who then held the post of Minister of War. This body 
engaged in espionage and secret operations, and it is probable that al-Baruni was 
one of its members.9 
At the outbreak of World War I he was sent to Cyrenaica with the task of 
convincing Ahmad al-Sharif, the shaykh al-kabir of the Sanusi brotherhood, to 
direct action against Egypt: according to the plans of the Ottoman general staff, the 
Sanusis should have acted in support of the troops under the leadership of German 
senior officers who were preparing the attack against the Suez Canal. 
Arriving some time between the end of August and the beginning of September 
1914 in Amsa‘ad, the armed camp where the Sanusi forces were concentrated, al-
Baruni came into conflict with Ahmad al-Sharif, who had him imprisoned. After 
various vicissitudes, he returned to Istanbul in December of the following year. 
From there he was again sent to Libyan territory in the fall of 1916, but this time to 
                                                          
7 The sultan’s irade (decree) addressed to the populations of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, states: 
“In order to revive peace and prosperity and avail myself of my sovereign rights, I grant you full and 
complete autonomy. Your country will be governed by new laws and special provisions, which you 
will take part in drafting so that they may correspond to your needs and your customs” (from the text 
of the decree in T. W. Childs, Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War over Libya (1911-1912), Brill, 
Leiden, 1990, 248). 
8 A few days earlier (March 23rd 1913), in al-Asaba‘a, the Italian expeditionary force had defeated 
the army of the republic. 
9 I was unable to find probative documents in this regard. Yusuf Shatwan, a former deputy for the 
Benghazi district, was a member of the Teshkilat-i mahsusa, whose main exponents were later 
responsible for the Armenian genocide (R. Simon, Libya between Ottomanism and Nationalism, K. 
Schwarz Verlag, Berlin, 1987, 175). 
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the west, in Tripolitania, named governor by the sultan: the Sublime Porte had in 
fact decided to return the country to its control, invalidating the Treaty of Ouchy.10 
During the last two years of the war, the Turkish-Libyan forces of Tripolitania 
(whose leadership al-Baruni shared with Turkish and German officers) continued 
to fight actively against the Italian forces, who were barricaded in the coastal 
strongholds of Tripoli, al-Khums and Zuwara. The Turks and Libyans besieged and 
contained the Italians, but were unable to defeat them definitively. 
When in the last months of 1918 the fate of the war turned definitively in favor 
of the Entente powers, the Ottoman government had no choice but to declare itself 
defeated and sign an armistice.11 However, the main political leaders of Tripolitania, 
including al-Baruni, refused to lay down their weapons; instead, they assembled in 
al-Qusabat and declared the birth of the Jumhuriyya al-Tarabulusiyya (the 
Tripolitanian Republic) on the 16th of November 1918. As mentioned in the 
opening to this paper, together with Ramadan al-Shitiwi al-Suwayhili, ‘Abd al-
Nabi Bilkhayr and Ahmad al-Murayid, Sulayman al-Baruni was a member of the 
quadrumvirate appointed to lead the young republic. 
The republic had a very short life. In addition to the rivalry between some of its 
main leaders, the survival of the republic was undermined by the withdrawal of the 
Turkish-German forces, which until then had supported the war operations with 
their weapons’ supplies and logistical organization. The end of the war in Europe 
had allowed the Italian government to redirect some of the troops previously 
engaged on the northern borders of the peninsula to the Libyan territories: were the 
fighting to resume, this time between the Italian troops and the “rebels” of the 
Tripolitanian republic, the military outcome seemed decidedly favorable to Italy. 
In this situation, some members of the quadrumvirate opened negotiations with 
the Italian government, and after a few meetings in Khallet al-Zaytun in April 1919, 
an agreement was reached leading shortly afterward to the proclamation of the 
Statute (or Basic Law, al-qanun al-asasi) for Tripolitania on the 1st of June 1919. 
The statute provided a special citizenship status and wide civil rights to the 
native population, with large measures of administrative autonomy for the territory, 
recognizing Italian control in a form similar to a protectorate: among other things, 
provisions were made for the formation of an elective parliament, tasked mainly 
with financial management, and the creation of a modern school system within the 
framework of wider economic improvements as part of the planned introduction of 
measures to modernize the country.12 
                                                          
10 The sultan had granted him the title of governor of Tripolitania, Tunisia and Algeria (idem, 229). 
11 The armistice was signed in Mudros on the October 30th 1918. 
12 Legge fondamentale per la Tripolitania. Al-qanun al-asasi li’l-qathar al-tarabulusi (1 June 
1919, printed text in Italian and Arabic), in ASMAI, Libia 122/22, fasc. 196. The Fundamental law 
(which al-Baruni defines as “Dustur”, i.e. Constitution), granted Italian citizenship (of a special kind) 
to all those born in Tripolitania, stated the equality of all citizens before the law and listed the 
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With the proclamation of the Statute, the war ended: an amnesty was issued for 
all those who had fought against Italy, and the main exponents of the Tripolitanian 
Republic became members of a council of government (in fact, salaried members 
of the colonial government), while waiting for parliamentary elections to be called. 
Sulayman al-Baruni was also included in the amnesty, freeing him of the hefty 
bounty that the Italian government had previously put on his head. In June 1919 
moved to Tripoli and came into close contact with the colonial government, but did 
not accept to hold any office: he still considered himself an Ottoman senator (and 
citizen), regardless of the provisions concerning colonial citizenship that, according 
to the Statute, formally made him an Italian citizen. 
Most interpretations of al-Baruni’s thought and political activity have presented 
him as subscribing to the dream of establishing a Berber principality,13 as one of 
the protagonists of the pan-Islamist movement in North Africa14 and, finally, as 
mentioned above, as one of the “lions” of Tripolitanian proto-nationalism in his 
role as a leading member of the ephemeral Jumhuriyya al-Tarabulusiyya. 
Over the last few decades, there has been an increase in academic attention 
towards Sulayman al-Baruni, focusing mainly on the period of his 
participation in the anti-colonial struggle, up to the end of the First World 
War.15 One of the less studied periods of his life however is that between the 
proclamation of the Tripolitanian Statute and his definitive departure from the 
country in November 1921. The short biographies dedicated to him in more 
generalist volumes in fact make no mention of this period,16 or at most treat it 
                                                                                                                                                   
fundamental civil and political rights of the citizen (individual freedom, inviolability of the home, 
inviolability of property, right to compete for civil and military positions, active and passive electoral 
rights, right to petition the national parliament, etc.). Among other things, it guaranteed respect for 
religion, local principles and customs, and the freedom of the press and of assembly. According to the 
fundamental law, the government would have been constituted by a governor appointed by the king 
and by a local parliament elected by the population. 
13 F. Corò, op. cit., 957-969. 
14 An “Ibādī pan-Islamist”, as in Custers’ definition (1972, op. cit.) . 
15 Among other essays: M. H. Custers, op. cit., 1972; J. E. Peterson, Arab Nationalism and the 
Idealist Politician: the Career of Sulayman al-Baruni, in J. Piscatori - G. S. Harris (eds.), Law, 
Personalities and Politics of the Middle East. Essays in Honor of Majid Khadduri, Westview 
Press/The Middle East Institute, Washington, 1987, 124-139; A. Ghazal, An Ottoman Pasha and the 
End of Empire. Sulayman al-Baruni and the Networks of Islamic Reform, in J. L. Gelvin - N. Green 
(eds.), Global Muslims in the Age of Steam and Print, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 
2014, 40-58; S. Ben Sa‘īd al-Shaībānī al-Nafūsī, Sulaymān Bāshā al-Bārūnī: ‘Umma fī rajul’, J. al-
Fatah, Omān, 2013. See also A. Baldinetti, Italian colonial rule and Muslim elites in Libya: a 
relationship of antagonism and collaboration, in M. Hatina (ed.), “Ulama” in the Middle East, Brill, 
Leiden, 2009, 96-103. 
16 “Suleiman al-Baruni (1870-1940) [...] returned to Tripolitania on October 8th 1916 following a 
decree from the Ottoman sultan who had appointed him governor of Tripolitania. When Tripolitania 
was occupied again by Italian troops in 1922, al-Baruni left and was later denied re-entry” (A. Ghazal, 
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with some inaccuracy. 17  In turn, essays mainly based on Arab sources – 
generally secondary sources and hagiographic memoirs – totally disregard his 
contacts with the colonial government and instead insist on his role as an 
Ottoman agent even after 1919. An example of this is an essay by Amal 
Ghazal, which argues that: “al-Baruni’s activities shortly after 1919 indicate 
that he, like many others at the time, still had faith in an Ottoman future: he 
was assisting the new Turkish government in Ankara in its activities of 
interference in Tripolitania”.18 
The article by Laura Veccia Vaglieri in the second edition of the Encyclopædia 
of Islam, though extremely succinct, seems more precise: 
 
[After the proclamation of the Statute] two movements […] emerged, one aiming at 
an agreement with Italy which would have meant complete independence, and the 
other, represented especially by the Berbers, favorable to collaboration with Italy by 
the application of the Statute. Al-Bārūnī, who supported the latter course, gave his 
support to the Italian government, although his ultimate aims still remained the 
formation of a Berber amīrate in the western Djabal with access to the sea.19 
 
This paper aims at analyzing the position of Sulayman al-Baruni towards the 
new politics of colonial Italy after the First World War, by looking at a number of 
archival documents and interviews concerning his stays in Italy in 1919 and 1920. 
 
Sulayman al-Baruni in Rome 
In just a few lines, a paragraph of “Il Popolo d’Italia” of November 15th 1919 
announced the arrival in Rome of Sulayman al-Baruni: “The Tripolitanian notable 
El Baruni arrived today in Rome and took lodgings at the Hôtel Excelsior. 
Tomorrow he will hold a long conference with the President of the Council the 
Hon. Nitti”. 
                                                                                                                                                   
The Other Frontier of Arab Nationalism: Ibadis, Berbers, and the Arabist-Salafi, IJMES, 42/1, 
February 2010, 116). 
17 “A member of the ruling Council of Four of the 1919 Tripoli Republic, he later rallied to the 
Italian cause after the promulgation of the Legge Fondamentale and visited Rome to join in the 
celebration that surrounded its announcement […]. Baruni ended his career in Libya despised by 
other republican leaders who held him responsible for Italian gains. In November 1921, Suleiman 
Baruni left Libya for the last time” (R. Bruce St John, Historical Dictionary of Libya, Scarecrow, 
Lanham, 2006, 30, a.v. Baruni, Suleiman). Al-Baruni did not travel to Rome for the celebrations of 
the Tripolitanian statute, also because there were no such celebrations in Rome.  
18  A. Ghazal, An Ottoman Pasha…, 49. The chronology of this essay seems in some cases 
erroneous, stating that al-Baruni “in the spring of 1913 was appointed to the Chamber of Deputies” 
(he was actually elected senator in 1913) and that he left Tripolitania for the last time in 1923 (which 
he actually did in November 1921) (Ibidem, 48-49). 
19  L. Veccia Vaglieri, al-Bārūnī Sulaymān, in Encylopaedia of Islam (2nd ed.), I vol., Brill, 
Leiden-Paris, 1960, 1071. 
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Al-Baruni’s journey to Rome followed his request to the government of 
Tripolitania to travel to Constantinople in order to bring his family back home. His 
journey would take him through Italy, and Governor Vittorio Menzinger, 
considering it useful for the development of the country’s colonial enterprise, urged 
the ministry for the Colonies to receive him with all honors.20 
After his arrival in Rome, the newspaper “Il Messaggero” sent a reporter to 
interview him: the interview was published a few days later.21 Enrico Jacchia, the 
author, recalled in the first part of his article the role of the “powerful leader of the 
Abadites and the Berbers” in the resistance against the Italian occupation after 
1911, his long struggle against Italy and its political and military action on the side 
of the country’s enemy during the First World War. After a brief biographical 
sketch, the journalist pointed out that enmity between al-Baruni and Italy had in 
fact ceased, and that he had recently played an important role in the pacification of 
Tripolitania thanks to his influence “among the rebel tribes”, to the great advantage 
of the Italian cause. 
Al-Baruni’s conversion (or rather, the fact that someone “who was once a bitter 
enemy of Italy” had taken on a “friendly attitude”) – the article continued – 
occurred after the end of the war and the signing of the armistice which was 
followed by the exit of the Turks from the Libyan scene. The negotiations with the 
representatives of the Italian government and the subsequent granting of the Statute, 
promulgated by the governor of Tripolitania, General Vincenzo Garioni, had 
convinced him that the new course of Italian politics in Tripolitania would be 
profitable for the internal peace and development of his country, leading him to 
become its staunch defender.22 Jacchia cited previous statements by the interviewee: 
 
Two great forces – he  wrote – will defend the Dustur as parents! The first of these is 
H.M. the King who sought to grant the Nation its Statute, astonishing all of Europe 
and earning the sympathy of the whole Islamic world; the second is the Tripolitanian 
Nation, which had suffered the miseries of war, hunger, and a thousand other 
hardships to achieve the granting of the Statute. 
Anyone who dared to attack the Statute [...] will be rejected by the Nation and 
pushed on the right path by the King with his sword! Whoever plays with the Dustur 
will come to resemble the one who plays with a snake and ends up injected with his 
                                                          
20 ASMAI, Libia 150/15, 62: Menzinger to Rossi, 4.11.1919. After arriving in Naples, al-Baruni 
was accompanied on a visit to Rome and Turin. He was again in Italy from December 1921 until the 
end of January 1922, and between November and December 1922 (E. De Leone, La colonizzazione 
dell’Africa del Nord, Cedam, Padova, 1960, II vol., 492, 511).  
21 E. Jacchia, Gli effetti della Costituzione in Tripolitania (Nostra intervista con El Baruni), Il 
Messaggero, Rome, November 20th 1919, 3. 
22 “From the day of the signing of the Fundamental Law for Tripolitania, he showed himself to be 
a loyal cooperator and a valid advisor to the government of the colony, eager to do nothing other than 
work for the benefit of our country”, ibidem. 
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poison and killed. [...] Keep this in mind, then, you who have asked remain in the 
shadow of this Dustur! Take care not to transgress it, be you superior or subordinate 
officers. The Tripolitanian Dustur does not allow for any kind of reduction! The fall 
after the ascent is a shame! Slavery after liberty is ruin!23 
 
The interview was conducted through the translation of Major Romeo Borriello, 
“able connoisseur of the Arabic language” and “valiant artillery officer, twice 
decorated, instructed by the political office of Tripoli to accompany the Arab 
leader in his journey across Italy”.24 
A physical portrait of al-Baruni follows his short biography, and includes some 
religious notes: Major Borriello, faced with a small delay in al-Baruni’s arrival, 
states that he is carrying out the evening prayer and that, while not a fanatic, he 
follows the rites most strictly and does not allow for exceptions or concessions to 
Western skepticism. The protagonist of the interview then finally makes his ingress, 
“almost olive-colored, with very dark, sparkling and intelligent eyes, an aquiline 
nose, of medium height, with robust and well proportioned limbs. He wears 
European style clothes [...] and the traditional fez”.25 
After some a short exchange of pleasantries, al-Baruni replies to the first 
question (“Do you think that the benefits brought by the Statute have penetrated the 
soul of the Arab people?”): 
 
The whole country [...] knows now that this is a concession of great value, that 
might ensure the interests, prosperity, and happiness of the people now and in the 
future. And the people are indeed so convinced, that all hostilities against Italy have 
ceased [...]. Even in the most distant regions the spirit of the new law has now 
penetrated everywhere and complete pacification is about to take place across the 
land [...]. The Italian government has only to loyally follow the path outlined by the 
Constitution. Do this, and you will have all of our trust.26 
 
It is true, he admits, that not all the population is perfectly able to understand 
the matter, and ready to welcome the Statute: while the inhabitants of the coastal 
regions would immediately have been able to do so, it would have taken more time 
for the populations of the interior to reach the same level of maturity. The task of 
the Italian government should be to assist the Arab nation “as a teacher or elder 
brother”, advising and suggesting the path to follow: “The fundamental law [...] has 
in fact created in my country the feeling that Italy is its valid, able and prescient 
elder sister. Italy will thus have to help her weaker, unenlightened and less capable 
brother of Africa”. 
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First of all, in al-Baruni’s view it is necessary to create schools and spread 
education: 
 
One must think that in the past, the few Arabs in possession of a certain education 
had lived in Turkey and occupied the offices of government. The masses had only a 
religious education: very much in one sense, but too little in another. Now the new 
law sanctions the creation of schools and makes attendance compulsory: this is why 
we will grow future generations that will have received the right education and will 
be aware of all the duties and rights of the citizen. And this, of course, can only bind 
us even more to your country.27 
 
Al-Baruni also sees it as necessary to develop commercial and industrial 
relations: 
 
First of all, we need to develop our means of communication. Roads and railways 
are scarce in our country. Italy must build them [...]. Tripolitania needs everything. 
If the government will study the situation carefully and do its best to provide, we 
will be grateful, and not just in words. 
Before, mutual mistrust made it impossible for us to cooperate. Distrusting the 
Arabs, the Italians did not invest much capital in our country; and for our part - 
because, let it be said, we did not trust the Italians - we did not risk exposing money 
that we feared we would lose. As a result of this mutual distrust, commerce and 
industry in our country were far from prosperous. But today, with the new law, we 
finally have trust. Arabs and Italians have been drawn together and fertile ideas of 
prosperity and happiness for both will arise from an assiduous and loyal 
relationship.28 
 
The change in al-Baruni’s position, after his seven-year struggle against the 
Italian forces, seemed astounding to Italian observers: rather abruptly, within a few 
months, he had passed from the declaration of the independence of Tripolitania in 
November 1918 to the acceptance of the colonial situation in March of the 
following year. 
 
Tripolitania from the end of the First World War to the Statute 
In order to gain a better understanding of the reasons that had brought al-Baruni 
to support the Statute, it is worth looking in more depth at the events that took 
place during the last months of 1918 and first half of 1919 within the anti-Italian 
resistance, which had at one point seriously threatened colonial control of the 
country during the war. 
                                                          
27 Ibidem. 
28 Ibidem. 
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The armistice of Mudros and the capitulation of the government in Istanbul had 
not put an immediate end to the hostilities in Tripolitania.29 The war in Libya 
continued and the leaders of Tripolitania did not consider themselves defeated. The 
proclamation, in the middle of November, of the Jumhuriyya al-Tarabulusiyya30 
gave ample demonstration of this. Within the quadrumvirate in command of the 
newly formed republic, Sulayman al-Baruni represented the north-western region, 
from the Mediterranean to the Jabal Nafusa and the margins of the Sahara: there he 
had fought, in addition to the Italian army, also against the forces of other rival 
Tripolitanian leaders, strengthening his hegemony over the region with his 
victories. 
The Tripolitanian republican project had also been stimulated by Wilson’s 14-
point speech (issued on the 9th of January 1918)31, and by the declarations of the 
Italian military command in Tripoli in the second half of that year, stating that the 
future of the colony had to be decided with the agreement of its population.32 
Combining with the various autonomist movements that were flourishing in the 
country at the time, the republican ideal found its highest expression in the 
proclamation of the Jumhuriyya in al-Qusabat, on the 16th of November 1918, 
prompted by Sulayman al-Baruni and ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Azzam.33 
                                                          
29 A. Del Boca, Gli italiani in Libia. Tripoli bel suol d’amore 1860-1922, Mondadori, Milan, 
1993 (I ed. Laterza, Bari 1986), 358-359. The commanders of the Ottoman troops in Tripolitania were 
ordered to cease-fire at the end of November 1918 and the last Turkish soldiers left the country only 
during October of the following year (R. Simon, op. cit., 178-180). 
30 L. Anderson, The Tripoli Republic, 1918-1922, in E. G. H. Joffé - K. S. Maclachlan (eds.), 
Social and Economic Development of Libya, Menas Press, London, 1982, 43-66; S. Behre, Notabili 
libici e Funzionari italiani: l’amministrazione coloniale in Tripolitania (1912-1919), Rubbettino, 
Soveria Mannelli, 2015, 264-272.  
31 The Fifth point of this declaration proposed an absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial 
claims, based upon the principle that the interests of the populations had equal weight with the 
equitable claims of the colonial governments. The influence of the Wilson declaration must also be 
taken into account when looking at the debate within the colonial powers on the future of the colonies 
and on the rights of indigenous peoples at the end of the First World War (F. Cresti, What Future for 
Italian Libya? The Debate on Colonial Policy, 1918-1920, in S. Lorenzini (ed.), Ideas of Empire after 
the First World War. Identity and Citizenship in Colonial Empires. Comparativ, 6/XXVI, Leipziger 
Universitäts Verlag, 2016, 73-89). 
32 It is difficult to say whether the aspirations for autonomy were also influenced by the political 
debate in Italy, which, according to a new trend in the post-war period, was moving towards the 
recognition of wider rights for indigenous peoples and a less authoritarian form of government open 
to their participation (ibidem). According to Enrico De Leone (La colonizzazione…, 483) this question 
can be answered in the affirmative, since the al-Qusabat proclamation occurred after it became clear 
to the “rebels” that the Italian government would not resort to its army. 
33 ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Azzam, an Egyptian, was educated in England. During the First World War 
he travelled to Libya, becoming Ramadan al-Suwayhili’s advisor. He fled to Egypt with Idris al-
Sanusi in January 1923 and many years later, in 1945, was elected first general secretary of the Arab 
League. 
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With regard to the ideal of Tripolitanian independence, al-Baruni could without 
doubt claim to be one of its precursors. At the end of the first Italo-Turkish war, 
following the Ouchy treaty and the abandonment of its former Libyan provinces by 
the Ottoman empire, the proclamation of the aforementioned hukuma wataniyya in 
Yefren was announced to the “respectable Commander of the Italian army in the 
city of Tripoli” with these words: 
 
In order to implement the desire of the majority of the population of the coast of 
Tripoli, of all the inhabitants of the Jabal al-gharbi and of the south of Tripoli up to 
the Sahara and Fezzan, and in order also to apply the text of the firman of the Sultan, 
which clearly grants independence to the people of Tripolitania, it was decided to 
accept the independence. I was commissioned [...] to proclaim this independence 
and to organize a government based on the law of the Koran and on codes inspired 
by civilization and progress that will be modulated on those of civilized nations 
[...].34 
 
Most scholars seem to agree that the proclamation of the republic in al-Qusabat 
was not the result of a precise ideological determination, but rather of the 
impossibility of reaching an agreement on who was to preside over the new 
institution. The establishment of a quadrumvirate and of an advisory council 
(majlis al-shura) of 24 members representing the regions and tribes of the country, 
was, therefore, an expedient. The Quadrumvirate and advisory council gathered 
extremely different personalities who were often embroiled in bitter rivalries:35 it 
was hoped that the creation of a republic would serve to absorb the disintegrating 
pressures of the tribal potentates, who risked triggering a civil war, by finding a 
balance between the political groups of the country.36 According to the perspective 
of a number of colonial historians, the republic was seen as an “artificial Turkish-
German creation of war”,37 functional to future developments in peace negotiations, 
                                                          
34 ASMAI, Libia 150/14, 59: Governo della Tripolitania, Ufficio politico-militare, Notizie su 
Suleimán el-Barúni, n. 4, 39. As R. Simon has pointed out (op. cit., 385, n. 30), the sultan’s decree did 
not speak of independence (istiqlal) but of autonomy (muhtariyet). 
35 The list of the committee members is cited in S. Behre, Notabili libici e Funzionari italiani…, 
254. One of al-Baruni’s brothers, Yahia, was its vice-president, while the president was Muhammad 
Suf al-Mahmudi, one of his rivals. Muhammad Fikini, of the Rujban tribe, was also part of the 
committee, and another of al-Baruni’s bitter enemies. Two key positions within the committee were 
held by al-Suwayhili partisans: ‘Azzam was the secretary and Mukhtar Ku’bar (another rival of al-
Baruni) the treasurer. In the context of cross enmities which proved to be fatal for the republic, the 
strongest dispute was between al-Suwayhili and Bilkhayr, which led to the assassination of the former 
in 1920. 
36 S. Behre, Notabili libici e Funzionari italiani…, 269. 
37 G. Mondaini, Manuale di storia e Legislazione coloniale del Regno d’Italia, Rome, Attilio 
Sampaolesi Editore, 1927, 424. Following a similar interpretation, the republic “was viewed as a 
coalition of chiefs rather than a true state, [and] seems to have been a tactical measure aimed at 
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regardless of the political ideas that had flourished and spread in the country over 
the previous few years. 
The quadrumviri did in fact govern their respective territories autonomously, 
and the republic did not appear to be the result of a concordant political plan. 
Ramadan al-Suwayhili, who controlled Misrata and the surrounding region, while 
‘Azzam effectively served as the ideologue of his regime, appeared to be the 
strongest member of the quadrumvirate from an economic and military point of 
view: he had inherited the weapons and money of the Turkish-German base in 
Misrata, and aspired to rise to the rank of national leader, extending his hegemony 
over the whole of Tripolitania. However, he had to compete with several other 
equally ambitious actors, none of whom was willing to give way, as demonstrated 
by the subsequent clashes and infighting. 
The supporters of the republic were confident that they could enforce their 
desire for independence during the peace negotiations by reference to the 
Wilsonian principles of self-determination, 38  but the evolution of the post-war 
period proved unfavorable to their project. Demonstrations of military strength by 
Italy (after the end of the war in Europe, an entire assault division was transferred 
to Tripolitania, totalling a presence of more than 70.000 soldiers39), pacification 
measures and diplomatic negotiations allowed the colonial government to obtain 
the acceptance of Italian rule over Tripolitania within the framework of a 
Fundamental Law, or Statute. 
The negotiations involving all members of the quadrumvirate culminated on the 
21st of March 1919 at Qal’at al-Zaytun with the signing of the final text of the Statute 
on the basis of reciprocal concessions. The return of the Italian war prisoners and the 
progressive pacification of the territory would have been met on the Italian side with 
the establishment of new administrative rules: the local population would be awarded 
significant institutional participation in the government of the country, whilst the 
authoritarian and repressive colonial administration of the previous period would 
have been suppressed. The benefits of the Statute thus seemed rather reciprocal: the 
Italian government, faced with a very difficult internal situation due to the economic 
and social consequences of the war, avoided the need to undergo a new military 
                                                                                                                                                   
gaining concessions from the Italians” (R. Coury, “Arabian Ethnicity” and Arab Nationalism: the case 
of Abd al-Rahman Azzam, Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt, 25, 1988, 63).  
38  Even the shaykh al-kabir of the Sanusiyya, Ahmad al-Sharif al-Sanusi, thought that the 
Wilsonian doctrine could offer support for obtaining the autonomy of Cyrenaica during the peace 
conference (ASMAI, Libia 140/3, 19: Rodd to Agnesa, 1.11.1918). See also E. A. V. De Candole, 
The Life and Times of King Idris of Libya, Mohamed Ben Ghalbon, Manchester, 1990, 35-36; F. 
Cresti, Una questione di famiglia: la ṭarīqah al-Sanūsiyyah tra Aḥmad al-Šarīf e Muḥammad Idrīs 
(Libia, 1914-1918), Oriente Moderno, 98, 2018, 2; L. Anderson, The State and Social Transformation 
in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986, 206. 
39 O. Gabelli, La Tripolitania dalla fine della guerra mondiale all’avvento del fascismo, 2 voll., 
Airoldi, 1939, I vol., 202; E. De Leone, La colonizzazione…, 482.  
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operation in the colonies, while many of the exponents of the republic obtained 
substantial appanages, maintaining power and large room for acting on their own 
initiative. As for the Tripolitanian leaders, as mentioned already, the decision to 
pursue a peaceful settlement was influenced also by the consideration that, after the 
defeat of the Ottoman Empire and its allies, any further war effort on their own part 
was undermined by the lack of arms supplies.40 
 
Al-Baruni, the Statute, and the colonial Government: an ambiguous relation  
Al-Baruni’s prominence during the negotiations was viewed with unease by 
many Italian officials, mainly due to the leadership role he had assumed during the 
war.41 In fact, though other members of the Jumhuriyya had fought on the enemy 
side, al-Baruni had been in charge of the governorship of the country, following 
appointment by the sultan in 1916. In addition, his position as a member of the 
Ottoman senate could only raise suspicions. But was he in fact still an Ottoman 
senator after the end of the war? According to some, he was no longer entitled to 
bear this position, having disobeyed the sultan’s order to return to Istanbul after the 
armistice.42 However, the Ottoman government had not taken any official measure 
in this regard and al-Baruni himself, in his correspondence with the Italian 
government authorities, continued to sign himself: “Sleman El Baruni, former 
governor of Tripolitania, Senator of the Ottoman Empire”.43  
                                                          
40 It is useful, from an historiographical point of view, to compare the new Italian policy leading 
to the proclamation of the Libyan Statutes with the changes in the indigenous politics of the imperial 
powers at the same time, in particular with the French policy towards the Algerian colony (F. Cresti, 
What Future for Italian Libya?..., 73-75, 78; On colonial citizenship, see V. F. Renucci, L’accession 
des indigènes à la citoyenneté entre assimilation et réformisme : les mesures légales prises par l’Italie 
et la France en 1919, in M. Ganzin (dir.), Sujet et citoyen. Actes du colloque de Lyon (Septembre 
2003), PUAM , Aix-en-Provence, 2004, 393‐ 420. 
41 It is worth remembering that during the war a 10,000 lire price was set on al-Baruni’s head (an 
amount lower, truth be said, than the 20,000 promised for that of Ramadan al-Suwayhili). Anywhere, 
all previous punitive measures against the leaders of the “rebellion” were revoked by Governor 
Garioni in the first months of 1919 (ASMAI, Africa III, 137, 61a/bis). 
42  This was the opinion held by Osman Fuad, great-grandson of Sultan Murad V and his 
representative in Tripolitania since May 1918, questioned in this regard by Governor Garioni 
(ASMAI, Libia 159/14, 3: Garioni to Ministry of Colonies, 19.4.1919). This insubordination could be 
explained by the misunderstandings and rivalries that in the last years of war had opposed al-Baruni 
to the Ottoman military hierarchies: in particular, to Nuri Pasha, who since the beginning of 1917, 
despite al-Baruni’s role as governor, became the real centre of power through the control of war 
supplies and the prestige that derived from his family membership (R. Simon, Libya between 
Ottomanism.., 231. Nuri was the brother of Enver, the minister of war and the sultan’s son-in-law). 
After the arrival of Osman Fuad, al-Baruni was ceased to be governor. 
43 ASMAI, Libia 150/15, 62: Baruni to the Government of Tripolitania, 10.2.1921. Al-Baruni’s 
right to “the title and emoluments of a senator” were only revoked in 1922 by the government of 
Ankara (E. De Leone, La colonizzazione…, 511). 
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This led to the emergence of a rather ambiguous situation,44 as was pointed out 
by the Ministry for the Colonies, whose representatives saw it as “odd that an 
Italian subject”, who would become an “Italian citizen as a result of the Statute”, 
could at the same time maintain his position as a senator of the government of 
Constantinople.45 
Al-Baruni’s position seemed unclear also to many of the officials who were 
required to deal with him. For example, following the Italian commissioner in 
Constantinople’s request for clarification on this matter, the ministry for the 
Colonies stated elliptically that al-Baruni, “one of the notables who took part in the 
negotiations with the […] Government of Tripolitania, for the pacification of the 
colony”, had taken up residence in Tripoli following the issuing of the Statute, but 
held in fact no official office, despite being “in continuous relations with the local 
government”.46 
It is difficult to pinpoint the real reasons that persuaded al-Baruni to accept the 
proposals of the Italian government: it seems evident, however, that his adherence to 
the Statute was not unconditional, despite his enthusiastic statements in the Roman 
interview. This is demonstrated by the repeated references to his “Nation” (be it 
Tripolitanian or Arab), which underline a clear dualism between this Nation and the 
Italian one. No trace or reference to the Tripolitanian or Arab Nation was to be found 
in the text of the Statute, but it seems clear that in al-Baruni’s mind the two elements 
remained irreducible and irreducibly separate: with time and fruitful collaboration 
(the use of Italian capital and technology to bolster the development and economic 
progress of the country in exchange for an internationally recognized dominant role 
for Italy) a rapprochement, a harmony of purpose between the two Nations could be 
achieved – stated al-Baruni – but this would by no means entail the dissolution of the 
first (the Arab, or Tripolitanian nation) into the second. Conversely, from the point of 
view of the Italian government, the Statute was the instrument for the elimination of 
                                                          
44 This ambiguity did not seem to worry Governor Menzinger, while it was reason for perplexity 
for the ministry for the Colonies, whose officials stressed that “it is necessary that [Sulayman al-
Baruni] takes a precise and well defined attitude towards Italy [...]. He cannot remain in the current 
state of hybridism and uncertainty [...]. While we appreciate the delicacy of his position, linked to a 
moral and political past that cannot be suddenly expunged, he must nevertheless provide us with 
sufficient elements of guarantee that will allow us to evaluate exactly his intentions and his thought” 
(ASMAI, Libia 150/15, 62: Rossi to Menzinger, 3.11.1919).  
45 E. De Leone, op. cit., 491. 
46  ASMAI, Libia 159/14, 3: Theodoli to the Italian High Commissioner in Constantinople, 
8.10.1919. Al-Baruni was not among the eight Tripolitanian leaders who, after the proclamation of 
the Statute, became part of the interim Governing Council, which included the main leaders of the 
Jumhuriyya with Ramadan al-Suwayhili at its head: according to De Leone, this showed the weakness 
of al-Baruni and his lack of credit among the leaders of Tripolitania, so that, knowing that he could no 
longer rely on “the rebel chiefs with whom it was not easy for an Ibadi to find credit”, he sought 
support and help from the colonial government (E. De Leone, op. cit., 490, 492).  
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this dualism: through the granting of Italian citizenship, extended to all those who 
were “born in Tripolitania on the date of [...] the decree [establishing the Statute]”,47 
any other kind of national belonging was excluded. 
In the interview cited above, this contradiction is not perceived by the 
interviewer, while al-Baruni affirms all along the existence of the Tripolitanian 
Nation as the basis of the Republican project: he therefore denies that either the 
Republic or the Nation have been erased by the recognition of the sovereignty of 
the king of Italy and of external domination, which undoubtedly retained its 
colonial character, whatever its constitutional guarantees. 
If this interpretation of al-Baruni’s thought is correct, the subsequent statement 
about the suffering endured by the Tripolitanian Nation in order to achieve the 
Statute appears much clearer. Such an affirmation apparently lacks any historical 
grounds (whatever the aims of its different leaders, it is impossible to argue that 
during the previous seven years the Libyan resistance had fought for a Statute); but 
it makes sense if taken to mean that the Statute is a victory for the Tripolitanian 
Nation, the result of its resistance and struggle, and not a gift from the Italian 
government. 
A statement along such lines was far from the reality perceived by the Italians: 
the liberal political forces that decided to pursue peace by means of the Statute 
(against the continuation of war invoked in particular by the Nationalist party) 
considered it to be a “chivalrous concession of peace” on the part of Italy, as the 
country refused to use the force of its “powerful army” in Libya and instead elected 
to follow the path set out by by the “democratic ideals [... which] had been among 
the most suggestive and effective coefficients of heroic deeds [of First World 
War]”.48 This very concept was reiterated by the Minister for the Colonies: 
 
Italy, which emerged larger and more powerful from its victorious war effort, could 
have used the force of her Army against the rebels with inevitable success, but 
preferred to follow the path of clemency and loyalty indicated by her traditions.49 
 
An interview published by the Damascus newspaper “Alif-Ba’” more than a 
decade later, where al-Baruni recalls his participation in the events in Tripolitania, 
                                                          
47 Article 1 of the Statute of Tripolitania. 
48 G. Mondaini, Manuale di storia e legislazione, I vol., 425. In another paragraph Gennaro 
Mondaini affirms that “the chivalrous act of offering peace, while having at its disposal a powerful 
army that would surely have been victorious, was not a procedure that could be understood by the 
Arabs in its true essence” (ibidem). Mondaini was among those who had helped define the new 
colonial policy as a member of the Post-war Commission set up by the Italian government in 1918. 
49 Colosimo [Minister of Colonies] to Garioni, 1.6.1919: this passage pertains to the message 
accompanying the decree of the Tripolitanian Statute and was published by Il Messaggero on the 
same date (G. De Meo, I risultati della nuova politica in Libia. Corrispondenza da Tripoli, Il 
Messaggero, 1.6.1919, 3). 
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shows how his own interpretation of the origins of the Statute differed radically 
from such a vision. He stated: 
 
Since the American Government insisted on resolving the Oriental issue according 
to the points of Wilson’s message, the Italians were forced to open peace talks with 
the Republic, negotiations that lasted for a long time and underwent several 
interruptions, and during which they tried, in vain, to advance with their strength. 
Finally, the Italian Government and the National Republic reached the agreement 
that granted the country […] internal independence on the basis of a “Fundamental 
Statute”.50 
 
In fact, even though none of the forty articles of the Statute cited “internal 
independence”, it is not impossible that over the course of the negotiations between 
Garioni and the Tripolitanian leaders, the matter was left indeterminate, 
intentionally or not, as was already noted at the time by colonial historiography: 
 
In the norms of the Statute there was nothing formally contrary to our sovereignty 
[...] but no clear answer was given to certain questions: [...] was the Statute freely 
granted by the dominant power, or was it won from it?51 
 
Based on the official Italian documentation, the answer could only have been 
that the reading of the post-war Libyan events presented by al-Baruni in his 
interview on Alif-Ba’ was tendentious and did not correspond to reality,52 or that on 
another occasion al-Baruni had (instrumentally?) confused administrative 
autonomy and independence.53 Ruling out other hypotheses, it seems clear that al-
Baruni’s idiosyncratic adherence to the Statute was based on quite a few subtleties, 
or maybe on some fundamental misunderstandings, which were probably shared by 
the Tripolitanian nationalists and ignored by the Italian government:54 to sum up, 
two very different visions of the political and military situation opposed one 
                                                          
50 L. Veccia Vaglieri, La partecipazione…, 73. 
51 O. Gabelli, op. cit., 241-242.  
52 Veccia Vaglieri’s reaction is very meaningful in this sense: following Baruni’s statement that 
“[the Italians] tried, but in vain, to advance with their forces”, she inserts the following note: “Here el-
Barùni is wrong: the forces for a strong offensive were already gathered in Tripolitania, but nothing 
was done: the government preferred the negotiations” (op. cit., n. 16, 73).  
53 See above, note 34.  
54 These contradictions also reflected in subsequent historiography, as is clear from this erroneous 
statement by Majid Khadduri: “Italy agreed to recognize this regime [i.e. the Tripolitanian Republic] 
and a statute was issued […]” (M. Khadduri, Modern Libya. A study on political development, Johns 
Hopkins, Baltimore, 1963, 21). In fact, during the negotiations some of the members of the 
Jumhuriyya repeatedly asked for its recognition, but the request was not accepted by the Italian 
counterpart: this would have denied any sense to the Statute, since the recognition of the Jumhuriyya 
would have meant the independence of Tripolitania. 
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another during the negotiations, so that the two sides set themselves very different 
objectives in the application of the resulting Statute. 
 
Between Rome, Constantinople, and Naples: al-Baruni’s love for Italy 
After this long circumlocution, we must return to our main subject: al-Baruni’s 
travels and interviews in Italy. 
At the current stage of my research, I have not yet been able to pinpoint exactly 
what were his contacts with the institutions and with the Roman political forces: 
however, he certainly had at least one meeting with the Minister for the Colonies 
Luigi Rossi,55 and perhaps also further contacts with other politicians. 
The presence in Rome of the Tripolitanian notable did not draw much attention in 
the press. Apart from the brief announcement reported by Il Popolo d’Italia, neither 
the Corriere della Sera nor Avanti!, two of the most important Italian newspapers of 
the time, made any mention of it: this is understandable given the political 
atmosphere of those days in the country, with the looming general elections to be 
held on the 16th of November, the day after al-Baruni’s arrival in Rome. 
The elections were to take place at a time of increasing polarization within the 
country in the wake of the crises provoked by the world conflict and the evolution 
of international relations, while in the background fascism began its progressive 
rise. 
On the international scene, post-war peace talks were still underway: Austria 
had signed the peace treaty in Saint-Germain just over a month earlier (on the 11th 
of September), but the fate of the Ottoman empire had not yet been determined. 
The already troubled domestic Italian politics of the second half of 1919 was 
shaken further by strikes protesting the high cost-of-living, while the political scene 
was dominated by the issue of Fiume, which had been occupied by volunteers 
under the command of Gabriele D’Annunzio on the 12th of September, placing 
Francesco Saverio Nitti’s ministry in a delicate predicament.56 The strengthening of 
the fascist movement was demonstrated in October in Florence with the 
movement’s first mass demonstration after the foundation of the Fasci di 
combattimento which had taken place on the 23rd of March of the same year in 
Milan. 
                                                          
55 Luigi Rossi (1867-1941) was minister for the Colonies during the first Nitti government from 
the 23rd of June 1919 to the 14th of March 1920, and again from the 15th of June 1920 to the 4th of July 
1921 during the fifth Giolitti government. Al-Baruni’s meeting with Rossi is documented by the 
photograph published in this article (ASMAI, Libia 150/15, 61) which bears the following inscription 
on the back: “Photograph taken at the Ministry on the occasion of El Baruni’s visit to Rome in 
November 1920”. 
56 Formed in June after the resignation of the Vittorio Emanuele Orlando government, due to the 
bankruptcy that followed the outcome of the Paris peace conference. 
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The atmosphere of serious political and social instability that hung over Italy in 
those months, and certainly must have made an impression also on the 
Tripolitanian visitor, did nonetheless not seem to impinge on his optimistic vision 
of the future: in another interview during his second stay in Italy, a few months 
later,57 al-Baruni reiterated his full support for the Statute and the political stand 
adopted by the Ministry for the Colonies and colonial government in Tripoli, as 
well as his profound friendship with Italy, which he went so far as to call love.58 
As in the previous interview, Major Borriello acted as interpreter, but this 
interview took place in Naples, where al-Baruni arrived from Istanbul (and from 
where “the women of his harem” – the journalist wrote – were about to leave for 
Tripoli)59, and where he visited the Oriental Institute. 
The interview once more opens with the usual pleasantries and with a statement 
by al-Baruni (“I love Italy very much, but I like no city as much as Naples”) which 
surprised the interviewer: 
 
I cannot tell why these words make me think of the Libyan war and of the part 
played in it by Suleiman El-Baruni, who was our greatest enemy in those days. My 
sudden reminiscence is too antithetical to the words [… of] the Libyan pasha [...]. 
Perhaps El-Baruni has guessed my thought. He stares at me with eyes that flash with 
cunning. 
 
The interviewee continues: 
 
Yes, we are good and sincere friends now. I come from Constantinople, where I 
have seen how the French and English troops behave towards our poor Muslim 
brothers, and I cannot fail to compare this to the behavior of the Italians in Libya, in 
Turkey, everywhere. We were mistaken or, better, we were deceived at the time of 
the Libyan war. Italy is a great country of civilization. We now have no grudge 
towards Italy, but only gratitude. The Constitution that was spontaneously and 
liberally given to Tripolitania, persuaded even the last of the skeptics. With Italy, not 
under Italy, we will go forward, towards civilization, in a continuous trajectory of 
progress that will bring both countries immense economic and moral benefits. You 
cannot begin to imagine what a deep sense of gratitude lies in our hearts for what 
Italy did in favor of Turkey at the Paris conference. We Muslims will never forget 
it... You must say this, write it in your newspaper, repeat it to everyone! It is a 
                                                          
57  R. D’Elia, Conversando con Suleïman-El-Baruni, Il Mezzogiorno, 25-26 March 1920. A 
clipping of the interview, which took place at the Hôtel de Londres, in ASMAI, Libia 150/15, 60.  
58 The use of the word “love” in political discourse is curious, and can perhaps be explained in 
terms of marking a reversal of the feelings of hatred in the post-war psychological situation: similarly, 
Minister Colosimo in an interview stated that “our post-war program is based on a policy of love and 
not of struggle” (O. Gabelli, La Tripolitania…, 181). 
59 The harem was composed of his wife, mother-in-law, and three of his sons (E. De Leone, op. 
cit., 490). 
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profound, true, indestructible gratitude: the kind of gratitude that arises in the soul 
when it feels mortally offended by someone and sees that a friendly person comes to 
our aid... 
 
The statement about the deception during the war is disconcerting: if interpreted 
literally, it would entail the repudiation of all anti-colonial resistance from 1911 to 
1918, of the positions held by al-Baruni during that period, and of his 
responsibilities as a high representative of the Ottoman government. But it would 
certainly be mistaken to read literally a sentence pronounced during an interview 
that, appearing in this form following translation from the Arabic, may not 
correspond to the words that were actually pronounced:60 however, it would not be 
surprising if the statement had been a simulation or dissimulation to reach 
consensus, as a form of captatio benevolentiae, given al-Baruni’s experience as a 
politician, accustomed to the use of the press as a means of propaganda. 
The Neapolitan interview accentuates al-Baruni’s conciliating and 
commendatory tones regarding the Statute, no longer presented as a victory of the 
Tripolitanian Nation, but as a “constitution spontaneously and liberally given to 
Tripolitania” by Italy. No line of the interview presents al-Baruni as a member of 
the Arab or Tripolitanian Nation, but only as a Muslim (“We, Muslims”…). The 
Neapolitan interview thus arguably expresses a less nationalist and a more 
panislamist feeling, dwelling largely on the new developments in the Ottoman 
capital, where al-Baruni soon intends to return and where, he states: 
 
a great crime is being committed. The powers of the Entente have occupied 
Stambul: this is a new and frightening calamity that is about to beset the world. Until 
the present day, three hundred million Muslims had lived in peace and did not fret 
excessively if they saw some of their land be occupied by foreigners, because they 
were confident in the knowledge that they had a Caliph, who was their father living 
in Stambul, the protector of their religion, who could welcome all the exiles flowing 
from every corner of Islam to Constantinople to enjoy the tenderness of this good 
father and find respite thanks to the piety of the Government and the generosity of 
their Muslim brothers. But now the armed forces of the Entente have occupied that 
land of exile and hope, they have taken possession of the holy capital of Islam, they 
have reduced in captivity the Caliph, who is the shadow of God on earth. 
 
This event will have: 
 
great and disastrous repercussions. It seems that Europe underestimates the threat of 
a general Islamic movement, or, to be more exact, Europe considers it unlikely. And 
yet... a great inferno can often originate in just a small flame or a single spark; a 
                                                          
60 At any rate, the interviewer stressed that al-Baruni “speaks slowly as if dictating, allowing the 
interpreter to translate his speech nearly word for word”. 
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flood may sometimes arise from the breaking of a tiny dam; the ruin of a state is 
sometimes a revolt that at first does not seem to be too serious!61 
 
The interviewer then points out that the victorious powers plan to respect the 
status as Caliph of the head of the Ottoman lineage. Al-Baruni replies bitterly that 
this way the caliphate is “reduced to a personal sinecure by gracious concession of 
the Entente”. He then attempts to retort to the following observation (“But you, the 
Arabs, have you not always maintained that the Caliph must be Arab, just as the 
Prophet was an Arab?”) in a rather convoluted way: 
 
These are internal matters [...]. Here, the matter at hand is the Caliphate, rather than 
the Caliph. 
Do you remember the times of Abdul Hamid?... All of Arabia was in turmoil; 
Yemen was in perpetual war with the Sultan’s troops [...]. Then we could fight each 
other because we knew that the bases of the Caliphate, which are the bases of all 
Muslim life, still held fast. We knew that, for one reason or another, no power in 
Europe thought to deny us our religious rights, which are basically the same as our 
political rights. Now things have changed. Europe is mistaken if it imagines that 
Muslims can tolerate a Caliph appointed with the intervention, however indirect, of 
a Christian state, or subject to the sovereignty of any European state, or resident in a 
territory occupied by a foreign power, or finally placed in a position with no means 
of defense. He would be a little sultan, like any tribal emir: he would no longer be 
the Caliph of all of Islam! [...] The matter of the Caliphate and its seat cannot be 
resolved in any way other than by an undertaking by the whole Muslim world, 
which, if it sees its capital destroyed, must rebuild it in a safer place. But this 
reconstruction will require painful tribulations and terrible wars, with great 
sufferings for Europe, and especially for those who will be recognized by the 
Mohammedans as those truly responsible for the destruction of the haven of their 
Caliphate. [...] France and England: the latter especially. Superb and contemptuous, 
England repeats the refrain: Rule Britannia... but forgets that we are three hundred 
million, scattered throughout the world, from India to Morocco, and we are all 
followers of the Koran, which certainly requires us to treat with benevolence and 
justice those who do not fight our religion and do not drive us away from our homes, 
but also forbids us from sympathizing with those who fight our faith, banish us from 
our homes, and help our enemies. 
 
                                                          
61 The same passage, almost verbatim, is found in a memorandum in French sent previously by al-
Baruni to the Hauts Commissaires de l’Entente in Istanbul: “Il semble que l’Europe n’attache pas 
d’importance à un mouvement musulman général, si cela a lieu, ou bien qu’elle le juge improbable, 
malgré qu’elle sait que l’origine d’un incendie est une simple étincelle, que la source d’une 
inondation est dans les petites goutte de pluie les plus fines et que la cause de l’effondrement des 
États disparus est une révolution n’ayant aucun caractère grave au début” (Première [sic] mémoire 
présenté par Soileiman el Barouni… cit. infra, 4). 
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At this point, al-Baruni resumes his expressions of gratitude and friendship on 
the part of the Muslim world towards Italy: 
 
That’s why we feel gratitude for Italy. Italy showed sympathy for Islam, supported 
our points of view at the Paris conferences; she made the allies understand the 
importance of dealing with our interests... We will always remember this. 
- What will you say of Italy, returning to Tripoli? 
- The peace made with Italy is sincere. I will only work to strengthen the feelings of 
sympathy that now bind us forever. With these sentiments, I will return to my 
country. I will be grateful if, through your newspaper, you shall make this known to 
your country, for which, I am sure, a great and brilliant future lies ahead. 
 
Italy and Islam, or the Italian friendly attitude towards Islam and the future 
of Tripolitania according to al-Baruni 
In this second interview, as we can see, al-Baruni again states how he is 
confident in a future of prosperity and peace for his country thanks to the 
agreement with the Italian government, but this time he focuses mainly on the 
events surrounding the international post-war negotiations and the situation in the 
Orient. 
In order to make best sense of his speech, it is worth remembering that the 
French General Franchet d’Esperey had entered Istanbul after the armistice, on the 
8th of February 1919. The French occupied part of Syria and Cilicia and the 
province of Adana, while British troops occupied the Dardanelles and other 
strategic points along the Black Sea coast; Italian detachments had landed in 
Antalya on the 29th of April 1919. The occupation of Istanbul to which al-Baruni 
referred to was not, however, that of February 1919, which emphatically publicised 
by the European press for its eminently symbolic character,62 but the actual military 
occupation of the whole city decreed by the Supreme Allied Council on March 1st 
1920: on the 16th of that same month, British troops had taken control of all the 
city’s districts, arresting and deporting the main exponents of the Turkish national 
movement who had begun to organize their opposition against the dismemberment 
of the empire. 
At the outset of 1919, while al-Baruni was in Istanbul, alarming news arrived 
from Paris regarding the future of the capital of the Ottoman Empire and the 
caliphate: in early January rumors spread of an agreement among the Entente 
powers according to which Constantinople and the Straits would remain under 
military occupation and the seat of the Ottoman government would be transferred 
                                                          
62 Franchet d’Esperey had entered Istanbul on a white horse (offered by the Greek community of 
the city) repeating the gesture of Sultan Mehmet II, who had entered the ancient capital of Eastern 
Christianity in 1453 inaugurating the era of the Muslim domination (B. Lewis, The Emergence of 
Modern Turkey, Oxford University Press, London, 1968, 211). 
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to somewhere in Anatolia’s interior, while the sultan would continue to reside in 
his ancient capital, keeping the Caliphate under the control of the Entente. 
Following these rumors, al-Baruni sent reminders and petitions to the governments 
of the Entente countries.63 In these letters, an abundance of Koranic quotations and 
ahadits announced the revolt of all Muslims against the measures that threatened 
the survival of a sovereign and independent caliphate and the security of its 
headquarters (which among other things required the control of the Straits by its 
armed forces). In fact, news of the Entente’s intentions had provoked widespread 
protests across many Muslim countries, which were taken by al-Baruni as clear 
evidence of the awakening of a pan-Islamist movement. 
In a letter sent to the editor of the Istanbul newspaper Ikdam which was then 
published, al-Baruni expressed his opinion on the political events that had taken 
place during the period of his stay in the Ottoman capital before returning to Italy. 
Faced with the rapidly spiralling disagreements between on the one hand the 
sultan-caliph and his government (who were practically being held prisoner in 
Istanbul by the occupying powers) and on the other the nascent Turkish national 
movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (which had established the 
headquarters of its representative committee in Ankara on the 27th of December 
1919), al-Baruni presented a resolute defense of the caliphate as the common 
heritage of all Muslims, opposing the claim that the caliphate and Istanbul were 
issues that strictly regarded the Turkish nation: 
 
The Muslims of the world have entrusted the Caliphate and the relics of their Prophet 
to the Ottoman imperial family, from the day when the Sultan Selim assumed the 
Caliphate until the present: how is it now possible for our dear Turkish brothers to 
decide by themselves on the question of the caliphate and its seat with their adversaries, 
the powers of the Entente, in a way that does not satisfy [all] Muslims [...]? How can 
the illustrious Turkish ulamas approve of them doing this so willfully? And how could 
Mohammed Uahid ed-Din (the current Sultan of Turkey), the only custodian of this 
precious treasure (the Islamic Caliphate), approve of this?64 
 
It is clear that al-Baruni did not share in the aims and intentions of the Turkish 
nationalists (who a few years later would establish the Republic of Turkey and 
                                                          
63  “Première [sic] mémoire présenté par Soleiman el Barouni aux Hauts Commissaires de 
l’Entente à Constantinople au sujet de la question du Khalifat Islamique (6 March 1920); Memoriale 
presentato alla Commissione Interalleata di Costantinopoli riguardo agli Stretti” (undated, signed: 
“Suleiman el Baruni della Tripolitania Senatore ottomano”); Lettre adressée aux Représentants des 
Nations libres dans les Parlements d’Italie, de France, d’Angleterre et des Etats-Unis d’Amérique 
(undated). These documents are gathered in a booklet (Constantinople, les musulmans et l'Europe: 
Notes par Soleiman el Barouni) published in Naples in 1920. 
64 Lettera inviata al Direttore del giornale turco Ikdam e pubblicata dal giornale stesso, 29 gennaio 
1920, in Constantinople, Les musulmans et l’Europe…, 13. 
Federico Cresti 89 
abolish the caliphate): instead, he opposed the Turkish-nationalist perspective in 
light of his own panislamist views, criticizing the “Turkish brothers, who 
demonstrate how they do not appreciate the value of the strength of Islam [...] and 
defend Constantinople only in the name of Turkey with the aim of saving the 
graves of their  ancestors and the monuments of the city”.65  
And he continues: from the time of Abu Ayyub al-Ansari, the companion of the 
Prophet, and of the other saints martyred under the city walls, from the era of 
Sultan Mehmet who conquered the city and his successors who brought to it the 
relics of the Prophet, “Constantinople is neither Turkish, nor Arab, nor Indian, but 
it is only the Islamic capital of the Caliphate of all Muslims”.66 
Read in this context, al-Baruni’s appreciation of the “Italian behavior” during 
the peace negotiations expressed in the Neapolitan interview, derives from the 
position the Italians adopted on the issue of the fate of Constantinople and of the 
future of the Ottoman Empire, which contrast with that of Great Britain and France. 
During the peace conference, Italian Prime Minister Nitti declared in favor of 
Turkey’s sovereignty over Constantinople:67 he reiterated this position during the 
London conference, which began on the 12th of February 1920, where he expressed 
many doubts regarding the desirability of entrusting Thrace and an important part 
of the Anatolian coastal territories to Greece. 
 
Conclusion: from opposition to collaboration to failure. What happened to the 
“powerful Chief of the Berbers”?  
There is something missing from al-Baruni’s interviews and which deserves 
instead to be mentioned: with the exception of one line at the start of the first 
interview which describes al-Baruni as the “powerful chief of the Berbers”, there is 
no other reference to the Berber minority or the issue of the autonomy of the 
Berber region in Tripolitania, on which, on the contrary, much ink had been spilled 
during the early years of colonial occupation.68 
For their part, the Italians had shown great interest in the Berbers of the Adrar n 
Infusen since the beginning of the colonial occupation: in addition to the obvious 
political implications of earning the Berbers’ sympathy in terms of the control over 
the country, this interest also led to an important cultural outcome with the 
                                                          
65 Ibidem. 
66 Idem, 14. 
67  The Italian position on the future of the Ottoman Empire supported “the maintenance of 
Ottoman sovereignty in all predominantly Turkish regions [...]. Turkish sovereignty will be preserved 
on Constantinople and on its territory. Constantinople will be the capital” (quoted in L. Micheletta, 
Italia e Gran Bretagna nel primo dopoguerra, Jouvence, Rome, 1999, vol. I, 127).  
68 See in this regard F. Cresti, Due volte minoranza: i berberi ibaditi del jabal Nafūsa nella visione 
coloniale, in F. Cresti (ed.), Minoranze, pluralismo, stato nell’Africa mediterranea e nel Sahel, 
Aracne, Ariccia, 2015, 21-61.  
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establishment in 1914 of the first chair of Berber language in Italy at the Oriental 
Institute of Naples.69 Italian interest in the Berbers continued after the war: in 1919, 
the Post-war Commission charged with dealing with colonial issues had stated the 
right of colonized peoples to study their own history and their own native 
language: the colonial government of Tripoli was instructed to encourage the study 
of the Berber language in the schools that would be opened in the Berber region.70 
After his transfer to Tripoli following the promulgation of the Statute, al-Baruni 
was questioned by an Italian official, and did not show himself at all favourable to 
this project. The official reported the following: 
 
Sleman Bei El Baruni, himself a Berber, upon being questioned about the 
opportunity of setting up Berber language schools, did not hesitate to answer that 
this institution would be totally useless, because the Berbers themselves would not 
devote themselves to the study of their language, finding it more useful to learn 
Arabic instead.71 
 
As already mentioned, during his stay in Naples, al-Baruni visited the Oriental 
Institute and probably met Francesco Beguinot, who held the chair of Berber 
studies: however, in neither interview did al-Baruni mention any Berber specificity 
or affirm his belonging to the Berber minority, asserting instead only that to the 
Muslim world, or the Arab and Tripolitanian Nation. Perhaps, at the time of his 
visits to Italy, the dream of a Berber principality (assuming that he ever had such a 
dream in the first place) were no more than a memory of youth in the thought of 
the “powerful leader of Abadites and Berbers”, and were no longer of great 
relevance, due to his panislamist stance and the course of events in both his country 
and the Muslim world after the end of the First World War.  
The adhesion of al-Baruni to the new political course inaugurated by the 
colonial government with the signing of the Tripolitanian Statute can be seen as a 
turning point in his political life: from armed opposition to the acceptance of a 
colonial situation. Was this purely an instance of opportunism? Or maybe of 
political realism? Rachel Simon has already pointed out: 
 
the readiness of the [Libyan] notables to cooperate with whoever was the ruling 
power in the region when they realized that resistance was futile. […] The notables’ 
                                                          
69 F. Cresti, Conoscenza scientifica e politica coloniale. Francesco Beguinot, l’impresa di Tripoli 
ed un progetto incompiuto di “Storia del Berberi” (1911-1923), in A. M. Di Tolla (ed.), La lingua 
nella vita e la vita della lingua. Itinerari e percorsi di studi berberi […] Scritti in onore di Francesco 
Beguinot, Unior, Naples, 2016, 179. 
70  Ministero delle Colonie, Relazione della VII sezione della Commissione del Dopo-guerra 
(questioni coloniali), Camera dei Deputati, Rome, 1919, 136.  
71 ASMAI, Africa III, 37: Regia Soprintendenza scolastica della Tripolitania, Anno scolastico 
1918-1919. Relazione finale a S. E. il Governatore della Tripolitania (July 1919), 174. 
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loyalty was not open-ended: they were ready to cooperate with the Italians as long as 
the conditions necessitated this and so long as they gained benefits from it for 
themselves and their tribes.72   
 
Anna Baldinetti in turn argues that: “The hypothesis that ambivalence was a 
feature of the relationship of most Muslim notables with the Italian colonial 
authorities seems plausible; they always oscillated between collaboration and 
antagonism”.73 
In the case of al-Baruni, once the hope of definitively asserting independence 
had faded, the prospect of a protectorate over Libya by Italy was not entirely 
excluded from the objectives of his struggle. In fact, as early as November 8th 1912, 
shortly after the signing of the treaty of Ouchy, he had invited two distinguished 
Italian prisoners, Count Sforza and Cavalier Sanfilippo, who were about to be 
released, to: 
 
become ambassadors to the Italian Government of the desires of the populations [i.e. 
those of the Gebel] that aspire to either absolute independence, or should this not 
prove possible, to a protectorate similar to that exercised over Egypt by England.74 
 
Some time later, having fled to Tunisia following the battle of al-Asaba‘a, while 
negotiating with the Italian government for the return of the Berber population that 
had been exiled from their villages, he proposed as a counterpart to the Italian 
emissaries one of three conditions: 
 
Autonomy of the Gebel and of the coastal plain with its capital in Marsa Zuàga: if 
this is not acceptable, a form of protectorate similar to that exercised over Egypt by 
England. If also this proposition is rejected, we request at least the concession, for 
the aforementioned territories, of some special privilege and greater independence 
than that accorded to other districts.75 
 
From this perspective, it does not seem implausible to suggest that al-Baruni 
had accepted some form of Italian protectorate over Tripolitania in light of the 
impossibility that armed resistance would succeed. It thus became plausible, even 
for “he who was once a bitter enemy of Italy”, to back the Statute, which 
effectively promised a form of protectorate and a degree of autonomy for the native 
populations unparalleled in any of the colonial empires. If pushed a little further, 
the Statute could even be considered a victory for the Tripolitanians after years of 
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armed struggle: the triumphant armed entry into Tripoli of the knights of the 
Jumhuriyya on the day of its proclamation seemed to demonstrate that victory, 
rather than the acceptance of a peace offered by the colonial government in order to 
end the bloodshed. In the same vein, following the promulgation of the Statute, 
Sulayman al-Baruni cut the long hair that had decorated his head for many years: 
he had promised at the beginning of the war that he would not cut it until the 
Italians had been expelled from Libya.76 
By choosing to go down the more realistic path of compromise, and also with 
an eye to the course of the post-war negotiations in Paris, Sulayman al-Baruni 
probably estimated that Italy in its 1920 state might be the lesser enemy of the 
Islamic world, compared to the other colonial powers (France and Great Britain) 
that were dismembering the Ottoman Empire and threatening the very reality of the 
caliphate. 
At any rate, only a short time after al-Baruni’s travels in Italy the situation 
changed dramatically. After the first few months, when an atmosphere of 
conciliation had prevailed in Tripolitania following the promulgation of the Statute, 
there was a spike in incidents and divisions among the Tripolitan leaders, among 
whom an increasing tendency to prefer independence started to progressively take 
hold. In the meantime, the personal feuds between some of the leaders of the 
Jumhuriyya further exacerbated the already tense situation: in the context of an 
ongoing clash between the militias of Ramadan al-Shitiwi al Suwayhili and ‘Abd 
al-Nabi Bilkhayr, the former was murdered at the end of August. The colonial 
government (which had seen the replacement of the main supporter of the Statute, 
General Garioni, with less determined officials), had for its part proved incapable 
of implementing the most urgent measures, such as the convening of political 
elections and the formation of a parliament, further stoking the country’s internal 
rivalries. Nobody but al-Baruni seemed still to think that the application of the 
Statute would place the country on the path towards peace: several groups from the 
Tripolitanian camp formed a Central reform committee (hayat al-islah al-
markaziyya), and in a meeting of the chiefs held in Gariyan in November 1920 
proposed the creation of an autonomous emirate which would abandon the 
Statute.77 Al-Baruni was invited to the meeting, but he refused to attend, stating 
that his position as an Ottoman senator prevented him: and in any case, he opposed 
the establishment of an emirate.  
                                                          
76 See fig. 3. See also Il Giornale d’Italia, n. 38, 14.2.1922: Dichiarazioni di El Baruni (“[al-
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non avessero abbandonato la Tripolitania]”, in ASMAI 150/15, 61. 
77 A. Del Boca, Gli italiani in Libia…, 369-373. 
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Instances of a true civil war shook the country at the beginning of 1921: in 
March, clashes between Berbers and Arabs began in earnest, with the former being 
forced to abandon their villages in the Jabal Nafusa to the forces of the Reform 
Committee. According to some, al-Baruni, who was sent on several occasions to 
intervene as a conciliator between the parties by the colonial government, was 
gravely responsible for much of the tragic turn of events: his prestige between the 
Berbers was shaken, and many government officials of the ministry for the 
Colonies interpreted his actions as directed by personal ambition and in opposition 
to Italian interest. 
Faced with this chaotic and uncontrollable situation, various political groups in 
Italy became increasingly convinced that conciliation on the basis of the Statute 
could no longer be pursued, and that forceful action was required in Tripolitania, 
with the resumption of military operations.78 The main actor in this turn was the 
new governor, Giuseppe Volpi, who arrived in Tripoli in August 1921.  
The antipathy and disagreements between al-Baruni and the new governor, who 
considered him a dangerous intriguer,79 manifested quickly. When in December 
1921 al-Baruni asked for permission to embark for Italy, and from there to travel to 
Istanbul, arguing that he was an Ottoman citizen, the governor agreed: al-Baruni 
set sail for Syracuse on the 22nd December 1921. He never again obtained 
permission to return to Tripoli, despite his repeated requests. 
Some time later, al-Baruni stated that his interdiction from returning to Tripoli 
was due: 
 
to the bad way I was received by Count Volpi [... who instead of following the path 
of conciliation] had preferred to resort to a strong manner and had taken military 
measures of a demonstrative nature which made me understand that there was 
nothing to hope for from that man. Then I retired.80 
 
On the 26th of January 1922, with a surprise action decided by Volpi, the 
colonial troops occupied Qasr Ahmad (Misurata Marina), on the coast east of 
Tripoli, and in the following months began the “reconquest” of Tripolitania, in 
which Colonel Rodolfo Graziani distinguished himself for his leadership. Thus, the 
last governments of liberal Italy shot down the final chances for a peaceful 
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resolution of the Tripolitanian question, definitively reneging the Statute and the 
friendship between Italy and Tripolitania, for which al-Baruni thought it had been 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Sulayman al-Baruni played a particularly important role during the first decade of the 
colonial occupation in Libya: from the landing of the troops in Tripoli till the end of the 
First World War, he was one of the main animators of the resistance against the Italian 
intervention. A muslim of Ibadi confession, he belonged to one of the most important 
families of the Adrar n Infusen (the Berber mountain) region and was elected deputy of the 
Ottoman parliament after the seizure of power by the Union and Progress Committee in 
1908. Closely related to Enver Pasha, one of the most prominent figures in Ottoman politics 
of that period, in 1913 he was appointed senator in Istanbul. During the First World War he 
was charged with promoting the intervention of the Libyan forces alongside the central 
Empires against Italy and its allies.  
The interpretations of his thought and political activity have made him one of the 
followers of the Berber principality dream, one of the protagonists of the pan-Islamist 
action in North Africa and, finally, one of the “lions” of Tripolitanian proto-nationalism as 
a leading member of the ephemeral Jumhuriyya al-Tarabulusiyya of 1918. 
This paper aims at analyzing the position of Sulayman al-Baruni towards the new 
politics of colonial Italy after the First World War, trying to understand it through some 
archival documents concerning his stays in Italy in 1919 and 1920. 
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Fig. 1 - Sulayman al-Baruni’s half-length portrait (undated: ca. 1938?) displayed in the Mathaf al-
saraya al-hamra of Tripoli along with the portraits of the leaders of the Jumhuriyya al-Tarabulusiyya. 





Fig. 2 - Sulayman al-Baruni as condottiere of the anti-Italian Resistance, 1912 (Tripoli, Mathaf al-
saraya al-hamra). Photo: Federico Cresti, September 2010. 
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Fig. 3 - Sulaiman al-Baruni in a photograph (signed and dated 25 muharram 1335 [21 November 
1916]) sent to the qadi of Zuwara and the Awlad Issa kabyle with a message summoning to 
participate in the meeting in Aziziyya for the proclamation of the return of Tripolitania under the 
Ottoman government (ASMAI, Libia 150/14-58: Governo della Tripolitania, Ufficio politico-militare, 





Fig. 4 - The Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, Luigi Rossi, and others high officials receiving al-
Baruni in Rome (november 1920). On the right, Major Borriello, his interpreter during the travels in 
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Libyan Intermediaries on the Eve of Country Independence: 
The case of the Bin Sha‛ban Family 
 
 
The independence of the Federal Monarchy of Libya was proclaimed on 
December 24, 1951, after almost ten years of British military administration in 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and French occupation of Fezzan (1943-1951), and 
after more than thirty years of Italian colonial rule (1911-1943). The period 
following World War II was decisive and fundamental in defining the shape of the 
new Libyan State and the country’s post-colonial power dynamics. In the available 
literature, Libya’s independence has been analyzed and understood above all as, on 
the one hand, a process of decolonization from above, mediated by the United 
Nations and in the context of the retreat, if not collapse, of the Italian colonial 
system, and, on the other hand, as a struggle between Libyan independentist forces 
and the external interference of the old colonial powers (Italy, United Kingdom and 
France) or of the new superpowers, especially the United States. 1  This paper 
intends to underline the colonial attitude of Italy immediately after the fall of 
Fascism and during the early years of the Republic, and the international 
competition for the domination of Libya between the end of the Second World War 
and 1949. In this year, the so-called Bevin-Sforza Compromise was rejected by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, leading to the failure of the attempt to 
divide Libya among Italy, the United Kingdom, and France. Only as a consequence 
                                                          
1 J. Bessis, La Libye contemporaine, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1986; G. P. Calchi Novati, Mediterraneo 
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Oxford, 2008; J. Wright, The Emergence of Libya, Silphium Press, London, 2008. 
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of this event, we argue, did Italy for the first time declare itself favorable to the 
independence of colonized countries. However, such colonialist plans for Libya 
were not just an expression of external interference, but also involved the 
intermediation of groups of notables who often moved within a regional rather than 
a national horizon. Although after 1949 the projects for the re-colonization of 
Libya were set aside and the legitimacy of the country’s independence ceased to be 
questioned, the fact that the various elites who had intermediated at various 
regional levels with the European colonial powers had become ensconced at the 
head of the new independent state led to a fragmentation of political power in the 
country. This encouraged considerable ongoing external interference in Libyan 
affairs, and fostered the prevalence of conservative projects for the new 
independent Libyan society. 
Abroad in Africa, the former colonial intermediaries, the native authorities of 
the British Empire and the chefs of the French Empire’s administrative districts, 
tried to defend their positions of power in a political and social framework that was 
undergoing rapid change. However, in most cases, it was the new political forces 
inspired by nationalism that prevailed. In Libya, history took the opposite course: 
the nationalists were the main losers in the decolonization process, while a 
multifaceted alliance of conservative elites, led by Idris al-Sanusi in the name of 
Islam and privileging a localist political agenda, was able to take control of the 
newly independent State. The struggle between nationalists and conservative forces 
in the country and their respective international supporters on the eve of Libyan 
independence has been decidedly less studied compared to international 
competition over the country. 2  This paper broadly discusses the paradigm of 
Libyan intermediaries in relation to the country’s transition towards independence, 
and points out a specific case study of political intermediation in Western 
Tripolitania that is related to the Berber speaking Bin Sha‛ban family. The political 
engagement of this group is analyzed from the perspective of intermediation (rather 
than collaboration), arguing that colonial subjects that served under European rule 
strategically acted in the interest of improving their authority and their own 
personal welfare or social status.3 In this regard, the historical trajectory of the Bin 
Sha‛ban proves their ability to encompass the changing political scenario and to 
                                                          
2 Regarding political competition in Libya, see L. Anderson, The State and Social Transformation 
in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986; A. Baldinetti, The 
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secure (or improve) their status, relying upon the enhancement of their Berber 
ethnicity. 
 
The international struggle over Libya 
Italy’s defeat in World War II and its loss of dominion over its African colonies, 
instead of leading to a rapid settlement of the question of the status of the former 
Italian colonies, gave rise to a long and complex political and diplomatic process 
that lasted until the late 1940’s. Article 23 of the peace treaty signed in Paris on 
February 10, 1947, forced Italy to give up its colonies and hand over all decisions 
concerning them to the four victorious powers (the US, the USSR, France, and the 
UK), which were given a year from the date of the treaty’s ratification to reach a 
solution; otherwise the colonial dossier would pass to the UN, as in fact happened 
in September 1948. Many factors played against the idea of a possible “return of 
the colonies to Italy”, starting from “the hostility of the Arabs, the strenuous 
opposition of Ethiopia and, above all, the lack of reliability of Italy until its 
political orientation and its place in the international system were clarified”.4 Italy 
had lost its status as a colonial power, experiencing this diminution of its 
international role as a vexation, an injustice, which the new republican ruling class 
tried to remedy throughout the post-war period, up to 1949. Italy’s defeat during 
the Second World War did not mean the outright end of Italian colonialism, nor did 
it bring about the independence of Libya, Eritrea and Somalia. On the contrary, 
during the post-war period, there was an “overabundance and competition” of 
different colonial policies that can be referred back to Italy, Great Britain and 
France.5 Italy’s staunch efforts to regain its overseas possessions, including Libya, 
were constantly opposed by Great Britain and France’s attempts to topple Italian 
influence and transform their respective military administrations in civilian 
trusteeship administrations. European colonial competition for Libya also 
influenced the clash between the Libyan nationalists, which had grown rapidly 
under the British Military Administration (BMA), and the various groups of 
notables that were willing to broker with the different European powers. 
The real turning point in the complex affair of the settlement of the status of the 
former Italian colonies came on May 18, 1949, when the UN General Assembly 
failed to approve the Bevin-Sforza Compromise, which would have divided Libya 
into three different trusteeship administrations: an Italian mandate for Tripolitania, 
an English mandate for Cyrenaica, and a French mandate for Fezzan. The negative 
swing vote in the UN General Assembly was specifically that of the representative 
of Haiti. More generally, the reasons for the lack of approval were due to an 
                                                          
4 G. P. Calchi Novati (ed.), L’Africa d’Italia. Una storia coloniale e postcoloniale, Carocci, 
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5 A. M. Morone, La fine del colonialismo italiano. Politica, società e memorie, Le Monnier, 
Firenze, 2018, 5. 
102 Libyan Intermediaries on the Eve of Country Independence: The Case of the Bin Sha‛ban Family 
international system that was undergoing rapid and decisive change, in which 
direct colonial rule was increasingly distant from the logic of indirect influence that 
was beginning to characterize what developed into the Cold War. After the failure 
of their last attempt to restore a colonial regime in Libya, Italy and Great Britain 
then declared their readiness to support its independence. Minister Sforza spoke 
before the UN’s Political Committee on October 1, 1949 to pledge Italy’s 
commitment to immediate Libyan independence. Compared to the colonial 
remonstrances of the immediate post-war period, it was a true diplomatic about-
face that however still pursued “a tactical aim”, under the belief that Italian 
influence in Libya could still be furthered through (and not against) independence:6 
Italy was now trying to secure its influence over the independent Libya by 
supporting their closest intermediaries, such as the Qaramanli, the Muntasir and the 
Bin Sha‛ban families. 
The solution of an independent Libya organized as a federal State under the 
kingship of Idris al-Sanusi promised to serve a conservative project which had been 
realized through an unlikely alliance between the various sources of Western 
influence and the interests of various regional notables. The grandson of the 
founder of the Sanusi Order, Idris al-Sanusi, was born in 1890 and was educated in 
al-Kufrah. In 1922, Idris escaped the Italian military campaign in Libya and took 
refuge in British-ruled Egypt, while Sanusi resistance in Cyrenaica lasted until 
1931. In 1947, Idris returned from exile and was suddenly acclaimed as leader of 
Cyrenaica. Great Britain took advantage of its good relations with the Sanusi Order 
and proclaimed the autonomy of Cyrenaica on July 1, 1949 under the rule of Emir 
Idris al-Sanusi. In terms of international law, “Cyrenaica could not have either de 
facto or de jure recognition as a State” since any decision about the former Italian 
colonies necessarily had to pass through a UN vote.7 However, in political terms 
Idris’s role was greatly strengthened, clearly to the detriment of the nationalists, but 
above all also with regard to other local notables. For its part, the UK was able to 
gain a leading role in relations with what would soon become the country’s new 
ruling class. France, among the three European powers directly involved in Libya, 
was certainly the one that manifested the greatest resistance to the political change 
triggered by the failed approval of the Bevin-Sforza Compromise. This was also 
due to the fact that it was suffering the consequences of this rejection without 
having directly taken part in it. Like the colonialist plans of Italy and Great Britain, 
France’s had hinged on the support of local notables, specifically the Saif al-Nasr 
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family, and especially Ahmed Saif al-Nasr: France had relied on them to 
administer the region and discourage the penetration of nationalist ideology. 8 
However, the train of events forced France in Libya and elsewhere in Africa to 
“negotiate formal domination in exchange for lasting influence”.9 By exploiting 
their link with France and leveraging their historical collaboration with the 
Sanusiyya, the Saif al-Nasr became the leaders of the new independent Fezzan. 
The dynamics of settling the status of the former Italian colonies moved toward 
a rapid solution when a two-stage agreement was reached at the UN General 
Assembly. Resolution no. 289 of November 21, 1949 called for Libya’s 
independence, officially proclaimed on December 24, 1951. It was, as stated, a 
conservative independence, a “lively but contradictory compromise between 
different foreign interests and national aspirations”, cobbled together through the 
forms of a federal State.10 Such an institutional structure left ample powers to the 
governments of the three federated regions, and by virtue of this, was a 
compromise that managed to bring together the political interests of the various 
local notables with the various European policies of interference in the country. It 
was Idris himself who “used all his personal influence and authority to persuade 
the Tripolitan leaders to support federalism, without which Libyan unity would 
probably never have been achieved”.11 
The center of gravity of the new state was to be found in the figure of Idris, 
who, as must be remembered, before being King of the federal monarchy of Libya, 
had been, and then continued to be, the head of the Sanusi Order. In fact, Islam was 
the lowest common denominator on which to establish a conservative pact among 
the different regional notable leaders: for this reason, the sense of identity provided 
by Islam was much more important in Libya than it was for the States that 
succeeded the Ottoman Empire in the Arab Orient.12 In the framework of Idris’s 
conservative project, religion became his main tool for overcoming the 
particularism of the country’s many regional affiliations or qabila ties in order to 
build the new Libya: “Islam was institutionalized as a source of political legitimacy 
                                                          
8 F. Cresti, Il nazionalismo libico a Tripoli durante l’amministrazione militare britannica: note su 
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and the Constitution [...] sanctioned the sacredness of the monarchy”.13 At the time 
of independence, the challenge was to transform into a shared political and cultural 
reality what had been an artificial invention of colonialism, by bringing together in 
the Libyan colony three regions with specific and partly divergent histories: while 
for the nationalists this challenge was to be won by constructing a tightly-knit Arab 
nation, for the conservatives it was a matter of preserving areas of local autonomy 
and power within the broader framework of Islam and Idris’s recognized role as a 
nodal point for the various regional notables. 
Idris’s ascent to the throne therefore marked the defeat of the nationalists, and 
for a section of the Libyan population Idris’s return to Libya, after his years of 
exile in Egypt, was not experienced as an authentic liberation, but rather as a 
conservative restoration. With the elections of March 1952, the first of the newly 
independent Libya, the nationalists who opposed Idris had hoped, if not to 
overturn, at least to restore a balance in the situation that might be favorable to 
them. Tripolitania elected 35 seats out of 55 total deputies, while the rest were 
divided between Cyrenaica (15) and Fezzan (5). The results delivered the 
parliament and the country firmly into the hands of the conservative power system 
linked to Idris. The 1952 elections had in fact confirmed the long-time fears of the 
nationalists regarding the possibility that the electoral test might reveal itself to be 
a democratic trap: “The majority of people who went to the polls voted for 
individual personalities, and not for parties or policies at all”. 14  Although the 
nationalist parties had made reference to the Arab League, and to ideas, passions 
and slogans of the broader pan-Arab movement, the capacity for political and 
social mobilization of modern nationalism remained limited among Libyans. The 
vote was characterized by a political and often conceptual horizon that did not 
supersede clans, reputations or bonds of patronage. In Tripoli, where the 
nationalists could count on a greater following among the mobilized urban workers 
who had demonstrated and gone on strike several times against foreign 
interference, the election result was indeed different and marked a “resounding 
victory”, 15  as the British documents of Bashir al-Sa‛dawi’s National Congress 
define it. However, the nationalist victory in Tripoli was not enough to influence 
the result at the national level, although it was, somewhat paradoxically, the 
warning signal that persuaded Idris to ban political parties and expel Bashir al-
Sa‛dawi and other nationalist intellectuals and politicians from the country, using 
the pretext of a few protests that followed the vote. Evidently, such an initiative 
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immediately emphasized the conservative character of the regime, but also 
underlined its need for self-defence and conservation, which perceived political 
parties as an element of social change adverse to the classes on which it instead 
based its consent. 
 
The Bin Sha‛ban family’s case of intermediation 
Italian colonial rule had forbidden its Libyan subjects from forming all kinds of 
associations, especially of a political sort; the British Military Administration 
(BMA), on the contrary, fostered the liberalization of Libyan society and allowed 
the formation of the first political associations, with the aim of making them into 
the British’ own referents and political interlocutors. At the same time, the Italians 
also began to support and finance individual notables, families or associations 
which were willing to support the idea of Italy’s return to Libya. The Ministry of 
Italian Africa, Ministero dell’Africa Italiana (MAI) in Italian, which was only 
closed down in 1953, played a prominent role in disseminating funds and building 
up political allegiances. The creation of nationalist associations and parties marked 
a significant political change in the relationship between Italy and Libya, even if it 
was not a change genuinely inspired by the former, but rather a strategy 
implemented in response to the political liberalization triggered by the British 
occupants. The relative autonomy and freedom that Libyans experienced under 
BMA rule soon became a contested space between different groups, associations 
and parties and their respective plans for the future of Libya in partnership with 
different foreign handlers. 
The competition between the United Kingdom and Italy to win the support of 
the most influential Libyan intermediaries (both in terms of individuals and of 
groups) was mirrored not only by the eruption on the country’s political scene of 
the Libyan nationalists, but also by the increasing competition between Libyan 
intermediaries to hold on to the most important and valuable positions in a state 
and society in transition. While the young nationalists were part of the broader 
networks of pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism and supported the independence and 
strong unity of the Libyan nation-state, the different groups of notables who 
intermediated with Italy, Great Britain or France favoured a parochial and 
conservative vision of political power that could safeguard their position in society 
on the basis of their ties with a qabila, family, or Islamic brotherhood, or of a 
specific colonial relationship (as was the case for the askaris, the African soldiers 
serving in the armies of many European colonial powers). 
On the Libyan side, the struggle for independence was understood for the most 
part in terms of the competition between two different ideas of State and society: 
the unified and progressive plans of the nationalists on the one hand, and the 
alliance among regional or local conservative hierarchies of notables on the other. 
The claim to power and legitimacy of these notables was often due to historically 
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entrenched economic and political factors, such as the control of the trans-Saharan 
trading routes, the agricultural production (olive growing and pastoralism in 
particular), and commercial activities in the urban centers; but in other cases, they 
also stemmed from connections to “noble” Muslim and Ottoman lineages or 
familial links with important Islamic Orders, such as the Sanusiyya. It was 
therefore not surprising that in the 1940s a point of convergence for the different 
fractions and currents that existed among Libyan notables was found in Idris al-
Sanusi, who headed the Order first established in Cyrenaica in 1843 by 
Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Sanusi. 
In this complex scenario, the elements that fostered and facilitated intermediary 
roles were many and varied. Among others, shared ethnicity was a powerful tool 
through which to conduct negotiation. The case of the Bin Sha‛ban, a Berber-
speaking family from the city of Zwara. Ibrahim Bin Sha‛ban was the son of 
Sultan, who since the early stages of the colonial occupation of Western 
Tripolitania had been a precious ally of Italy in the city.16 Ibrahim was one of the 
most prominent members of the Bin Sha‛ban family; as such, after having served 
as administrative chief (capo-cabila) during colonial rule, he was imprisoned in 
1943 by the British for his closeness to Italy. After he was released following the 
end of the Second World War, his political career was closely linked with that of 
Salim al-Muntasir, who was one of the most prominent figures in another family 
that had acted as intermediaries for Italy since the beginning of colonial rule, and 
had undoubtedly help to facilitate Italian rooting in Tripolitania.17 In 1946, Ibrahim 
Bin Sha‛ban was part of the leading group of the United National Front (UNF) 
which, under the leadership of Salim al-Muntasir, aimed “to unite and create an 
independent Libya under the constitutional rule of Idris al-Sanusi and with the 
support of Great Britain”.18 The Front represented the more conservative bloc of 
Tripolitanian society, and it gained its main followers from among notables, 
shaykhs, traders, and some Jewish circles. The UNF simultaneously fostered 
relations with Great Britain and Italy: from the Libyan perspective, the most 
profitable position was to have relations with all the main players in the Libyan 
game, the British Administration, Italy and Idris al-Sanusi.19 
The situation changed rapidly during the spring of 1948, when the Four Power 
Commission (FPC) landed in Tripoli on 6 March 1948. During its 40 days of 
investigation in Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan, the FPC “recognized that 
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Libyans were virtually unanimous in their desire for freedom from foreign rule”; but 
it also nevertheless concluded that Libya could not be reputed to be economically 
“self-supporting” and was “thus not ready for independence”.20 Apart from the great 
resentment that this decision produced in Libya, the perspective of a further period of 
foreign rule over Libya, as well as the increasing rapprochement between Italy and 
the United Kingdom, lead the various Libyan players to review their positions. The 
UNF faced a “schism” inside its executive committee: president Salim al-Muntasir 
and Ibrahim Bin Sha‛ban were both accused of having been “bought by the 
Italians”.21 According to Italian records, there is no doubt that the Italians invested 
both propaganda and monetary support in trying to win over both Libyan notables; 
on the other hand, however, their potential engagement with the Italians could have 
been intended as an instrument through which to maintain a position of strength in a 
constantly shifting scenario: faced with the close relations between the United 
Kingdom and Idris al-Sunusi, Salim al-Muntasir and Ibrahim Bin Sha‛ban could at 
best aspire to come second in any relations with the British Administration, while 
intermediation with Italy had the potential to be more fruitful. Relations with Italy 
also appeared promising with a view to counteracting the rise of Libyan nationalists 
in Tripolitania under the leadership of Bashir al-Sa‛dawi: the latter, after years of 
exile in Syria and Egypt, in 1948, looking forward to the arrival in Libya of the FPC, 
had transferred the offices of Libyan Liberation Committee from Cairo to Tripoli 
with the support of the Egyptian government and the Arab League. 
In 1949, the failure of the Bevin-Sforza Compromise and the consequent Italian 
and British willingness to grant Libyan independence once again revolutionized the 
scenario. According to Italian archival documents, Abdallah Bin Sha‛ban, son of 
Ibrahim, had been sent to New York at the expense of the Italian government in 
November 1949 to witness the final act of the long and complex diplomatic 
negotiations over Libya at the General Assembly of the United Nations, and to 
praise the Italian support of Libyan independence and its postcolonial commitment 
to help (and influence) the new State. In fact, resolution no. 289 of November 21, 
1949 put an end to the international dispute over Libya through arranging for its 
independence by the end of 1951. Upon his return from New York, Abdallah 
stopped off in Tunis where, according to Italian documents, he had a series of 
discussions with the French authorities, from whom Abdallah presumably 
requested aid “for the Berbers, who will always be mistreated as a minority no 
longer protected by Italy, against a Tripolitan government made up mainly of 
Arabs, who had always been traditionally hostile to the Berbers. In the past, the 
Italians had protected loyal Berbers who had fought for them against the Arabs, 
saving the Italians from potentially calamitous predicaments, especially during the 
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First World War, when Italian forces were about to be driven back into the sea by 
the onslaught of the rebellious Arabs. However, following the end of the war, Italy 
had showed no gratitude to the Berbers, and had in fact elevated into positions of 
power the leaders of Arab factions that had not always been faithful to the Italian 
cause, as in the case of a number of members of the treacherously pro-British al-
Muntasir family. Given these conditions of the Tripolitan Berber people, it is 
advisable to rely on the Berber brothers of Tunisia and the French authorities in 
order for the former to prepare themselves to resist the expected hostilities of the 
Tripolitan and pro-English Arab government”.22 
The author of the document, senior MAI official Gaetano Chapron, linked Bin 
Sha‛ban’s attitude to a “resentment for the pre-eminence afforded by the Italians to 
Salim al-Muntasir”, who had given a secondary role to the Bin Sha‛ban family. The 
senior official also confirmed that what was reported in the document “were veiled 
threats in the same vein as those spoken by Ibrahim Bin Sha‛ban in a conversation he 
had with me when he was in Rome”.23 According to an information report from 1950 
(considered “reliable” by the Italian Ministry of Defence), it was even assumed that 
the Bin Sha‛ban were in favour of “a French occupation of Zwara, Nalut, Jado and 
Yefren [...] in their desire to unite with the Berbers of Tunisia”.24 In actuality, the 
agreement on the settlement of the Tunisian-Tripolitan border in 1910 between 
French rulers in Tunis and Ottoman authorities in Tripoli had already produced a 
considerable enlargement of French-Tunisian space at the expense of Tripolitania.25 
In this regard the Bin Sha‛ban’s strategy took for granted France’s long lasting 
interest in increasing its influence across the border region. 
The document clearly shows a representation of the Berber identity and its 
history centred on ethnicity, in correspondence with the colonial astuteness that had 
helped shape and construct it as part of its strategy of domination. Recourse to 
ethnicity made it possible to create a minority discourse among the relevant 
communities of Western Tripolitania, as was the case with the city of Zwara, where 
the Berber language was spoken alongside Arabic. While in the pre-World War II 
period Berber identity (and from the point of view of colonial power a possible 
Berber policy) had been cultivated as a negotiating asset to broker in the context of 
a war that opposed Libyans to Libyans and not only colonizers to colonized, in 
1949 a similar bargaining logic re-emerged, in which the ethnic and minority 
arguments were updated to suit the new political context and the competing 
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colonial hierarchies of the European powers - which, regarding Libya in general, 
were Italy and England, but included French interference along the border with 
Tunisia and Fezzan. In fact, another Italian document, dating from just over a year 
later, reports that in the first months following Libya’s independence, France 
(while doing everything in order not to give up its positions in Fezzan) “tried to 
attract into its orbit the Berber group of Jebel [al-Nafusa] and the Ghibla 
nomads”.26 This kind of policy was in direct contiguity with the French strategy in 
Fezzan of exerting influence through close relations with the Saif al-Nasr family.27 
Exercising influence on the population of Fezzan up to Nafusa and Zwara was 
evidently a strategic aim for France in the context of controlling a border area with 
Tunisia and Algeria through which contact was being made between the nationalist 
movements in the French colonies and their Libyan, Egyptian and Arab 
counterparts in the Middle East, and which later saw “the illegal passage of arms 
destined for the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN)”, which transformed 
Libya into its rear line.28 
From the Berber perspective, therefore, what this implied was the continuation 
of a strategy of intermediation, which could hardly be understood as an objective in 
itself, but rather ought to be seen as a means to achieve other objectives. Reading 
the above document between the lines, it emerges clearly that the real competition 
was between the Bin Sha‛ban and the Muntasir families, who were vying against 
each other to occupy as many positions of power within the new State and its 
institutions as they could. It was certainly no coincidence that the Bin Sha‛ban 
came immediately after the UN’s final decision on the independence of Libya, 
when the issue was no longer that of the colonial resurgence of Italy, Great Britain 
and France, but rather that of the competition among Libyan notables scrambling to 
define their respective roles, positions of power and institutional positions in the 
new State. Turning to France was therefore a tactic to attract Italy’s attention in 
away from the competing Muntasir family, and to try to mobilize part of the 
material and symbolic resources that Italy was preparing to deploy to support 
Libya’s post-independence “development”, and which evidently the Bin Sha‛ban 
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Conclusions 
If the main goal of intermediation was to secure a position of power in a 
changing society, the vicissitudes of the Bin Sha‛ban family and in particular those 
of Ibrahim, testify to the success of this strategy, especially when contrasted with 
the claims of the nationalists and, at the same time, the concurrent intermediation 
of the Muntasir family. In 1951, Ibrahim Bin Sha‛ban became the Minister of 
Communications for the government led by Mahmoud al-Muntasir, grandson of 
Selim. Then, in 1954, under the Bin Halim government, Ibrahim Bin Sha‛ban 
became Minister of Education, and then Minister of Defence following a 
reshuffling of the cabinet at the end of the same year. In conclusion, the positioning 
of Libyan actors with regard to the development and enforcement of Italian 
colonial and post-colonial policies was not at all one of passive reception, but was 
instead clearly marked by a spirit of intermediation, with which more than one 
actor tried to cope with the changing situation in order to safeguard their positions 
of political power. This was the case for the nationalists and the established 
hierarchies of local notables. By shifting its attention to Libya, Italy, together with 
Great Britain and France, contributed significantly in making sure that a 
conservative regime took over independent Libya, and thus ensured the victory of 
the older, conservative echelons of notables over the young pan-Arabic progressive 
nationalists. Intermediation did not therefore only provide important levers through 
which to exercise their influence over a newly independent Libya for Great Britain, 
Italy and France alike, but it was in fact decisive in acquiring the economic and 
symbolic resources that helped produce the definitive affirmation of the more 
conservative groups of the country over the new progressives. It appears clear that 
through their relations with Italy, the Bin Sha‛ban family were able to reinforce 
their respective positions of power within the frame of a logic of self-preservation. 
Furthermore, we have seen how Berber identity was invoked and framed in 
terms of ethnicity and of a minority oppressed by the Arabs in relation to the 
process of political bargaining. While colonial knowledge had produced ethnic 
identities in order to divide and rule over its subjects, the case of the Bin Sha‛ban 
family shows the ability of post-colonial subjects to reverse this logic and utilize 
colonial ethnic labels to gain advantages in bargaining with foreign authorities. An 
interpretation framing the anti-colonial struggle in Western Tripolitania in terms of 
political and socio-economic interests that were beyond the agenda of Islamist 
mobilization was first formulated by the Libyan historian Aghil al-Barbar.29 Libyan 
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resistance to Italian occupation did not form a “unique religious front”,30 but it 
instead contributed to a rising process of territorial grounding of political agency 
which – as Chiara Pagano has demonstrated in her work – combined with the 
strategic use of discourses of ethnicity in order to mobilize people and bargain with 
foreign counterparts.31 Similar dynamics emerged during the Libyan transition to 
independence, thus demonstrating the Libyans’ ability to understand, manipulate 
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This paper broadly discusses the transition to the independence of Libya and points out 
a specific case study of political biography in Western Tripolitania that is related to the 
Berber speaking Bin Sha‛ban family. The political engagement of this group is analyzed 
from the perspective of intermediation (rather than collaboration), arguing that colonial 
subjects that served under European rule strategically acted in the interest of improving 
their authority and their own personal welfare or social status. In this regard, the historical 
trajectory of the Bin Sha‛ban proves their ability to encompass the changing political 
scenario and to secure (or improve) their status, relying upon the enhancement of their 
Berber ethnicity. 
  










The Idea of a United Libya: Sulayman al-Baruni, 
Pan-Arabism and National Identity 
 
 
This article discusses the emergence and construction of the idea of a Libyan 
nation among Libyan exiles in the Mediterranean region from the 1920s until 
independence. Highlighting the contributions of Sulayman al-Baruni to the 
debate the article demonstrates how the influence of pan-Arabism in the 
theoretical elaboration of a “Libyan nation-state” led to the prevalence of 
identifying the Libyan nation as an Arab nation, thereby disregarding the Berber 
component. 
 
Exiles and Sulayman al-Baruni in the Fight against Colonial Rule 
My use of the term “exile” denotes all those who fled Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica as a consequence of the Italian colonial occupation between 1911 and 
the end of colonial rule in 1943. This exile involved many countries, mainly 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria, but also Turkey, Palestine, Chad, and Niger. It is 
extremely difficult to know the exact number of exiles for a number of reasons. 
First, no census data from the period exist on nomadic tribes. Furthermore, 
currently available data are not uniformly reliable. Italian diplomatic 
documentation gives partial figures for returning exiles only, and it is a legitimate 
suspicion that the authorities had some interest in overestimating the numbers of 
returnees in order to demonstrate the success of Italian colonial policies. Libyan 
sources, on the other hand, are based on oral histories, and thus are not perfectly 
reliable. Second, exiles frequently migrated between different countries, sometimes 
after being expelled, other times in order to reunite with members of their families 
or tribes, or to seek work. Therefore, while it is not possible to provide an exact 
figure, it can be surmised that a large proportion of the Libyan population was 
affected by these displacements.  
Through the experiences undergone during exile, new structures of loyalty 
and solidarity among the Libyan diaspora were formed. This process was 
essential as it replaced the traditional roles played by ethnic membership, tribal 
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loyalties, kinship, brotherhood bonds, and affiliation with the pre-colonial 
Ottoman provinces.1 
Sulayman al-Baruni offers us a prime example of how the experience of exile, 
which did not follow a linear trajectory but was characterised by migration from 
one country to another as well as by intermittent returns to the homeland, 
contributed to the shaping of a new political culture which foreshadowed the union 
of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica as a new political entity. Sulayman al-Baruni was 
born around 1870 in the Jabal Nafusa into a prominent Berber Ibadi family. His 
father had been a leading figure among the Ibadis of the Mzab (Algeria), of Jerba 
and also among many non-Ibadis of north-western Tripolitania. Al-Baruni studied 
at the most prestigious Islamic universities in North Africa: the Zaytuna in Tunis 
and later at al-Azhar, in Cairo. He was arrested several times and accused of 
plotting against Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II to establish an independent emirate in the 
Jabal Nafusa, with the aim of re-establishing the traditional power of Ibadi imams 
and amirs.2 But as Amal al-Ghazal rightly points out, “There is no evidence in the 
writings, career, or thought of al-Baruni that he was guilty”.3 It is worth noting that 
some recent literature in Arabic on al-Baruni argues that his activity and thought 
during this period must not be interpreted, as claimed instead by colonial sources, 
as a quest to affirm the “Berberness” of the area, but instead as an attempt to 
highlight the “Maghribness” of Islam.4 
After returning to Cairo in 1906, he founded the printing house Matbaʿat al-
Azhar al-Baruniyya and the newspaper al-Asad al-Islam, which published three 
issues between August 1907 and April 1908. Despite the fact that publishing house 
printed and disseminated many works on Ibadism,5 what emerges from al-Asad al-
Islam is that during this period al-Baruni favoured pan-Islamism, understood as the 
                                                          
1 For a detailed discussion of the term “exile” and a general outline of the exile during Italian 
colonial rule see A. Baldinetti, The Origins of the Libyan Nation. Colonial Legacy, Exile and the 
Emergence of a New Nation-State, Routledge, London-New York, 2010, 4-7; 53-54. 
2 For a general outline of al-Baruni’s life and political activities, see J. E. Peterson, Arab Nationalism 
and the Idealist Politician: the Career of Sulayman Al-Baruni, in J. Piscatori - G.S. Harris (eds.), Law, 
Personalities and Politics of the Middle East, Westview Press, Boulder, 1987, 124-139; L. Veccia 
Vaglieri, al-Baruni Sulayman, Encyclopaedia of Islam, CD-ROM Édition, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 2001; in 
Arabic: I. Abu Yaqzan, Sulayman al-Baruni Basha fi atwar hayatihi, al-Dar al-ʻUmaniyya, n. p. 1956; 
H. Mushaykhi, Siyāsī, Ibādī, Maghribī: Sulaymān al-Bārūnī (1873-1940), JMS Plus, Tunis, 2013. 
3 A. Ghazal, An Ottoman Pasha and the End of Empire: Sulayman al-Baruni and the Networks of 
Islamic Reform, in J. Gelvin - N. Green (eds.), Global Muslims in the Age of Steam and Print, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, 2013, 47. For a precise discussion of al-Baruni’s charges 
and arrests, see M. Custers, Sulaymān al-Bārūnī, an Ibāḍī pan-Islamist, unpublished M. A. thesis, 
University of Leiden, 1972, 25-28. 
4 See for example Mushaykhi, Siyāsī, Ibāḍī, Maghribī…, 26. 
5 M. Custers, al-Ibadiyya. A Bibliography. Second, revised and enlarged edition, Georg Olms 
Verlag, Hildesheim, 2017, 123-126. 
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unity of Muslims within the frame of allegiance to the Ottoman Empire.6 In 1908, 
after the Young Turk revolution, he was elected deputy of the Ottoman parliament 
for the Jabal Gharbi district.  
The importance of pan-Islamic identity, which prevailed over the narrower and 
more local Ibadi ethnic-religious identity, is evident in al-Baruni’s position vis-à-
vis the Italian occupation. As soon as the Italian troops disembarked in Tripoli, 
Sulayman al-Baruni, following Ottoman directives, started recruiting volunteers to 
bolster the ranks of the resistance. He emerged as one of the latter’s main leaders at 
the conference in al-‘Aziziyya, which followed the Treaty of Lausanne, and in 
October 1912 brought together the most important Tripolitanian chiefs and 
notables to discuss their position regarding the Italian occupation. The Treaty had 
ratified the peace between Italy and the Ottoman Empire, and the Sultan had 
granted full autonomy to the provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Al-‘Aziziyya 
marked the first split among the Tripolitanian chiefs and tribes facing colonial 
occupation: on the one side there were those who accepted the occupation, 
including a large number of notables from the Jabal who submitted themselves and 
their tribes to Italian authority; and on the other were those who were resolved to 
continue with the resistance. Al-Baruni was among the latter. Even though, as 
clearly attested by the Italian colonial documentation, these different attitudes did 
not represent a fracture along ethno-religious lines, the Berber-Ibadi tribes and 
chiefs, including al-Baruni, were the most determined not to submit.7 
Al-Baruni, referring to the Ottoman firman granting independence to 
Tripolitania, opened negotiations with the Italian authorities in November 1912 and 
requested autonomy for the Jabal and the western coastal plain, with the 
administrative centre located in Marsa Zuwaga, an ancient Ibadi centre. 
Alternatively, he wished to establish a protectorate based on the British model in 
Egypt; or as a final and least preferred possibility, he hoped for the concession of 
special privileges to the area.8 It seems that the Minister of the Colonies was 
inclined to agree to the constitution of a Berber province with special status and 
governed by its own elective chiefs, but the colonial officers in Tripoli opposed this 
solution because the provision would have satisfied only al-Baruni and a few other 
chiefs.9 The imposition of colonial occupation on the Jabal, following the battle of 
                                                          
6 ʿA. M. al-Misrati, Sihafat Libiya fi nisf qarn, Dar al-kashshaf, Beirut, 1960, 118-126. 
7 ASDMAE: ASMAI Libia 150/14, Governo della Tripolitania, Ufficio politico-militare, Notizie 
su Suleiman al-Baruni, 1916, typescript, 8. 
8 ASDMAE: ASMAI Libia 150/14, Governo della Tripolitania, Ufficio politico-militare, Notizie 
su Suleiman al-Baruni, 1916, typescript, 13-17. 
9 ASDMAE: ASMAI Libia 150/14, Ragni to Ministero delle Colonie, 23 March 1913; F. Corò, 
Una interessante pagina di storia libica. Suleiman el Baruni, il sogno di un principato berbero e la 
battaglia di Asàaba 1913, Gli annali dell’Africa Italiana, 1/3-4, 1938, 962-967. 
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al-Asaba‘a on the 23rd of March 1913, dissolved what Francesco Corò, a colonial 
officer and scholar, called “the dream of a Berber principality”.10 
Sulayman al-Baruni and other notables emigrated to Tunisia. The waves of 
departures of Libyan exiles correlated with different periods and stages of colonial 
rule. The first wave occurred with the initial stages of the Italian occupation of 
Tripolitania in 1911, and the first country of destination was Tunisia. This first 
wave of migration to Tunisia concerned the tribes of the areas of al-‘Ajilat, Nalut, 
Fassato, and Zuwara: it was mainly a movement of nomads and of the poorest 
social strata. The Italian authorities, concerned about the number of Tripolitanians 
in Tunisia, tried to persuade the exiles to return through the mediation of a few 
loyal notables and the promise of important offices in the colonial administration. 
A preferred interlocutor for the Italians was al-Baruni, who was allegedly promised 
a separate district for the Berbers and was entrusted with the task of writing a 
monograph on the Jabal Gharbi for the colonial authorities, intended as an account 
of the living conditions of Arabs and Berbers.11 It must be underlined here that 
Ibadis had been identified by Italy as potential facilitators of colonial rule. Enrico 
Insabato, who had been the main agent of the pro-Islamic policy facing the 
occupation of Tripolitania,12 argued that: 
 
The Abadites are destined to become a major economic and political force in our 
colonies, due both to their aspirations to independence, and because, if we can find a 
way of drawing them into the orbit of our interests, they could serve as an 
instrument of commercial penetration and of exercising political influence in all the 
other Abadite districts of the Muslim world.13 
 
There is evidence that al-Baruni was in touch with the Italian authorities and 
tried to convince a number of Libyan exiles to return to Tripolitania.14 The 
motivation for the subsequent shift in his conduct can be explained by the 
observation that: 
 
                                                          
10 Idem, 960. 
11 ASDMAE: ASMAI Libia 122/1-8, Relazione del conte Sforza in Tunisia, 23 November 1913, 
45-48. 
12 Beginning in 1903, E. Insabato planned the means by which Italy would be able to carry out 
what he called the “penetration into the Muslim Orient” and which, by attracting the sympathies of 
the Muslims themselves, would have led them to support the Italian colonial policy. For a detailed 
discussion of Insabato’s activities and writings, see A. Baldinetti, Colonialismo. La ricerca di 
consenso in Egitto per l’impresa di Libia, Istituto per l’Oriente C.A. Nallino, Roma, 1997, 33-70. 
13 E. Insabato, Gli Abaditi del Gebel Nafusa e la politica islamica in Tripolitania, Istituto 
Coloniale Italiano, Roma, 1918, 19. 
14 ANT: E 550/30-15, Mohammed Benkhalifa to M. Blanc, Gabes, 27 May 1913.  
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the loyalty of the notables was not open-ended: they were ready to cooperate with 
the Italians as long as the conditions necessitated this and as long as they gained 
benefits from such negotiations for themselves and their tribes. Once the political 
and military situation changed, the local leaders cast off the Italian yoke.15 
 
Ambivalence was a feature of the relationship of most Muslim notables with the 
Italian colonial authorities; they always oscillated between collaboration and 
antagonism. In Tunisia, al-Baruni was in touch with a number of important figures 
among the Young Tunisians, such as Amor Guellaty, Chadly Darghout, and 
Mehmed Zeki,16 but in those years his allegiance was to the Ottoman Empire and 
with the Ottoman re-involvement in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania during the First 
World War. In October 1916, at the request of the Sultan, Sulayman al-Baruni, 
“who was in Istanbul in virtue of his appointment to the Chamber of Deputies”, 
returned to Tripolitania as governor of Tripolitania, Tunisia, and Algeria.17 
It was after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire that al-Baruni came to consider 
Arab unity, intended as “a political unity defined by Islam, Arabism, or a 
conflation of both, to be the best alternative to shattered Ottoman order and a 
safeguard against the European colonial order in the region”.18 
 
Pan-Arabism and the Quest for an Independent, United Libya 
During the 1920s, following the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the beginnings 
of fascist colonial rule in Libya, a second large wave of emigration began to take 
place. During the first decade of Italian occupation, exiles had been mainly 
involved in collecting weapons, money, and supplies in support of the ongoing 
primary resistance in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica; now, the patterns of the Libyan 
exiles’ activity changed: they began to form political associations, using these new 
platforms to issue calls and make plans for the formation of an independent nation 
– though at this stage the vision of what this would look like was considerably 
different from what was ultimately implemented with the establishment of the 
monarchical state after independence. 
Due to its geographical proximity to Cyrenaica, as well as its own internal 
political developments, and its involvement with the resistance,19 Egypt became the 
first centre of the political activity of the Libyan exiles. The first association of 
Libyan exiles based in Egypt association, the Jam‘iyya khayriyya li-khatt Libya 
                                                          
15 R. Simon, Libya between Ottomanism and Nationalism. The Ottoman Involvement in Libya 
during the War with Italy (1911-1919), Klaus Schwarz Verlag, Berlin, 1987, 219. 
16 ANT: E 550/30-15, Note, Gouvernement Tunisien, Sûreté Publique, Tunis, 12 April 1913. 
17 R. Simon, Libya..., 229-232. 
18 A. Ghazal, An Ottoman Pasha…, 51-52. 
19 For a general overview of Egyptian solidarity at the beginning of occupation see A. Baldinetti, 
Orientalismo e Colonialismo…, 125-152; see also M. G., al-Mawqif al-sha‘bi al-misri min harakat 
al-jihad fi Libiya, Markaz jihad al-libiyyin li-l-dirasat al-ta’rikhiyya, Tripoli, 2003, 147-235. 
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(Charity Association for the Libyan Region), formed in 1924, was sponsored by the 
Sanusi family, but its later political activism was mainly led by Tripolitanians. 
Again in 1924, another association, Jam‛iyyat ta‛awun jaliyyat Ifriqiyya al-
shamaliyya (The Cooperative Society of Northern African Exiles) was established 
in Cairo; apart from Libyans, this association also included Moroccans, Tunisians, 
and Algerians amongst its members. In January 1925, a third association was 
established. It was named al-Rabita al-Tarabulusiyya (The Tripolitanian Bond) by 
analogy with Jam‘iyyat al-Rabita al-Sharqiyya (The Society of the Eastern Bond) 
which had been founded in 1922. This Egyptian association aimed at fostering the 
ties between the Eastern Arab peoples. These early associations had the support of 
the Egyptian nationalists of the Wafd and of other nationalist parties and leaders. 
Among them was ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Azzam, future first general secretary of the 
Arab League, who had also previously been involved in the anti-colonial struggles 
of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.20 
‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Azzam, unanimously considered by historians to be one of 
the first Arab nationalists, resided in Libya between 1915 and 1923, and was 
therefore in close proximity to the mujahidin. ‘Azzam arrived in Cyrenaica from 
Egypt in December 1915 in order to connect with Nuri Bey and a group of 
Ottoman officials who were intending to form a Sanusi army to fight the British. 
After the Sanusiyya signed the Pact of Akrama in 1917, ‘Azzam and Nuri Bey 
shifted their focus to Tripolitania, where they sought to establish a centralised 
authority.21 ‘Azzam was one of the main promoters of the Tripolitanian Republic 
(al-Jumhuriyya al-Tarabulusiyya), which was announced on 16 November 1918 at 
Misurata in Tripolitania, following the initiative of a number of Ottoman officials 
and several local notables. The Tripolitanian Republic was an important attempt at 
overcoming the tribal divisions in Tripolitania, and was able to hold a strong stance 
during negotiations with the colonial authorities; moreover, it was the first formal 
republican government in an Arab-majority country.22 Although Libyan historians 
tend to emphasise its role as an expression of a unified nationalist Tripolitanian 
movement, in actuality this aspect seems to have been limited. The effort to 
establish the Tripolitanian Republic foundered very soon, and its failure must be 
largely attributed to the intertribal conflicts for leadership which resumed in 1920. 
                                                          
20 On the early political associations in Egypt, see A. Baldinetti, The Origins of the Libyan 
Nation…, 71-74. 
21 For a detailed description of Azzam’s role in Libya see R. M. Coury, The Making of an 
Egyptian Arab Nationalist. The Early Years of Azzam Pasha 1893-1936, Ithaca Press, Reading, 1998, 
95-228. 
22 L. Anderson, The Tripoli Republic, 1918-1922, in E. G. H. Joffé - K. S. McLachlan (eds.), 
Social and Economic Development of Libya, Middle East and North African Studies Press, Wisbech, 
1982, 43-79. 
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From the pages of al-Liwa’ al-tarabulsi, which was published between 1919 
and 1923, and was the main organ of the Hizb al-islah al-waṭani (National Reform 
Party), formed after the promulgation of the Fundamental Laws, ‘Azzam called for 
unity in the anticolonial struggle in the name of a Tripolitanian nation (‘umma) 
linked to the Arab one. His appeals had no effect either on the resistance or on the 
production of a theorical elaboration of “the nation” in those years. Although being 
described as “a newspaper of the people”,23 al-Liwa’ al-tarabulsi was actually read 
by very small groups of elites, and ‘Azzam’s ideas of a new national identity, 
which were influenced by the Egyptian experience, often came across as hollow 
because they did not reflect the situation on the ground in Tripolitania. 
‘Azzam’s ideas had an influence on the first associations of Libyan exiles based 
in Egypt, but these first groupings had limited scope and were lacked concrete and 
well-defined political programmes. In addition, these associations and 
organisations often lacked coordination. By the late 1920s, mainly through the al-
Lajna al-tanfidhiyya li-l-jaliyyat al-tarabulusiyya al-barqawiyya (The Executive 
Committee of Tripolitanian and Cyrenaican Communities, ECTCC), established in 
Damascus, some exiles had initiated a process of political advancement. Their 
struggle started to veer towards obtaining the independence of Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica from Italian colonial rule. In early 1929, the ECTCC drew up its first 
manifesto entitled “National Covenant of the Tripolitanian and the Cyrenaican 
People”. This ought to be considered the country’s first national charter, as it was 
explicitly stated that the nation which was being referred to, with the term ‘umma, 
was formed by Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The charter sought to:  
1) Set up a national government to be led by a Muslim, chosen by the community 
(‘umma), who would exercise sovereignty over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. 
2) Convene an assembly to draft a constitution for the nation. 
3) Elect a committee responsible for making key reforms. 
4) Introduce Arabic as the sole official and educational language. 
5) Safeguard Islam and the country’s local traditions. 
6) Administer the waqf properties through the election of an Islamic commission. 
7) Grant general amnesty for all those accused of political crimes. 
8) Improve relations with the Italian authorities.24 
 
The aims of the charter reflected the demands that Libyans had advanced during 
the conference of Gharyan in November 1920,25 and the negotiations which 
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followed in 1922. There were clear similarities with comparable initiatives in other 
Arab countries that were subject to League of Nations mandates. 
The ECTCC stated that the nation, understood to be the traditional ‘umma (the 
term waṭan used by Arab nationalists to indicate the nation, or sometimes 
homeland, was not in use yet), had to be considered as one unified territory which 
was geographically and historically known as Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. 
Accordingly, this early document does not mention the word Libya to indicate 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, taken as an integral territory; instead, the charter’s 
terminology referred to a “Cyrenaican-Tripolitanian nation”.26 
From the early 1930s the activities of the associations of Libyan exiles reached 
larger audiences, as members were invited to take part in various Arab or Islamic 
conferences throughout the Middle East, such as the Islamic Congress in Jerusalem 
in 1931. Libyan exiles were increasingly able to make their voices heard as they 
appropriated the rhetoric and ideologies of the other political movements that 
existed throughout the Arab-Muslim world. The Libyan cause came to be widely 
endorsed by Arab nationalist circles, and the exiles’ growing nationalist activity 
and debates were mirrored also in the press. In particular, the Egyptian weekly 
magazine al-Rabita al-‘arabiyya became a discussion forum for the various 
communities and groups of Libyan exiles. The magazine was published by 
Jam‛iyyat al-rabita al-‘arabiyya (the Arab Bond Society). Founded in 1936, the 
Society promoted Arab unity mainly through cultural activities, which reflected 
“the salon/hafla tradition of Egyptian cultural interaction”.27 The periodical, whose 
stated aim was to be the voice of the Arab nationalist movement and to establish a 
link between Egypt and other Arab countries, paid particular attention to the 
Libyan cause from its very first issues, both by publishing general articles on 
Italian policy and by dealing with specific questions connected to the Italian 
occupation. The rivalries which opposed the peoples of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, 
both among the resistance movement in the region and also among the exiles, were 
reflected in the discussions that developed in the al-Rabita al-‘arabiyya magazine, 
which devoted a regular section to this issue, entitled al-Qadiyya al-tarabulusiyya. 
                                                                                                                                                   
25 The Conference of Gharyan was promoted by ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Azzam, with the purpose of 
stopping intertribal conflict. The Conference took place in Jabal Gharyan in November 1920 and 
brought together the most influential Tripolitanian notables and chiefs. The appointment of an 
important committee concluded the conference. The committee, Hay’at al-islah al-markaziyya 
(Central Reform Committee), had the task of entering negotiations with the Italian government for the 
implementation of the Fundamental Laws of 1919 and the election of a local government elected by 
the people under a Muslim chief with religious, civil, and military powers. 
26 A. Baldinetti, The Origins of the Libyan Nation…, 82-83. 
27 I. Gershoni Israel - J. P. Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1995, 24. 
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Despite the name, the periodical section was nonetheless concerned with 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. 
Although voicing different points of view, the discussion on al-Rabita al-
‘arabiyya also highlighted existing commonalities, demonstrating that the Libyan 
question was only one part of a greater Arab nationalist cause. Sulayman al-Baruni 
played a vocal part in the debate: in a series of articles published in al-Rabita al-
‛arabiyya between 1937 and 1938, responding to Shakib Arslan, it clearly emerges 
how the principles of unity and nationalism penetrated the exiled Libyan 
population, and how Sulayman al-Baruni considered the struggle against the 
Italians fought by both the Tripolitanians and the Cyrenaicans as a uniting cause.  
Shakib Arslan, a leading personality of that peculiar current of Arab nationalism 
which scholars have termed “Islamic nationalism” or “Islamic internationalism”,28 
had previously always endorsed the Libyan cause, but had increasingly adopted a 
conciliatory position toward fascist policies in Libya due to his contacts with 
Mussolini.29  
Arslan distanced himself more and more from the Libyan anti-colonial struggle. 
In a conference held in Damascus in 1937, he allegedly reconsidered his previous 
position on the Libyan issue and, in general, on all subjects regarding North Africa. 
He argued that the majority of the inhabitants of North Africa were not Arabs and 
that Arab unity should be limited to Asia. These statements provoked indignation 
and harsh reactions among Libyans in different countries. In Syria, the Libyan 
exiles’ association responded to Arslan with a report arguing that while not all the 
inhabitants of North Africa were ethnically Arab, they were all effectively part of a 
grand nation (waṭan) based on qawmiyya ‘arabiyya (Arab nationalism) and waḥda 
‘arabiyya (Arab unity). The report also argued that many of the inhabitants of 
North Africa had originated from the Arabian Peninsula; these two geographic 
areas had shared a common history since the Umayyad period. Moreover, they 
shared the religious link of Islam.30 Similarly, Sulayman al-Baruni, who had 
initially attempted to soothe the controversy and disappointment caused by 
Arslan’s statements among Libyan exiles,31 believed that the exiles were fighting 
for the same national issue (qadaya waṭaniyya), which was intrinsically linked to 
                                                          
28 On the different labels given to Arslan see A. Salvatore, Dilemmi e opzioni 
dell’internazionalismo arabo-islamico dinanzi alla politica araba di Roma negli anni trenta. Il caso di 
Šakīb Arslān, Oriente Moderno, 10/1-6, 1991, 75-76 and note 1, 99-100; For an interpretation of its 
activities as Islamic internationalism see A. Colás, “Internationalism in the Mediterranean”, The 
Journal of North African Studies, 3/1, 1996, 226-227. 
29 A. Baldinetti, The Origins of the Libyan Nation…, 97-102. 
30 T. Bin Musa, Kifah al-libiyyin al-siyasi fi Bilad al-Sham, 1925-1950, Markaz jihad al-libiyyin 
didda al-ghazw al-itali, Tripoli, 1983, 116-17. The report is reproduced on pages 257-259. 
31 ‘Sulayman Basha al-Baruni yu‘linu al-bira’ min al-amir Shakib Arslan’, al-Rabita al-‘arabiyya, 
72, 1937, vol. II, 30-4. 
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the Arab unity (waḥda arabiyya).32 In the debate, which had at its core the question 
of whether the Maghreb was to be considered part of the Arab nation, the Algerian 
reformer Ben Badis, probably in an attempt to reconcile the two positions, made a 
distinction between Arab unity as an idea and Arab unity as a realistic political 
achievement; he momentarily excluded the Arabs of the Maghreb from the latter 
due to colonial rule.33 
Al-Baruni’s position also reflected the Salafi nationalist discourse. As Amal 
Ghazal argues, this discourse was articulated in the interwar period and was 
probably a response to the colonial rule which often adopted policies that divided 
the population along sectarian and ethnic lines, and “drew many Ibadis closer to 
Sunnis. Because North African Ibadis are Berbers, also turned many Berbers into 
Arabist Salafis”.34 During this period, al-Baruni divided his time between Iraq and 
Oman. Banished from Tripolitania by the Italian colonial authorities from 
December 1921, following a stay in France and the Hijaz, al-Baruni arrived in 
Oman in 1924. Oman at the time was divided into the Sultanate of Muscat, ruled 
by Sultan Faysal b. Taymur, and the Imamate of Oman, in the interior, ruled by 
Imam Muhammad b. Abdullah al-Khalili. Al-Baruni served both rulers: from 1924 
to 1929 he acted as financial adviser of the Imam and chairman of a council of 
ministers, and then served as an adviser to the Sultan in Muscat from 1938, after 
spending a few years in Baghdad.35 Al-Baruni made attempts to unite the divided 
country and suggested both rulers pass reforms to modernize their respective state 
institutions.  
During his time in Oman, al-Baruni’s ideas, which “were probably the first and 
last attempts at modernization experienced by the Ibadi community during the 
twentieth century”,36 were largely ignored; Khalid M. Ali has argued that this was 
probably because they were alien to both Ibadi scholars and tribal leaders.37 
                                                          
32 ‘Radd al-Baruni Basha ‛ala al-amir Shakib Arslan’, al-Rabita al-‘arabiyya, 92, 1938, vol. II, 
26-33. 
33 B. Fayyad, Khilaf Sulayman al-Baruni maʿa Shakib Arslan’ hawla al-wahda al-siyasiyya al-
ʿarabiyya wa mawqif ʿAbd al-Hamid Ben Badin min-hu, Majallat al-mustaqbal al-ʿarabi, 454, 2016, 
117-128. 
34 A. Ghazal, The other frontiers of Arab nationalism: Ibadis, Berbers and the Arabist-Salafi press 
in the interwar period, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 42/1, 2010, 105-122. 
35 A. M. ʿA. Qinawi, Sulayman al-Baruni Basha wa nashatuhu al-siyasi fi al-mahjar, Majallat 
Kulliyat al-Adab Jamiʿat Qariyunis, 35, 2011, 1-38. 
36 K. M. Al-Azri, Social and Gender Inequality in Oman: The Power of Religious and Political 
Tradition, Routledge, New York, 2013, 28. 
37 Ibidem. Recently, the role played by al-Baruni on Omani society at the time and the impact of 
his ideas on the modernization of the country have been more positively acknowledged in Oman, see 
for example: Oman Studies Center, Sultan Qaboos University al-Nadwa al-duwaliyya, Sulayman 
Basha al-Baruni wa hudhura fi al-thaqafa al-ʻUmaniyya 10-11 Yulyuū 2012. Buhuth al-Nadwa, 
Jamiʻat al-Sultan Qabus, Markaz al-Dirasat al-ʻUmaniyya, Mascat, 2013; S. S. Shaybani - S. A. al-
Baruni, Sulayman Basha al-Baruni Umma fi rajul. Maktabat Khazaʼin al-Athar, Barka’, 2017, 3rd ed. 
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However, during that period, al-Baruni’s main concern continued to be the struggle 
for the attainment of a national Libyan territoriality. Besides campaigning through 
his writings, al-Baruni also tried to get as near as possible to Tripoli,38 and 
envisaged initiatives to free his homeland from Italian occupation. In September 
1939, al-Baruni, on behalf of the exiles scattered in “Tunis, Algiers, Egypt and 
Damascus”, addressed a letter to the French Foreign Minister and Resident General 
in Tunisia and to the French Minister for War asking for French support to “make 
easy the way to their national unity”. His plan was to use French help to raise an 
army comprised of about 20,000 Libyan exiles from Tunisia, Algeria and Syria, “to 
be ready to march when Italy declares her entry into the war on the German side”.39 
Although the Sultan of Oman, as reported in British diplomatic documentation, 
considered al-Baruni “too old for active work”,40 the French authorities considered 
al-Baruni as a possible interlocutor and in June 1940, a few months before his 
death, the French general officer in command of North Africa approached him to 
“go to Algiers to undertake certain works in connection to Libya”.41 His death,42 
however, deprived al-Baruni of any chance of continuing to play an active role in 
the fight for a new Libyan political entity; nonetheless, by the end of the 1930s, the 
principles of unity and nationalism had become widespread among the exile 
population, and Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were considered as a single subject that 
demonstrated all the features of a “national struggle”. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, over the course of the 1930s, a range of associations constituted 
by Libyan exiles began to imagine the future of their country in terms of a modern 
nation. This required the construction of a national identity based on common 
territoriality and on a single shared language and culture, i.e. Arabic. 
This new national image, which was shaped and strongly influenced by 
encounters and comparisons with the experiences of other Arab countries, was an 
attempt to find an alternative to the old political systems that had collapsed due to 
                                                                                                                                                   
It must be said that al-Baruni’s Omani period has not been investigated in detail by scholarship in any 
European language, and there is not yet a complete biography of al-Baruni in any European language. 
38 IOR/L/PS/12/2990, The Political agent in Muscat to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, 
Muscat, 19 September 1939. 
39 IOR/L/PS/12/2990, Letter from Sulayman al-Baruni to the French Minister and Resident-
General at Tunis, Musca 21st September 1939. 
40 IOR/L/PS/12/2990, The Political agent in Muscat to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, 
Muscat, 19 September 1939. 
41 A. Ghazal, An Ottoman Pasha…, 54. 
42 al-Baruni died on the 30th of April 1930 in Bombay, where he had arrived a few days earlier 
together with the Sultan of Muscat, probably in order to obtain “expert medical advice”. 
IOR/R/15/6/450, Report from the Intelligence Bureau House Department, Department of India, 11th 
May 1940. 
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colonial occupation, and it attempted to overcome the historical separation of 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The altered political and social mapping of the region 
also led al-Baruni to prioritise Arab unity over Ibadi and Berber identity. 
Throughout this period, there is no specific reference to the Berbers in the claims 
of any of the associations set up by the Libyan exiles. 
Beginning in the 1920s, Egyptian nationalists consistently influenced the 
political activity of the Libyan exiles, and contributed to the development of the 
latter’s political culture through their direct and indirect support of the exiles’ 
associations. It remains an open question whether Egyptian nationalists supported 
Libyan demands for independence because they recognised a shared idea of a 
“Libyan” nation, or whether their support was an act of solidarity articulating an 
agenda of “Arab unity”, a unity which would be led by Egypt.  
The outbreak of the Second World War hampered further developments of 
Libyan nationalism and caused fractures within the exile communities. The events 
of the war and its aftermath contributed to the re-emergence of divisions between 
Tripolitanians and Cyrenaicans, divisions which were reflected in the political 
parties formed in Tripolitania after 1945.43 But it is worth noting that the LLC 
Hay’at tahrir Libiya (The Libyan Liberation Committee, LLC) was established in 
1947 with the aim of bringing together the different nationalist groups, both from 
Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. In its first memorandum, addressed to the Council of 
Ministries in March 1947, the LLC mentioned Berbers directly.44 The 
memorandum, which asked for the unification and independence of Libya, stressed 
that this “united Libya” was characterized by an Arab identity forged by the Arabic 
language which had facilitated the intermixing and interlinking of Arabs and 
Berbers. 
Ultimately, the process of carving out the new and independent state of Libya 
was mainly determined by external powers, while local political force had little 
impact. Independent Libya was strongly marked by regionalism; besides the 
administrative regionalism which characterised the new state, it quickly became 
clear that the newfound feeling of national unity was meaningless to the majority 
of the population, with the exception of the Tripolitanian political class. Thus, the 
binomial of Arabism and Islam became the watchword for the construction of a 
new national identity. This binomial did not take into consideration the Berbers and 
other minorities groups in the country and denied them any official recognition. 
The Law on the Arabic Language, promulgated in 1952 just a few months after 
independence, institutionalised Arabic as the official language of the state in 
                                                          
43 On this period, see A. Baldinetti, The Origins of the Libyan Nation…, 110-130. 
44 TNA: PRO WO 230/206, Libyan Liberation Committee, Note addressed by the Libyan 
Representatives to the Foreign Ministers of the Four Big Powers, March 1947. 
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accordance with Article 186 of the Constitution.45 In fact, the 1951 Constitution, 
whilst formally guaranteeing the equality of citizens without discrimination on 
religious, ethnic, or linguistic grounds, and the freedom “to use any language in 
private transactions or religious or cultural matters or in the Press or any other 
publications or in public meetings” (Article 24), did not grant any particular rights 




Archivio Storico-Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASDMAE), Rome: 
ASMAI Libia 122/1-8, 150/14. 
Archives Nationales de Tunisie (ANT), Tunis: E 550/30-15. 
India Office Records (IOR), British Library London: L/PS/12/2990, R/15/6/450. 





Abu Yaqzan, Ibrahim, Sulayman al-Baruni Basha fi atwar hayatihi, al-Dar al-ʻUmaniyya, 
n. p. 1956. 
Al-Azri, Khalid M., Social and Gender Inequality in Oman: The Power of Religious and 
Political Tradition, Routledge, New York, 2013. 
Anderson, Lisa, The Tripoli Republic, 1918-1922, in E. G. H. Joffé - K. S. McLachlan 
(eds.), Social and Economic Development of Libya, Middle East and North African 
Studies Press, Wisbech, 1982, 43-79. 
Baldinetti, Anna, Orientalismo e Colonialismo. La ricerca di consenso in Egitto per 
l’impresa di Libia, Istituto per l’Oriente C.A. Nallino, Roma, 1997. 
Baldinetti, Anna, The Origins of the Libyan Nation. Colonial Legacy, Exile and the 
Emergence of a New Nation-State, Routledge, London-New York, 2010. 
Baldinetti, Anna, Languages in Libya: Building Blocks of National Identity and Soft Power 
Tools, The Journal of North African Studies, 23/3, 2018, 418-439. 
Bin Musa, Taysir, Kifah al-libiyyin al-siyasi fi Bilad al-Sham, 1925-1950, Markaz jihad al-
libiyyin didda al-ghazw al-itali, Tripoli, 1983. 
Colás, Alejandro, Internationalism in the Mediterranean, The Journal of North African 
Studies, 3/1, 1996, 211-233. 
                                                          
45 On the institutionalization of Arabic as the official language in Libya at independence, and the 
following Arabisation policies, see A. Baldinetti, Languages in Libya: Building Blocks of National 
Identity and Soft Power Tools, The Journal of North African Studies, 23/3, 2018, 419-421. 
46 M. Khadduri, Modern Libya: A Study in Political Development, The John Hopkins Press, 
Baltimore, 1963, 141-179, 342-362. 
128 The Idea of a United Libya 
Corò, Francesco, Una interessante pagina di storia libica. Suleiman el Baruni, il sogno di un 
principato berbero e la battaglia di Asàaba 1913, Gli annali dell’Africa Italiana, 1/3-4, 
1938, 959-969. 
Coury, Ralph M., The Making of an Egyptian Arab Nationalist. The Early Years of Azzam 
Pasha 1893-1936, Ithaca Press, Reading, 1998. 
Custers, Martin, Sulaymān al-Bārūnī, an Ibāḍī pan-Islamist, unpublished M.A. thesis, 
University of Leiden, 1972. 
Custers, Martin, al-Ibādiyya. A Bibliography. Second, revised and enlarged edition, Georg 
Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 2017. 
Fayyad, Bashir, Khilaf Sulayman al-Baruni maʿa Shakib Arslan’ hawla al-wahda al-
siyasiyya al-ʿarabiyya wa mawqif ʿAbd al-Hamid Ben Badin min-hu, Majallat al-
mustaqbal al-ʿarabi, 454, 2016, 117-128. 
Gershoni, Israel - Jankowski, James P., Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995. 
Ghazal, Amal, An Ottoman Pasha and the End of Empire: Sulayman al-Baruni and the 
Networks of Islamic Reform, in James Gelvin - Nile Green (eds.), Global Muslims in 
the Age of Steam and Print, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2013, 40-58. 
Ghuwayta, Miftah Bal‘id, al-Mawqif al-sha‘bi al-misri min harakat al-jihad fi Libiya, 
Markaz jihad al-libiyyin li-l-dirasat al-ta’rikhiyya, Tripoli, 2003. 
Insabato, Enrico, Gli Abaditi del Gebel Nafusa e la politica islamica in Tripolitania, Istituto 
Coloniale Italiano, Roma, 1918. 
Ismaʻil, ʻIzz al-Din, Sulayman al-Baruni: al-muʻallim al-muqatil, Dar al-ʻAwda, Beirut, 
1985. 
Khadduri, Majid, Modern Libya: A Study in Political Development, The John Hopkins 
Press, Baltimore, 1963. 
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The paper, based on archival sources and Arabic press, addresses the emergence and 
construction of a Libyan nation and nationalism, particularly among Libyan exiles, in the 
Mediterranean region from the 1930s until independence. Since the 1930s, associations of 
Libyan exiles in Tunisia, Syria and Egypt began to imagine the future of their country in an 
attempt to find an alternative to both Italian colonial occupation, and the older previous 
political system, which had collapsed in its wake. 
I discuss how the influence of Pan-Arabism in the theoretical elaboration of a “Libyan 
nation-state” led to referring to the Libyan nation as an Arab nation. The paper stresses the 
contribution of Sulayman al-Baruni to the debate. Particular attention is devoted to a series 
of articles published in 1937 by al-Baruni in al-Rabita al-‛Arabiyya. This weekly Egyptian 
magazine was an important instrument in giving voice to different points of view on the 
Libyan question. I argue that al-Baruni’s stress on an Arab-Islamic identity probably aimed 
at appeasing and overcoming the divergences between Tripolitanians and Cyrenaicans 
concerning the “imagined” future Libyan nation.  
(Upon independence, the Arabism-Islam binomial became the watchword for the 
construction of a new national identity. This binomial did not include the Berbers and other 
minority groups and denied them any official recognition). 
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La colonisation italienne : une narration impossible 
 
 
La littérature postcoloniale en langue italienne présente des caractéristiques 
marquantes qui la rendent unique dans le cadre des autres productions 
postcoloniales :1 
1) Elle émerge au début des années 90 du siècle dernier avec des écrits 
principalement autobiographiques, en grand retard par rapport à la fin de 
l’expérience coloniale. Ce décalage d’environ une cinquantaine d’années peut 
s’expliquer au niveau historique par la chute brutale du fascisme en septembre 
1943 et le renoncement forcé aux possessions coloniales à la suite de la 
signature du Traité de Paris le 10 février 1947. Les colonies italiennes n’ont 
donc pas vécu la période de décolonisation, comme c’est le cas par exemple de 
l’Algérie ou de l’Inde, c’est-à-dire le temps des luttes des populations 
colonisées contre les colonisateurs, où la littérature occupe une place importante 
et devient une arme de combat. 
2) Au début, elle apparaît de manière fragmentaire dans le cadre de la littérature de 
la migration et se mêle avec les écrivains transculturels en démontrant 
immédiatement une prise de conscience thématique-expressive et une maîtrise 
parfaite de la langue. 
3) Il faudra une quinzaine d’années pour qu’un corpus organique de romans se 
forme, en établissant donc vers 2005 l’émergence officielle d’une littérature 
postcoloniale en Italie. Ces romans ne s’affranchissent qu’en apparence du 
genre autobiographique, qu’ils proposent sous d’autres formes, à travers le jeu 
subtil des renvois distinctifs de la fiction et de l’autofiction. 
4) Elle se décline souvent, mais pas uniquement, comme écriture féminine. 
5) Elle se manifeste comme un rhizome (dans l’acception donnée au mot par 
Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari et reprise par Édouard Glissant), qui se 
multiplie et qui se disperse dans les nombreuses formes de différents 
témoignages : écrivains nés dans les ex-colonies qui ont immigré en Italie et 
                                                        
1  M. G. Negro, Il mondo, il grido, la parola. La questione linguistica nella letteratura 
postcoloniale italiana, Franco Cesati Editore, Firenze, 2015, 45-50. 
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ensuite ailleurs ; Italiens nés dans les territoires coloniaux qui, une fois revenus 
en Italie, ont dénoncé les abus de la colonisation ; enfants de Somaliens, 
Ethiopiens et Érythréens nés en Italie ; enfants de couples mixtes nés dans les 
ex-colonies et installés ensuite en Italie, démontrant la complexité du discours 
postcolonial italien. 
6) Elle se présente comme un témoin muet pour certaines colonies (Libye et 
Chine) et comme témoin tardif et non-organique pour d’autres (Albanie, 
Dodecanese, Grece, Slovenie). 
 
Nous arrivons ainsi au cœur de mon intervention : malgré une domination 
italienne relativement longue et organique, nous n’avons aujourd’hui aucun 
témoignage postcolonial direct de la Libye, c’est-à-dire qu’aucun écrivain libyen 
n’a thématisé des souvenirs coloniaux vécus en première personne ou à travers des 
narrations familiales dans un texte littéraire écrit en italien. L’écrivain italien 
Amara Lakhous, d’origine algérienne, pose la question de l’absence d’attestations 
postcoloniales de la Libye sous la forme d’une série de questions, qui invitent les 
Italiens à « s’inquiéter ».2 
Il faut d’abord enquêter sur les causes de ce mutisme pour détecter ensuite 
quand même des témoignages indirects, qui nous permettent de reconstruire la 
narration de l’occupation italienne. 
Grâce à l’apport des historiens, nous sommes capables de mieux éclairer les 
raisons de ce silence: la cruauté de la domination italienne qui, avec massacres, 
déportations et internements d’une grande partie de la population, a provoqué un 
véritable génocide de Libyens ;3 la fermeture des écoles publiques en 1911, qui a 
privé d’éducation une génération entière de Libyens ; l’analphabétisme diffus dans 
la population locale compensé par la diffusion de la littérature orale 
(particulièrement poèmes épiques et poésie) ; la surexposition propagandiste de la 
mémoire de la domination italienne du côté libyen (je pense à l’utilisation 
nationaliste de la lutte de résistance anticoloniale faite par Gheddafi ; à la jalaa de 
1970, c’est-à-dire l’expulsion définitive des italiens par le Colonel ; au financement 
en 1980 du film Omar al-Mukhtar. Lion of the Desert ; à ses discours au peuple 
                                                        
2 A. Lakhous, Maghreb, in A. Gnisci (éd.), Nuovo Planetario Italiano. Geografia e antologia 
della letteratura della migrazione in Italia e in Europa, Città Aperta Edizioni, Troina (EN), 2006, 
155.  
3 N. Labanca (éd.), Un nodo. Immagini e documenti sulla repressione coloniale italiana in Libia, 
Lacaita, Manduria, 2002 ; M. T. al-Jerary, Damages Caused by the Italian Fascist Colonization of 
Libya, in R. Ben-Ghiat - M. Fuller (éds.), Italian Colonialism, Palgrave Macmillian, New York, 2005, 
203-208 ; E. Salerno, Genocidio in Libia. Le atrocità nascoste dell’avventura coloniale italiana 
1911-1931, Manifestolibri, Roma, 2006 ; C. Di Sante - S. H. Hury (éds.), L’occupazione italiana 
della Libia. Violenza e colonialismo (1911-1943), Arti Grafiche Picene, Ascoli Piceno, 2009. 
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libyen en 2011, qui l’incitait au jihad contre les rebelles encore au nom et en 
souvenir de la défaite de la colonisation italienne). 
L’historien et politologue Ali Abdullatif Ahmida nous rappelle que les 
témoignages autobiographiques écrits par les Libyens qui ont vécu directement le 
colonialisme sont difficiles à trouver, précisément à cause de l’analphabétisme 
diffus dans la population locale au temps de l’occupation italienne, alors que les 
attestations orales liées à la poésie populaire sont plus nombreux.4 En 2014 a été 
publié à Tunis, traduit en français par Kamal Ben Hameda, un témoignage oral 
important des souffrances endurées par le peuple libyen : Le livre du camp 
d’Aguila. Il s’agit d’un chant de tourments et d’humiliations, en trente strophes 
brèves, dicté par le shaykh Rajab Bou Houaiche al-Mnafi, poète et résistant, à l’un 
de ses compagnons de captivité, lors de sa détention dans un camp de 
concentration érigé par les troupes de Mussolini. Al-Mnafi est un membre de la 
Confrérie Sanusiyya, à laquelle appartient aussi le chef de la résistance Omar al-
Mukhtar, et il arrive en 1932 dans le camp fasciste de détention après une marche 
forcée de 400 km dans le désert. La voix du poète nous rapporte en écho également 
les mots d’autres détenus du camp de El Agheila, leurs blessures et leurs 
souffrances face à la barbarie fasciste : l’arrachement aux terres, la douleur 
physique et mentale, l’avilissement, la mort des compagnons, la perte de toute 
dignité. Voilà deux citations de ce poème, d’où émerge l’impuissance devant le 
génocide de son propre peuple et sa propre condition d’esclavage : 
 
Mon seul tourment 
la perte de nos jeunes 
les fascistes les ont cueillis 
comme dattes mûres 
nos jeunes sans cesse se soulevaient  
et contre tout criminel faisaient front  




Je leur obéis comme un esclave  
auparavant 
j’étais digne et respecté 
mon séjour dans ce camp 
m’a dérobé la vie 
si faméliques 
nous tenons à peine debout  
pourtant nous devons 
                                                        
4 A. A. Ahmida, When the Subaltern Speak: Memory of Genocide in Colonial Libya 1929 to 
1933, Italian Studies, 61/2, 2006, 175-190. 
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soulever des charges si lourdes 
comme bagnards forts et agiles.5 
 
« » / « Mon seul tourment » : il s’agit d’un refrain répété vingt-six 
fois dans le bref poème, articulé selon un schéma métrique précis et un rythme 
constant, qui nous rappelle sa matrice orale, en provenance des chants bédouins du 
désert libyen. De même, la structure prosodique, avec un vers divisé en trois 
hémistiches, au lieu des deux de la lyrique arabe classique, et la présence du 
dialecte libyen particulièrement évident avec les noms des tribus et du bétail, 
confirment l’origine orale de ce poème. 
Pour bénéficier de reformulations littéraires écrites sur la présence italienne en 
Libye nous devons recourir aux écrivains de la communauté juive et aux Italiens 
nés dans l’ex-colonie, mais il est évident que ces témoignages, très importants, ne 
peuvent pas guérir cette blessure profonde et ce vide de voix locales qui nous 
décrivent la colonisation du point de vue des colonisés. 
En ce qui concerne la communauté juive, je cite rapidement un groupe 
d’écrivains de la communauté séfarade et leurs romans écrits en italien : David 
Gerbi, Costruttori di pace. Storia di un ebreo profugo dalla Libia, 2003 ; Arthur 
Jorno, Il ribelle, 2003 ; Victor Magiar, E venne la notte. Ebrei in un paese arabo, 
2003. Déjà à commencer par les titres de ces romans, on comprend bien que la 
focalisation de la narration reste l’histoire de la présence juive dans un pays arabe, 
mais les pages dédiées à l’enfance des écrivains rendent bien l’ambiance de Tripoli 
dans les années 30 et 40 du siècle dernier. Il en ressort la description d’une ville 
dynamique, cosmopolite, multiconfessionnelle, avec les lieux de loisirs 
typiquement italiens, comme le stade et le cinéma, mais aussi avec les difficultés 
de l’apprentissage scolaire de l’histoire coloniale.6 
En ce qui concerne les Italiens nés dans l’ex-colonie, non appartenant à la 
communauté juive, je cite rapidement un groupe d’écrivains qui, comme les 
précédents, consignent à l’écriture autobiographique leurs souvenirs de Tripoli, 
cette fois du temps du fascisme jusqu’à la jalaa : Paola Hoffmann, La mia Libia, 
1990 ; Luciana Capretti, Ghibli, 2004 ; Luisa Pachera, Tripoli 1970: allontanati 
dalla nostra vita, 2010 ; Alma Abate, Ultima estate in suol d’amore, 2010. Dans ce 
cas aussi, la focalisation reste l’attachement à un pays vécu comme le sien, la 
nostalgie d’un monde multiculturel et l’arrachement du départ définitif de la Libye. 
De nouveau, il en ressort la géographie classique d’une ville coloniale, avec les 
maisons Incis édifiées par le fascisme pour les fonctionnaires, avec le quartier 
                                                        
5 R. B. Houaiche Almnafi - K. Ben Hameda, Poème du camp d’Aguila, Elyzad, Tunis, 2014, 30 
et 26. 
6 Pour une analyse plus détaillée de ces écrivains, voir D. Comberiati, Identità ibride. Scrittori 
ebraico-libici di lingua italiana, Zapruder. Brava gente. Memoria e rappresentazione del colonialismo 
italiano, 23, 2010, 98-105. 
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résidentiel italien de la Cité Jardin, avec le marchand de glace sicilien, mais avec 
assez peu de Libyens comme figures individuelles (à l’exception du roman de 
Hoffmann). 
Aussi, dans la littérature libyenne contemporaine le souvenir de la présence 
italienne est bien présent comme l’attestent par exemple les romans d’Ibrahim al-
Koni. En particulier, dans le recueil de contes Waṭan al-ru’ā al-samāwiyya, paru en 
traduction italienne en 2007 (La Patria delle visioni celesti e altri racconti), entre 
les atmosphères magiques du désert et les passionnantes traditions touareg, se 
dégagent des aperçus historiques d’une incroyable cruauté : les résistants libyens 
morts de faim à cause des dévastations italiennes ; la dissémination des mines 
italiennes dans le territoire; le barbelé et les fourches patibulaires répandus partout; 
la bataille sanglante de Cufra; les massacres aveugles effectués par les Italiens; les 
pendaisons commandées par Balbo ; les prisonniers avec la corde déjà au cou 
obligés à regarder leurs femmes brûlées vivantes ; les violences sexuelles sur les 
femmes locales et d’autres terribles tortures.7 La figure de Graziani prévaut par sa 
malveillance, bien condensée dans le dialogue fondé sur la loi du plus fort qu’il 
entretient avec le chef de la résistance libyenne Omar al-Mukhtar et qui rappelle le 
discours entre Athéniens et habitants de l’île de Milos, contenu dans la Guerre du 
Péloponnèse de Thucydide: 
 
« Sais-tu combien de soldats nous avons et combien sont par contre les forces dont 
tu disposes ? »  
« Oui, je le sais, dizaines de milliers, et mes hommes seulement quelques centaines. » 
« Sais-tu de quel équipage nous disposons ? » 
« Oui, je le sais, le plus moderne. » 
« Pensais-tu nous battre avec tes hommes et avec ton équipage ? » 
« Non, je savais que je ne pouvais pas y arriver. » 
« Pourquoi nous as-tu combattus, alors ? » 
« Je n’ai accompli que mon devoir. »8 
 
Gheddafi, lors de sa visite officielle en Italie en 2009, portait, épinglée sur son 
uniforme, une photo du héros anticolonial, 9  témoignant à quel point encore 
aujourd’hui les histoires entre les deux pays sont entremêlées. Mais quels souvenirs 
de la domination libyenne sont restés dans l’imaginaire italien contemporain ? Je 
citerai à présent trois évènements, détecteurs du refoulement qui caractérise la 
                                                        
7  I. al-Koni, La patria delle visioni celesti e altri racconti, Roma, edizioni e/o 2007, 
respectivement pages 92; 190; 199; 200; 207; 225; 230; 245. 
8 Idem, page 197: notre traduction. 
9  https://www.corriere.it/politica/09_giugno_10/gheddafi_foto_provocazione_ccc2daa4-55b6-11de- 
8b38-00144f02aabc.shtml  
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narration coloniale libyenne dans la construction de l’identité italienne 
contemporaine :10 
 
1) Je traduis le commentaire d’un lecteur, Monsieur Sosio, publié sur le site du 
journal Il Giornale après la signature entre Berlusconi et Gheddafi en 30 août 2008 
du Traité de Bengasi sur l’immigration et sur la coopération entre les deux pays, 
qui prévoyait aussi une compensation monétaire de la part de l’Italie pour 
l’occupation militaire du passé : 
 
Je suis né tout de suite après la guerre, mais de ce que j’ai appris de l’école, de 
l’histoire, de mes lectures, de mon père et des vieux du village, il semble que les 
Italiens, dans cette colonisation, n’ont fait que du bien et rien d’autre. Après, ceux 
qui étaient restés là-bas pour faire progresser les Bédouins, Gheddafi les a pillés de 
tous leurs biens et il les a renvoyés en Italie comme des réfugiés. Maintenant, c’est à 
nous de les rembourser ? Je crois que cette fois le sens des affaires du Président [du 
Premier Ministre Berlusconi] a complètement raté.11 
 
Comme le fait remarquer Chiara Ottaviano, la lettre de Monsieur Sosio résume 
bien la pensée de la plupart des Italiens qui, généralement divisés sur tout entre 
fascistes et antifascistes, entre catholiques et laïcs, entre droite et gauche, partagent 
dans la vision idéalisée du passé colonial une unique page historique de mémoire 
commune.12 
 
2) Déjà dans les années 30 du siècle dernier, circulait un témoignage direct des 
cruautés de la domination italienne en Libye écrit par un jeune danois, Knud 
Holmboe, qui traversa toute l’Afrique du Nord d’ouest en est en voiture. Son livre 
Desert Encounter. An Adventurous Journey through Italian Africa, publié en 1931, 
fût interdit en Italie. Il sera traduit en italien avec le titre Incontro nel deserto et ne 
sera publié qu’en 2005 par la maison d’édition Longanesi. 
3) Le destin de ce livre rappelle celui du film Lion of the Desert, du metteur en 
scène Mustapha Akkad, que j’ai mentionné précédemment. Ce film narre la 
résistance libyenne contre le fascisme italien conduite par le chef Omar al-
Mukhtar. Le film, réalisé en 1980, fût interdit en Italie pour « diffamation des 
Forces Armées italiennes » selon les mots du Premier Ministre Giulio Andreotti. 
En 1987, dans une projection publique du film à Trento, intervint la DIGOS (c’est-
à-dire la police qui s’occupe du terrorisme et du maintien de l’ordre public) pour 
                                                        
10 A. M. Morone, Asimmetrie postcoloniali: le relazioni italo-libiche tra storia e memoria, in F. 
Sinopoli (éd.), Postcoloniale italiano. Tra letteratura e storia, Novalogos, Aprilia, 2013, 174-190. 
11 http://storieinmovimento.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Zap23_2-Zoom1.pdf 
12 C. Ottaviano, Riprese coloniali. I documentari Luce e la «Settimana Incom», Zapruder. Brava 
gente. Memoria e rappresentazione del colonialismo italiano, 23, 2010, 10. 
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confisquer les bobines du film. En 2003, le Ministre des Biens Culturels Giuliano 
Urbani n’octroya pas d’autorisation pour la diffusion du film sur la RAI (la 
télévision d’État). Le film a été projeté, enfin, sur une télévision privée, Sky, le 11 
juin 2009, après la visite officielle de Gheddafi en Italie. En 2009, à la suite de 
cette rencontre, la réalisation d’un autre film fût bloquée : Dhulm: Years of 
Torment, du metteur en scène syrien Najdat Anzour. Le scénario de ce film était 
fondé sur un texte de Gheddafi concernant la déportation de cinq-cents Libyens 
dans les îles Tremiti survenue en 1911 (dhulm en arabe signifie « noir, obscurité »). 
Grâce à Naman Tarcha, alors assistant réalisateur, l’unique tronçon resté du film 
est visible sur Internet.13 
 
Voilà donc quelques exemples du refoulement de l’occupation libyenne dans 
l’Italie contemporaine. L’absence presque totale d’une littérature postcoloniale 
produite par des écrivains libyens malheureusement ne fait que renforcer ce mur 
d’obstination, qui empêche l’Italie non seulement de prendre conscience de son 
propre passé, mais aussi de lire les évènements contemporains qui lient encore les 
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Le cadre général de cette intervention fait référence à la littérature postcoloniale en 
langue italienne et à son unicité par rapport à la production littéraire d’autres pays, comme 
la France et l’Angleterre. 
Dans ce cadre on constate immédiatement l’absence totale d’une littérature postcoloniale 
libyenne en langue italienne, malgré la longue domination de notre pays. Après avoir analysé 
les causes de ce mutisme, l’intervention se focalise sur les rares témoignages directs de la 
colonisation italienne (tradition orale) et sur les narrations indirectes (écrivains de la 
communauté juive nés dans l’ancienne colonie, anciens colons italiens, auteurs libyens 
contemporains qui thématisent dans leurs œuvres la violence des dominateurs). 
L’absence totale d’une production libyenne postcoloniale dans la langue des anciens 
dominateurs a des effets aussi sur l’identité italienne contemporaine, privée d’un important 







LAURA TROVELLESI CESANA 
 
 
Journalisme, journaux et journalistes dans la construction  




La littérature historique (en particulier les recherches italiennes) a accordé une 
attention particulière à l’occupation italienne en Libye de 1911/1912, en référence 
à l’extraordinaire couverture médiatique qui lui a été accordée par la presse 
nationale.1 L’intérêt de la presse italienne à promouvoir le dessein expansionniste 
de l’Italie libérale et sa détermination à proposer l’action de la conquête comme un 
moment de partage national ont favorisé la formation croissante d’une opinion 
publique nationale2 qui n’a aucun précédent dans la brève expérience du nouvel 
État unitaire. Ainsi, notre recherche prendra en considération les particularités de la 
presse italienne dans ce contexte historique pour en comprendre les raisons de son 
action. 
                                                 
1 La discipline historiographique, qui a produit des œuvres importantes à deux périodes 
différentes, entre les années 70 et 90 du XXe siècle et la première décennie du XXIe siècle, a été 
complétée par les contributions importantes de certains historiens du journalisme qui ont fourni à la 
recherche scientifique des pistes d’investigation et des sources documentaires inédites. Cf., entre 
autres : G. Farinelli - E. Paccagnini - G. Santambrogio - A. I. Villa, Storia del giornalismo italiano. 
Dalle origini ai nostri giorni, Utet, Torino, 1997 ; V. Castronovo - N. Tranfaglia (éds.), Storia della 
stampa italiana, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1976-1994 ; Vol. 2 : La stampa italiana del Risorgimento (A. 
Galante Garrone, I giornali della Restaurazione 1815-1847, F. Della Paruta, Il giornalismo dal 1847 
all’Unità) ; Vol. 3 : La stampa italiana nell’età liberale (V. Castronovo, Stampa e opinione pubblica 
nell’Italia liberale, L. Giacheri Fossati - N. Tranfaglia, La stampa quotidiana dalla Grande Guerra al 
fascismo 1914-1922) ; G. Gozzini, Storia del giornalismo, Bruno Mondadori, Milano, 2000 ; P. 
Murialdi, Storia del giornalismo italiano. Dalle gazzette a Internet, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2006 (Nuova 
ed.) ; M. Forno, Informazione e potere. Storia del giornalismo italiano, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2012, G. 
Tartaglia, Un secolo di giornalismo italiano. Storia della Federazione nazionale della stampa 
italiana, Mondadori, Milano, 2008, vol. 1 (1877-1943). 
2 Cf., entre autres : C. Di Sante, La stampa e la guerra di Libia, in M. Severini (éd.), L’Italia e la 
guerra di Libia, Associazione di Storia contemporanea e Società pesarese di Studi storici, Pesaro, 
2012, 57-75 ; M. Pincherle, La preparazione dell’opinione pubblica all’impresa di Libia, Rassegna 
storica del Risorgimento, LVI, 1969, f. III, 450-482 ; M. Tesoro, Stampa e opinione pubblica in Italia 
al tempo della guerra con l’Impero ottomano, Il Politecnico, LV, 1990, 4. 
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Les conditions arriérées du pays ont conditionné les processus évolutifs des 
médias et leur rôle dans la société touchée par de profonds changements. Dans la 
première décennie du vingtième siècle, le système de l’édition italienne luttait 
encore pour se libérer du modèle qui avait caractérisé la période du Risorgimento.3 
L’absence de définition de la figure du journaliste, la difficulté à considérer les 
nouvelles comme une valeur économique nécessaire au développement d’un 
système d’édition moderne structuré selon une logique de marché sur le modèle 
existant en France et en Angleterre, les problèmes liés à la recherche des ressources 
ainsi que le retard technologique, l’héritage des États pré-unitaires entravant la 
création de marchés non régionaux, la lenteur de l’intégration politique de la 
population (suffrage universel masculin institué en 1912), l’hétérogénéité 
culturelle, sont des éléments qui ont empêché le développement d’une presse 
d’information, même dans un contexte de transformation. Tous ces éléments ont 
alimenté les débats au sein de la catégorie alors naissante des journalistes et les 
dynamiques de la guerre de Libye ont constitué un banc d’essai pour la définition 
de leur identité professionnelle et la bataille pour la liberté de presse. 
En effet, dans ce contexte, l’attitude de la presse s’est caractérisée, d’une part, 
par la contiguïté avec la classe politique (qui a joué un rôle prépondérant dans le 
soutien à la presse, et donc dans son contrôle, par des formes de financements 
directs, indirects et dans certains cas cachés) et par la qualité des investissements 
privés des grands groupes industriels intéressés par la presse principalement pour 
se doter d’instruments de pression politique en faveur d’intérêts spécifiques et, 
d’autre part, par la recherche d’une modernisation du journalisme pour le public, 
avec des avant-gardes plus repérables dans les journaux milanais tels que Il Secolo 
et Corriere della Sera.4 
La presse a également joué un rôle de premier plan dans la propagation du 
sentiment colonialiste, mais le très vaste consensus populaire que la guerre pour la 
conquête de la Libye enregistrait dans le pays était déterminée par d’autres facteurs 
qui agirent dans l’espace public. La conquête du territoire d’outre-mer a été 
caractérisée par une grande mobilisation visant à la construction d’une « nouvelle 
Italie » à l’époque où l’Europe vivait la saison de sa mondialisation.5 
Le virage belliciste représentait bien plus qu’une conquête (tardive) d’un 
territoire d’Outre-mer. Autour de ce défi se mesuraient des processus internes au 
pays, comme l’apparition des premières esquisses d’un système capitaliste 
                                                 
3 P. Murialdi, op. cit., 55 : « le journalisme italien de la période du Risorgimento s’est développé 
avec une forte connotation politique et reste avant tout une vraie activité politique. La figure du 
journaliste assume donc des traits particuliers et il est rare que l’engagement politique ne prévale pas 
sur celui professionnel. Les journaux sont des instruments de lutte politique et d’agrégation de 
consensus. De plus, les meilleurs périodiques ont une empreinte formatrice » (notre traduction). 
4 Idem, 76-87. 
5 E. Gentile, Ascesa e declino dell’Europa nel mondo, 1898-1918, Garzanti, Milano, 2018. 
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industriel, qui ont mis en évidence l’étroite corrélation entre les banques et les 
industries, la politique et les médias.6 
Sur le choix interventionniste, on peut mettre en évidence les anciennes et les 
nouvelles familles politiques, les relations entre l’État et l’Église, dont les effets ont 
duré bien au-delà de la période du conflit italo-turc, après l’implication du « Banco 
di Roma » en tant qu’instrument de pénétration pacifique en Tripolitaine et en 
Cyrénaïque, déjà matérialisée en 1907 avec l’ouverture d’une première succursale 
à Tripoli.7 
Avec la nouvelle guerre coloniale, l’armée avait activé une puissante machine 
de propagande, vécue comme une occasion de rédemption après la défaite d’Adua, 
pour conférer pour la première fois à l’imaginaire collectif un sentiment identique à 
celui construit autour de la figure du soldat, symbole de la nouvelle patrie.8  
La conquête coloniale a traversé aussi les mouvements féministes italiens. Le 
débat circulant dans l’espace public à travers les magazines féminins et la 
représentation des femmes dans la presse trouva un reflet cohérent dans le registre 
patriotique de la « Mère », à la fois dans sa dimension familiale, donc domestique, 
et dans sa dimension publique en tant que « Mère de la Patrie », car mère de soldat, 
combattant pour la « nouvelle Italie ».9 
Il s’agissait donc d’une mobilisation extraordinaire10 qui a eu lieu dans l’espace 




                                                 
6 Cf. A. Aruffo, Il colonialismo italiano da Crispi a Mussolini, Datanews, Roma, 2007; D. Mack 
Smith, Storia d’Italia dal 1861 al 1997, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2007 ; F. Cammarano, Storia dell’Italia 
liberale, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2000 ; A. Lepre - C. Petraccone, Storia d’Italia dall’Unità a oggi, Il 
Mulino, Bologna, 2012. 
7 Cf., entre autres, A. D’Alessandro, Il Banco di Roma e la guerra di Libia, Storia e Politica, 
VII/3, 1968, 491-509 ; L. De Rosa - G. De Rosa, Storia del Banco di Roma, Banco di Roma, Roma, 
1982-1984, voll. 1-3 ; R. Mori, La penetrazione pacifica italiana in Libia dal 1907 al 1911 e il Banco 
di Roma, Rivista di studi politici e internazionali, XXIV/1, 1957, 102-118. 
8 N. Labanca, La guerra italiana per la Libia 1911-1931, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2012; V. Nocentini, 
Il palcoscenico della guerra di Libia. Protagonisti, retorica, nazione, 1911-1912, PhD, Columbia 
University, 2013, 55-73 et 98-138. B. Vandervort, Verso la Quarta sponda. La guerra italiana per la 
Libia 1911-1912, Ufficio Storico Esercito, Roma, 2014. 
9 A. Forti Messina, La guerra spiegata alle donne, L’impresa di Libia nella stampa femminile 
1911-1912, Biblink editori, Roma, 2011 ; S. Bartoloni, Donne di fronte alla guerra, Laterza, Roma-
Bari, 2017 ; C. Papa, Sotto altri cieli, L’Oltremare nel movimento femminile italiano (1870-1915), 
Viella, Roma, 2009. 
10 A. Schiavulli, La Guerra lirica. Il dibattito dei letterati italiani nell’impresa di Libia (1911-
1912), Pozzi, Ravenna, 2009 ; S. Romano, La quarta sponda. La Guerra di Libia 1911/1912, 
Longanesi, Milano, 1977 ; R. Reali - A. Ricci, Libia: confini, relazioni e conseguenze di una guerra 
coloniale, in La Grande Guerra, L’Italia e il Levante, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, De Luca Editori 
D’Arte, Roma, 2018, 43-50. 
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La guerre contre l’empire ottoman et la nouvelle Italie encore en construction 
En 1911, l’entrée en guerre de l’Italie, unifiée depuis seulement cinquante ans, 
contre l’Empire ottoman marque l’aboutissement d’une ambition qu’elle 
poursuivait depuis près d’une trentaine d’années, à savoir rejoindre les autres 
puissances européennes dans la « ruée vers l’Afrique » engagée tout au long du 
XIXe siècle. Une ambition à deux visages, puisqu’elle est destinée autant à affirmer 
la place de la nouvelle nation italienne sur la scène internationale qu’à renforcer 
l’idée collective d’une communauté encore en construction. 
C’est sur la nécessité d’assurer un territoire d’outre-mer jugé nécessaire par les 
classes dirigeantes que se confrontent en réalité les différentes parties constitutives 
d’un pays né du Risorgimento : l’État, la politique, l’économie, le modèle de 
société, l’idée de peuple. La conquête de la Libye par le Royaume d’Italie est, en 
effet, l’une des étapes les plus complexes de l’histoire post-unitaire. Bien entendu, 
la longue phase de préparation de ce conflit est également motivée par des intérêts 
économiques, déjà caractéristiques des premières incursions en Afrique et 
considérés par les classes dirigeantes comme la réponse au spectaculaire retard de 
l’Italie dans les premières décennies qui suivirent l’unification. 
 
Le caractère élitiste d’un choix et le très vaste consensus populaire 
Il est intéressant de remarquer que le caractère élitiste de la participation 
italienne au « jeu » du partage de l’Afrique, exclusivement réservé à la classe 
dirigeante, n’empêchera pas pour autant la propagation d’un très vaste consensus 
populaire en faveur de la guerre pour la conquête de la Libye. Les recherches 
historiques ont montré que le rôle de la presse a été un facteur clé dans le virage 
belliciste. Pour certains, il a représenté le détonateur d’un mécanisme savamment 
activé au fil du temps. 
La propagande nationaliste a joué un rôle non négligeable, ayant trouvé ses 
principaux moyens d’expression dans les magazines et les journaux, de Il Regno 
fondé en 1903 à L’Idea nazionale qui publie la première fois le 1er Mars 1911, 
anniversaire de la défaite d’Adua, après la naissance de l’Association nationaliste 
italienne en décembre 1910.11 Cependant, comme indique Castronovo, 
 
accanto e certamente più delle infiammate campagne giornalistiche e della 
mobilitazione ‘piazzaiola’ dei circoli e dei fogli nazionalisti – fu la grande stampa 
d’informazione a svolgere in effetti un ruolo di rilievo, almeno nel creare un clima 
sempre più pressante di orientamenti politici e di opinione pubblica suscettibile di 
per sé di affrettare e anche di forzare i tempi della decisione governativa di 
intervento in Libia.12 
                                                 
11 Che cosa si vuole dalla Tripolitania?, L’Idea nazionale, 1er mars 1911. 
12 V. Castronovo, La stampa italiana dall’Unità al fascismo, Laterza, Bari, 1970, 192-193 ; trad. 
par l’A. : « à côté, et certainement plus des campagnes journalistiques enflammées et de la 
mobilisation de rue, des cercles et des pamphlets nationalistes, c’est la grande presse d’information 
Laura Trovellesi Cesana 145 
Les dynamiques que l’Italie expérimentait dans la construction d’une opinion 
publique favorable à la guerre sont fortement liées à la mise en place d’un premier 
discours sur la Libye et de la formation d’une idée de nation, renforcée par ailleurs 
par la représentation de la définition de l’Autre, de la différence. 
L’omniprésence attribuée à la presse italienne au début du XXe siècle serait 
cependant mieux ciblée dans le processus qui détermina la naissance d’un espace 
public où prend forme une pensée dominante qui écarte les voix dissidentes, en les 
reléguant dans le périmètre de l’antipatriotisme. Si l’opinion publique trouve 
habituellement son expression dans la dialectique entre grands courants la plupart 
du temps opposées, celle qui prend forme dans le pays dès la première tentative 
d’expansion coloniale italienne jusqu’à la guerre en Libye ne se nourrissait que 
d’une seule pensée.  
Dans le pays naissait le profond sentiment que cette guerre avait pour but de 
construire définitivement la nation, que la nouvelle grande Italie était sur le point 
de devenir une réalité reconnue de tous comme l’écrivait Pasquale Villari dans son 
article publié le 24 Octobre 1912, sur le Corriere della Sera. Pour l’historien, 
 
la guerre menée en Libye a été la première guerre pour laquelle l’enthousiasme fut 
vraiment manifeste dans la nation tout entière, dépassant, à son avis, de loin le 
consensus sur les batailles qui portèrent à la naissance de l’État unitaire. 
 
La conquête des territoires de l’Afrique du Nord, écrit encore Villari, 
 
a concerné tous les niveaux sociaux : l’aristocratie et la bourgeoisie, les gens de la 
campagne et de la ville, le Sud de l’Italie aussi, peut-être même plus que le Nord. Le 
clergé lui-même (...) a béni nos soldats de l’autel (...). 
 
La formation d’une opinion publique nationale, un long processus déterminé 
par plusieurs facteurs 
La construction du consensus autour d’un double objectif – la poussée sur le 
levier identitaire lié à la conquête d’un territoire de l’autre côté de la frontière – fut 
un processus qui commença bien avant que les voix des nationalistes ne se lèvent à 
l’intérieur de la société italienne.13 Un long processus déterminé par plusieurs 
facteurs.  
Parmi ceux-ci, les activités éditoriales des sociétés géographiques et 
d’exploration, nées elles aussi en Italie entre 1867 et 1880, ont joué un rôle 
                                                                                                                            
qui a joué un rôle important, du moins dans la création d’un climat toujours plus pressant 
d’orientations politiques et d’opinion publique qui eut la possibilité d’accélérer et même de forcer le 
moment de la décision du gouvernement d’intervenir en Libye ». 
13 D. Grange, Peut-on parler au début du XXe siècle d’un « parti colonial » italien?, in Fonti e 
problemi della politica coloniale italiana, Atti del Convegno Taormina-Messina, 23-28 octobre 1989, 
Mibac, Ufficio centrale per i Beni Archivistici, Roma, 1996, vol. I. 
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important : la première était la Società geografica italiana. Plus tard nous 
trouverons la Società di Esplorazione Commerciale in Africa di Milano et la 
Società Africana di Napoli, avec la dénomination de Club Africano.14 
En général, il s’agissait de sociétés consacrées à des explorations scientifiques 
dans des domaines inexplorés du monde, qui orienteront bientôt leur horizon vers 
des territoires jugés intéressants d’un point de vue économique et commercial. Les 
associations nées en Italie auront un caractère encore plus envahissant dans la 
société en propulsant la perspective de l’expansion coloniale si on les compare aux 
associations les plus anciennes présentes dans les autres pays européens. Toutefois 
comme dans les associations européennes, qui avaient changé d’horizon avec 
l’entrée dans les listes des fondateurs et des investisseurs des grands noms de la 
finance et de l’industrie, de la même manière, les sociétés italiennes ont été 
animées par les Pirelli, Erba, Rossi, Gondrand, Rubattino.15  
Le changement de mission des sociétés géographiques en Europe est dûment 
enregistré par Guidetti, qui affirme : 
 
(l’) obligation morale induite par la supériorité sur les peuples primitifs, barbares, 
misérables de faim et de maladie : la concrétisation technico-scientifique de la 
rationalité occidentale ne permet plus de douter, fixe les paramètres d’évaluation de 
la civilisation et de ses itinéraires obligatoires.16 
 
Si, selon Natili, les activités de ces associations seront caractérisées par l’action 
en tant que groupe de pression sur la classe politique et la société en faveur d’une 
exploration organisée,17 on peut ajouter que la présence continue des protagonistes 
de la vie parlementaire et politique, même de premier plan, dans les conseils 
d’administration des plus importantes sociétés italiennes aura un grand poids dans 
la tentative de concrétiser la perspective coloniale, déversée ensuite dans l’espace 
public à l’aide de différents instruments. 
C’est encore Natili qui souligne comment l’action de la Società geografica 
italiana en particulier se jouera entre la politique et l’opinion publique, où elle 
exercera sa stratégie coloniale et c’est dans ce cadre que les idéaux, politiques et 
économiques, à l’origine de l’expansionnisme colonial italien doivent être 
recherchés.18 
 
                                                 
14 D. Natili, Un programma coloniale ; La Società geografica Italiana e le origini dell’espansione 
in Etiopia 1867-1884, Istituto per la Storia del Risorgimento italiano, Serie II: Memorie, vol. LVI, 
Gangemi Editore, Roma, 2008. 
15 M. Guidetti (éd.), Il passaggio del secolo e la Grande Guerra, in AA.VV., Storia d’Italia e 
d’Europa, vol. 7, Jaca Book, Milano, 1983.  
16 AA.VV., Storia d’Italia e d’Europa, 72-76. 
17 D. Natili, op. cit. 
18 Ibidem. 
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Le premier discours public sur la Libye, les topoi 
En effet, au cours des trente années de débats parlementaires à partir de 1881, 
l’année de la soi-disant « perte » de la Tunisie, jusqu’à la déclaration de guerre à 
l’Empire ottoman du 27 Septembre 1911, les activités des sociétés d’exploration 
ainsi que leurs affaires intérieures ont trouvé écho dans l’hémicycle de la Chambre 
des députés et du Sénat du Royaume, où prennent forme, bien avant la possibilité 
de la guerre, les idées de pénétration pacifique dans les territoires libyens, mais 
aussi les topoi qui ont marqué le premier discours public sur la Libye.  
Topoi que l’on peut retrouver dans les activités éditoriales des sociétés citées et 
dans les rapports des organes d’information. Le recours au journaliste-amphibie – 
une personne qui fournissait gratuitement et de manière intéressée des 
correspondances politiques de Rome – était une pratique répandue.19 Dans une 
sorte de circularité dynamique, générée par plusieurs champs apparemment 
distincts, les raisons de la conquête descendirent dans l’espace public. 
Le mythe de Rome, qui réapparaissait dans les territoires d’Afrique du Nord sur 
les ruines d’un passé défini comme « fécond » pour ce territoire,20 montrait que la 
Libye, après tout, n’était pas un territoire inconnu. Au contraire, les traces 
évidentes et diffuses de l’âge classique suggéraient l’inévitabilité d’un retour. Le 
retour à ces terres aurait coïncidé avec la reconquête de l’ancienne splendeur, 
rendue possible grâce au labeur assidu des Italiens, qui arrivés là-bas – et qui 
n’étaient donc plus obligés d’émigrer loin – auraient travaillé avec sacrifice à côté 
des populations autochtones libérées du joug ottoman. Des territoires fertiles mais 
pas encore productifs les attendaient en raison de l’incapacité des indigènes. 
Une idée forte se propagea dans l’espace public et marqua les années 
précédentes le conflit italo-turc : il s’agissait d’attribuer au peuple libyen la volonté 
de se libérer de « l’oppresseur ottoman » ; les libyens seraient donc prêts à se 
ranger du côté des libérateurs italiens qui renouaient ainsi avec les idéaux 
fondateurs de l’État unitaire, qui célébrait en 1911 ses 50 premières années, ce qui 
justifiait donc une intervention militaire. Idée qui s’est révélée être une erreur 
stratégique dans les opérations de conquête militaire. Les classes dirigeantes, si 
attentives depuis les premières tentatives d’élargir l’orientation des mécanismes de 
l’information et de la propagande, furent-elles victimes de la pensée dominante ou 
plus probablement en payeraient-elles consciemment le prix ? 
À cheval entre le XIXe et le XXe siècle, une importante production éditoriale 
reflétait l’objectif de l’expansion coloniale. En peu de temps de nombreux journaux 
virent le jour : Il Giornale delle Colonie, L’Espansionista, La Rivista d’Africa. Les 
magazines s’étendent aussi aux plus jeunes. 
                                                 
19 M. Forno, Informazione e potere, Storia del Giornalismo italiano, 32. 
20 M. L. Musso, Prima della Grande Guerra: esplorazioni e archeologia in Libia in età giolittiana, 
in La Grande Guerra. L’Italia e il Levante, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, De Luca Editori D’Arte, 
Roma, 2018, 51-56. 
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Ces publications ont contribué à la détermination d’un discours public à la suite 
duquel ont été ajoutés les travaux des soi-disant voyageurs-propagandistes. Parmi 
eux, beaucoup plus tard, nous retrouvons des journalistes envoyés à Tripoli pour 
suivre les événements de la guerre : Giuseppe Bevione de La Stampa de Turin, 
Giuseppe Piazza de La Tribuna, Enrico Corradini pour L’Illustrazione Italiana. 
Dans leurs rapports, quelques mois avant le déclenchement de la guerre, ils avaient 
loué la fertilité des territoires libyens.21 C’est grâce à cette vaste activité éditoriale 
que la Libye, presque inconnue des italiens, sera transformée en imaginaire 
collectif en quelques décennies seulement, passant de terre inconnue à « terre 
promise ».22 
 
Le contrôle de la presse et le genre de journalisme 
Le colonialisme de l’Italie libérale marque l’action gouvernementale et 
diplomatique.23 Le contrôle presque obsessionnel de la presse par les 
gouvernements de Royaume d’Italie était une constante. Dans les décennies qui ont 
suivi l’unification, les journaux ont assumé un rôle d’une importance 
disproportionnée pour les gouvernements, ayant été identifiés comme le vecteur 
des efforts des classes dirigeantes pour transformer le pays en un État moderne et 
efficace, même si, pour cette période, comme le souligne Forno,24 on peut parler 
d’une expression plutôt modeste du journalisme d’information. 
Bien que l’article 28 du Statut Albertin de 1848 ait affirmé et reconnu la liberté 
de la presse et que l’édit suivant en réglementait l’exercice, la non-uniformité du 
territoire post-unitaire ne permit pas sa correcte application. Les dispositions 
concernant la répression des abus possibles ont été bien plus déployées que les 
garanties pour la liberté de la presse. Il faudra attendre le 28 juin 1906 pour que la 
pratique de la saisie préventive soit abolie. En 1873, le tirage total de 555 journaux, 
revues et magazines publiés en Italie, caractérisés par conséquent par une forte 
dimension territoriale, n’a pas encore dépassé les 800.000 exemplaires, exactement 
797.520.25 Le taux d’analphabétisme est encore élevé (69% avec des taux très 
élevés dans certaines régions du Sud). La population atteint les 26 millions. 
La possession (directe ou indirecte), comme l’acquisition de la première agence 
de presse Stefani, et le contrôle des journaux comptait énormément, en particulier 
pour les 29 gouvernements qui s’alternèrent de 1881 à 1911. Sur la possession et le 
contrôle des journaux, les politiques créèrent des structures de surveillance – 
comme celles du Ministère de l’Intérieur – et allouèrent des ressources détournées 
                                                 
21 A. Del Boca, La nostra Africa nel racconto di cinquanta italiani che l’hanno percorsa, 
esplorata e amata, Neri Pozza, Vicenza, 2003. 
22 A. Del Boca, Gli italiani in Libia. Tripoli bel suol d’amore 1860- 1922, vol. 1, Laterza, Bari, 
1986. 
23 N. Labanca, Oltremare Storia dell’espansione coloniale italiana, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2007. 
24 M. Forno, op. cit. 
25 P. Murialdi, op. cit., 70. 
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et même cachées destinées à la presse. Cette approche a souffert d’une vision 
hégélienne de l’opinion publique (les classes dirigeantes éduquent l’opinion 
publique parce qu’elle est passionnelle et irrationnelle), plus proche de l’esprit de 
la Restauration que de celle d’une société libérale.  
Cette approche a déjà fait ses preuves dans la représentation à l’intérieur de 
l’espace public des défaites de Dogali et d’Adua présentées comme preuves de 
l’héroïsme des soldats tombés à cause des traîtres indigènes. Les manifestations 
laïques et les messes pour les victimes de Dogali étaient l’un des signes les plus 
frappants du nouveau climat de conciliation entre l’État et l’Église. En outre, ils se 
sont avérés décisifs pour propager un message bien précis. 
 
Radicalisation du débat public pour ou contre la patrie 
Dans le pays, une radicalisation des confrontations entre ceux qui étaient 
favorables et ceux qui étaient contraires à l’expansionnisme colonial se déclencha. 
Le débat dichotomique pour ou contre la patrie, avec la prédominance de l’esprit 
patriotique, devint stratégique à l’époque de la guerre libyenne. Comme le dit Nani, 
sans l’aide de grands et petits intellectuels et d’une grande partie de la presse, 
l’élaboration et la diffusion de cette lecture des faits auraient réduit la probabilité 
de succès dans l’opinion publique.26 
Il est opportun de rappeler que le journalisme de cette saison s’est révélé être un 
véritable instrument de militantisme politique. Les journalistes de l’époque ne 
vivaient pas de leur écriture, et il en sera ainsi pour longtemps encore, bien au-delà 
de la signature du premier contrat de travail national en 1911. L’activité 
journalistique était dans la plupart des cas une activité secondaire, visant le plus 
souvent à soutenir des ambitions politiques. Les journaux étaient un simple 
instrument de lutte. Les lignes éditoriales ainsi que la disparition ou la naissance de 
nouveaux journaux suivaient l’évolution de la politique. 
L’arrivée au pouvoir de la Gauche historique, ainsi que les scandales financiers, 
ont eu des effets sur les journaux et les journalistes. Même les oppositions 
socialistes et catholiques étaient représentées dans l’espace public à travers la 
presse. Le front laïc fut victime de saisies et de censures. Depuis les années 80 du 
XIXe siècle, plusieurs journaux circulèrent sur le territoire italien. La naissance 
d’Avanti! date de 1896. Le front catholique était également présent dans le 
panorama de l’édition. Le processus de rapprochement de la vie politique 
caractéristique des premières années du XXe siècle a favorisé la création en 1908 
d’un premier trust de journaux catholiques suite à la dure répression de la fin de 
siècle contre les journaux dits « intransigeants ».27 
                                                 
26 M. Nani, Ai confini della nazione, stampa e razzismo nell’Italia di fine Ottocento, Carocci 
editore, Roma, 2006. 
27 P. Giovannini, Cattolici nazionali e impresa cattolica (1907-1918), Edizioni Unicopli, Milano, 
2001. 
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Le trust s’est avéré être un front compact de soutien au virage colonialiste après 
la participation du Banco di Roma comme instrument de « pénétration pacifique » 
en Tripolitaine et Cyrénaïque, déjà matérialisée en 1907 avec l’ouverture le 15 
avril d’une première filiale à Tripoli de Barbarie. 
L’Osservatore Romano, né à Rome le 1er Juillet 1861, après sa promotion en 
1870 à organe officiel du Saint-Siège, a été forcé, lui aussi, de se distancier du 
trust, en particulier, du Corriere d’Italia qui, dans la fureur de la campagne pro-
Libye, avait été jusqu’à comparer la conquête libyenne à une croisade chrétienne 
contre les « infidèles » et la prise de Tripoli à la bataille de Lepanto,28 même si, 
depuis le déclenchement de la guerre italo-turque, non seulement le journal 
rapportait à ses lecteurs des actualités ponctuelles et constantes sur l’évolution du 
conflit, mais il fut aussi obligé de se défendre contre les accusations de la presse 
libérale sur son soutien à la guerre de Libye.29 
Au début du XXe siècle seulement trois quotidiens Il Secolo et le Corriere della 
Sera, tous deux nés à Milan et La Tribuna de Rome – tirent environ 100 000 
copies. Il y a un abîme entre les tirages des journaux les plus répandus en Europe et 
celui des principaux journaux italiens.30 Le Petit journal de Paris en 1867 a atteint 
à lui seul les 300 000 exemplaires. Encore au début du siècle, c’est un peu plus de 
la moitié des Italiens qui savent lire et écrire, bien que persistent des différences 
entre le Nord et le Sud. La population atteint désormais les 32 millions d’habitants. 
Le droit de vote était passé de 1.9% en 1861 à 8.3% en 1909. Pour le suffrage 
universel masculin, il a fallu attendre les élections de 1913. Et pourtant, en 1908, 
170 journaux sont publiés en Italie.31 
Un effort concentrique, donc, de plusieurs protagonistes et de plusieurs outils de 
propagande ont permis la mise en place d’une stratégie de communication qui, 
avec le déclenchement de la guerre, a été orchestrée selon une savante régie, grâce 
au film Kodak qui raconte l’histoire avec les images, à travers le moyen le plus 
moderne et imaginatif : le cinéma, avec les cartes postales vidéo des familles de 
soldats qui saluaient leurs proches depuis le front et la réalisation d’un jeu de 
société comme le « Jeu de l’oie » de la guerre italo-turque.32 
Ainsi, le Corriere della Sera et Il Secolo compterons parmi les journaux qui ne 
se sont pas alignés avec la campagne de Tripoli, et ils se déclareront en faveur 
d’une intervention quelques semaines seulement avant le début des opérations 
militaires, bien que le Corriere della Sera, premier journal italien par son nombre 
d’exemplaires, mettait en garde le 27 Janvier 1911, dans un article en première 
                                                 
28 M. Forno, op. cit., 63-66. 
29 Di che cosa ci si accusa?, Osservatore Romano, Roma 25 Novembre 1911. 
30 P. Murialdi, op. cit. 
31 G. Tartaglia, 2008, op. cit., 2-174. 
32 Un « jeu de l’oie » reprend également la propagande militaire de la guerre italo-turque, 
Collezione Ciompi, 1912, reproduit dans La Grande Guerra. L’Italia e il Levante, Archivio Centrale 
dello Stato, De Luca Editori D’Arte, Roma, 2018, 155. 
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page : « Il faut que la chaîne d’accidents s’arrête, que ce soit le dernier, que nos 
affaires à Tripoli prennent une autre tournure ».33 
 
La guerre italo-turque, un banc d’essai pour le journalisme « patriotique » 
Cependant, pour la presse, qui a joué un rôle fondamental dans le choix 
interventionniste, la guerre italo-turque a été un banc d’essai. Le journalisme          
« patriotique » est ainsi obligé de se repenser. Il expérimenta la pratique de la 
censure militaire et la rupture avec la presse étrangère ; il enregistra les premières 
réclamations contractuelles et les effets des fusions d’éditions. 
L’agitation interne à la catégorie au cours de la même période avait enregistré 
une forte activité associative locale et la naissance en 1908 de la Fédération de la 
presse.34 Le journalisme, bien qu’en ébullition pour tenter de devenir de plus en 
plus indépendant du pouvoir politique et économique, était encore loin de se 
présenter aux lecteurs sans fort conditionnement. 
Le militantisme de la presse l’a transformé en un outil de défense des intérêts de 
l’Italie contre les autres puissances européennes durant la guerre qui se menait 
aussi par l’intermédiaire des journaux sur la scène internationale.35 La presse 
étrangère aussi a suivi avec grand intérêt le conflit italo-turc. 
                                                 
33 Cependant, comme le dit Murialdi, la contribution la plus importante du Corriere della Sera se 
trouve à la troisième page (P. Murialdi, op. cit., 113-114 : c’est celui de Gabriele D’Annunzio). Son 
texte Canzoni d’Oltremare est la pointe la plus haute et la plus effrénée de la vague de rhétorique qui, 
à travers les journaux, envahit le pays. En comparaison, le fameux discours de Pascoli, intitulé « Le 
grand prolétaire » proposé et publié dans La Tribuna en novembre 1911, semble une « piètre 
exhortation » (nous traduisons). 
34 Parmi les fondateurs de la Fédération nationale de la presse officiellement créée en 1908, en 
pleine saison Giolittienne, on trouve plusieurs journalistes/politiques : Filippo Meda, Claudio Treves, 
Leonida Bissolati. Salvatore Barzilai, en est le président, plusieurs fois député et futur ministre du 
gouvernement Salandra, qui présenta à plusieurs reprises à Giolitti, fermement opposé à toute 
initiative en faveur de la presse, les protestations des journalistes envoyés au front qui avaient formé 
le Syndicat des correspondants de l’Union de Tripoli. Après Barzilai, la Fédération nationale de la 
presse a été dirigée par Andrea Torre, ancien responsable de la rédaction romaine du Corriere della 
Sera, à qui Albertini avait délégué le traitement de la ligne filo-tripolitaine du quotidien, et député à 
cinq reprises et plusieurs fois ministre dans les gouvernements Nitti. Les présidents suivants 
incarnèrent également la double dimension politique et journalistique : Alberto Bergamini, fondateur 
de Il Giornale d’Italia et Roberto Bencivenga. (L. Albertini, Epistolario 1911-1926. Dalla guerra di 
Libia alla Grande Guerra, vol. 1, Mondadori, Milano, 1968, 11 ; G. Tartaglia, 2008, op. cit. ; G. 
Tartaglia, Il giornale è il mio amore. Alberto Bergamini inventore del giornalismo moderno, Edizioni 
All Around, Roma, 2019). 
35 Guelfo Civinini du Corriere della Sera et Mario Bassi de La Stampa, envoyés à Tripoli, ont été 
récompensés par une médaille de bronze à la fin de la guerre, pour s’être unis spontanément aux 
forces combattantes sur la ligne de tir (v. Medaglie al valor militare a due giornalisti per la campagna 
di Libia, Bollettino della Federazione della stampa, a. VI/6 du 25 Juin 1915, 3, in G. Tartaglia, 2008, 
op. cit., 130-131). 
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C’est aussi à partir de la comparaison avec les journaux étrangers que le 
journalisme « patriotique » a été au centre d’un débat déchirant parmi les 
journalistes. Une dure confrontation qui s’est terminée par la distanciation des 
journalistes étrangers opérant en Italie par les collègues italiens. Une rupture qui 
s’est manifestée ouvertement avec la naissance en 1912 à Rome de l’Associazione 
della stampa estera.36 
De plus, selon Tartaglia, la présence d’un journalisme si fortement idéologique 
finit cependant par perturber les opérations militaires et poussa les autorités à 
promouvoir des mesures strictes de censure et de contrôle des journalistes.37 À bien 
peu servirent les actions de protestation des journalistes pendant la guerre contre la 
censure du personnel de l’armée et leurs demandes répétées d’amélioration du 
service télégraphique pour la transmission des rapports depuis le front.38 
Cependant, l’expérience au front spécialisa d’une certaine manière la figure du 
journaliste avec la naissance de l’envoyé spécial remplaçant le poste occasionnel 
du « rédacteur itinérant »39 et ouvrit une timide réflexion sur la définition de leur 
rôle dans la société. 
Parmi les grands envoyés spéciaux en terre libyenne, on retrouve des 
personnalités déjà impliquées ou projetées dans la dimension politique après le 
conflit italo-turc, comme Corradini, déjà mentionné ci-dessus, figure importante du 
nationalisme italien. Il sera sénateur et, de 1925 à 1929, membre du Grand Conseil 
du fascisme ; Ernesto Vassallo, envoyé spécial des journaux catholiques sera 
député pour le Parti populaire italien de 1919, nommé sous-secrétaire aux Affaires 
étrangères dans le premier gouvernement de Mussolini et premier Podestà de 
Caltanissetta ; Corrado Zoli, un des protagonistes de l’expédition à Fezzan, sera 
nommé gouverneur de l’Érythrée en 1928 ; Giuseppe Bevione, rédacteur de La 
Stampa de 1904, déjà interprète dans les colonnes du journal de Turin des voix 
favorables à la conquête, aura une longue carrière politique et journalistique ; il 
sera directeur du Il Secolo de Milan (1923-1926) ; Luigi Federzoni, sera une figure 
de proue de la période fasciste et il deviendra le président de l’Istituto fascista 
dell’Africa italiana de 1937 à 1940. 
Ces profils révèlent le lien entre la politique et le journalisme et, en particulier, 
comment ce domaine représentait à nouveau un vivier de recrutement ou la voie 
d’accès utilitaire à la formation des classes dirigeantes. L’Italie coloniale de la 
saison libérale verra beaucoup de ses protagonistes se ranger du côté de l’Italie 
                                                 
36 Ibidem. 
37 Ibidem. 
38 D’octobre 1911 au 15 juillet 1912, 200 000 télégrammes privés furent envoyés et reçus, parmi 
ceux-ci 7557 télégrammes destinés à la presse, dont 1790 furent bloqués par les autorités (Voir 
« L’ufficio stampa e censura a Tripoli », Bollettino della Federazione della Stampa, a. V, n. 4 de 25 
avril-5 mai 1914, cité in G. Tartaglia, 2008, op. cit., 132). 
39 Ibidem. 
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impérialiste du régime fasciste. La dictature de Mussolini a amplifié dans l’espace 
public de nombreux topoi des premiers discours sur la Libye. 
 
Conclusion 
L’occupation de la Tripolitaine et la Cyrénaïque représentait non seulement une 
occasion pour le jeune Royaume d’Italie d’entrer sur la scène internationale avec la 
dignité d’une puissance coloniale et un geste militaire fortement favorisé par des 
intérêts financiers et commerciaux formés à l’intérieur des nouveaux systèmes de 
pouvoir nationaux qui, comme nous avons essayé de montrer, se déplaçaient sur un 
échiquier caractérisé par des rôles politiques, économiques et financiers indistincts, 
mais elle représentait aussi la première grande occasion de formulation d’un 
discours public où le peuple et les classes dirigeantes pouvaient se reconnaître. On 
peut donc affirmer que ces faits ont marqué la naissance d’une opinion publique 
nationale dont l’élément constitutif était un sentiment collectif nourri par l’esprit 
colonialiste. 
Dans la constitution de ce sentiment, la presse italienne, qui naissait au même 
moment, tout comme le nouvel État et la nouvelle classe dirigeante, a joué un rôle 
décisif bien que nettement inférieur par rapport aux pouvoirs politiques et financiers, 
mais d’autre part elle semblait confuse, à quelques exceptions près. Cette « aura » 
d’ambiguïté dans laquelle baignait la formation de la première opinion publique 
italienne perdura durant des décennies et ce jusqu’à aujourd’hui, laissant visible la 
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Le caractère élitiste de la participation italienne au « jeu » du partage de l’Afrique, 
exclusivement réservé à la classe dirigeante, n’empêchera pas pour autant la propagation 
d’un très vaste consensus populaire en faveur de la guerre pour la conquête de la Libye. Le 
degrés élevé d’omniprésence attribué à la presse italienne au début du XXe siècle, 
cependant, serait mieux ciblé dans le processus qui déterminât la naissance d’un espace 
public dans lequel pris forme une pensée dominante qui écartât les voix dissidentes en 
marge, en les reléguant dans le périmètre de l’antipatriotisme. Les dynamiques que l’Italie 
expérimentait dans la construction d’une opinion publique en faveur de la guerre ne sont 
pas détachées de la création d’un premier discours sur la Libye et de la formation d’une 
idée de nation en-soi renforcée par ailleurs par la représentation choisie pour définir 
l’Autre. Toutefois, pour la presse, qui joue un rôle désormais reconnu comme capital dans 
le choix interventionniste de l’Italie, la guerre italo-turque est un véritable banc d’essai. 
  










The Role of Libya in the Construction of  




During Italian rule in Libya, myths and topoi came into being or were 
reinforced that would later support and accompany not only our colonial 
enterprises but also a certain idea of Italianness that is still very much alive in 
the news and in cultural-political endeavors – and fiercely preserved by 
political and government censorship overseeing the construction (or denial) of 
historical memory in Italy. The myth of Rome and that of the soldier-settler 
were at the very heart of the so-called “civilization of the plough” – which was 
also the subject of a column regularly appearing in the magazine Libia in the 
1950s. Along with the myth about the one-of-a-kind and good-natured Italian 
colonizer, they have endured over the years thanks to a too often politicized 
archaeology, as well as by extolling the virtues of Italian architecture and 
infrastructure in Libya. 
Acts of censorship and glaring omissions, stubbornly pursued until very recent 
years, have served the same purpose – with such effectiveness that one may 
wonder how many in Italy today are aware that poison gases banned by the 
Geneva Protocol were also used in Libya against civilians, as well as for 
“testing” and repressive purposes. How many know about the concentration 
camps, the decimation of the Cyrenaic people, the atrocities of the “reconquest”, 
and the deportation of Libyan men, women and children to Italy? How many, 
even among Italian students, know that the twenty-year war in Libya was the 
longest ever fought by Italy and that for about twenty years Italian “domination” 
did not go far beyond the coast? How many Italians have heard about Shar al-
Shatt? Or about the Arab revolt of 1914-15 and the many Italians imprisoned in 
Libya? 
Yet Libya has carried greater weight than East Africa in Italian history and 
colonial rule. Already in 1885, at the time of the landing in Massawa, foreign 
minister Mancini justified the enterprise claiming that in the Red Sea were “the 
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keys to the Mediterranean”.1 Moreover, at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Libya represented an extraordinary laboratory for the construction of unity and 
identity in newly unified Italy. 
And while Italy had joined the “scramble for Africa” with the landing at 
Massawa in 1885, it was only with the 1911 Italo-Turkish war that the country set 
out to become a colonial power. It is no coincidence that the Ministry of the 
Colonies was established in 1911 (and in the same year the Istituto Orientale of 
Naples, formerly under the Ministry of Education, was placed under direct control 
of the Ministry of the Colonies, thus becoming the official teaching institution for 
the Oriental languages and colonial subjects needed by its students to improve 
upon their general knowledge and professional skills).2 
The significance of the Italian venture in Libya went well beyond its military 
and political achievements. With its exaltation of the glorious past of ancient 
Rome, the military claims, the exaltation of war as a means to national prestige and 
power, and colonial expansionism as an outlet for emigration no longer in a foreign 
land, it was a far more complex and vast phenomenon of cultural processing 
involving the construction and consolidation of national conscience and identity 
within a political, social and cultural milieu deeply marked by nationalism.3 A 
dominant theme running throughout Italian politics and society, Libyanism 
summarized its characteristics with an extraordinary pervasive force.4 
 
The civilization of the plough – and other myths 
From the outset, Italian imperialist and colonial expansionism took Romanness5 
and empire as its foundation myths – invoking them to legitimate both a destiny of 
power and supremacy and a civilizing mission. They would underpin Italy’s 
venture overseas for its entire duration, and eventually became reality with Fascism 
when, at the height of Romanisation of the country’s culture, on May 9, 1936, the 
Empire was proclaimed and its reappearance “on the fatal hills of Rome” officially 
announced. 
                                                 
1 See Mancini’s reply to his opponents who claimed that the Mediterranean should be the main 
focus of Italian expansionist policy in P.S. Mancini, Discorsi parlamentari di Pasquale Stanislao 
Mancini, Tip. della Camera dei deputati, Roma, 1893-97, vol. VIII, 162-190. 
2 Royal decrees, September 8, 1911, no.1165 and no. 1166. 
3 L’Idea Nazionale, leading organ of Italian nationalism, was launched in 1911 and, certainly not 
by chance on March 1st, the anniversary of the battle of Adwa. 
4 F. Mazzei (ed.), Nazione e anti-nazione. Vol. 1: Il movimento nazionalista da Adua alla guerra 
di Libia (1896-1911), Viella, Roma, 2015; P. S. Salvatori (ed.), Nazione e anti-nazione. Vol. 2: Il 
movimento nazionalista dalla guerra di Libia al fascismo (1911-1923), Viella, Roma, 2016. 
5 Romanness itself was a much older phenomenon. See A. Vauchez - A. Giardina, Il mito di 
Roma. Da Carlo Magno a Mussolini, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2000. Other colonial powers such as 
France had employed the myth of Rome during wars of conquest in Tunisia e Algeria. See M. 
Bénabou, La résistance africaine à la romanisation, La Découverte, Paris, 1976. 
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The “epic of the return”,6 which began to spread soon after unification, turned 
the North African lands facing the Mediterranean into the object of a claim based 
on historical rights going back to Roman times. “Tripolitania and Cyrenaica – 
wrote Corradini in 1911 – are all the legacy that remains for us Italians from 
Rome’s empire on the northern coast of Africa”.7 
A wide array of dissemination channels aided in the popularization of the 
ideology of return, from the press, literature, cinema (e.g. Cabiria and Scipio 
Africanus: The Defeat of Hannibal), the arts, and schools to decidedly more 
popular and immediately accessible means such as newspaper illustrations or 
postcards. A good case in point is a drawing by Fortunino Matania, one of the 
greatest Italian illustrators of the twentieth century. Published in the immediate 
aftermath of the landing in Tripoli, the drawing portrays an Italian sailor holding 
the Italian flag in one hand and the dagger of a Roman legionary, whose skeleton 
emerges from the newly re-conquered ground, in the other. The image was easy to 
understand and was massively circulated thanks to being reproduced as a postcard 
in Christmas 1911.8 The caption allowed an unequivocal reading: “Italy wielding 
the sword of Rome”. 
Archaeology was destined to play a fundamental role in this context.9 
Throughout the Italian occupation, and amid rare dissenting voices, such as 
Arcangelo Ghisleri’s, calling for the demythization of Romanness, archaeology 
provided useful tools to support economic and military objectives, until it 
seamlessly meshed with fascist policies, and excavation work became linked to the 
regime’s propaganda program.10 A case in point is the link between excavation 
work and tourism. In the 1930s, after the “pacification” years, Libya became not 
only a land of emigration but also an important national and international showcase 
for the Italian “colonizing talent”. To this end, the development of tourism industry 
and improving infrastructure in Libya – highlighting and selling the contrast 
between modernity and backwardness – played a significant role in the 
construction of Italian identity, now fuelled by the perception that Italians had of 
that land, by its actual transformation into the Italian “fourth shore”, as well as by 
the contrast between Italian modernity and the primitiveness of the Libyans. 
                                                 
6 M. Munzi, L’epica del ritorno. Archeologia e politica nella Tripolitania italiana, L’Erma di 
Bretschneider, Roma, 2001. 
7 E. Corradini, L’ora di Tripoli, Treves, Milano, 1911, 193. 
8 Initially featured in the British publication The Sphere, it contained Christmas greetings for the 
troops in Tripolitania. 
9 On the complex interactions between archaeology and politics in Libya, see M. Munzi, L’epica 
del ritorno…, and also M. Barbanera, L’archeologia degli italiani, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1998. 
10 Archaeology continued to play a political role in the post-colonial period (see M. Munzi, La 
decolonizzazione del passato: archeologia e politica in Libia dall’amministrazione alleata al regno di 
Idris, L’Erma di Bretschneider, Roma, 2004). 
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The archaeological excavation campaigns strongly promoted by the fascist 
regime thus offered an effective contribution also to the tourism industry while 
promoting Italy’s imperial image.11 
The references to the past and to Rome’s historical right to the “fourth shore”, 
which would in fact lead to considering Libya an extension of Italy, – summed up 
in itself, in particular, also that of Rome’s colonization of those lands, which once 
yielded abundant harvests but were now in the hands of incompetent Arabs and no 
longer bearing fruit. Libyan lands were repeatedly described as a sort of Garden of 
the Hesperides – a promised land for Italy’s imbalance and demographic issues that 
would soon become Italian farmers’ ultimate fantasy and the target of their 
aspirations.12 
As a matter of fact, despite several documented traces of Roman farming 
practices,13 the idea that Libya had been colonized by the Romans was also part of 
an artificially constructed myth used to support Italy’s historical claim to Libya. It 
seems proven, in fact, that unlike other regions in North Africa, Tripolitania never 
experienced Roman agricultural colonization. The documented traces are rather: 
 
the result of an eminently mixed culture – a blend of Libyan, Punic, Greek and 
Roman elements. […]. Neither colonial foundation – Munzi asserts – nor allotment 
of fields has affected Tripolitanian cities and farmland, nor were the Libyan-Punic 
aristocracy supplanted in their possessions by subjects of Italic origin.14 
 
Nevertheless, the most popularized aspect of the myth of Romanness was tied to 
the exaltation of the Italian farmer and settler’s ability to cultivate, enhance and 
“redeem” the Libyan land in light of his descendancy from the Romans. The 
country: 
 
lacks the support of civil society institutions, and in which trade is non-existent; 
without public or private works; living almost exclusively off a land they are unable 
                                                 
11 On the Fascist tourist policies in colonial Libya see F. Dumasy, Entre exotisme et fascisme. Les 
caractères locaux du tourisme à Tripoli de Libye, 1922-1940, in C. Zytnicki - H. Kazdaghli (éds.), Le 
Tourisme dans l’empire français : politiques, pratiques et imaginaires (XIXe-XXe siècle). Un outil de 
la domination coloniale?, Publications de la Société française d’histoire d’Outre-mer (SFHOM), 
Paris, 2009, 255-270. On the development of tourism and its role in Libya see also B. Spadaro, Una 
colonia italiana: Incontri, memorie e rappresentazioni tra Italia e Libia, Mondadori, Milano, 2013. 
As for the image of the Libyan colony during the Thirties in two of the main Italian tourist magazines 
of the time, see S. Berhe, Un impero di carte: l’immagine della Libia nelle riviste turistiche ‘Le Vie 
d’Italia’ e ‘Libia’, Clio@Themis, 12, 2017, 1-14. 
12 On colonial imaginaries and the war in Libya, see G. Proglio’s extensive work, Libia 1911-
1912. Immaginari coloniali e italianità, Mondadori, Milano, 2016. 
13 Some detectable traces in the lexicon as in the case of the word rumi, which in Arabic indicates 
a valued variety of olive oil, from rumiyah, “Roma”. 
14 M. Munzi, L’epica del ritorno, 124. 
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to cultivate […] when famine comes, not so much because the rains did not fall in 
abundance or did not fall in time, but because of their inexperience in farming, 
because of inadequate tools; the time has come for this decrepit Arab people, who 
was already in a very weakened state, cast out of the human consortium like any 
primitive people.15 
 
In the typical bombastic rhetoric of the time, Tripolitania first and then Libya 
became the land where Italians’ cleverness and industriousness would achieve new 
heights, so much so “that the boundaries between fecundity and sterility, between 
life and death, will be chased away, far away, and all will be life and fecundity. 
The desert will be divided into gardens and farms”.16 
Thus, from the very beginning, the construction of Italianness also called for the 
ability to reinvent the territory – one of the most effective ways of proclaiming 
Italian superiority and civilization over indigenous barbarism and backwardness 
and a leitmotif not only of the colonial and colonialist discourse but also of a large 
part of Italian self-representations that has endured to this day. 
It should not come as a surprise then that in the 1950s, a scientific journal such 
as Libia – a quarterly of Libyan studies edited by the Arabist Gino Cerbella – 
featured a regular column by Domenico Catitti titled “The civilization of the 
plough”. 
Together with the section titled “Craftmanship” (edited by Giuseppe Costa), it 
was devoted to the achievements of Italian labor the world over, which reflected 
“the brilliance, industriousness, intelligence, perspicacity, will, tenacity, style, art, 
technique, sentiments, and aesthetic standards of our race [my italics] [like] a 
luminous prism of the purest crystal”.17 
The full exaltation of Italian genius – nowadays one of the more frequently 
employed topoi of national self-representation – went hand in hand with adamantly 
proclaiming Italians’ belonging to a specific racial group. 
An article was published during Fascism, on the eve of the invasion of Ethiopia, 
whose title closely echoed that of Catitti’s column. The article suggested that what 
was about to happen was not a military aggression but a workers’ initiative. By 
evoking the “civilization of labor”18 at the time of a military campaign, it indirectly 
reaffirmed the myth of the uniqueness of Italian colonialism, which exported its 
workforce to Africa bringing well-being and progress rather than exploitation and 
domination. This argument was repeated over and over again, lending support to 
the typically Italian myth of colonialism “with a human face”. The quality of 
Italy’s achievements and improvements in the overseas territories was repeatedly 
                                                 
15 E. Corradini, L’ora di Tripoli…, 70. 
16 Idem, 52. 
17 D. Catitti, La civilta dell’aratro, Libia, 2/4 (October-December), 1954, 78. 
18 V. Rastelli, La civiltà del lavoro verso l’Impero, Il Solco fascista, August 11, 1935. 
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recalled in Republican Italy, too – starting in the immediate postwar period with 
the claim for the return of its colonies, which ended up interweaving nationalist 
stances with the racism inherent in the idea of “civilization”. 
The Italo-Turkish war was a defining moment of Italian nation-building, not 
least because it provided the opportunity to shift the focus away from the internal 
fractures that hindered national unity. 
Among the most serious challenges facing the country was the so-called 
“southern question” arising from the deep economic, political and social rifts 
between North and South. 
Due to its widespread backwardness and weaknesses, Southern Italy was at the 
center of a complex process of Othering19 and insistently approached, both 
scientifically and in literature, as racially different from the North. 
In fact, Southern Italy had long been regarded as an “elsewhere”, as well as a 
Grand Tour destination by those chasing exotic dreams in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. They were dreams of wild and luxuriant nature, beautiful 
landscapes, and traces of the Greek-Roman past but also of a colorful humanity 
stuck in backwardness and immobility, experienced as part of a long-gone era and 
portrayed in endless visual and literary representations (however stereotyped and 
formulaic and still to this day shaping European opinions about Southern Italy).20  
In post-unification Italy, the South ended up representing the country’s internal 
elsewhere, an anthropological elsewhere that was no longer the object of exotic 
dreams, but rather the focus of studies and theories of key figures of Italian 
positivism. Criminologists, anthropologists, sociologists of the caliber of Cesare 
Lombroso, Giuseppe Sergi, Alfredo Niceforo, Raffaele Garofalo, Enrico Ferri, and 
Scipio Sighele contributed to the construction of a racialized South and southern 
“diversity”, viewed as inferiority. These were not isolated views. Their theories, 
shared and circulated by journalists, intellectuals, doctors, politicians, became part 
of the collective imaginary of the time. 
Thus, a barbaric Southerner took shape, biologically inferior and, unlike the 
Northerner, not of Aryan but of Negro-African origin and therefore prone to 
violence, crime, laziness, idleness and vagrancy. Sexually and emotionally 
excitable as well as irrational, the southerners were, in a word, regarded as 
primitive, akin to Orientals21 and Africans. 
                                                 
19 A recent contribution to the enormous amount of writing on Italian southern question is that of 
N. Moe, Un paradiso abitato da diavoli. Identità nazionale e immagini del Mezzogiorno, L’Ancora 
del Mediterraneo, Napoli, 2004. 
20 On Naples, for example, see G. Galasso, Lo stereotipo del napoletano e le sue variazioni 
generali, in G. Galasso, L’altra Europa. Per un’antropologia storica del Mezzogiorno d’Italia, Guida, 
Napoli, 2009, 151-198. 
21 E. Augusto Berta wrote of “Muslim submissiveness” and “primordial life”, among other things, 
to describe the Sardinians to his readers (see Gazzetta del Popolo, 1899, no. 17 and no. 18). At the 
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The campaign of Libya fostered a change in perspective and the movement of 
the “frontier” from South to West, across the Mediterranean, and hence the 
creation, as argued by Lucia Re, of: 
 
an imaginary, racially different and inferior “other” [which] finally allowed for an 
Italian identity to come together as never before […] as ethnically “one people”, 
through which the profoundly disintegrating internal differences of race, gender, 
class, and religious belief that threatened the very notion of a united Italy were at 
once repressed, forgotten, and surpassed.22 
 
From this point of view, then, the war of conquest marked a decisive turning 
point in the political-cultural process of self-representation of post-unification Italy. 
The war allowed for a shift of the repertoire of stereotypes and the “ideology of 
civilization” from Southern Italy to Libya, together with a racially based nationalist 
and imperialist reconceptualization of the country, well ahead of the theories and 
racist legislation of the fascist regime.23 From this perspective, “the Libyan war 
thus constitutes the clearest evidence of the embarrassing long-term continuity 
between Liberal and Fascist Italy”.24 
National identity was constructed in opposition to Libyan Otherness – used as a 
mirror for defining the Italian Self, reducing southern diversity and bridging the 
gap with the other European powers (a process that will appear particularly evident 
in the years to come within the Libya Italian community: it is in Libya that Italian 
settlers, at least those of the upper and middle classes, will be able to build their 
own “whiteness” and, with it, define and delimit the rights of citizenship).25 
                                                                                                                            
time there were also references to positive qualities such as patience, their sense of sacrifice or 
imagination, which, however, ended up portraying nothing more than the “good savage” and therefore 
reinforcing, albeit indirectly, the Otherness and substantial wildness of the Southerners. 
22 See the rich and dense essay by L. Re, Italians and the Invention of Race: the Poetics and 
Politics of difference in the Struggle over Libya, 1890-1913, California Italian Studies Journal, 1, 
2010, 1. 
23 On the perceived divide between North and South see A. Wong, Race and the nation in Liberal 
Italy, 1861-1911. Meridionalism, Empire, and Diaspora, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2006. On 
racism and the construction of the Italian “imagined community”, with special reference to visual 
material, see the extensive work of G. Giuliani, Race, Nation and Gender in Modern Italy: 
Intersectional Representations in Visual Culture, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2018. On Italian 
internal racism see also R. N. Welch, Vital Subjects. Race and Biopolitics in Italy, 1860-1921, 
Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 2016. 
24 L. Re, Italians and the Invention of Race…, 8. 
25 On the internal articulation of Italian society in Libya and its relations with the local population 
see B. Spadaro, Una colonia Italiana, Le Monnier, Milano, 2013. The book highlights the self-
perception of Italian middle-high bourgeoisie who in Libya had the possibility of building a new class 
and “race” identity. See also N. A. Nannini, Tripolitaliani. Autorappresentazioni dei rimpatriati dalla 
Libia, Zapruder, 23, 2010, 124-131. 
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Arabs were alternately portrayed as miserable ragamuffins (“an assorted lot of 
beggars”, “swarming”, “human garbage, not even bestial”),26 “their offspring left to 
their own fate”27 and waiting to be rescued by Italians; as lazy and ignorant “Arabs 
are not hardworking”,28 or rebel, treacherous, barbaric; “not men but dogs” 
(D’Annunzio, Le canzoni delle gesta d’oltremare). The image of the Arab – born 
out of domineering thinking, founded on stereotypes and resting on ignorance – 
broke into the Italian political-cultural imaginary through a multiplicity of voices, 
gazes and narrative genres (from journalism, literature, and poetry to 
anthropological investigation and visual representations), until a shared repertoire 
of stereotypical images emerged underpinning consent to the overseas campaign 
and, with it, to the idea of national community.29 
Such racist and negative constructs of Arab identity did not vanish or weaken 
during the years of Mussolini’s pro-Islamic policy30 nor with the end of colonial 
rule, insomuch as their traces can be found even in our vocabulary. Such is the case 
with the word “Bedouin”, which is used disparagingly by both adults and children 
in Italy as a synonym for “stupid”, or “uncouth” at best. The term and its 
derogatory meaning are considered acceptable by Italian dictionaries to indicate a 
                                                 
26 E. Corradini, L’ora di Tripoli, 70. 
27 Idem, 74. 
28 G. Bevione, Come siamo andati in Libia, Bocca, Torino, 1912, 22. 
29 See for example I. Da Ros (ed.), Lettere di soldati veneti alla Guerra di Libia (1911-12), 
Grafiche De Bastiani, Godega S. Urbano, 2001, and S. Bono, Morire per questi deserti. Lettere di 
soldati italiani dal fronte libico (1911-12), Abramo ed., Catanzaro, 1992. The Italian troops’ racist 
stereotypes about Arabs are the best example of the nation’s sentiment. They emerge not only from 
the variously disparaging descriptions but above all from the amazement at the value and courage of 
the “enemies” (“Arabs fight like heroes”; “these damned Arabs have some guts”, see Bono, Morire 
per questi deserti, pages 81 and 41) which is acknowledged by some, albeit with great reticence. 
Sometimes they even acknowledge that “they are people, too” (Idem, 63). 
30 The relationship between Fascism and Islam was a complex one. The pro-Islamic policy 
adopted by Mussolini in the 1930s is generally considered wavering and contradictory, nevertheless 
some fascist intellectuals of the time went so far as to theorize doctrinal affinities between Fascism 
and Islam (see for instance G. Tucci, Il Fascismo e l’Islam, La Vita Italiana, May 1937, 597-601) 
while Italian press in some cases began to write about superiority of the “Arab race” over not only 
Jews but also other colored peoples. In general, however, it can be said that the Mussolinian pro-
Islamism of the 1930s, put in place after the “reconquest” of Libya and especially after the Ethiopian 
war, was born of purely pragmatic reasons: the occupation of Ethiopia was presented as an 
“opportunity for redemption” of Muslims against the oppression of the negus government while in 
Libya Mussolinian pro-Islamism aimed to counter Franco-English hegemony in the Mediterranean (E. 
Galoppini, Il fascismo e l’Islàm, Edizioni All’Insegna del Veltro, Parma, 2001). According to R. De 
Felice, the “Arab card” was considered “a currency of exchange in case a gap had opened for 
effective negotiations for a general Mediterranean agreement between Rome and London” (see R. De 
Felice, Il Fascismo e l’Oriente. Arabi, ebrei e indiani nella politica di Mussolini, Il Mulino, Bologna, 
1988, 21). 
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“person who is rough and uncultivated in appearance, with uncouth, unrefined 
manners, or dressed in strange, unkempt clothes”.31 
But significantly more disparaging practices still persist, even in the press. On 
June 13, 2009, on the occasion of Qaddafi’s visit to Italy, the Gazzetta del 
Mezzogiorno – one of the highest-circulation newspapers in Southern Italy, 
catering to medium to highly educated readers – published an article by Giuseppe 
Giacovazzo.32 Introducing the reader to the historic nature of the visit (also 
emphasized in the title “Qaddafi’s Arrival: Coming to Terms with History”), 
Giacovazzo wrote: 
 
The other night, in the hills of Fasano, a criminal was killed. For years he had been 
terrorizing towns and villages in the countryside. Thefts, robberies, extortion, and 
even murder. They shot him dead outside his house. Three bullets, the kind you use 
for wild boar hunting. Never before was this much glee seen in the eyes of the 
peasants of Valle d’Itria. A great sigh of relief: “They killed Gaddafi!” That’s how 
they called him. That is how the Libyan Colonel is still seen among the common 
folk. The outer layer in a media build up that is rooted in a distant past. Libya has 
suffered this ignominy since 1911, when it was seized from the Turks. Back then, in 
Locorotondo, the two local parties that sided with Giolitti or Salandra amid vote 
rigging and stabbings were mockingly called Senussi and Bedouins. 
Now Muammar Gaddafi has landed in Rome, an old photograph sewn on his chest, 
portraying the national hero of the Bedouins […]. 
 
The writer cannot help but rely on a racist stereotype to introduce to his readers 
the highest Libyan authority at the time, but he does not expressly identify it as 
such, nor does he make any effort to research or explain it to his readers. Rather, he 
simply offers it as an example of “stratification of the media”, which his article and 
the newspaper itself actually contribute to reinforcing. The anecdotal reference, 
perhaps meant to be amusing or even “brilliant”, adopts a clearly disparaging 
register. Variously racist images of the “other” are re-circulated through the 
association, albeit indirect, of Gaddafi with a criminal and of the Senussi and 
Bedouins (as if these were two peoples) with thieves and criminals - not to mention 
the uncalled for, offensive description of Omar el Mukhtar (“the hero of the 
Bedouins”). 
The negative, racist image of the Libyan Other is contrasted with that of the 
good-hearted Italian, which, as in any process of identity formation, is also 
constructed through differences, and through the invention and devaluation of the 
Other. Deeply rooted in Italian collective consciousness, this image is, according to 
                                                 
31 http://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/beduino, last accessed January 2018. 
32 Giuseppe Giacovazzo Italian journalist, long-time managing director of the newspaper La 
Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno, and politician. He was twice appointed Under Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs. 
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Del Boca, “an everlasting legend”33 harking back to the Libyan campaign, in which 
Italian soldiers are portrayed as opposing war and reluctant to commit acts of 
violence and oppression, ready to show solidarity and to help the helpless. This 
myth is complementary to that of the presumed peaceful and industrious Italian 
“civilizing” efforts in Africa, and Libya in particular.  
Contrary to what Focardi says,34 the depiction of the myth in literature and the 
arts did not start in the immediate aftermath of WW2. Although it was effectively 
reinforced during that period, it had its roots in the colonial wars, and the Italo-
Turkish war in particular, following military defeats such as the battle of Adwa 
and, above all, the revolt and massacre of Shar al-Shatt. It was then that the 
country’s newspapers and illustrated magazines disseminated images that, rather 
than portraying the dead or scenes of war, showed Italian soldiers being kind to the 
natives, or generously donating their bread and food rations to hungry children in 
Ethiopia35 and Tripoli36 in particular, thereby transmitting a “sanitized, 
domesticated memory” of the Italian colonial enterprise. 
Those images were a means of deflecting public attention from the country’s 
dramatic military losses, as well as from the atrocities that, despite propaganda 
efforts to describe it as a “walk in the park” had marked the Libyan campaign from 
the very beginning.37 
The press succeeded in reassuring the public by exploiting the communicative 
potential of drawings and photography, whose meaning could be read easily even 
by illiterate people (one need only think of the growing importance of Aldo 
                                                 
33 A. Del Boca, Italiani brava gente?, Neri Pozza, Vicenza, 2005, 50. 
34 F. Focardi, Il cattivo tedesco e il bravo italiano. La rimozione delle colpe della seconda guerra 
mondiale, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2013. 
35 S. Palma, The Italian Iconography of Adwa: a Domesticated Memory, in Abdussamad H. 
Ahmad - R. Pankhurst (eds.), Adwa Victory Centenary Conference (26 feb -2 mar 1996), Addis 
Ababa University, Addis Ababa, 1998, 491-500. 
36 See for instance the photograph on the front page, “Il cuore dei nostri soldati”, which was 
published, not unexpectedly, on Christmas Eve. The caption reads: “Soldiers distribute their bread 
rations to hungry Arab children”, L’illustrazione italiana, December 24, 1911. 
37 Extraordinarily similar images were recently circulated, for example on the occasion of the 
Restore Hope peace mission to Somalia in 1992, in the midst of the scandal about Italian troops’ 
abuses and violence against the Somali civilian population. See the image of an Italian parachutist in 
the act of feeding a Somali child: http://eafairsoft.com/missione-ibis-somalia-1992-1994/ (last 
accessed May 2018). 
A few years later, the Governmental Commission of Inquiry submitted a report to Prime Minister 
Romano Prodi confirming serious incidents in Somalia and also reporting on “gross attitudes, the 
expression of a subculture that the Armed Forces must reject in principle”. Especially condemned 
were “the frequent mockery of Somalis and the display in certain units of Nazi and Fascist symbols 
and slogans”. 
See: Violenze in Somalia accuse ai comandi, La Repubblica, May 27, 1998: 
http://www.repubblica.it/online/fatti/somtort/rapporto/rapporto.html (last accessed May 2018). 
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Molinari’s drawings for L’Illustrazione italiana or Achille Beltrame’s for La 
Domenica del Corriere), or reporting trivial news in unprecedented bombastic 
tones. As noted by Gioacchino Volpe, “competing on imagination and 
sesquipedalian titles, they would often lose all sense of proportion”.38 Count 
Werner van den Steen de Jehay, Belgium’s ambassador to Rome, ironically 
reported in his correspondence with the foreign minister Julien Davignon that it felt 
like “a new Iliad, with explosions every day, at noon in the morning, and at six 
o’clock in the evening”.39 
Amid a few dissenting voices, the Libyan campaign became a sprawling epic 
that, for the first time, involved all media, visual and literary, and reached every 
social class in the country, even the most backward. Among the reassuring stories 
that ended up occupying much space in the press of the kingdom, were especially 
heartbreaking tales such as Fatma’s, “the daughter of the regiment”. 
A “stark naked [and] abandoned” girl apparently aged four was found during 
the battle of Shar al-Shatt by an Italian bersagliere40 who adopted her. Despite 
being wounded, the soldier “comforted her, and in mother-like manner covered her 
with his own brand-new shirt, sent by his own mother”. The story of Fatma, who 
was entrusted to the Red Cross and immediately sent to “a shelter for abandoned 
children, where [she would] receive the care that her parents had never given her”, 
became one of the hypermediated episodes of that war of conquest, once again 
useful for exemplarily highlighting “the piety and generosity shown in these days 
by Italian troops”.41 
The figure of the soldier, a long-time protagonist of Libyan colonial events, 
emblematically served to exalt that of the good-natured and generous Italian – thus 
also contributing to “making the Italians”, a task that had begun during the 
Risorgimento, and to building “national character” in a country that, having arrived 
late at unification, lacked colonial consciousness but lacked national consciousness 
even more. 
Several influential people across the country expressed their outrage in those 
years when that noble and generous image was questioned due to (mainly foreign) 
press accusations that Italians were responsible for atrocities and massacres. In La 
grande proletaria si è mossa (The great proletarian has risen!), the speech he gave 
at the Teatro Comunale di Barga on 21 November 1911, Giovanni Pascoli 
forcefully evoked the Italian soldier’s image of meekness and generosity of spirit: 
“Oh slandered army! Who has not seen, at least once, our handsome, armed youths 
                                                 
38 G. Volpe, L’impresa di Tripoli, 1911-12, Sansoni, Roma, 1946, 74. 
39 A. Del Boca, Gli italiani in Libia. Tripoli bel suol d’amore 1860-1922, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 
1988, 144. 
40 Italian infantry soldier recognizable by his plumed hat. 
41 La Stampa, La figlia del reggimento, November 4, 1911, 2; Idem, November 7, 1911. 2. 
170 The Role of Libya in the Construction of Italy’s Collective Self-Portrait 
dividing their mess tins and ration bread with poor old men? Who has not seen, at 
least once, one of our dear boy soldiers with a baby held to his neck?”42 
In Pascoli’s national-socialist and decidedly interventionist speech there was 
room for the image of a feminized and maternal Italy, the “great Proletarian” that 
the need to achieve freedom from poverty and the exploitation of Italian labour in 
foreign lands had prompted to expand overseas. The Libyan campaign was thus not 
a violent and predatory act of conquest; rather, it was prompted by a need for 
emancipation, in which the figure of the Roman soldier-settler was once again the 
protagonist, a bearer of culture and progress among “slothful, lazy” peoples. 
The themes employed by Pascoli in his socio-political speech, which was also 
disseminated across schools throughout the Kingdom, would feed the country’s 
colonial narrative for years to come. The occupation of Libya, and more generally 
Italian colonial expansionism, were a different experience compared to other 
contemporary colonialisms, largely because they were linked to demographic and 
labour issues that also mitigated its aggressiveness. 
In fact, just a few days before Pascoli gave his speech, the member of 
Parliament Maffeo Pantaleoni had openly suggested genocide as a way of 
disrupting Libyan Resistance to Italian occupation: “The current mongrelized 
population, the result of interbreeding among the filthiest human races, must be 
rejected and destroyed, and replaced with good Italian blood”.43 
Twenty years later, when policies were put in place against rebels in Cyrenaica 
that were to a degree genocidal, the same determination was evident in the words 
of Pietro Badoglio “[...] our path has now been set and we must follow it even if 
the entire population of Cyrenaica were to perish”.44 
Yet the gallows, the atrocities and the massacres, when not denied, were 
regarded as occasional necessities. Italians’ good-natured colonial rule, their 
industriousness, and the interracial relationships based on collaboration, ended up 
becoming topoi that are still to this day among the more implacably evoked. This 
narrative, fed by the Libyan campaign and constantly reaffirmed by Italian 
politicians and the press – and for decades by historiography, too – ended up 
becoming a sort of tenaciously defended hegemonic tale, spread even in comic 
books, such as those of Hugo Pratt, one of the world’s leading Italian comic 
artists.45 
                                                 
42 G. Pascoli, La grande proletaria si è mossa, Zanichelli, Bologna, 1911, 19. English translation 
by Adriana M. Baranello, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6jh07474. His speech was more widely 
circulated after being published in La Tribuna on November 27. 
43 Popolo, newspaper, Gallipoli, November 19, 1911, quoted in A. Del Boca, Gli italiani in Libia. 
Tripoli bel suol d’amore 1860-1922, 153. 
44 Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Carte Graziani, b.1, f. 2, subf. 2. 
45 In the graphic novel Gli scorpioni del deserto, one of the most famous stories of Pratt 
(published in 1969 and up to 2001), set in North Africa during World War II, the character of Omar 
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Starting with the publication of L’Italia in Africa,46 a monumental work in 40 
volumes and a form of “State revisionism”47 that is most probably unique on the 
European scene, over the years academic and popular historical discourse have 
remained largely impervious to progress and new insights in historical studies,48 
and more or less explicitly anchored to the myth of Italian colonialism as different 
and humane. That same myth of Italian colonialism as different and humane 
continues to be part of a widespread culture and unshakeable collective self-
representation, staunchly defended by the State almost to the point of abusing 
history through various forms of censorship49 or apologetic reconstructions that, 
over the years, have affected all the media – and cinema in particular. 
In 1953, charges of “defamation of the Italian armed forces” were pressed 
against Guido Aristarco, editor of the journal Cinema Nuovo, and Renzo Renzi, a 
screenwriter, when the latter merely wrote about a possible storyline for a future 
film, L’armata s’agapò, which would recount some not very flattering events 
associated with the Italian occupation of Greece during World War II. The film 
was “put on trial”, although it did not exist. As for Renzi and Aristarco, they were 
arrested, tried and imprisoned.50 
Far better known, at least to historians of colonialism, is the case of Lion of the 
Desert (1981), a film by Mustapha Akkad that was subject to censorship in 1982. 
With an exceptional cast and strict adherence to the facts, the film was a re-
enactment of the epic story of Omar al-Mukhtar, the hero of the Libyan resistance 
to Italian rule. Regarded as being “detrimental to the honour of the Italian army”, it 
was banned from being broadcast in Italy (and is still unavailable in video stores), 
                                                                                                                            
al-Mukhtar’s nephew appears. Hassan Beni Muchtar is described as a mercenary on the British 
payroll in 1940 only because “They pay me much more than the Italians”, and he had “expensive 
vices”. The meaning being also that if Libyans sided with Italy’s enemies, it was certainly not 
motivated by political-ideological considerations, but rather by greed (see S. Palma, The image of 
Italian Colonial Africa in Comics and Graphic Novels, in P. Bertella Farnetti - C. Dau Novelli (eds.), 
Images of Colonialism and Decolonisation in the Italian Media, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, 2017, 169-191). 
46 Ministero degli Affari Esteri - Comitato per la documentazione dell’opera dell’Italia in Africa, 
L’Italia in Africa, Roma, 1955-1981; A. Morone, I custodi della memoria. Il Comitato per la 
documentazione dell’opera dell’Italia in Africa, Zapruder, 23, 2010, 24-38. 
47 A. Del Boca (ed.), La storia negata. Il revisionismo e il suo uso politico, Neri Pozza, Vicenza, 
2010, 12. On L’Italia in Africa and the debate surrounding it in recent years, see S. Palma, Colonial 
archives, memory and political culture in Italy. The Italo-Eritrean historical heritage, Rassegna di 
Studi Etiopici, 2, 2018, 26-28. 
48 M. Lenci, Dalla storia coloniale alla storia dell’Africa, Africa, 2, 2003, 207-218. 
49 On how Republican Italy’s institutional politics of memory, with regard to the country’s 
colonial history, were also implemented through control of the archives, see S. Palma, Colonial 
archives…, 23-40. 
50 G. Oliva, “Si ammazza troppo poco”. I crimini di guerra italiani 1940-1943, Mondadori, 
Milano, 2007. 
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to the point that in 1987 a public screening in Trento was interrupted by the Digos 
(a state police special operations division), charges were pressed against the 
organizers, and a trial followed. It was only on the occasion of Qaddafi’s visit to 
Italy, in June 2009,51 that the film was finally broadcast in the country. But even 
then, it was broadcast on Sky, a pay-TV platform with fewer than one million 
subscribers, rather than on the public service TV stations. 
The same censorship, for the same reasons, affected Fascist Legacy, a BBC 
1989 documentary about fascist Italy’s war crimes in Africa and the Balkans, 
which also drew strong protests from the Italian ambassador in London, Boris 
Biancheri. 
A major box office success of the time was, unsurprisingly, Mediterraneo 
(1991), directed by Gabriele Salvatores. The film, which won considerable acclaim 
both in Italy and in the US, depicted Italian soldiers at war in Greece as caring, 
helpful youths, perhaps a tad naive, skilled in the art of getting by without resorting 
to arms, and mostly inclined to play football and woo Greek women. 
In 2006 Mario Monicelli, one of the grand masters of Italian cinema, presented 
Italians with the same interpretation in an equally successful film, Le rose del 
deserto (The Roses of the Desert), where a caricatured version of the Italian venture 
in North Africa portrayed the Italian soldiers, once again, as good-natured and 
virtually harmless.  
More recently, research on Libyan deportees in Italy, commissioned by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of an Italian-Libyan cooperation agreement and 
strongly urged by Qaddafi’s Libya,52 had to face challenges and objections. 
Censorship was first imposed on the terminology used in the agreement itself, 
where a basic word like “deported” was replaced with the weaker expression 
“forcibly removed from their homeland and their families”,53 and later affected the 
outcome of the scientific cooperation program. Indeed, its findings were discussed 
during workshops held on the islands that used to host Liberal and Fascist-era 
confinement colonies (the Tremiti Islands, Ustica, Ponza, and Favignana). The 
workshops – as Labanca rightly pointed out – were never brought to public 
attention, nor were they advertised in the national press.54 
                                                 
51 During his first official visit to Italy in June 2009, Colonel Qaddafi got off the plane with a 
photograph of the Libyan hero – an emblem of the anti-colonial struggle and of the memory that Italy 
wiped out – pinned to his uniform. 
52 This and other initiatives were part of bilateral agreements presented in a Joint statement signed 
on July 4, 1998 in Rome by the Italian and Libyan foreign ministers, Lamberto Dini and Omar 
Mustafa El Muntasser. 
53 The text of the Joint statement is in attachment in G. Rossi, La collaborazione culturale tra 
l’Italia e la Libia, oggi, Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, 2/2000, 295-297. 
54 N. Labanca, Perché ritorna la ‘brava gente’. Revisioni recenti sulla storia dell’espansione 
coloniale italiana, in A. Del Boca (ed.), La storia negata…, 97. 
Silvana Palma 173 
Survivals and memory gaps 
In recent years, when Italy’s colonial past and the events in Libya resurfaced on 
official occasions – not surprisingly endorsed and funded by “returning” right-wing 
cabinets – it was only to reactivate a “memory” that could once again disseminate 
symbolic-mythological readings and universes linked to colonial and fascist themes 
and propaganda. A case in point is the impressive exhibition on the fascist 
“founding cities” launched in 2002 at the monumental complex of San Michele a 
Ripa, in Rome, and sponsored by the Lazio Region under the patronage of the 
Ministry of Cultural Heritage and Activities. The title itself, Constructed 
Metaphysics,55 was a highly evocative oxymoron. Much of the exhibition space 
was devoted to the farming villages built in Libya in the 1930s to accommodate the 
thousands of Italian settlers who were allotted expropriated land.56 It marked the re-
emergence of the “civilization of the plough” and Italy’s peaceful civilizing efforts 
– an Italianness void of cruelty, racisms and oppression but prodigal of 
achievements, development and generous transformations.57 The initiative 
remained, thus, a historiographically lost opportunity for a reflection on the 
contribution that the architects of the time gave to the fascist and imperial Italy’s 
identity-building through the use of space in Italy as well as in Africa, where 
symbolic geographies and ideologies of racial segregation governed the planning of 
the Italian colonial cities.58 
                                                 
55 R. Besana - C. F. Carli - L. Devoti - L. Prisco (eds.), Metafisica costruita. Le città di fondazione 
degli anni Trenta dall’Italia all’Oltremare, Touring editore, Milano, 2002. 
56 On Italian settlement in Libya see F. Cresti, Oasi di italianità. La Libia della colonizzazione 
agraria tra fascismo, guerra e indipendenza (1935-1956), SEI, Torino 1997; F. Cresti, Non 
desiderare la terra d’altri. La colonizzazione italiana in Libia, Carocci, Roma, 2011. 
57 Two years later, a grandiose exhibition on the Askaris was held, first at the Vittoriano in Rome 
(a venue of high symbolic and historical value), and then in Bologna. Askaris, the indigenous colonial 
troops deployed by Italians during the wars of African conquest, were celebrated for their loyalty to 
Italy. Their loyalty was regarded as a sign of the “legitimate” presence of Italians in Africa as well as 
of its strength and the value of its “civilizing” efforts (see S. Palma, Il ritorno di miti e memorie 
coloniali. L’epopea degli ascari eritrei nell’Italia postcoloniale, Afriche e Orienti, 1, 2007, 57-79). 
Surprisingly, also this event, whose explicit intent was celebratory in nature, was organized and 
sponsored by members of the government in 2004 and in particular “wanted by the MP, General 
Luigi Ramponi (who spent his childhood in Eritrea, as he was the son of an officer in charge of 
cartography from Adwa to Gondar), who in 2004 was President of the Defence Commission of the 
Chamber of Deputies and President of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies. Promoted by the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, the Ministry for Italians Worldwide, the Army General 
Staff and the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, the exhibition was launched with a solemn 
ceremony, during which a laurel wreath was deposited at the Altare della Patria. A picket of Lancieri 
di Montebello was in attendance, as well as minister Mirko Tremaglia, senators Alfredo Mantica and 
Franco Servello, and ambassador Emanuele Pignatelli, who in 2004 was the Italian diplomatic 
representative in Eritrea”. Idem, 60. 
58 Among the many writings, see M. Fuller, Moderns Abroad: Architecture, Cities and Italian 
Imperialism, Routledge, London, 2009. 
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Two years later Deputy Prime Minister Gianfranco Fini expressed the same 
certainties on the Italian positive role in Libya in a public speech, stating that: 
 
There is no doubt that over the course of the last century, colonialism has been one 
of the most difficult issues affecting relationships between different peoples and 
between Europe and, in this case, North Africa. But, and of course this is my 
personal opinion, when it comes to Italian colonialism, I believe we need to be well 
aware of the fact that others in Europe should be ashamed of dark pages in their 
history because we, too, have our responsibilities, but Italians brought to Libya not 
only roads and employment, but also their values, civilization, and laws that are a 
beacon for humanity as a whole, not only for Western culture.59 
 
The same belief had been shared by the press a few years earlier. An article 
by Pietro Radius on the Adwa centenary celebrations was published in Famiglia 
Cristiana, a popular Catholic weekly and one of the nation’s leading news 
outlets at the time, with more than three million readers. In closing the article, 
the author remarked: 
 
Did Italy really [...] deserve to become, in the [...] memory of Africa, the symbol of 
defeated colonialism? Or should other countries, such as England and France, play 
the part of the bad guys? [...] Italy was not yet colonialist a hundred years ago. 
Colonialism is a strategy of aggression.60 
 
With his rhetorical questions Radius was actually reiterating a widespread and 
long-lasting belief, so firmly established as to be repeated by Gianfranco Fini, a 
State representative, even in the aftermath of the first agreements aimed at 
resolving the colonial dispute between Italy and Libya. 
Besides, only generic and hasty statements in the media came with the 
ratification of the Treaty of Benghazi in 2008; certainly not the end of the silences 
and omissions that for decades have enveloped the Italian colonial page in Libya.61 
Instead there is the risk that the colonial past may reappear in another guise in 
government policies, such as those provided for in the Treaty of Friendship and 
Partnership (2008) with Qaddafi’s Libya. Among other things, Libya has been 
turned into the gatekeeper of Italian racist policies, policing immigration from 
                                                 
59 Thereby erasing, as Del Boca later emphasized, several hundred thousand casualties due to 
deportations from Cyrenaica, the use of poison gas, the concentration camps, and the deportation of 
civilians to Italy (see E. Salerno, Genocidio in Libia, Manifesto Libri, Roma, 2005, 10-11). 
60 Famiglia Cristiana, XIII, 1996, 69. 
61 According to N. Labanca, this period of “oblivion” can be divided in six phases, beginning with 
the fascist “reconquest” of Libya in 1932, when silence on the campaign was imposed and the regime 
focused on propagandizing Italian accomplishments (N. Labanca, La guerra italiana per la Libia. 
1911-1931, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2012, 207-226). 
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Africa through violence and internment camps – where migrants are often detained 
until they die (Italy even supplied the body bags) – built on the same land and often 
on the same sites as the Italian colonial concentration camps for Libyan patriots. 
Just as in the colonial period, Italy has chosen to let the Other do its “dirty” work: 
first the Spahis (like the Eritrean Askaris and the Somali Dubat) were enrolled as 
cannon fodder in the colonial wars of conquest against Africans; today their 
updated versions are financed and entrusted with stopping sub-Saharan migratory 
flows 
Not even in 2011, on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the unification of 
Italy, was the country’s history in Africa – which actually accounts for sixty of 
those one hundred and fifty years – mentioned in the celebrations, nor was it the 
cause for reflection. This is even more surprising if we consider that 2011 was also 
the year in which the country, despite many doubts, participated in the war against 
Libya – a war justified within the framework of the so-called humanitarian wars 
(an indecent oxymoron) – thus “celebrating” the centenary of the 1911 invasion. 
Shortly before being appointed prime minister, center-left politician Enrico 
Letta released a statement in support of the US/NATO war in Libya. His incredible 
words are worth mentioning: “It is those who oppose the international intervention 
in Libya who are warmongers; certainly not us, we are the peacemakers”.62 Once 
again, Italy’s civilizing mission (now termed “pacification”) was invoked to justify 
a war that guaranteed that Western countries – and especially Italian ENI – would 
have access to the precious energy resources of a balkanized region. 
Furthermore, the 2011 war saw the re-emergence of the lexical, ideological and 
discursive colonial repertoire. In both political and journalistic language, the 
Libyans were once again portrayed as hordes of savages (e.g., with the persistent 
use of the term “tribe”, which has a profoundly negative connotation, especially in 
the Italian press), awaiting the peace-making and “civilizing” intervention of the 
West – and of Italy in particular, by virtue of the “shared past”. 
Nonetheless, in the analyses as well as in the chronicles of the conflict, the 
attention was substantially focused on Westerners and Italians rather than on the 
protagonists of the revolt and on Libyan civil society. Now as then, Libya is not 
considered a historical subject but rather one of the terms of the confrontation 
within a war that was configured as that of order, of which Italy and the West were 
bearers, versus chaos. One of the major outcomes of humanitarian intervention was 
thus to reactivate the ancient ethnocentric division between “us” and “them”. 
But, after all, the “Orientalist” and essentially Eurocentric gaze had already 
emerged aplenty on the occasion of Qaddafi’s visit to Italy, during which it seemed 
as though he was the subject of a media contest for best folkloric representation.  
 
                                                 
62 M. Dinucci, Al via la nuova missione in Libia, Il Manifesto, November 19, 2013. 
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Conclusions 
Amid omissions, forgery, forgiveness and denial, contemporary Italy’s self-
portrait seems all too similar to 1911-12 – a longevity favoured not only by the 
omissions and denial that accompanied the history of the Republic and are only 
partly discussed here, but also by the lack of trials for major Italian war criminals 
and the fact that in the decolonization period, Italy did not have to deal with any 
armed or negotiated confrontation with Libya nor with the other countries it ruled, 
unlike other colonizers. Thus, the country was prevented from dealing with its 
colonial past and facing the inevitable tearing and agony of self-questioning that 
elsewhere in Europe marked the confrontation-conflict with the peoples struggling 
for self-determination and independence. The loss of the colonies following the 
defeat in World War II caused the country to “suffer” decolonization and live it as 
the result of a confrontation between whites, which in turn allowed the continuity 
of the idea of a different and good-natured colonialism. 
Furthermore, the failure of de-fascistisation in the Republican period – in  the 
ministries, in the State apparatuses, in the Universities – and the prolonged 
inaccessibility of public archives have in turn contributed to a tenacious and long 
lasting memory control. 
It then becomes easier to understand how it took sixty years following the war 
in Ethiopia, as well as several parliamentary debates and a thirty-year controversy 
– which in 1995 involved the entire national press surrounding the debate between 
the historian Angelo Del Boca (who based his argument on some archival 
documents) and Indro Montanelli (who contended on the basis of “I was there”) – 
before the Italian government would officially shed light, through one of its 
ministers, on an important aspect of the country’s colonial past. That was the use of 
gas as a chemical weapon, which historians were aware of for years, even if not in 
detail. In 1996 the Minister of Defence, General Domenico Corcione, admitted that 
Italy used chemical weapons in Ethiopia in violation of the Geneva Agreement of 
1925 (written response dated 7 February 1996 to the Parliamentary interrogation 
no.4 -13103 of 6 September 1996).63 
Apparently different the Libyan case: the claims of Qaddafi’s Libya since the 
time of the coup d’état and the denunciation of the harshnesses suffered during the 
Italian rule, led the Italian government to commission with great confidentiality an 
investigation to two Italian scholars (Francesco Castro and Luigi Goglia) who were 
allowed access to the documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the ex-
Ministry of Italian Africa. The research confirmed the accuracy of the Libyan 
accusations, but it was never made public. 
                                                 
63 On the use of poison gas, see A. Del Boca, I gas di Mussolini. Il fascismo e la Guerra 
d’Etiopia, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1996. 
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Many years later, following Libyan requests on the occasion of political 
agreements, a commission specially appointed by the government in 1988 selected 
documents relating to Libyan deportees to Italy kept in Italian archives and handed 
them over in photocopy to a Libyan delegation. Neither the quantity nor the quality 
of that documentation is yet known.64 
In reality, as we have partly discussed, there have been many opportunities to 
rethink the colonial past, but Italy has either missed or deliberately ignored them. 
Not even the expulsion of twenty thousand Italians from Libya in 1970 triggered a 
serious reflection on the past. 
What is left of that memory today is entrusted to the names of streets and 
squares – “via Tripoli”, “via Tobruk”, “viale Libia” – about which little is known 
and even less questioned.65 And while the country tenaciously continued to 
cultivate the myth of the “good Italians”,66 a shrine to a war criminal was built in 
Affile. On August 11, 2012, slumbering consciences and dormant awareness were 
not awakened when amid general indifference a memorial was inaugurated and 
dedicated to General Rodolfo Graziani, responsible for a long series of crimes 
against humanity and still remembered as “the Butcher” in Libya and Ethiopia. 
                                                 
64 M. Missori, Una ricerca sui deportati libici nelle carte dell’Archivio centrale dello Stato, in 
Fonti e problemi della politica coloniale italiana. Atti del Convegno internazionale (Taormina-
Messina, 23-29 ottobre 1989), Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali-Ufficio centrale per i beni 
archivistici, Roma, 1996, 253-258. 
65 An entire district of Bologna was built during the 1911-12 Italo-Turkish war. Its main road is 
still called “via Libia”. Residents call the area “Cirenaica”, although most are not aware of the origins 
of its name, as reported by local blogs and institutional websites during celebrations for its centenary. 
See for instance Marco Poli: “In Bologna, when we hear the word Cyrenaica, we think about our 
neighbourhood, not about a region in Libya”:  
http://www.marcopoli.it/dblog/articolo.asp?articolo=117 (last accessed December 2017). 
66 Many contemporary historians and Africanists have written about the persistence of the myth of 
the “good Italians” in Italian national consciousness, among which D. Bidussa, Il mito del bravo 
italiano, Il Saggiatore, Milano, 1994, and A. Del Boca, Italiani brava gente?, Neri Pozza, Vicenza, 
2005. For a recent non-Italian contribution on the “culture war” of the past decades, see Aram 
Mattioli, Viva Mussolini!, La guerra della memoria nell’Italia di Berlusconi, Bossi e Fini, Garzanti, 
Milano, 2011. The same myth of Italians as different and humane was invoked once again in 2003 by 
the press and by Italian authorities in the aftermath of the massacre of Nāṣiriya, in Iraq, where on 
November 12, seventeen Italian soldiers died in a suicide attack at the hands of the Iraqis (the first in 
a series of attacks against Italian armed forces that would last until 2006). The country reacted with 
outrage and dismay and “produced the umpteenth revival of one of the founding topoi of our 
colonialism, the list of the virtues of the ‘good Italian’: the friendliness towards the population, [...] 
the smiles, [...] the light weapons, the small attentions typical of a certain style, the dispensed 
medicines, kindness towards children and the friendship towards some local ras”. (M. Nani, Il lutto, la 
nazione, la storia. Nassiriya dal cordoglio all’orgoglio, 900, X (2004), 168); not to mention those 
who, just days before the first anniversary of the massacre, suggested that the fallen Italians should be 
canonized (Facciamo santi i caduti di Nassiriya, Libero, November 4, 2004, 2). 
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Despite protests in New York and reports by the BBC, and El Pais in Spain, there 
was no public outrage in Italy.67 
The close relationship between colonial culture and nation-building is not 
exclusive to Italy, but Italy is probably the only country to have suppressed, or at 
any rate not acknowledged, the weight of sixty years of unitary history coinciding 
with its colonial past. 
And even when it is recalled, it is surprisingly believed that Italy should be 
compensated for having exported work without collecting revenues. More than a 
predatory act of conquest, an unfortunate adventure. Or at least that is what Italians 
have been led to believe. 
Alongside the gaps in school textbooks68 and the hasty explanations, there is 
nonetheless a narrative that found its place even in publications for children and 
young people: “We spent thirty years on a sea of oil, and we didn’t notice: what a 
joke our Libyan history was”. Thus wrote in 1969 Paolo Bugialli, a historic name 
in Italian journalism, for the young readers of Corriere dei Piccoli.69 
That reading definitely stands the test of time: in 2011, Paolo Mieli, one of the 
most authoritative and influential voices in history popularization, wrote an 
objective review of Federico Cresti’s book on Italian colonization in Libya.70 His 






Barbanera, Marcello, L’archeologia degli italiani, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1998. 
Bénabou, Marcel, La résistance africaine à la romanisation, La Découverte, Paris, 1976. 
Berhe, Simona, Un impero di carte: l’immagine della Libia nelle riviste turistiche “Le Vie 
d’Italia” e “Libia”, Clio@Themis, 12, 2017, 1-14. 
Besana, Renata - Carli, Fabrizio Carlo - Devoti, Leonardo - Prisco, Luigi (eds.), Metafisica 
costruita. Le città di fondazione degli anni Trenta dall’Italia all’Oltremare, Touring 
editore, Milano, 2002. 
Bevione, Giuseppe, Come siamo andati in Libia, Bocca, Torino, 1912. 
Bidussa, David, Il mito del bravo italiano, Il Saggiatore, Milano, 1994. 
                                                 
67 Corriere della Sera, September 30, 2012. 
68 Amid continuity, silences, omissions and ambiguity, the decolonization of Italian school 
textbooks can be considered fully achieved very late, in the 1990s, and even today it is still possible to 
trace a fundamentally Eurocentric reading of the colonial page. On the case of Libya, see N. Labanca 
(ed.), La Libia nei manuali scolastici italiani (1911-2001), IsIAO, Roma 2003. 
69 Corriere dei Piccoli, no. 42, October 19, 1969. 
70 F. Cresti, Non desiderare la terra d’altri… 
71 Corriere della Sera, February 22, 2011. 
Silvana Palma 179 
Bono, Salvatore, Morire per questi deserti. Lettere di soldati italiani dal fronte libico 
(1911-12), Abramo ed., Catanzaro, 1992. 
Corradini, Enrico, L’ora di Tripoli, Treves, Milano, 1911. 
Corriere dei Piccoli, nr. 42, October 19, 1969. 
Corriere della Sera, February 22, 2011. 
Corriere della Sera, September 30, 2012. 
Cresti, Federico, Oasi di italianità. La Libia della colonizzazione agraria tra fascismo, 
guerra e indipendenza (1935-1956), SEI, Torino, 1997. 
Cresti, Federico, Non desiderare la terra d’altri. La colonizzazione italiana in Libia, 
Carocci, Roma, 2011. 
Da Ros, Ido (ed.), Lettere di soldati veneti alla Guerra di Libia (1911-12), Grafiche De 
Bastiani, Godega S. Urbano, 2001. 
De Felice, Renzo, Il Fascismo e l’Oriente. Arabi, ebrei e indiani nella politica di 
Mussolini, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1988. 
Del Boca, Angelo, Gli italiani in Libia. Tripoli bel suol d’amore 1860-1922, Laterza, 
Roma-Bari, 1988. 
Del Boca, Angelo, I gas di Mussolini. Il fascismo e la Guerra d’Etiopia, Editori Riuniti, 
Roma, 1996. 
Del Boca, Angelo, Italiani brava gente?, Neri Pozza, Vicenza, 2005. 
Del Boca, Angelo (ed.), La storia negata. Il revisionismo e il suo uso politico, Neri Pozza, 
Vicenza, 2010. 
Dinucci, Manlio, Al via la nuova missione in Libia, Il Manifesto, 19 novembre 2013. 
Famiglia Cristiana, XIII, 1996. 
Dumasy, François, Entre exotisme et fascisme. Les caractères locaux du tourisme à Tripoli 
de Libye, 1922-1940, in Colette Zytnicki - Habib Kazdaghli (eds.), Le Tourisme dans 
l’empire français : politiques, pratiques et imaginaires (XIXe-XXe siècle). Un outil de la 
domination coloniale?, Publications de la Société française d’histoire d’outre-mer, 
SFHOM, Paris, 2009, 255-270. 
Focardi, Filippo, Il cattivo tedesco e il bravo italiano. La rimozione delle colpe della 
seconda guerra mondiale, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2013. 
Fuller, Mia, Moderns Abroad: Architecture, Cities and Italian Imperialism, Routledge, 
London, 2009. 
Galasso, Giuseppe, Lo stereotipo del napoletano e le sue variazioni generali, in Giuseppe 
Galasso (ed.), L’altra Europa. Per un’antropologia storica del Mezzogiorno d’Italia, 
Guida, Napoli, 2009, 151-198.  
Gazzetta del Popolo, 1899, nr. 17 e nr. 18. 
Galoppini, Enrico, Il fascismo e l’Islàm, Edizioni All’Insegna del Veltro, Parma, 2001. 
Giacovazzo, Giuseppe, Gheddafi qui per fare i conti con la storia, La Gazzetta del 
Mezzogiorno, 13 giugno 2009. 
L’illustrazione italiana, dicembre 24, 1911. 
La Stampa, November 4, 7, 1911. 
La Repubblica, May 27, 1998. 
La Tribuna, November 27, 1911. 
Giuliani, Gaia, Race, Nation and Gender in Modern Italy: Intersectional Representations in 
Visual Culture, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2018. 
180 The Role of Libya in the Construction of Italy’s Collective Self-Portrait 
Labanca, Nicola (ed.), La Libia nei manuali scolastici italiani (1911-2001), IsIAO, Roma, 
2003. 
Labanca, Nicola, Perché ritorna la ‘brava gente’. Revisioni recenti sulla storia 
dell’espansione coloniale italiana, in A. Del Boca (ed.), La storia negata. Il 
revisionismo e il suo uso politico, Neri Pozza, Vicenza, 2009, 69-106. 
Labanca, Nicola, La guerra italiana per la Libia. 1911-1931, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2012. 
Lenci, Marco, Dalla storia coloniale alla storia dell’Africa, Africa, 2, 2003, 207-218. 
Libero, November 4, 2004. 
Libia - rivista trimestrale di studi libici, anno II, n. 4 (ottobre -dicembre 1954). 
Mancini, Pasquale Stanislao, Discorsi parlamentari di Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, Tip. 
della Camera dei deputati, Roma 1893-97, vol. VIII, 162-190. 
Mattioli, Aram, Viva Mussolini!, La guerra della memoria nell’Italia di Berlusconi, Bossi e 
Fini, Garzanti, Milano, 2011. 
Mazzei, Federico (ed.), Nazione e anti-nazione. Vol. 1: Il movimento nazionalista da Adua 
alla guerra di Libia (1896-1911), Viella, Roma, 2015. 
Ministero degli Affari Esteri - Comitato per la documentazione dell’opera dell’Italia in 
Africa, L’Italia in Africa, Roma, 1955-1981. 
Missori, Mario, Una ricerca sui deportati libici nelle carte dell’Archivio centrale dello 
Stato, Fonti e problemi della politica coloniale italiana. Atti del Convegno 
internazionale (Taormina-Messina, 23-29 ottobre 1989), Ministero per i beni culturali e 
ambientali-Ufficio centrale per i beni archivistici, Roma, 1996, 253-258. 
Moe, Nelson, Un paradiso abitato da diavoli. Identità nazionale e immagini del 
Mezzogiorno, L’Ancora del Mediterraneo, Napoli, 2004. 
Morone, Antonio, I custodi della memoria. Il Comitato per la documentazione dell’opera 
dell’Italia in Africa, Zapruder, 23, 2010, 24-38. 
Munzi, Massimiliano, L’epica del ritorno. Archeologia e politica nella Tripolitania 
italiana, “L’Erma” di Bretschneider, Roma, 2001. 
Munzi, Massimiliano, La decolonizzazione del passato: archeologia e politica in Libia 
dall’amministrazione alleata al regno di Idris, “L’Erma” di Bretschneider, Roma, 2004. 
Nani, Michele, Il lutto, la nazione, la storia. Nassiriya dal cordoglio all’orgoglio, 900, X, 
2004. 
Nannini, Nancy Aluigi, Tripolitaliani. Autorappresentazioni dei rimpatriati dalla Libia, 
Zapruder, 23, 2010, 124-131. 
Oliva, Gianni, “Si ammazza troppo poco”. I crimini di guerra italiani 1940-1943, 
Mondadori, Milano, 2007. 
Palma, Silvana, The Italian Iconography of Adwa: a Domesticated Memory, in 
Abdussamad H. Ahmad - Richard Pankhurst (eds.), Adwa Victory Centenary 
Conference (26 February - 2 March 1996), Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa 1998, 
491-500. 
Palma, Silvana, Il ritorno di miti e memorie coloniali. L’epopea degli ascari eritrei 
nell’Italia postcoloniale, Afriche e Orienti, 1, 2007, 57-79. 
Palma, Silvana, The image of Italian Colonial Africa in Comics and Graphic Novels, in 
Paolo Bertella Farnetti - Cecilia Dau Novelli (eds.), Images of Colonialism and 
Decolonisation in the Italian Media, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon 
Tyne, 2017, 169-191. 
Silvana Palma 181 
Palma, Silvana, Colonial archives, memory and political culture in Italy. The Italo-Eritrean 
historical heritage, Rassegna di Studi Etiopici, 2, 2018, 23-40. 
Pascoli, Giovanni, La grande proletaria si è mossa, Zanichelli, Bologna, 1911. 
Popolo, quotidiano di Gallipoli, November 19, 1911. 
Proglio, Gabriele, Libia 1911-1912. Immaginari coloniali e italianità, Mondadori, Milano, 
2016. 
Rastelli, Vito, La civiltà del lavoro verso l’Impero, Il Solco fascista, 11 agosto 1935. 
Re, Lucia, Italians and the Invention of Race: the Poetics and Politics of difference in the 
Struggle over Libya, 1890-1913, California Italian Studies Journal, 1, 2010, 1-58. 
Rossi, Gianluigi, La collaborazione culturale tra l’Italia e la Libia, oggi, Rivista di Studi 
Politici Internazionali, 2, 2000, 295-297. 
Salerno, Eric, Genocidio in Libia, Manifesto Libri, Roma, 2005. 
Salvatori, Paola S. (ed.), Nazione e anti-nazione. Vol. 2: Il movimento nazionalista dalla 
guerra di Libia al fascismo (1911-1923), Viella, Roma, 2016. 
Spadaro, Barbara, Una colonia italiana: Incontri, memorie e rappresentazioni tra Italia e 
Libia, Mondadori, Milano, 2013. 
Tucci, Giuseppe, Il Fascismo e l’Islam, La Vita Italiana, maggio 1937, 597-601. 
Vauchez, André - Giardina, Andrea, Il mito di Roma. Da Carlo Magno a Mussolini, 
Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2000. 
Volpe, Gioacchino, L’impresa di Tripoli, 1911-12, Sansoni, Roma, 1946. 
Welch, Rhiannon Noel, Vital Subjects. Race and Biopolitics in Italy, 1860-1921, Liverpool 
University Press, Liverpool, 2016. 
Wong, Aliza, Race and the nation in Liberal Italy, 1861-1911. Meridionalism, Empire, and 











Libya has played a far more important role in Italian colonial and post-colonial policy than 
the Horn of Africa. It has also represented a sort of laboratory where colonial culture and 
Italian national identity have taken shape, influencing and reinforcing each other over time. 
This paper aims to explore what E. Said would call the “ideas, forms, images and 
imaginings” produced in and about Libya, and their persistence in Italian collective 
memory.  
Even though there is no longer room in Italian historiography for the myths and 
misconceptions that fed the construction of the country’s collective identity during and after 
the colonial period, outside academia some images and themes have surfaced and 
resurfaced over time and have persisted to date, to the point of influencing recent national 
policies. 























L’évolution de la carte de l’Afrique du nord-ouest antique. 
Le poids de l’histoire et de la géographie 
 
 
La contribution traitant de la carte de l’Afrique du nord-ouest et de son 
évolution durant l’Antiquité dans un colloque traitant de « La Libye, passé, présent 
et futur » peut surprendre. Est-il nécessaire de remonter si loin pour comprendre la 
situation présente ? L’histoire est un tout et il est aussi évident que la géographie 
occupe une place importante dans l’histoire puisqu’elle détermine souvent le mode 
de vie et son évolution, les productions, les besoins donc les échanges, etc. Le cas 
de la Libye actuelle pour être saisi n’échappe pas à son histoire et à son 
environnement physique et humain ; il s’inscrit dans une entité, l’amazighité, 
confrontée au fil du temps antique à l’influence égyptienne, aux rapports avec 
l’Afrique saharienne et subsaharienne, à l’installation grecque dans sa partie 
orientale, à l’occupation punique et romaine en Tripolitaine. Les périodes 
historiques successives ont certes marquées le pays et l’Afrique du nord en général, 
elles ne semblent pas avoir bouleversé des constantes telles que les divisions entre 
l’est et l’ouest, entre le littoral et l’arrière-pays immédiat ou plus ou moins lointain, 
entre les régions sédentaires puis citadines et les zones demeurées tribales et plus 
ou moins nomades, entre la vie dans les plaines et celle des habitants des 
montagnes, etc. 
L’idée est d’essayer de préciser l’évolution de la carte durant près de deux 
millénaires, la période antique, d’expliquer dans la mesure du possible cette 
évolution et de voir ce qui unit cette région et ce qui la régionalise ; cette 
régionalisation évolue en s’accentuant jusqu’à devenir une absence d’unité.1 Le 
poids de l’un et de l’autre de ces deux phénomènes s’explique certes par l’histoire, 




                                                          
1 I. Thébert, Romanisation et déromanisation en Afrique : histoire décolonisée ou histoire inversée ?, 
Annales, Histoire et Sciences sociales, 3/1, 1978, 64-82. 
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La terminologie 
Au fur et à mesure que se dévoile pour les sources littéraires grecques et latines 
la réalité africaine et que des rapports politiques, humains et économiques 
s’établissent et se renforcent, les termes utilisés aussi bien pour qualifier le pays 
que ces habitants se multiplient et se précisent; si au tout début, les sources 
utilisèrent les termes génériques, Libye et Libyens, elles vont aller plus vers le 
détail en parlant de maures, de numides, libyens (au sens de sujets de Carthage), de 
nomades qu’ils vont distinguer des sédentaires ; à des moments précis, il sera 
même question de plus en plus de noms de tribus.2 
Hérodote écrivait : 
 
Je viens d’indiquer les Libyens nomades qui habitent le long de la mer. Au-dessus 
d’eux, à l’intérieur des terres, se trouve la Libye des bêtes sauvages... Mais au 
couchant du lac Tritonis les libyens ne sont plus nomades et n’ont plus les mêmes 
coutumes... ce sont des libyens cultivateurs... ils ont des maisons et sont appelés 
Maxyes.3 
 
Au cours de la deuxième moitié du 1er millénaire avant J. C., la régionalisation 
entraine une meilleure identification des populations habitant l’Afrique du nord-
ouest ; la liste des tribus ira en s’allongeant même s’il n’est pas toujours aisé de 
situer avec un minimum de précision leurs territoires.4 Si dans le cas du nord, il 
semble qu’il y avait un minimum de stabilité des populations sédentaires, les 
populations nomades qui vivaient dans la partie centrale et sud de toute la région, 
souvent à quelques encablures du littoral et aux environs immédiats des cités 
installées sur la côte dans le cas de la Tripolitaine et de la Cyrénaïque, étaient 
difficilement localisables à moins d’accepter de leur attribuer de vastes territoires. 
La nature même du mode de vie, nomade ou semi-nomade, d’une grande partie de 
ces tribus, fait qu’elles se déplaçaient sur un espace parfois très grand en empiétant 
parfois sur le territoire de tribus voisines. 
Ce sont les maures, les numides et les africains qui furent influencés par la 
civilisation phénicienne-punique, puis romaine. Les relations entre les cités 
grecques et les tribus autochtones vivant dans ce qui est devenu la Cyrénaïque 
furent limitées et ne laissèrent presque pas de traces, tandis que les rapports avec 
l’hellénisme touchera presque toute la région.  
                                                          
2 M. Ghaki, Quels sens faudrait-il donner aux termes autochtones, libyen, libyque, libyphénicien, 
numide et maure ?, in A. M. Di Tolla (éd.), Studi berberi e mediterranei. Miscellanea offerta in onore 
di Luigi Serra, Studi Maġrebini, n.s. 3, 2005, 35-42. 
3 Hérodote, IV, 191. 
4  J. Desanges, Catalogue des tribus africaines de l’Antiquité classique à l’Ouest du Nil, 
Université de Dakar, Dakar, 1962. Y. Modéran, Les Maures et l’Afrique romaine (IVe-VIIe siècle), 
EFRome, Rome, 2003. 
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Occultés durant des siècles le toponyme, « Libye », et l’ethnonyme, « Libyens », 
reviennent sur le devant de la scène au XIXe siècle ; rivalité entre les deux grandes 
puissances coloniales de l’époque, la France et la Grande Bretagne, aboutit à la 
colonisation de l’Egypte par la Grande Bretagne et au protectorat de la Tunisie par 
la France ; cette dernière continuant à prétendre occuper le Fezzan considéré 
comme étant un prolongement « naturel » de l’Algérie française ; resté en suspens 
la région située entre l’Egypte et la Tunisie ; l’Allemagne puis l’Italie rivalisèrent 
pour occuper ce territoire qui finit par échouer à l’Italie. C’est l’Italie coloniale qui 
remettra « à la mode » le nom « Libye ». Les frontières coloniales qui deviendront 
celles des états-nations reposent sur une recherche d’équilibre entre les puissances 
coloniales, elles ne tiennent que très partiellement de la réalité géographique et 
historique ; elles généreront des problèmes et seront un facteur d’instabilité et 
d’incohérence interne à chaque pays et entre les pays voisins.  
 
La périodisation 
L’étude de l’évolution de la carte de l’Afrique du nord-ouest durant l’Antiquité 
pose entre autres les problèmes de la périodisation de l’histoire de la région et de la 
terminologie utilisée par l’historiographie. Parler de « périodes » et utiliser des 
dates précises pour les fixer n’exprime pas la réalité souvent complexe ; ainsi est-il 
question de « la période phénicienne-punique » entre 814 av. J. C. (date retenue 
pour la fondation de Carthage) et 146 av. J. C. (date de la destruction de la 
métropole punique et de la naissance de la première province romaine, Africa) ; on 
parle aussi de « l’époque romaine » qui commencerait en 146 av. J. C. et se termine 
en 429 par l’invasion vandale.  
Or la période phénicienne-punique devrait réellement commencer avec les 
premières fondations sur le littoral africain, Lixus et Utica et qui dateraient selon 
les sources de 1100 av. J. C. ; si 146 correspond bien à la destruction de Carthage, 
cette date ne signifie en rien la fin de la civilisation punique qui va se maintenir 
jusqu’au début du second siècle après J. C. 
Qualifier la période qui s’étend entre 146 av. J. C. et 429 de « romaine » ne tient 
pas compte de données importantes comme la différence entre une période romaine 
caractérisée par la paganisme et une autre qui voit le christianisme devenir une 
réalité et ce dès le IIIe s. Elle ignore les décalages dans le temps entre une province 
mise en place en 146 av. J. C., Africa et qui demeurera romaine jusqu’à l’invasion 
vandale et les deux maurétanies qui ne verront le jour qu’au milieu du premier 
siècle après J. C. et qui échapperont en grande partie à Rome au milieu du IIIe 
siècle suite aux révoltes des maures. 
Ces découpages ignorent la « période charnière » qui couvre les deux derniers 
siècles du premier millénaire av. J. C. et une partie importante du Haut empire et 
qui est multiculturelle par excellence, y coexistent plusieurs langues et alphabets 
(libyque, punique, grec et latin), des croyances multiples, des rites et une 
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architecture funéraires différents et une organisation administrative et politique 
complexe, le poids de la tribu, la royauté et son despotisme, un mélange de la cité-
état punique, de la polis grecque, de la res publica romaine et de titres et fonctions 
numides attestés dans une cité numide importante, Dougga. 5  La conséquence 
évidente est que les cartes établies pour illustrer des « périodes historiques » 
reflètent rarement la réalité. 
 
Les frontières 
Les frontières sont de deux types ; celles qui sont politiques, aux tracés plus ou 
moins clairs et les « frontières » culturelles qui débordent les premières et les 
relativisent. L’organisation administrative, le découpage en régions, territoires et 
provinces entrainent la mise en place de frontières internes à un pouvoir politique, 
il est ainsi question de « territoires » dirigés par des représentants du roi dans le 
cadre plus large du royaume numide ;6  à l’époque romaine, des pagi7  seraient 
hérités d’une organisation administrative pré romaine, attribuée à Carthage ; les 
provinces romaines d’Afrique, elles-mêmes sont « internes » à l’empire ; la vraie 
frontière étant le limes. 
 
Les frontières politiques 
Durant la période antique, il est question de : 
 La frontière entre le monde punique et le monde grec distinguant la Cyrénaïque 
de la Tripolitaine et qui est matérialisée par l’autel dédié aux frères Philènes 
auxquels Carthage vouait un respect pour leur sacrifice. 
 Au lendemain de la destruction de Carthage, se met en place la première 
province romaine Africa ; elle est délimitée par la fossa regia, dite aussi « le 
fossé de Scipion » qui en fut le réalisateur ; son tracé est en grande partie connu 
puisqu’il sera borné plus tard.8 Pour la période libyco-punique, il est question 
des « fosses phéniciennes » délimitant la frontière qui sépare le territoire 
dépendant de Carthage et où il est question de « libyens sujets de la métropole 
punique » du reste occupé par les « numides voisins de Carthage » ; le tracé des 
« fosses phéniciennes » est inconnu. 
 Vers le milieu du premier millénaire avant J. C. apparaissent les royaumes 
maure et numides. La « frontière » entre le royaume maure et celui numide des 
                                                          
5 M. Ghaki, La périodisation de l’histoire de l’Afrique du nord antique, in A. M. Di Tolla (éd.), 
Langues et littérature berbères : Développement et standardisation, Quaderni di Studi Berberi e 
Libico-berberi, 3, L’Orientale, Napoli, 2014, 72-81. 
 6 M. Ghaki, L’organisation politique et administrative des Numides, in À la croisée des études 
libyco-berbères, Mélanges Galand, Paris 1993, 89-102. G. C. Picard - A. Mahjoubi - A. Beschaouch, 
« Pagus Tuscae et Gunzuzi », CRAI, 1963,124-130. 
7 G.-C. Picard, Le pagus dans l’Afrique romaine, Karthago XV, 1969-1970, 3-12. 
8 N. Ferchiou, Fossa Regia, Encyclopédie Berbère, 19, 1998, 2897-2911. 
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Masaessyles est située au niveau de l’oued Moulouya9 tandis que la frontière 
entre les deux royaumes numides demeure difficile à situer. Le royaume de 
Syphax qui avait pour Capitale Cirta, devait occuper un espace de loin plus 
grand que celui de Gaia. La politique territoriale de Massinissa lui a permis, 
durant la première partie du second siècle avant J. C., avec « la bénédiction de 
Rome » d’agrandir le territoire de son royaume au dépend du territoire punique.  
 Durant la guerre entre Rome et Jugurtha, la Moulouya n’est plus une limite du 
royaume maure puisque celui-ci gagne des territoires vers l’est. Elle le 
redeviendra lors de la création des deux provinces de Maurétanie. 
 A l’époque romaine, un limes s’installe entre les provinces romaines et le reste ; 
ce limes permettait à Rome à la fois d’empêcher les tribus nomades d’entrer 
dans le territoire de l’empire, de contrôler les entrées sur son territoire et surtout 
de percevoir des taxes sur les marchandises de toute nature qui entraient dans 
l’empire. 
 
Les « limites » culturelles 
Parler de « frontières culturelles » pose un problème puisqu’il s’agit le plus 
souvent d’acculturation, de degré d’intégration et surtout de comportements des 
uns et des autres par rapport à leur culture d’origine que vis à vis des influences 
culturelles « étrangères » ; l’individu et, plus souvent, le groupe se retrouvent dans 
une situation de mélange culturel fait de la coexistence de données appartenant à 
deux civilisations, parfois plusieurs. 
Ces limites sont le plus souvent le résultat d’échanges humains dans la durée ; 
elles ne sont pas nécessairement le résultat d’une politique émanant d’un pouvoir 
central. La diffusion de la civilisation phénicienne punique qu’est la punicisation 
des autochtones est évidente à partir du IIIe siècle avant J. C., elle se renforce 
durant les siècles suivants et à une époque où la Carthage punique a disparu. Le 
système politique phénicien punique repose sur plusieurs facteurs qui ne militent 
pas en faveur d’une diffusion «organisée» de la civilisation : la cité-état, l’armée 
faite essentiellement de mercenaires, le fait que, basée sur le commerce maritime, 
Carthage, les autres cités phéniciennes puniques aussi, a tourné le dos au continent 
et ne s’y intéressera réellement qu’au lendemain de la première guerre (241 av. J. 
C.) et de la révolte des mercenaires et des libyens (241/237 av. J. C.). Au contraire, 
Rome par sa politique coloniale a répandu la civilisation romaine ; elle a 
indirectement encouragé les Africains à « se romaniser » pour jouir des avantages 
du statut de « citoyen » ; ceux qui servirent Rome, les vétérans en premier, ont 
obtenu la citoyenneté ; par contre Rome n’a rien pu faire contre la diffusion du 
christianisme. 
 
                                                          
9 R. Rebuffat, Moulouya, Encyclopédie Berbère, 32, 2010, 5092-5095. 
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Quels sont les éléments unificateurs de la carte ? 
 La géographie : la délimitation de la Libye est relativement naturelle : depuis le 
désert de Libye jusqu’à l’Atlantique, et entre la mer Méditerranée jusqu’aux 
confins du Sahara. 
 L’ethnie qui est au fil du temps un mélange composé d’un noyau « local » qui 
remonte aux origines de l’homme, d’apports orientaux, méridionaux et 
méditerranéens, est stabilisée durant le Néolithique. 
 Les croyances : tous les libyens sacrifiaient aux astres le Soleil et la Lune, tout 
en ayant développé régionalement et parfois même localement des pratiques 
religieuses souvent en rapport avec l’écologie et le mode de vie ; ces croyances 
furent ainsi en rapport avec les éléments naturels et le climat; Le cultuel 
évoluera par endroits pour donner un panthéon souvent local, parfois régional ; 
c’est au contact des autres civilisations et durant l’époque historique 
qu’apparaitront de vrais panthéons hiérarchisés comprenant des dieux et des 
déesses.10 
 La langue libyque qui fait partie de la branche africaine de la famille afro-
asiatique et qui est toujours présente à travers les parlers depuis Siwa, en Egypte 
jusqu’au littoral atlantique et entre le littoral kabyle et le nord du Niger et du 
Mali. 
 L’écriture libyque est aussi un facteur commun à la Libye antique même si elle 
demeure introuvable en Cyrénaïque. 
 Le funéraire dans ses deux aspects, rites et architecture, est commun, à l’origine 
et à toute la région ; l’attitude vis à vis du mort se caractérise par l’inhumation 
souvent collective et la position fléchie et latérale du corps ; tandis que les 
formes des tombes que sont le tumulus, le dolmen et la bazina, se rencontrent 
dans presque toute l’Afrique du nord-ouest et jusqu’aux zones sub-
sahariennes.11 
 Rome et la civilisation gréco-romaine ont été un facteur d’unité pour une large 
partie de la région puisqu’y était appliquée durant des siècles la même 
civilisation à partir d’un centre politique, idéologique et socio-économique. 
 
Quels sont les facteurs de régionalisation de la carte ? 
 Facteur d’unité, la géographie apparait aussi comme un élément important dans 
la régionalisation ; l’espace est trop grand d’où l’isolement de contrées les unes 
par rapport aux autres ; ces régions s’individualisent aux contacts d’autres 
cultures voisines : le littoral avec les iles méditerranéennes, l’extrême est avec 
l’Egypte et l’Orient, l’extrême ouest avec le sud de l’Espagne, le sud en général 
                                                          
10 M. Ghaki, L’évolution du cultuel chez les Libyens, Awal, 40-41, MSH - Paris, 2010, 145-160. 
11  F. Paris, Les sépultures du Sahara nigérien du Néolithique à l’Islamisation, coutumes 
funéraires, chronologie, civilisation, Études et Thèses, Orstom, Paris, 1995. 
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avec l’Afrique saharienne et sahélienne, etc. Hérodote écrivait : « Ce pays est 
habité par quatre nations, et d’autant que je puisse le savoir, il n’y en a pas 
d’avantage. De ces quatre nations, deux sont indigènes et deux sont étrangères. 
Les indigènes sont les Libyens et les Ethiopiens. Ceux-là habitent la partie de la 
Libye qui est au nord, et ceux-ci celle qui est au midi ; les deux nations 
étrangères sont les Phéniciens et les Grecs ».12 
 Le mode de vie se caractérise par une division nette due au climat entre 
sédentaires et nomades ; une partie importante du territoire, celle méridionale, 
restera isolée, ne subira pas les influences « étrangères » et demeurera fermée à 
l’évolution que connaitra la partie nord ; le sud nomade gardera une 
organisation tribale, une économie basée sur l’élevage et le commerce de divers 
produits provenant de l’Afrique saharienne et sahélienne. 
 Les apports étrangers n’atteindront pas toute la population et détermineront des 
différences régionales ; la partie touchée par les civilisations punique, grecque 
et romaine est à des degrés différents. Il faut distinguer, quand il s’agit 
d’acculturation, les centres urbains de la campagne ; les plaines et les plateaux 
des régions montagneuses parfois d’accès difficile et surtout d’un intérêt 
économique limité. 
 L’histoire qui installe des frontières politiques et culturelles pour des périodes 
relativement longues a finalement le plus déterminé la carte et ses divisions. Le 
cas le plus frappant est celui de l’est libyen qui portera le nom de Cyrénaïque.13 
Dès le VIIe av. J. C., la région est partagée en deux, d’un côté le territoire 
phénicien punique, de l’autre la partie grecque ; la frontière étant l’emplacement 
de l’autel dédié par Carthage aux « frères Philènes ». Comment fut fixé cet 
endroit ? La légende rapporte que pour résoudre le problème de la frontière et 
mettre fin à un conflit larvé, Carthage et Cyrène décidèrent que chacune et à un 
jour précis fasse partir deux coureurs et que le point de rencontre serait la limite 
du territoire de chacune ; les coureurs se rencontrèrent à la limite entre la Petite 
syrte et la grande or la distance entre le point d’arrivée pour le départ de 
Carthage est six fois plus longue que celle entre Cyrène et le fameux point de 
rencontre ; contesté par les grecs, ce résultat devint l’objet d’un litige, les 
coureurs carthaginois eurent le choix entre admettre avoir triché ou accepter de 
mourir sur le lieu ; la légende dit que les frères Philènes acceptèrent d’être 
sacrifiés.14 La conséquence est évidente : une partie de la Libye actuelle aura un 
parcours historique et de civilisation différent du reste de la région. La 
Cyrénaïque dans sa partie maritime fut donc grecque, elle formera avec la Crête 
une province romaine à part et elle sera à un moment sous la domination 
                                                          
12 Hérodote, V, 197. 
13 C. Sintes, La Libye antique, Gallimard, coll. « Découvertes Gallimard Archéologie », 2004. 
14 S. Gsell, 1913, Histoire ancienne de l’Afrique du nord, tome 1, Hachette, Paris, 1913, 450-454. 
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égyptienne. Sur le plan culturel et contrairement au reste de l’Afrique du nord-
ouest, en dehors de cités grecques, sa population fut et demeurera nomade ; la 
Cyrénaïque n’a pas livré d’écriture libyque et n’a pas subi la moindre influence 
phénicienne-punique. 
 L’autre exemple de division profonde fut l’installation des phéniciens sur le 
littoral et la pénétration de la civilisation punique ; les relations que les 
phéniciens puniques établissent avec les autochtones auront des conséquences 
sur la carte puisqu’une partie de la population autochtone sera punicisée ; on n’a 
toujours pas rencontré d’écriture libyque sur le littoral nord-africain et dans la 
partie nord-est de la Tunisie actuelle, régions « occupées » par la civilisation 
punique et par conséquent par l’écriture punique. L’influence punique 
relativement tardive se concentre sur la Numidie, elle ira en s’affaiblissant au 
fur et à mesure que l’on avance vers l’ouest et que l’on s’éloigne du littoral et 
des milieux urbains. 
 
Les royaumes maure et numides15 
 
Les royaumes numides vers 220/210 av. J. C. La défaite de Carthage et de son allié Syphax entraine 
la disparition du royaume de ce dernier et son rattachement au royaume de Massinissa (bataille de 
Zama 202 av. J. C.) 
 
Si nous ne connaissons pas avec précision quand naissent les royaumes numides 
et maure, il est possible de situer au début de la deuxième moitié du premier 
millénaire des faits historiques qui illustrent des changements profonds dans la 
                                                          
15 E. Smadja, Modes de contact, société indigènes et formation de l’état numide au second siècle 
av. notre ère, in Modes de contacts et processus de transformation dans les sociétés anciennes, Actes 
du colloque de Cortone, CEFRome 67, Rome, 1983, 685-702. 
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société, mutations qui vont aboutir à une organisation sociale et politique basée sur 
la royauté ; parmi ces changements, on pourrait retenir le rôle de Carthage qui 
aurait encourager la naissance de royaumes ne serait-ce que pour avoir des vis à 
vis, l’évolution d’une partie de la société autochtone vers une vie citadine, une 
ouverture sur la Méditerranée et les peuples méditerranéens, etc. Avec la naissance 
des royaumes, des frontières s’installent entre les monarchies entre elles et entre 
elles et le territoire punique ; une partie importante du littoral méditerranéen 
échappe ainsi à la gestion directe de Carthage, même si la maîtrise de la mer et du 
commerce maritime demeurent réservés aux puniques. 
 
Rome en Afrique16 
 
Les provinces romaines. La Cyrénaïque et la Crête formant une province unique 
 
La création des provinces romaines en Afrique commence en 146 av. J. C. par 
la naissance de la province Africa et se termine par la création des deux provinces 
maurétaniennes vers le milieu du premier siècle après C. Deux siècles séparent 
donc les deux évènements ; la conséquence évidente est le décalage dans le degré 
de romanisation. 
                                                          
16 J. Desanges, L’Afrique romaine et libyco-berbère, in C. Nicolet, Rome et la conquête du monde 
méditerranéen. Vol. 2 : Genèse d’un empire, Nouvelle Clio, Paris, 1978, 627-656. C. Lepelley, 
Frontières et limites géographiques de l’Afrique du nord antique. Hommage à Pierre Salama, Actes 
de la table ronde 2-3 mai 1997, La Sorbonne, Paris, 1999. C. Hugoniot, Rome en Afrique, De la chute 
de Carthage aux débuts de la conquête arabe, Flammarion, Paris, 2000. 
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Les provinces étaient « protégées » par une frontière discontinue, faite 
essentiellement de postes frontières placés à des points névralgiques, des lieux de 
passage « naturels » et habituels pour les hommes et les marchandises ; des taxes 
étaient exigées pour l’entrée dans le territoire romain. Le limes a évolué en fonction 
des moments et des exigences de sécurité, il servait surtout à contrer les nomades 
qui se déplaçaient en groupe et pouvaient constituer un danger pour les pâturages, 
les terres cultivées et le système romain lui-même. En installant des vétérans le 
long du limes, Rome les chargeait de surveiller le territoire tout en leur permettant 
de se fixer puisqu’ils deviennent propriétaires d’un lopin de terre. 
La domination romaine bouleverse la carte ; un limes marque le territoire           
« romain » et le distingue du reste ; il était souvent franchi par l’armée romaine 
essentiellement pour « contrer » les tribus nomades ; même divisé en provinces, ce 
territoire n’en est pas moins uni car soumis à une organisation, des lois et un mode 
de vie unique puisque provenant d’un pouvoir politique, administratif, social et 
culturel centralisé ; la bureaucratie romaine était la même quand il s’agit de gérer 
telle ou telle province ; ce qui pouvait faire une différence c’est le degré de             
« romanisation » des habitants et leur statut juridique. L’époque romaine ne fut que 
partiellement un facteur d’unité car le décalage dans le temps de la gestion romaine 
a fait que la partie orientale (Africa, Numidie et Tripolitaine), Rome y est présente 
plus de cinq siècles, fut de loin plus profondément romanisée. 
Les problèmes pour l’empire romain en Afrique commencent dès le milieu du 
troisième siècle suite aux révoltes des tribus maures et surtout à cause du christianisme 
qui minera la civilisation romaine païenne de l’intérieur ; l’affaiblissement de l’emprise 
romaine sur l’Afrique fut facilité par les « invasions barbares » qui toucheront de 
nombreuses provinces et obligeront l’empire à mener plusieurs guerres sur plusieurs 
fronts au même moment ; la réforme de Dioclétien cherchera à colmater les brèches et 
le nombre de provinces africaines passa de trois à six. L’accalmie fut courte. 
Des troubles marquent profondément le IVe siècle et aboutissent en 429 à 
l’invasion vandale. 
 Carthage est pillée par des soldats révoltés en 310. 
 Le schisme donatiste se déclenche en 312. 
 La révolte de circoncellions (340-350) encouragée par le donatisme créera des 
foyers de contestation et fera reculer l’administration romaine. 
 Révolte de Firmus (371-375). 
 Révolte du comte d’Afrique Gildon le frère de Firmus (397-398). 
Ces évènements de natures diverses, en apparence, s’inscrivent tous dans une 
logique, la contestation politique, idéologique et sociale du pouvoir romain. Ils 
illustrent l’affaiblissement de Rome et « annoncent » la fin d’une période et d’un 
monde. 
Miné de l’intérieur par le christianisme et sur ses frontières par les invasions des 
peuples du nord et de l’est, l’empire romain perdit du terrain sur presque tous les 
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fronts ; en Afrique, le système lui-même basé sur la Res publica s’affaiblit ; la cité 
païenne voyait les monuments qui la caractérisaient s’effondrer quand ils ne sont 
pas récupérés et réaffectés au christianisme ; les monuments de loisir n’étaient 
presque plus fréquentés et l’espace public lui-même n’était plus respecté. 
La période byzantine ne redressera pas la situation ; pour se « protéger », le 
pouvoir byzantin n’hésita pas à monter des fortifications en démantelant ce qui 
restait debout des monuments publics païens. La carte de l’Afrique du nord-ouest, 
intégrée dans l’empire byzantin semble retrouver une certaine unité ; vue de près, 
elle est en fait éclatée et le pouvoir central byzantin ne semble plus avoir une réelle 
emprise sur les populations et les territoires. 
 
Conclusion 
Au fil du temps et à chaque grande étape de l’histoire, l’Afrique du nord-ouest 
se verra dotée d’appellations multiples : Libye, Maghreb, Berbèrie, Afrique du 
nord, etc. ces divers noms sont certes le fruit de données historiques, ils sont aussi 
et surtout dus à des lectures de cette histoire. 
Deux constantes permettent de saisir l’évolution de la carte : 
 La première donnée humaine et de civilisation prend ses sources dans la 
civilisation libyenne qui se maintient tout en s’ouvrant aux civilisations punique, 
romaine, grecque, chrétienne ; le résultat est une période libyco-punique suivie 
d’une époque afro-romaine et d’un christianisme africain qui donnera des « pères 
de l’église ». L’amazighité caractérise donc et permet de distinguer l’Afrique du 
nord-ouest du reste des pays du bassin occidental de la Méditerranée. 
 La seconde caractéristique est une régionalisation qui va en s’accentuant jusqu’à 
aboutir à un éclatement. La carte telle qu’elle se présente aujourd’hui est faite 
d’états-nations aux frontières tracées dans l’essentiel par la colonisation. Les 
frontières politiques d’aujourd’hui sont une source de problèmes parfois de 
conflits entre les états-nations ; ces frontières ne sont pas ethniques, encore 
moins culturelles. Le passé antique de la Libye actuelle ne permet pas de parler 
d’une entité politique et culturelle caractérisée par une histoire commune et 
unificatrice ; les périodes historiques des premiers siècles de l’islamisation et de 
l’arabisation ont en partie unifié culturellement la Libye ; l’époque coloniale , 
fruit d’un équilibre momentané entre les puissances coloniales a « crée » une 
Libye encore plus complexe en y intégrant une partie du Sahara. 
Les frontières d’aujourd’hui rendent encore complexe les situations socio-
politiques des états-nations ; si durant l’Antiquité, la division reposait surtout sur le 
mode de vie, la géographie et les influences dues à l’installation de civilisation       
« étrangères » à la région, la situation d’aujourd’hui a créé une instabilité intérieure 
des états-nations, des animosités entre eux et des ingérences étrangères qui 
alimentent la division quand elles ne génèrent pas un danger qui remet en question 
l’existence même de certains de ces états. 
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La Libye telle que définie par les Grecs couvre un vaste territoire « naturellement » 
délimité par le Nil, le rivage atlantique, la Méditerranée et le Sahara. Cette unité 
géographique l’est aussi par des données humaines et culturelles. L’évolution historique 
créera au fil des siècles, sinon des millénaires des frontières politiques et de civilisations. 
Pour saisir l’évolution dans le temps et dans l’espace de cette vaste région il est nécessaire 
de recourir à une terminologie la plus précise possible et à une périodisation qui tienne 
compte d’une régionalisation parfois poussée jusqu’à l’éclatement. 
  










« Les ennemis de la Nation arabe ». 




À la fin de l’été 1958, un télégramme de Tripoli, adressé au ministère des 
Affaires étrangères de Londres, annonce la nouvelle des troubles survenus à 
Zouara, à la frontière tuniso-libyenne. Le bilan officiel est de deux morts, un blessé 
et six arrestations, bien que d’autres sources indiquent six victimes. Le document 
se concentre également sur l’intervention de l’infanterie libyenne visant à soutenir 
la police et sur le fait que le wali a dissous le conseil municipal de Zouara.1 
Cet évènement a représenté l’une des nombreuses frictions ayant eu lieu au 
cours de ces années, alors que la Libye, indépendante depuis 1951, vivait une 
phase d’ajustement et une situation interne complexe, également affectée par le 
contexte international. La monarchie héréditaire du roi Idriss Ier, au moment de 
l’indépendance était en effet l’un des pays les plus pauvres du bassin 
méditerranéen, avec une population d’un peu plus d’un million d’habitants répartie 
sur un vaste territoire et dont 42% étaient nomades ou semi-nomades. 2 
Parallèlement, la Libye demeurait un acteur important de la scène méditerranéenne, 
toujours objet de l’intérêt international, et ce en particulier depuis la découverte des 
champs pétrolifères. Les liens avec l’Occident se matérialisaient principalement 
par l’existence des bases militaires de Wheelus concédées aux États-Unis, d’El 
Adeur et El Benina détenues par la Grande-Bretagne, ainsi que par les concessions 
pétrolières accordées surtout à ces deux puissances et à la France. L’exploitation 
                                                        
* La recherche a été conduite dans le cadre d’un projet financé par le Fonds national suisse de la 
recherche scientifique (165585 ; 2016-2019). 
1  The National Archives, Kew, London (TNA). Foreign Office (FO) 371/131792, African 
Department, Libya. Disturbances at Zuara, originating from Arab/Berber rivalry. Confidential from 
Tripoli to Foreign Office No. 314, 09.09.1958. 
2 J. Lindeberg, A General Economic Appraisal of Libya prepared by Mr. John Lindberg, Expert 
appointed by the Technical Assistance Administration of the United Nations, UN, New York, 1952, 5-
6. 
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des gisements de pétrole, dont l’extension s’est développée à partir de 1955, faisait 
de la Libye le cinquième producteur du monde après les États-Unis, le Venezuela, 
l’Iran et l’Arabie saoudite.3 
À l’époque du télégramme, des traités d’alliances militaire et financière avaient 
été signés avec la Grande-Bretagne (1953) et les États-Unis (1954). De plus, des 
négociations avec l’Union soviétique (1955) avaient été menées et le traité avec 
l’Italie (1956) était entré en vigueur. Ainsi, la Libye se trouvait à la croisée des 
chemins, avec d’un côté les anglo-américains, les soviétiques et les italiens et, de 
l’autre, le monde arabe. En effet, avec la crise de Suez de 1956, le pays avait 
ouvertement exprimé sa position pro-arabe et son soutien à l’Égypte de Nasser, 
ainsi qu’à la Tunisie et au Maghreb arabe en général, perçus alors comme de 
nouveaux alliés.4 
Nous noterons que le télégramme de 1958 relevait le lien entre le conflit armé et 
la longue rivalité arabe-berbère, « de caractère purement paroissial » 5, et exprimait 
des craintes sur l’exploitation de la situation par les contestateurs de la monarchie. 
Finalement, la situation est rapidement rentrée dans l’ordre,6 comme si, bien au-
delà d’une simple rivalité, la relation entre Arabes et Berbères n’existait pas, 
presque passée sous silence. Sous le règne d’Idriss, le nationalisme panarabe a 
reconnu les Berbères comme la nouvelle Libye arabe et sunnite indépendante. Par 
la suite, le silence vis-à-vis de la question amazighe a réellement marqué les 
quarante-deux années du régime de Kadhafi, rendant la situation libyenne similaire 
à ce qui s’est passé dans le reste de l’Afrique du Nord.7 En réalité, la revendication 
de l’arabité, apparue aussi avec la naissance de la Ligue arabe en 1945, a été 
légitimée par les indépendances nord-africaines et l’adhésion de chaque pays à la 
Ligue, ainsi que par des Constitutions qui ont reconnu, dans leurs premiers articles, 
l’Islam comme religion d’État et la langue arabe comme langue officielle. Au 
moment de l’indépendance, le choix d’une langue officielle a constitué l’un des 
premiers « actes symboliques fondateurs de la souveraineté » 8  à travers le 
processus d’arabisation, qui a pris des formes différentes selon les pays. En Tunisie 
par exemple, le but de Bourguiba consistait à « tunisifier » la société et il a, en 
                                                        
3 Documents Diplomatiques Suisses (DDS), dodis.ch/33795, Changement de régime en Libye : 
instauration de la « République arabe libyenne », 12.09.1969, 4-5. 
4  TNA, FO 371/126023, Confidential. Graham to Llyod, Annual review for Libya, Tripoli, 
22.01.1957. 
5 TNA, FO 371/131792, African Department, Libya. Disturbances at Zuara, cit. 
6 TNA, FO 371/131792, Confidential Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office, 
September 10, 1958 - TNA, FO 371/131792, Secret Telegram, British Embassy in Libya, Tripoli, 
17.09.1958. 
7 Pour une vue d’ensemble de la question berbère en Afrique du Nord, M. Fois, Il Nord Africa tra 
contestazione politica e culturale. Il caso berbero, in L. El Houssi (éd.), Minoranze in Nord Africa e in 
Medio Oriente tra tradizione e modernità, Ricerche Storiche, 1, 2018, 55-72. 
8 B. Droz, Histoire de la décolonisation au XXe siècle, Seuil, Paris, 2006, 310. 
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même temps, conduit un processus de « déberbérisation ». 9  En Algérie, une 
révolution culturelle a été menée en vue de l’arabisation, considérée comme la 
première étape visant à surmonter l’expérience coloniale.10Ainsi, ce processus 
d’arabisation est devenu un « objectif révolutionnaire »11 et a rendu la langue arabe 
obligatoire, en premier lieu dans la sphère administrative, puis dans les domaines 
juridique, scolaire et économique. Au Maroc, les premières années du règne de 
Mohamed V ont été marquées par divers épisodes de dissidence berbère, 
démontrant le mécontentement général à l’égard d’un projet d’État essentiellement 
arabe. En effet, bien que le processus linguistique ne se présentât pas comme 
linéaire, il ne laissait pas suffisamment de place à la langue berbère.12 
Dans le cas libyen, l’arabisation et l’unité de l’État après l’indépendance se sont 
avérées plus difficiles en raison de l’unification des trois territoires historiquement 
divisés, Fezzan, Cyrénaïque et Tripolitaine, à laquelle l’Italie avait procédé pendant 
la période coloniale. Le gouvernement italien, après quelques études et recherches 
visant à approfondir sa connaissance des Berbères, avait cherché à définir une 
politique d’administration et de contrôle des régions berbérophones différente de 
celle du reste du territoire. 13  En effet, tout comme dans le cas des colonies 
françaises, les Berbères étaient considérés comme un instrument permettant 
d’administrer et de gérer les territoires occupés de manière plus efficace, 
notamment grâce à l’application d’une hiérarchie raciale.14 Dans le contexte de la 
décolonisation et de l’indépendance de la Libye, ils ont été considérés – comme 
d’ailleurs toutes les minorités en général – comme un élément perturbateur qui 
mettait en péril la stabilité politique. Pour cette raison, pendant les années de 
Kadhafi, leur rôle a été délégitimé. 
 
« Les ennemis de la Nation arabe » 
 
Dans la nuit du 1er au 2 septembre 1969, en l’absence du roi Idriss qui se trouvait 
dans un lieu de cure en Turquie, un groupe de jeunes officiers libyens s’est emparé 
du pouvoir […]. Ce coup d’État semble avoir été exécuté sans effusion de sang. En 
annonçant par radio [leur] réussite, ses auteurs déclarèrent avoir formé un “Conseil 
                                                        
9 G. Grandguillaume, L’arabisation au Maghreb, Revue d’aménagement linguistique, 107, 2004, 18. 
10 M. Fois, La minoranza inesistente. I berberi e la costruzione dello Stato algerino, Carocci, 
Roma, 2013, 109. 
11 El Moudjahid, 29 avril 1970. 
12 G. Grandguillaume, Arabisation et politique linguistique au Maghreb, G.-P. Maisonneuve-
Larose, Paris, 1983. 
13 F. Cresti, Due volte minoranza: i berberi ibaditi del jabal Nafūsa nella visione coloniale, in F. 
Cresti (éd.), Minoranze, pluralismo, stato nell’Africa mediterranea e nel Sahel, Aracne, Roma, 2015, 
21-61. 
14 J. Despois, La colonisation italienne en Libye : problèmes et méthodes, Larose, Paris, 1935. 
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de la révolution”15 porte-parole d’« […] une Libye révolutionnaire, socialiste […], 
pays qui luttera contre le colonialisme et le racisme et aidera les pays colonisés ».16 
 
La République arabe libyenne, proclamée par les forces armées en septembre 
1969 au nom de la volonté populaire, visait la mise en place d’un gouvernement 
démocratique et progressiste, ainsi que la garantie du socialisme et de l’unité arabe. 
Cette perspective permettait de dépasser les antagonismes régionaux en plaçant 
l’unité nationale au centre d’un projet politique plus ample. Le coup d’État a été 
comparé à une lutte de libération, établissant une relation directe avec les guerres 
de décolonisation.17 Une nouvelle Constitution, dont le préambule proclamait que 
le peuple libyen faisait partie de la Nation arabe et qu’il s’était battu pour éliminer 
tous les obstacles potentiels, a remplacé celle de 1951. En outre, depuis 
l’avènement du nouveau régime, la situation a également changé pour les Juifs.18 
Comme communiqué au Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, « ceux-ci feraient 
l’objet d’intimidations de la part des militaires libyens. Ils devraient subir des 
perquisitions à leur domicile et d’autres humiliations. Certains furent arrêtés, puis 
relâchés. D’autres se trouvent encore en prison, soi-disant dans l’intérêt de leur 
propre sécurité ».19 
À l’origine du nationalisme de Kadhafi, l’union du monde arabe faisait 
certainement partie de ses mots-clés. Inspiré par l’idéologie de Nasser, il 
reconnaissait la composante islamique comme une partie essentielle de 
l’arabisme.20 En 1973, la Révolution populaire a vu son origine à Zouara, ville des 
émeutes de la fin des années cinquante. Elle présentait un programme en cinq 
points qui, outre le fait de supprimer les structures politiques existantes et 
d’améliorer l’orientation populaire de la révolution, incluait des mesures visant à 
                                                        
15 DDS, dodis.ch/33795, Changement de régime en Libye : instauration de la « République arabe 
libyenne », cit., 1. 
16 Idem, 3. 
17  F. Dumasy - F. Di Pasquale, Être historien dans la Libye de Kadhafi. Stratégies 
professionnelles et pratiques mémorielles autour du Libyan Studies Center, Politique africaine, 125/1, 
2012, 129-130. 
18  Archives fédérales suisses (AFS), Berne, E2003A#1980/85#798* Communautés juives en 
Libye. Ambasuisse, Tripoli, Télégramme n. 39, 23.09.1969. 
19  AFS E2003A#1980/85#798* Communautés juives en Libye. Situation des Juifs en Libye, 
Lettre du Département politique fédéral au Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, Genève, 
03.10.1969. 
20 Pour une analyse sur le point de vue de Khadafi v. M. Cricco - F. Cresti, Gheddafi. I volti del 
potere, Carocci, Roma, 2011. Sur l’histoire de la Libye, v. F. Burgat - A. Laronde, La Libye, PUF, 
Paris, 1996 ; D. Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge University Press, New York, 
2006 ; A. Baldinetti, The Origins of the Libyan Nation. Colonial Legacy, Exile and Emergence of a 
New Nation-State, Routledge, London / New York, 2010 ; F. Cresti, Non desiderare la terra d’altri. 
La colonizzazione italiana in Libia, Carocci, Roma, 2011 ; F. Cresti - M. Cricco, Storia della Libia 
contemporanea, Carocci, Roma, 2015, 2 ed. 
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accélérer l’élimination des opposants au régime, l’armement des citoyens et la 
suspension des lois de l’État. La mobilisation est venue de la base.21 Tout au début, 
il s’agissait de construire « la communauté imaginée », pour utiliser les mots de 
Benedict Anderson.22 Comment ? À travers une sorte de classement des différentes 
composantes de la société, dont on trouve un exemple concret dans le Livre Vert. 
Ce dernier constitue le fondement de la réflexion qui aboutira à la création de la 
Grande Jamāhīriyya arabe libyenne populaire et socialiste, instaurée en 1977 par 
Kadhafi. En proposant une troisième voie alternative au bipolarisme, dans la 
section sur les fondements sociaux de la troisième théorie universelle, le Livre Vert 
analyse la notion de minorité et son rôle au sein de la société libyenne, en 
distinguant deux types de minorités.23 
 
Qu’est-ce qu’une minorité ? Quels sont ses droits et ses devoirs ? Comment le 
problème des minorités peut-il se résoudre en partant des principes généraux de la 
Troisième Théorie Universelle ? 
Il n’y a que deux types de minorités. 
Celles qui appartiennent à une nation qui leur fournit un cadre social, et celles qui, 
n’appartenant pas à une nation, forment elles-mêmes leur propre cadre. Ces 
dernières accumulent les traditions historiques qui doivent permettre, à terme, par le 
jeu de l’appartenance et de la communauté de destin, de former des nations.  
Il est clair que ces minorités ont des droits sociaux qui leur sont propres. Toute 
altération de ces droits par une majorité constitue une injustice. Les caractéristiques 
sociales sont inhérentes et ne peuvent être ni octroyées, ni confisquées. Quant à leurs 
problèmes politiques et économiques, ils ne peuvent être résolus qu’au sein d’une 
société populaire dans laquelle les masses détiennent le pouvoir, la richesse et les 
armes. Considérer les minorités comme étant politiquement et économiquement 
minoritaires, relève de la dictature et de l’injustice.24 
 
Toutefois, paradoxalement, ce discours n’a pas eu d’application concrète. En effet, 
les droits sociaux n’étaient pas reconnus, et aucune tutelle n’était assurée. Les 
Imazighen étaient plutôt considérés comme « ennemis de la Nation arabe et 
instruments du colonialisme et [de] l’impérialisme ».25 Dès le début, le régime de 
                                                        
21 D. Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006, 
100-102. 
22 B. Anderson, L’imaginaire national. Réflexions sur l’origine et l’essor du nationalisme, La 
Découverte, Paris, 1996. 
23 Le Livre Vert a été publié en trois parties (entre 1976 et 1979) : la première s’intéresse à la 
politique, la deuxième à l’économie et la troisième à la société, son organisation et ses objectifs. 
24 M. El Khadafi, Le Livre Vert. La solution du problème de la démocratie, « le pouvoir du peuple ». 
La solution du problème économique, « le socialisme ». Les fondements sociaux de la « troisième 
théorie universelle », Centre mondial d’études et de recherches sur le livre vert, Tripoli, 1999, 155. 
25 S. Chaker - M. Ferkal, Berbères de Libye : un paramètre méconnu, une irruption politique 
inattendue, Politique Africaine, 125, 2012, 107. 
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Kadhafi a mené une politique très dure à leur égard, et ceci sur plusieurs domaines. 
Le système éducatif, par exemple, a été conçu entièrement en arabe, sans aucune 
mention du passé berbère dans les manuels d’histoire nord-africaine. De même, 
l’usage de la langue berbère a été prohibé dans tous les lieux publics et les 
toponymes berbères ont été arabisés. Au sein de la famille, une loi (n° 24-1994), en 
vigueur jusqu’en 2007, interdisait le choix de noms berbères pour les nouveau-nés. 
Le peuple libyen a toujours été décrit comme un bloc monolithique, caractérisé par 
la langue arabe et la religion islamique, sans stratifications ni différences. 
L’ibadisme a d’ailleurs été réprimé. Les enquêtes statistiques ont également été 
interdites, fait qui, comme partout ailleurs en Afrique du Nord, rend difficile 
l’évaluation démographique de la population berbérophone.26 Celle-ci est concentrée 
dans l’ouest du pays, en particulier à Zouara, au sud-ouest de Tripoli dans le Djebel 
Nefoussa, ainsi que dans les oasis de Ghadamès, Ghat, El-Foqaha, Sokna et Augila. 
Le refus de reconnaissance exprime un désir d’homogénéisation et de contrôle 
social et territorial. 
Si « l’écriture de l’histoire a pu être un élément du système complexe de 
compromis et de négociation entre différents acteurs et entre des mémoires 
hétérogènes »,27 l’approfondissement de l’histoire libyenne du point de vue des 
Berbères et la reconstruction de leur contribution s’avèrent d’autant plus 
compliqués, notamment en raison du choix du régime de cacher d’une manière ou 
d’une autre leur existence. Pendant des décennies, les sources les plus importantes 
sur les berbérophones ont été d’ordre linguistique, en particulier du côté italien, 
conséquence directe des intérêts coloniaux et des liens historiques.28  Après les 
                                                        
26 Compte tenu de l’absence de recensements linguistiques, on l’estime à un peu plus de 10 % de 
la population globale, dont la grande majorité se situe dans le binôme Zouara-Nefoussa, v. S. Chaker 
- M. Ferkal, op. cit., 108. 
27 F. Dumasy - F. Di Pasquale, op. cit., 128. 
28 Pour plus de détails, voir les travaux des linguistes italiens, notamment F. Beguinot, Gli studi 
berberi dal 1919 al maggio 1922, Rivista degli Studi Orientali, 9, 1922, 382-408 ; G. Buselli, Berber 
Texts from Jebel Nefûsi (Žemmâri Dialect), Journal of the Royal African Society, 23/92, 1924, 285-
293 ; F. Zanon, Contributo alla conoscenza linguistico-etnografica dell’oasi di Augila, Africa italiana, 
5, 1933, 259-270 ; F. Beguinot, Il Berbero Nefûsi di Fassâṭo, Istituto per l’Oriente, Roma, 1942 ; L. 
Serra, Testi berberi in dialetto di Zuâra, Annali dell’Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli, 14, 
1964, 715-726 ; L. Serra, I dialetti berberi orientali (Rassegna degli studi e prospettive di ricerca), Atti 
del Sodalizio Glottologico Milanese, 21, 1979, 23-34 ; L. Serra, “Il contributo italiano agli studi di 
berberistica, L’Universo: rivista di divulgazione geografica, 64/5, 1984, 634-642 ; L. Serra, Studi di 
berberistica, Gli Studi africanistici in Italia dagli anni ‘60 ad oggi, Atti del convegno, Roma, 25-27 
giugno 1985, Istituto italo-africano, Roma, 1986, 207-226 ; V. Brugnatelli (éd.), Fiabe del popolo 
tuareg e dei Berberi del Nordafrica, Mondadori, Milano, 1994. Pour une reconstruction historique de 
la question berbère dans la politique italienne pendant les premières années de la présence italienne en 
Libye, v. F. Cresti, 2015, op. cit. En ce qui concerne les études francophones, voir, dans le domaine 
de la géographie, J. Despois, Le Djebel Nefousa (Tripolitaine). Étude géographique, Larose, Paris, 
1935 ; D. Bisson - J. Bisson - J. Fontaine, La Libye. À la découverte d’un pays. Tome 1. Identité 
libyenne ; Tome 2. Itinéraires, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1999. 
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soulèvements de 2011, la question berbère a trouvé un nouvel élan – en Libye mais 
aussi en Tunisie – concrétisé par un débat très vif et des nouvelles recherches.29 
 
Révolutions et résistances. Influences internationales 
L’approche du gouvernement libyen à l’égard de la question berbère ou, en 
d’autres termes, celle de la majorité à l’égard de la minorité, relevait du déni. Les 
seuls espaces d’expression possibles étaient à l’étranger, et ce grâce aux contacts et 
aux influences internationales. Tout d’abord, le printemps berbère de 1980 en 
Algérie a donné de nouvelles impulsions. Il a représenté la première manifestation 
publique dans ce pays contre le gouvernement du parti unique du Front de 
libération nationale (FLN), seul détenteur du pouvoir depuis l’indépendance, et 
avait pour objectif la reconnaissance de la diversité linguistique et culturelle. Les 
manifestations en faveur de la langue à l’Université de Tizi Ouzou, en Kabylie, ont 
démontré que « la revendication berbère n’était pas le fait d’intellectuels isolés – 
« résidus du colonialisme » – mais bien une aspiration largement diffusée au sein 
de la population berbérophone ».30 La résistance des militants des territoires du 
Djebel Nefoussa et de Zouara, de nature essentiellement culturelle, a probablement 
été influencée par les contacts avec des militants Kabyles, ainsi que par la 
participation des exilés au Front national pour le salut de la Libye (National Front 
for the Salvation of Libya, NFSL). Créé en 1981, il s’opposait au régime depuis 
l’étranger ; son objectif visait un gouvernement constitutionnel et 
démocratiquement élu. 
De plus, le panberberisme ou panamizighité – sentiment d’appartenance à la 
composante berbère – a trouvé dans le Congrès Mondial Amazigh (CMA) l’une de 
                                                        
29 Suite aux changements depuis 2011, de nouvelles études sont apparues. Voir, par exemple, B. 
Maddy-Weitzman, The Berber Identity Movement and The Challenge to North African States, 
University of Texas Press, Austin, 2011 ; A. M. Di Tolla, I Berberi del Gebel Nefusa tra rivoluzione e 
identità culturale, in A. M. Di Tolla - E. Francesca (éds.), La rivoluzione ai tempi di internet: il futuro 
della democrazia nel Maghreb e nel mondo arabo, Il Torcoliere, UNIOR, Napoli, 2012, 79-91 ; Y. 
Sawani - J. Pack, Libyan constitutionality and sovereignty post-Qadhafi: the Islamist, regionalist, and 
Amazigh challenges, The Journal of North African Studies, 18/4, 2013, 523-543 ; B. Maddy-
Weitzman, A turning point? The Arab Spring and the Amazigh movement, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 
Minority politics in the Middle East and North Africa: the prospects for transformative change, 
38/14, 2015, 2499-2515 ; A. M. Morone - C. Pagano, Les Berbères du Jebel Nefousa dans la Libye 
post-Kadhafi : une perspective historique, Libyan Affairs, 1/2, 2016, 128-157 ; K. E. Hoffman, 
Navigating the Border: Amazing Minorities from Libia in Tunisia during the 2011-2012 Uprising, in 
M. Carboni - G. Sistu (éds.), Mobility and Minorities in Africa, Aracne, Roma, 2018, 149-171 ; A. 
Baldinetti, Languages in Libya: Building Blocks of National Identity and Soft Power Tools, The 
Journal of North African Studies, 23/3, 2018, 418-439. 
30 S. Chaker, Berbères aujourd’hui, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1989, 35. 
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ses expressions concrètes.31 En s’inspirant de la Déclaration des Nations Unies de 
1994 sur les droits des peuples autochtones, le CMA a réuni de nombreuses 
associations berbères. La conception du CMA, présentant les Berbères comme un 
peuple transnational, était aux antipodes du discours nationaliste soutenu par les 
différents pays après l’indépendance. 
L’internationalisation du débat a également pu exister grâce aux associations de 
la diaspora et au réseau web, qui, compte tenu des restrictions imposées par le 
régime, représentait l’un des seuls moyens d’expression et contribuait à la diffusion 
d’une identité multiple. À cet égard, deux exemples peuvent être mentionnés, à 
savoir le site Tawalt (« mot » en tamazight), né en 2001 en tant que forum devenu 
ensuite une plate-forme pour la sauvegarde du patrimoine culturel, et le Congrès 
libyen amazigh (CLA), fondé à Londres en 2002. En 2005, ce sont précisément les 
Berbères vivant hors de la Libye qui ont dénoncé la violation systématique des 
droits linguistiques et culturels auprès du Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies aux 
droits de l’homme, ce qui démontre à quel point les voies de contestation étaient 
externes.32 
 
2011 : une rupture radicale avec le passé ? 
La désintégration de l’État en Libye, avec les changements survenus en 2011, a 
représenté paradoxalement l’accomplissement de l’idéologie de la Jamāhīriyya, qui 
donnait le pouvoir au peuple. Inspiré par des principes révolutionnaires, Kadhafi 
avait montré un profond scepticisme quant au concept d’État.33 D’un autre point de 
vue, la reconnaissance, de la part de l’ONU, du Conseil national de transition en 
tant que le seul représentant légitime de la Libye, a proclamé la fin de la 
Jamāhīriyya.34 
Les mobilisations populaires de 2011 et la fin des régimes autoritaires ont de 
leur côté ouvert la voie à la revendication amazighe, qui a alors trouvé un élan 
nouveau et une place différente, comme l’a affirmé le président du Congrès 
Mondial Amazigh pendant le Forum Permanent des Nations Unies sur les droits 
des peuples autochtones : 
                                                        
31 Fondé en 1995 à Saint Romain de Dolan en France, le CMA a organisé sa première conférence 
en 1997, dans les îles Canaries. Pour plus de détails, voir le site officiel du CMA, 
https://www.congres-mondial-amazigh.org. 
32 Pour plus de détails, A. Baldinetti, Le istanze amazigh in Libia: la nascita di una società civile?, 
in A. Baldinetti - A. Maneggia (éds.), Processi politici nel Mediterraneo: dinamiche e prospettive, 
Morlacchi Editore, Perugia, 2009, 231-250. Sur le rôle des sites web, M. Lafkioui, Interactions 
digitales et construction identitaire sur les sites Web berbères, Études et Documents Berbères, 29/30, 
2011, 213-233. 
33 D. Melfa, Forme e problematiche della statualità nel Maghreb. Note introduttive, in D. Melfa 
(éd.) Statualità e periferie nel Maghreb contemporaneo, Aracne, Roma, 2018, 11. 
34 J. Jurado Anaya, « La Seconde Jamahiriyya » libyenne : l’échec d’une stratégie de survie, 
L’Année du Maghreb, VIII, 2012, 215. 
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[…] c’est naturellement et avec enthousiasme que les Amazighs participent très 
activement aux protestations populaires en cours, afin de mettre fin au règne des 
régimes despotiques et tyranniques et instaurer des États de droit et la démocratie.35 
 
Les médias ont montré les drapeaux amazighs brandis de Zouara jusqu’à 
Tripoli, donnant un message très clair. Ainsi, le débat, qui n’était jusqu’alors 
possible qu’à l’étranger ou sur le web, a pu trouver une place au sein de la 
complexe société libyenne, principalement en raison de l’implication militaire du 
Djebel Nefoussa. L’espoir résidait dans le fait que l’importance historique, 
culturelle et linguistique des Amazighs pouvait être reconnue, et que leurs droits 
pouvaient être assurés.36 
Dès août 2011, le projet de Constitution provisoire a permis de franchir une 
première étape, notamment avec son article 1, qui affirme que : « L’Arabe est la 
langue officielle, en garantissant les droits linguistiques et culturels des Amazighs, 
des Tabous, des Touaregs et des composantes de la société libyenne ». Cependant, 
le Congrès national amazigh libyen (CNAL)37 a exprimé ses doutes et a rejeté 
l’article susmentionné, considéré comme discriminatoire et « en nette contradiction 
avec les bases de formation d’États démocratiques, civils, pluriels, modernes et 
justes ; […] avec les principes de base des droits de l’Homme et des traités 
internationaux ». 38  De plus, ce congrès a exigé que la langue amazighe soit 
considérée comme langue officielle au même titre que l’arabe.39 
En réalité, le travail à faire est encore important, même si l’on tient compte du 
chemin déjà parcouru au cours des dernières décennies par les autres pays nord-
africains. Si l’on peut tirer des leçons de ce qui s’est passé en Algérie et au Maroc 
– où les Berbères ont été confrontés à leur gouvernement respectif au cours des 
dernières décennies –, les moments de crise de l’État ont conduit à la 
reconnaissance, quelquefois partielle, de la langue berbère. Ce fait est confirmé par 
le projet de Constitution de 2011 et son article 2, consacré à l’identité et la langue, 
qui affirme que : 
 
L’identité libyenne se base sur des principes inclusifs et diversifiés ; les Libyens sont 
fiers de leurs éléments sociaux, culturels et linguistiques et la Libye est considérée 
comme une partie du monde arabe et musulman, de l’Afrique et du bassin 
méditerranéen. 
                                                        
35  Belkacem Lounes, Président du Congrès Mondial Amazigh à la Xe session du Forum 
Permanent des Nations Unies sur les droits des peuples autochtones, New York, mai 2011.  
36 Ibidem. 
37 Pour plus de détails, v. A. Bensaâd (éd.), La Libye révolutionnaire, Politique africaine, 125, 
2012. 
38 Art. 1 Communiqué du premier Congrès national amazigh libyen. 
39 Art. 2 Communiqué du premier Congrès national amazigh libyen. 
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Les langues parlées par les Libyens ou d’une partie d’entre eux, y compris Arabe, 
Amazigh, Tuareg et Tubo, sont considérées comme un patrimoine culturel et 
linguistique et constituent un atout commun pour tous les Libyens. L’État garantit de 
prendre les mesures nécessaires pour les protéger, préserver leur originalité et 
développer leur enseignement et leur utilisation par ceux qui les parlent. 
 
Les Amazighs de Libye ont rejeté ce projet par la voix du Haut Conseil des 
Amazighs. Ce dernier, en 2013 a décrétée une période de désobéissance civile, qui 
s’est concrétisée dans une série de protestations contre l’attribution des sièges de 
l’Assemblée constituante. Après la menace de boycotter les élections, de fermer les 
routes principales et les ports, les représentants de la communauté berbère ont 
bloqué le terminal gazier de Zouara, ville encore une fois protagoniste.40  
Sans doute, le défi de la reconstruction du pays, la concurrence entre légitimité 
politique – strictement liée aux urnes – et légitimité révolutionnaire, le rôle des 
milices et les fragmentations locales ont influencé l’approche amazighe. 41 
Aujourd’hui, il s’agit d’une situation en cours de développement, mais la position 
des membres du Haut Conseil des Amazighs reste inchangée. Selon eux, le projet 
de Constitution est « basé sur la discrimination raciale en violation flagrante du 
droit international et des principes démocratiques », 42  vu qu’il prévoit « deux 
catégories de citoyens ».43 
 
Conclusion 
Le débat sur le rôle des Berbères en Libye est toujours animé et d’actualité. 
Historiquement, les minorités dans leur ensemble ont été considérées comme un 
problème, représentant l’une des principales raisons de l’absence de consolidation 
de l’État-Nation. Après les mobilisations de 2011, il est apparu clairement qu’elles 
constituaient « un précieux indice de la pluralité politique et culturelle » dans les 
sociétés de l’Afrique du Nord.44 
Bien qu’il s’agisse d’une question indéniablement politique, elle va au-delà de 
cette seule arène et atteint d’autres contextes comme la langue, l’éducation et la 
religion. Une question qui, comme nous l’avons vu, dépasse les frontières 
nationales et géographiques. Elle y puise une plus grande force et une résonance 
internationale qui, bien qu’elle ne propose pas de « solution » à court terme, assure 
                                                        
40 S. Haddad, Insécurité, exclusion et blocage politiques dans une Libye fragmentée, L’Année du 
Maghreb, 11, 2014. 
41 S. Haddad, La sécurité, « priorité des priorités » de la transition libyenne, L’Année du Maghreb, 
IX, 2013. 
42  https://www.congres-mondial-amazigh.org/2018/12/22/libye-projet-de-nouvelle-constitution, 
consulté le 5 janvier 2019. 
43 Ibidem. 
44 B. Stora, Le 89 arabe, réflexions sur les révolutions en cours, dialogue avec Edwy Plenel, 
Stock, Paris, 2011, 144. 
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la persistance du débat. Trois communiqués récents du CMA de 2018 en sont la 
preuve. 
Le premier rapporte la motion du VIIIe congrès à Tunis en octobre 2018, qui 
donne un aperçu de la situation des Berbères en Afrique du Nord. En ce qui 
concerne la Libye, le document souligne que, dans le territoire du Fezzan, plusieurs 
dizaines de familles sont privées de documents d’identité et, par conséquent, de 
liberté de circulation, et que l’accès aux services publics de base leur est interdit. 
Pour cette raison et « conformément aux conventions internationales, le CMA 
demande instamment aux autorités libyennes de délivrer des documents d’identité 
aux membres de ces familles sans délai ». De plus, le CMA attire une nouvelle fois 
l’attention sur la Constitution, qui « ne peut en aucun cas ignorer la question 
amazighe » et met en garde contre le « risque réel de division et de partition du 
pays ».45 
Le deuxième document est une lettre que le CMA, à nouveau, émet à l’occasion 
de la journée internationale des droits de l’Homme, dans laquelle il dénonce « le 
racisme institutionnel et les multiples violations des droits historiques des 
Amazighs dans tous les pays de Tamazgha et de la diaspora ». Se concentrant sur 
le cas de la Libye, la lettre critique « les différents groupes arabo-islamiques qui, 
actuellement actifs dans ce pays, s’accordent tous pour exclure l’amazighité du 
pays. Le projet de Constitution actuellement en discussion fait totalement 
abstraction de la culture amazighe autochtone ». Dans la conclusion, le CMA 
« recommande vivement aux Amazighs de Libye d’exercer sans tarder leur droit à 
l’autodétermination et d’accélérer sa mise en œuvre dans leurs territoires ».46 
Le troisième document est une lettre du CMA et de l’Organisation de la Diaspora 
Touarègue en Europe (ODTE) au Haut Conseil des Amazighs et au Conseil social 
suprême des Touaregs de Libye, déclarant le soutien à la cause et l’engagement à 
s’opposer à un changement qui ne peut être considéré comme tel si celui-ci ne 
reconnaît pas les droits de tous les membres de la société (voir Annexe 1). 
Il apparaît clairement qu’il s’agit de documents à forte valeur politique, mais ils 
peuvent néanmoins nous donner l’image d’un débat toujours en cours et d’une 
histoire encore en évolution. 
 
* * * 
                                                        
45  https://www.congres-mondial-amazigh.org/2018/10/28/motion-du-viii-congrès-du-cma-à-tunis, 
consulté le 5 janvier 2018. 
46 https://www.congres-mondial-amazigh.org/2018/12/10/journée-mondiale-des-droits-de-l-homme, 
consulté le 5 janvier 2018. 
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Annexe 1 
Lettre au Haut Conseil des Amazighs et au Conseil social suprême des Touaregs de 
Libye47 
  
Depuis la fin du régime de Kadhafi, la Libye traverse une situation incontrôlée avec 
l’apparition d’une multitude de milices armées. La plupart de ces groupes se sont constitués 
à partir du système dominant mais se livrent à une lutte féroce pour le contrôle du pouvoir. 
Chaque groupe tente de s’imposer par la force, semant la mort et la désolation. 
Dans ce contexte de chaos généralisé, vous, Amazighs du nord et du sud de la Libye, 
peuple autochtone de ce pays, vous vous êtes mis volontairement à l’écart de cette folie 
meurtrière, en restant dans vos territoires respectifs. Malgré cela, vous n’avez pas été 
épargnés par les agressions violentes, subissant des pertes humaines, les déplacements 
forcés et la destruction de vos biens. Chaque groupe a tenté de vous imposer sa loi, de vous 
dominer et de faire de vous des étrangers chez vous. 
Aujourd’hui, ce processus se poursuit sur le plan politique à travers un projet de 
Constitution décidé sans vous et contre vos droits et vos intérêts. En disposant 
unilatéralement que « la Libye fait partie de la nation arabe » et que « la langue arabe est la 
langue de l’État » et que pour les autres langues libyennes « on verra plus tard », les 
promoteurs de ce projet choisissent de maintenir la Libye à l’écart de la marche de 
l’Histoire. En effet, les autres pays du nord de l’Afrique renouent progressivement avec la 
dimension amazighe de leur identité après avoir constaté l’impasse dans laquelle les ont 
plongés des idéologies rétrogrades et totalitaires. Le projet de Constitution qui vous est 
imposé aujourd’hui, vous marginalise, ignore vos besoins et veut vous maintenir dans un 
statut de citoyens de seconde zone. Ce projet est par conséquent anti-démocratique, raciste 
et illégal. 
D’autres articles de ce projet de Constitution, notamment ceux relatifs aux droits des 
femmes, à l’accès à la nationalité libyenne et à l’exercice des pouvoirs, ne tiennent compte 
ni de l’histoire, ni des valeurs socioculturelles des Amazighs, ni de leurs droits 
fondamentaux en tant que peuple autochtone, notamment leur droit internationalement 
reconnu 
 
d’être autonomes et de s’administrer eux-mêmes pour tout ce qui touche à leurs 
affaires intérieures et locales, ainsi que le droit de maintenir et de renforcer leurs 
institutions politiques, juridiques, économiques, sociales et culturelles distinctes. 
 
Aujourd’hui, il est scandaleux et incompréhensible que des milliers de Libyens Kel-
Tamacheq soient privés de la pleine citoyenneté libyenne alors que des personnes 
originaires de pays arabes accèdent quasi-automatiquement à la nationalité libyenne. Il 
s’agit là d’une discrimination raciale grave et absolument intolérable ! 
                                                        
47  https://www.congres-mondial-amazigh.org/2018/12/30/lettre-du-cma-et-de-l-odte-aux-amazighs-
de-libye, consulté le 5 janvier 2018. 
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Face à un environnement plus que jamais hostile et oppressant, et aux incertitudes liées 
aux bouleversements géopolitiques dans la région, le Congrès Mondial Amazigh (CMA) et 
l’Organisation de la Diaspora Touarègue en Europe (ODTE) tiennent à exercer leur devoir 
de vous alerter et de vous demander instamment d’unir vos forces et de faire front par tous 
les moyens aux dangers qui menacent votre survie individuelle et collective. Prendre votre 
destin en main comme le propose le Haut Conseil des Amazighs de Libye qui a décidé 
d’élaborer et de mettre en œuvre une Constitution propre à vous et à vos territoires et de 
vous doter de gouvernements locaux, nous semble être la voie à suivre. Cette voie légitime 
et conforme au droit international, est la seule garante de votre avenir. 
Le CMA et l’ODTE vous expriment leur soutien fraternel le plus total et se tiennent à 
votre disposition pour vous appuyer, notamment au niveau international, par tous les 
moyens légitimes dans la quête de vos droits, de votre liberté et de votre dignité. 
  
Tudert i Tmazight g Libya ! Vive Tamazight en Libye ! 
  
Paris, 18/12/2968 – 30/12/2018 
P/le CMA       P/l’ODTE 
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Historiquement, les minorités dans leur ensemble ont été considérées comme un 
« problème », représentant une des principales raisons de l’absence de consolidation de 
l’État-nation. Après les mobilisations de 2011, il est apparu clairement qu’elles 
constituaient un indice de la pluralité politique et culturelle de l’Afrique du Nord. L’article 
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propose de mettre en perspective les revendications amazighes libyennes et de comprendre 












Libye, les rentes d’une transition inaboutie* 
 
 
Cet article s’intéresse à la transition en Libye. Il aborde comment celle-ci, en se 
prolongeant excessivement, est devenue, de ce fait, génératrice de rentes pour des 
acteurs qui, à la faveur du contexte d’incertitudes, ont conquis des structures de 
transition, s’y sont enkystés et en ont fait des instruments pour tenter de prolonger 
leur pouvoir. Comment ces acteurs n’ont pas intérêt à une clarification de situation 
qui réduirait leur place à l’échelle de leur réelle représentativité et préfèrent un 
exercice institutionnel fictif fait de marchandage et de cooptation pour préserver les 
positions acquises dans les incertitudes de l’insurrection ou de la deuxième guerre 
civile, une sorte de « rente de transition ». 
L’article explique ainsi comment ce contexte a permis au PJC (Parti de la 
Justice et de la Construction), vitrine politique des Frères Musulmans, de conquérir 
la présidence du HCE (Haut Comité d’État) et d’autres positions alors qu’il est très 
minoritaire. 
Il s’intéresse au paradoxe de la ville de Misrata, lieu d’origine des plus grandes 
figures de l’islamisme du pays, mais pourtant celle qui leur oppose la plus grande 
résistance ainsi que le désarroi d’une ville victime de cet état de « transition 
permanente ». 
Il s’intéresse à l’émergence de Serradj comme le produit inattendu des querelles 
des élites du pays et comment à défaut de pouvoir gérer une transition, celui-ci 
s’est attelé à son tour, à se construire un pouvoir et des réseaux, à partir de sa 
position dans cette transition. 
Enfin l’article explique comment l’état de « transition permanente » a 
également permis aux milices de s’enraciner, que celles-ci ne sont pas des acteurs 
complètement autonomes mais sont dans un rapport d’interdépendance avec les 
acteurs politiques locaux et puissances étrangères et qu’elles restent très 
perméables aux contextes et pressions politiques. La communauté internationale 
peut les faire reculer et faire reculer leurs parrains comme elle l’a fait chaque fois 
qu’elle a adopté des positions fermes accompagnées de mesure. Dans un pays où 
manque un recours national, l’ONU reste une figure morale respectée. 
                                                          
* Cette article a été publié au 2018 sur Monde Afrique, dans cinq volets. 
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Les Frères Musulmans, une minorité agissante au cœur des réseaux de 
pouvoir 
Sur la scène politique libyenne, les bouleversements et les retournements 
d’alliance se succèdent sans cesse et sont toujours plus inattendus. Alors que cette 
éventualité était des plus improbables, Souihli, un des leaders de Misrata, la ville-
bastion révolutionnaire, a été évincé de la présidence du HCE (le Haut Comité 
d’État) en avril 2018. Mais ce qui était encore plus inattendu, c’est l’élection, à sa 
place, d’un Frère Musulman, Mecheri. Sitôt élu, celui-ci, sans en référer aux 
membres du HCE, s’adresse au chef du parlement de Tobrouk pour lui déclarer son 
entière disponibilité à négocier, sans conditions, confirmant le complet 
retournement politique des islamistes qui, il est vrai date déjà de quelque temps. 
Tournant le dos à leur stratégie antérieure, l’affirmation pacificatrice des Frères 
Musulmans libyens au travers de leur vitrine politique le PJC (Parti de la Justice et 
de la Construction) est aujourd’hui évidente, et leur a même coûté cher : 150 de 
leurs cadres, surtout des « lettrés », désapprouvant l’engagement de leur parti dans 
les accords de Skhirat, ont d’un bloc quitté le parti ou ont été contraints à le faire, 
ouvrant la voie à une hémorragie continue. Celui-ci est sociologiquement, 
aujourd’hui, surtout un parti de commerçants comme le sont la plupart de ses 
cadres dirigeants à l’instar de son secrétaire général Mohamed Sowan ou de son 
homme fort et puissant argentier, le richissime homme d’affaires Abderazak 
Laaradi, une des plus grosses fortunes de Libye, édifiée du temps de Kadhafi et 
dans sa proximité, notamment par l’attribution de marchés publics. 
Au-delà du cas particulier de cette élection et au-delà du cas particulier du PJD, 
ces successifs retournements deviennent la norme du jeu politique libyen et le 
rendent illisible. Mais ils ne sont en rien erratiques et relèvent peu d’un « esprit 
nomade ». Ils sont surtout le résultat de la dérive d’une transition qui a trop duré et a 
connu trop de contrecoups, où des acteurs ont acquis des positions institutionnelles à 
la faveur du contexte d’incertitude et d’instabilité généré par l’insurrection et qui, 
pour préserver leurs positions de pouvoir, se sont enkystés dans ces institutions qui 
deviennent le lieu de luttes sourdes en vase clos, déconnectées des rapports de force 
du terrain. Et de ce fait, peuvent faire émerger toutes les combinaisons, même les 
plus improbables. 
De fait, rien ne prédisposait le PJC à la conquête de la présidence du HCE, une 
représentativité normalement au-dessus de ses forces réelles. Il a régulièrement été 
mis en minorité aux différentes élections, érodant toujours plus son capital de 
voix : législatives de 2012 et 2014, municipales, conseil pour la constitution. Il ne 
dispose pas de plus d’une quinzaine de sièges sur les 115 que compte le HCE. Et 
même si des membres du HCE, comme hier du CNG (Congrès National Général), 
étiquetés « indépendants » sont en fait liés ou proches du PJC, le meilleur score de 
celui-ci pour le vote dans cette instance, celui de l’année dernière, a réuni tout au 
plus 25 suffrages. Il connait une désaffection grandissante que ne nient pas ses 
propres dirigeants qui ne manquent pas de s’en inquiéter. Signe de cette crise, au 
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moment même où se déroulaient les élections, le représentant du PJC au Conseil 
Présidentiel, Abdeslam Kajman, annonçait son retrait du parti, après bien d’autres 
cadres qui n’y voient désormais plus une garantie pour leur carrière politique. 
Malgré tous ces handicaps, le Frère Musulman El Mecheri est élu. Apparatchik 
sans charisme, il est l’élu au CNG de la ville de Zaouia, ville au passé frondeur et 
qui fut naguère un fief de la gauche marxiste.1 
Qu’est ce qui a donc rendu possible cette élection ? Au-delà du sens de la 
combine et du clientélisme où les islamistes excellent autant que les autres acteurs, 
elle est le résultat de la conjonction d’un facteur structurel et d’une conjoncture. 
L’élément structurel qui a pesé depuis ses débuts sur la révolution, c’est le poids 
surdimensionné des islamistes dans les réseaux de pouvoir. Quasiment seuls à 
bénéficier d’une culture partisane et d’une organisation structurée, connectés aux 
réseaux internationaux au contraire des autres insurgés dont l’horizon était le plus 
souvent local, les islamistes ont fortement investi dès le début les structures 
politiques et militaires naissantes et y ont pris une place disproportionnée par 
rapport à leur place légitime. C’est à partir de ces positions de pouvoir qu’ils ont 
compensé leurs successives déconvenues électorales par la construction de réseaux 
d’influences dont l’efficacité s’est décuplée proportionnellement à la fragmentation 
grandissante du pays. L’élément conjoncturel, comme ce fut le cas dans d’autres 
élections, c’est une « transaction » qui a lieu cette fois avec les élus du Sud, le 
Fezzan, au HCE, dans un contexte où ces derniers veulent monnayer en postes et 
en opportunités d’affaires l’intérêt stratégique que suscite le Fezzan dans 
l’affrontement entre le pouvoir de Tripoli et celui de Tobrouk. 
La débauche d’énergie pour investir des structures de pouvoir censées être 
provisoires, est remarquable. Alors qu’au Fezzan se déroule l’épisode le plus long 
de la guerre entre Toubous et la tribu Ouled Slimane, les réseaux d’influence de 
cette région, eux, se sont transportés à Tripoli pour peser sur des nominations 
notamment celle probable du successeur de Moussa El Kaouni, vice-président du 
Conseil Présidentiel où il représentait le Sud et dont il avait démissionné depuis 
plus d’un an ainsi que celle, sans cesse différée, du gouverneur militaire du Fezzan, 
convoité par le Touareg, ancien militaire, Ali Kena. 
Cette focalisation sur des structures de transition est une des causes principales 
de l’enlisement de la transition, ces structures devenant, pour les acteurs qui les 
investissent, et pas seulement les islamistes, des positions de pouvoir qu’ils 
utilisent et qu’ils tentent de pérenniser pour assoir et prolonger le leur. C’est ce qui 
                                                          
1 L’évolution de cette ville s’inscrit dans celle des villes arabes et l’illustre, démentant une 
spécificité libyenne rétive à la modernité politique. Cette ville a été jusqu’aux années 70 un fief des 
courants de gauche, notamment marxistes, avec notamment la famille Bechti qui a donné une dynastie 
d’opposants dans un large prisme, allant de communistes à imams contestataires de gauche. Comme 
ailleurs dans le monde arabe, une féroce répression par Kadhafi et un profond bouleversement 
sociologique notamment un puissant exode rural, dont est issu d’ailleurs l’actuel élu El Mechri, ont 
érodé les bases sociologiques de ces mouvements politiques. 
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donne par ailleurs une pertinence à la stratégie de Ghassane Salamé d’organiser des 
élections pour sortir de ce « provisoire qui dure ». Peu d’acteurs, et encore moins 
chez la population, en contestent la pertinence. Il y a une réelle lassitude vis-à-vis 
du provisoire de structures « de transition » qui finissent par se juxtaposer, se 
contester la légalité et au final se survivre pour mieux se nuire mutuellement et 
bloquer le pays à l’image des trois gouvernements2 et deux parlements qui se 
superposent et se disputent la légitimité. Mais elle suscite tout à la fois, chez les 
mêmes, une perplexité quant à sa faisabilité. La question est en effet celle des 
conditions de sécurité loin d’être réunies pour crédibiliser ces élections. Et surtout 
pour en faire respecter le résultat. 
Beaucoup d’acteurs n’ont pas intérêt à une clarification de situation qui réduirait 
leur place à l’échelle de leur réelle représentativité et préfèrent un exercice 
institutionnel fictif fait de marchandage et de cooptation pour préserver les 
positions acquises dans les incertitudes de l’insurrection ou de la deuxième guerre 
civile, une sorte de « rente de transition ». C’est la mobilisation de cette rente, qui 
n’est pas spécifique au PJC, qui a permis à celui-ci, très minoritaire pourtant, de 
conquérir la présidence du HCE et d’autres positions. Tenter de reproduire cette 
rente de position par des accommodements entre acteurs reste la pratique prisée par 
ces acteurs installés. C’est ainsi qu’avant l’élection au HCE, et ne croyant 
absolument pas en ses chances d’accéder à sa présidence, le PJC voyant d’un 
mauvais œil le processus onusien de sortie de transition sur lequel il ne peut avoir 
de prise, organise début avril à Tunis, avec l’appui discret d’En Nahda et de 
l’Algérie, une réunion des partis contestataires de ce processus où il se retrouve aux 
côtés d’islamistes radicaux comme le CGIL (Groupe Combattants Islamiques de 
Libye) qui le combattent. Or, avec l’élection inattendue d’El Mechri, le PJC, 
minoritaire, se retrouve au cœur du dispositif institutionnel libyen et comme un de 
ses principaux maitres d’œuvre et garants du processus onusien alors même qu’il 
avait cherché à le court-circuiter. 
Confrontés à un contexte régional très défavorable avec notamment une 
hostilité viscérale du puissant voisin égyptien et la désaffection d’une partie 
importante d’une population libyenne où, par ailleurs, leur ancrage était déjà moins 
fort que partout ailleurs dans le monde arabe, les Frères Musulmans libyens du PJD 
se vivent sous une « menace existentielle » qui les autorise donc à toutes les 
concessions à condition qu’elles ne remettent pas en cause leurs positions de 
pouvoir acquises. Cette « normalisation » continue cependant à buter sur l’obstacle 
égyptien et sa phobie des Frères Musulmans. Lorsque l’Égypte prend la mesure à la 
fois de la difficulté de Haftar à s’imposer comme unique alternative mais aussi son 
incapacité à négocier, enfermé dans la bulle de ses prétentions, elle décide, tout en 
continuant à en faire son homme, de s’ouvrir à ses opposants. Le général Mahmoud 
                                                          
2 En 2018, en Tripolitaine, à côté du gouvernement de Serradj, Ghweil le premier ministre qui l’a 
précédé, a tenté de remettre en selle un autre gouvernement. 
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Hegazy, en charge du dossier libyen, constitue pour cela un comité de quarante 
personnalités de l’Ouest dont certaines sont farouchement hostiles à Haftar. Mais il 
en exclut absolument les FM et tous ceux susceptibles d’avoir un quelconque lien 
avec eux. 
Les Frères Musulmans se rabattront alors sur l’Algérie grâce à un improbable 
axe Algérie-Qatar qui s’est constitué autour des conflits qui ont secoué le Sud 
libyen3 et qui va ouvrir à l’Algérie l’accès aux islamistes libyens pourtant 
particulièrement hostiles à l’Algérie qui avait activement soutenu le régime de 
Kadhafi jusqu’à sa chute et même au-delà, en accueillant la famille du dictateur. Le 
contact se fait via le Qatar où vit le libyen Ali Sallabi, un proche d’El Karadaoui et 
autorité morale chez les Frères Musulmans et les islamistes libyens, et qui servira 
d’intermédiaire. Il sera relayé par Ghannouchi, obligé de l’Algérie qui l’avait 
accueilli en exil entre 1989 et 1991. C’est ce dernier qui abrite et parraine plusieurs 
rencontre entre Ali Sallabi et Ouyahia alors directeur de cabinet du président 
Bouteflika, avant de devenir son premier ministre. L’accès d’un cadre des Frères 
Musulmans, Abdelkader Touhami, au poste de responsable des services de 
renseignement libyen du gouvernement de Serradj, renforce leur relation à 
l’Algérie en y rajoutant une réponse aux préoccupations sécuritaires de celle-ci, 
d’autant que Touhami est originaire du Fezzan, la région frontalière avec l’Algérie 
et celle qui l’inquiète le plus. C’est pour cela que la première visite à l’étranger du 
Frère Musulman El Mecheri en tant que président du HCE, le 23 mai, sera 
consacrée à l’Algérie. 
La main largement tendue à Haftar par le nouveau président du HCE, au-delà de 
ce qu’elle peut signifier de désir de réconciliation, suscite chez les autres acteurs 
une suspicion sur ses réelles finalités. Le scénario d’un arrangement au sommet 
pour le partage du pouvoir, sur le mode de celui intervenu en Tunisie entre Nahda 
et Nida Tounes, et qui n’a pas pu se faire entre Haftar et Misrata, scénario envisagé 
par plusieurs chancelleries et sur lequel s’est particulièrement penchée l’Égypte 
sans succès, ce scénario tenterait le PJD qui se verrait bien en substitut de Misrata 
sinon comme le troisième partenaire d’une relation triangulaire au sommet. De fait, 
la veille des élections, le secrétaire général du PJC, Mohamed Sowan, fait une 
                                                          
3 Contre les émiratis qui soutiennent les Toubous, le Qatar, allié alors de Tripoli, tente de se 
positionner dans cette région stratégique en soutenant les Touaregs alors que l’Algérie qui avait 
complètement perdu pied en Libye, n’avait plus comme fil dans ce pays que ces mêmes Touaregs, la 
communauté des Kel Ajjer, qui se répartit des deux côtés de la frontière avec des relations de parenté 
croisées. Le Qatar qui s’était acheté les services de connaisseurs de la question Touareg comme le 
mauritanien Mustapha Limane Chaffei, sorte de mercenaire du renseignement, ne pouvaient risquer 
les capacités de nuisance des Algériens qui avaient l’avantage du terrain. Mais les algériens eux-
mêmes étaient affaiblis dans leurs capacités opérationnelles par la guerre dans leurs services qui a 
frappé leurs meilleurs connaisseurs de la région comme le général Hassan mis aux arrêts. D’où un 
mariage de raison entre services (Sur Mustapha Limane Chaffei, lire A. Bensaâd, Aux marges du 
Maghreb, des tribus mondialisées, Méditerranée, 116, Presses de l’Université de Provence, décembre 
2011, 25-34). 
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déclaration étonnante et inattendue où il glorifie Haftar et surtout ses hommes 
armés en poussant jusqu’à les qualifier de « martyrs ». C’est pourtant le même qui, 
auparavant, l’avait excommunié alors que Abdelkrim Laaradi, l’argentier du parti, 
finançait l’opération « Fajr » qui a chassé de Tripoli le parlement élu où le PJC 
avait encore plus reculé, et l’a contraint à se réfugier à Tobrouk. Opération qui a 
constitué le point de départ du schisme de l’autorité politique et de la deuxième 
guerre civile et qui a accentué la fragmentation du pays. Cette soudaine 
glorification de l’ennemi absolu d’hier s’apparente bien à une « parade nuptiale » 
en direction de Haftar. Nul doute que le PJD veut aller encore plus loin que les 
réconciliateurs qu’il combattait hier, jusqu’à probablement accepter de gouverner 
avec le Maréchal Haftar et avec l’essentiel des conditions de ce dernier. De fait, 
lors des négociations de Skhirat, El Makhzoum du PJD qui avait réussi à prendre la 
tête de la délégation, avait accepté intégralement la dite « version 4 » de l’accord 
émanant pour l’essentiel de la délégation de Tobrouk et faisant la part belle à ses 
revendications et qui, entre autre, évacuait la question de la primauté de l’autorité 
politique sur le militaire, c’est-à-dire préservait la position de Haftar. Pour dégager 
la voie vers un accord plus équilibré, Al Makhzoum sera débarqué et la rupture 
consommée entre les islamistes du PJC et le reste de ce camp dit révolutionnaire. 
 
Misrata, une place forte économique et révolutionnaire, gagnée par 
l’incertitude 
La ville qui a incarné la résistance à Kadhafi et la lutte contre l’État islamique 
est aujourd’hui minée par le désarroi et les divisions. Le meurtre du maire de la 
ville qui incarnait le courant civil et était la figure haï de l’islamisme et sur les 
raisons duquel règne une omerta, a ajouté à ce désarroi et affaiblit le courant civil 
qui a initié la réconciliation. La ville paie, à sa façon, par l’usure, ce processus de 
transition qui n’en finit pas avec ses multiples retournements. 
La perte de la présidence du HCE par le Misrati Souihli, même si elle doit pour 
une part à un début d’usure4 du crédit d’une personnalité par ailleurs charismatique 
et issue d’une famille dynastique symbolisant une part de l’identité libyenne, elle 
est aussi symptomatique à la fois des divisions de la ville et du recul de son 
influence qui ont facilité la manœuvre du PJC. La distance prise par une partie de 
la ville avec Serradj, même si elle se manifeste sous forme de « neutralité », érode 
encore plus son influence tout en fragilisant également celui-ci. 
Sortie exsangue de la bataille de Syrte qu’elle a engagée quasiment seule et qui 
lui a coûté plus de 700 morts et 3.000 blessés pour une ville de 400.000 habitants, 
la ville en est surtout sortie gagnée par le doute et des incertitudes qui ont fissuré 
son consensus, accru les clivages et les concurrences. L’amertume des Misratis est 
                                                          
4 Élu en 2012 au CNG pour une circonscription de Misrata avec 20.000 voix et en première 
position, il n’en a recueilli pour le parlement en 2014 que 3.000 et en cinquième position, il est vrai 
avec un fort taux d’abstention à l’échelle nationale. 
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grande face une communauté internationale qui s’est faite pressante pour les 
pousser à une bataille qui concernait les intérêts de celle-ci, à savoir le danger 
d’une enclave de l’EI à quelques encablures de l’Europe, mais qui sur-sollicitait 
leurs capacités. Une sur-mobilisation autour de Syrte, exploitée par Haftar, pour 
prendre de force, et par surprise, le croissant pétrolier qui lui a donné une stature et 
un rôle appuyé aujourd’hui par les mêmes européens. 
Avec son poids symbolique, militaire et économique, le rôle de la ville de 
Misrata a été déterminant dans l’enclenchement d’un processus de réconciliation 
qui a abouti aux accords de Skhirat. Sa division est aujourd’hui une menace pour la 
stabilité.  
C’est elle qui, la première, avait tourné le dos aux logiques de guerre, dès les 
élections municipales d’avril 2014 qui avaient permis d’élire une équipe sur une 
ligne de réconciliation. Dès avant son installation qui sera retardée par le 
déclenchement de l’opération « Fajr » en août, cette équipe avait entrepris des 
contacts avec les localités adverses même si ces initiatives buteront sur les tensions 
attisées par des milices minoritaires radicales, essentiellement islamistes. Près d’un 
an après, ce seront également des milices misraties, les deux principales, El 
Mahjoub et El Halbous, qui, lassées par le piétinement de la guerre, lancent un 
appel à la paix civile et s’engagent dans un processus de réconciliation avec leurs 
ennemis les plus irréductibles, les « Zintanes ». L’équipe municipale est ainsi 
confortée et les populations désinhibées dans l’expression de leur volonté de paix. 
Cet appel marque surtout la rupture entre miliciens révolutionnaires et islamistes. 
Mais derrière la scène institutionnelle et militaire, dans cette ville industrieuse 
aux vieilles traditions commerçantes et urbaines, c’est le rôle des entrepreneurs qui 
sera fondamental. Directement à travers leurs élus dans le conseil municipal où ils 
sont la catégorie sociale la plus représentée et à travers également le « conseil des 
entrepreneurs », un des lieux de pouvoir dans la ville. L’identité de la ville 
reprenait ainsi le dessus. 
Misrata est en effet une ville industrieuse aux vieilles traditions commerçantes 
et urbaines avec une population originaire de tout le pourtour méditerranéen dont 
une forte minorité, le tiers de la population, Kouloughlie ainsi que des Tcherkesses 
venant directement du Caucase ou par le détour de l’Égypte et de la Turquie. Ses 
négociants, dont certains ont une origine maltaise, crétoise et plus que souvent 
turque, sont connectés à des réseaux à l’échelle de toute la Méditerranée. Mais 
c’est surtout à l’intérieur du pays que la diaspora misratie domine l’activité 
économique, y compris et surtout à l’Est, là où se trouve le gouvernement rival de 
Tobrouk et où, en dehors de l’élevage pastoral, elle est en position de monopole 
dans tous secteurs d’activités confondus. Aux côtés de ses entrepreneurs, Misrata, 
au travers du clan des lettrés El Mountasser, a alimenté le corps bureaucratique de 
tous les régimes sans exception, depuis les Ottomans jusqu’à Kadhafi, en passant 
par les italiens et la monarchie senoussie. Même éloignés du pouvoir, ils sont dans 
tous ses rouages et ses antichambres, constituant une sorte de « bureaucratie 
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profonde ».5 C’est cette double rationalité à la fois bureaucratique et 
entrepreneuriale qui a fait des misratis les premiers opposants aux dérives de 
Kadhafi après avoir soutenu son arrivée au pouvoir avec un espoir de 
modernisation. Celui-ci les éradiquera de l’armée où, en plus de l’exécution de 
plusieurs officiers dont son compagnon d’armes Omar El Mahichi, plus aucun 
misrati n’accédera au grade d’officier supérieur. Cette répression explique 
aujourd’hui leur crispation sur leurs milices et leur revendication d’une 
« refondation de l’armée » qu’ils opposent à une « restructuration de l’armée » qui 
verrait revenir les anciens militaires du régime. Elle explique leur phobie du 
général Haftar. La personnalité de ce dernier et ses ambitions démesurées ont 
beaucoup joué dans le ralliement des misratis à l’opération « Fajr ». Le désarroi de 
la ville et ses divisions privent la Libye d’un acteur majeur de la stabilisation. C’est 
cette situation qui avait permis à des acteurs misratis, islamistes radicaux, comme 
le chef de milice Salah Badi ou l’ex chef de gouvernement Ghweil, d’occuper 
fictivement une place politique et militaire centrale à Tripoli alors que leur poids 
était très faible à Misrata même.  
Une ambiguïté a longtemps plané sur l’identité politique de la ville, surtout 
depuis l’insurrection qui a chassé Kadhafi. Elle est en effet le lieu d’un véritable 
paradoxe politique qui dit, en fait, la richesse de la ville. Elle a été souvent et 
hâtivement assimilée aux islamistes, notamment le PJD, et constitue effectivement 
la base arrière de celui-ci. Et pourtant, elle y oppose la plus forte résistance. De 
fait, les principales figures de l’islamisme sont issus de la ville : le secrétaire 
général du PJC (Mohamed Sowan), l’argentier et véritable homme fort du PJC 
(Abderazak Laaradi), le guide de la confrérie des Frères Musulmans en Libye 
jusqu’en 2017 (El Kebti), le libyen le plus haut placé dans la direction 
internationale de la confrérie (Ali Sallabi), et le dirigeant de la milice radicale El 
Marsa (Salah Badi). L’activisme de ces derniers est ainsi particulièrement 
marquant et bruyant dans la ville. Mais en complet décalage avec leur 
représentativité. Ils n’ont réussi à avoir aucun député aux deux élections 
législatives et ont arraché un seul siège sur neuf au conseil municipal. La véritable 
force militaire de ce bastion de la révolution est non islamiste et se structure autour 
de deux milices, les plus puissantes du pays, El Halbous et El Mahjoub, alignant 
respectivement un effectif permanent de 6.000 et 2.000 hommes et pouvant le 
tripler en situation de conflit. C’est elles qui, en mettant fin à leur engagement dans 
l’opération « Fajr », ont contraint islamistes et radicaux du CNG à s’engager dans 
le processus de Skhirat. Bien qu’il y ait un fort sentiment d’identification locale qui 
contraint l’expression publique de divergences, l’hostilité aux islamistes, toujours 
présente, connait une exacerbation. Ali Sallabi a encore une fois été conspué en se 
rendant à Misrata en fin décembre et en a été quasiment chassé. Mais surtout, fait 
nouveau dans le paysage libyen, un mouvement anti-islamiste « éradicateur » et 
                                                          
5 Le pouvoir des misratis ne se mesure pas au nombre de leurs ministres.  
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s’assumant comme tel, « le bloc volonté nationale », s’est structuré autour de l’ex 
ministre de l’intérieur en 2012, Fawzi Abdelali. Ce dernier, à l’origine de la 
création des Hauts Comités de sécurité et des Boucliers dans les différentes régions 
du pays, fut pourtant l’un des anciens compagnons de route des islamistes, celui 
qui les avait alors aidés dans leur structuration notamment militaire. Rompant avec 
un consensus au nom de l’homogénéité locale qui laissait libre cours à l’activisme 
des islamistes, « le bloc » n’hésite plus à risquer la confrontation direct avec eux. 
Ainsi, après leurs menaces sur la visite de l’ambassadrice française dont 
l’annulation a surpris la ville, pour la visite du ministre algérien Messahel, c’est 
« le bloc » qui s’est mobilisé par ses seuls moyens pour en assurer la sécurité, le 
but était de démontrer le peu de représentativité des islamistes. Cette hostilité aux 
islamistes se fonde sur l’argument d’une volonté hégémonique et leur propension à 
l’entrisme dans toutes les structures, et le reproche d’une stratégie duplice. Après 
avoir construit un rapprochement avec les révolutionnaires et pesé dans le sens de 
la radicalisation de la loi d’exclusion qui a éliminé la majeure partie des élites dont 
les précurseurs de l’opposition à Kadhafi mais qui, par un artifice, les a préservés,6 
ils cherchent aujourd’hui à s’entendre avec Haftar et l’ancien régime en tournant le 
dos à leurs alliés d’hier qui les ont remis en selle.7 La ville de Misrata a été un 
terrain particulier de cette stratégie qualifiée de duplice. En 2014, dès l’installation 
du conseil municipal, les islamistes, déçus par le résultat des urnes, se sont alliés 
avec certains radicaux pour constituer un « conseil de notable et sages » de la ville. 
Il fera alors une guerre d’usure violente au conseil municipal, allant jusqu’à murer 
son siège, lui reprochant d’avoir engagé des concertations pour la réconciliation 
soutenues par les entrepreneurs conscients qu’un enclavement de la ville, même 
puissante et victorieuse comme elle l’était alors, serait fatal à cette ville 
entreprenante dont la puissance économique tient surtout à son rayonnement 
national. La réconciliation avec les Zintan était encore plus stratégique. Au-delà du 
fait que les deux villes incarnent emblématiquement chacun des deux camps en 
conflit, elle leur est vitale dans leur rapport à la capitale, pas tant sur le plan 
militaire où dominent les milices de Tripoli mais en terme d’influence sociale, 
                                                          
6 Les islamistes avaient poussé à une radicalisation de la loi d’exclusion politique en pesant pour 
son élargissement à toute personne ayant occupé une fonction dans les structures de l’État depuis 
l’arrivée de Kadhafi au pouvoir, ce qui a conduit à l’élimination de tous les opposants historiques qui 
avaient pu, au début de l’arrivée de Kadhafi au pouvoir, soit rester à leurs postes technocratiques 
élevés ou même l’accompagner à ses débuts prometteurs avant de passer à l’opposition. La loi a ainsi 
éliminé la plupart des élites politiques y compris les promoteurs du soulèvement contre Kadhafi. Par 
contre les islamistes y ont échappé car la plupart soit ont fait leur apprentissage politique à l’étranger 
soit avaient intégré la fondation de Seif al-Islam Kadhafi, « La Libye demain », sorte de 
gouvernement parallèle destiné à le préparer à la succession et qui n’a pas été considérée par cette loi 
comme un lieu de pouvoir formel, pour les préserver. 
7 La plupart des islamistes, particulièrement les FM et les Madakhila, engagés dans un processus 
de ralliement à Kadhafi et d’entrisme, s’étaient opposés au soulèvement. Il a fallu attendre l’appel 
d’El Kardaoui sur Al Djazira, pour qu’ils s’y joignent. 
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celle-ci étant vecteur du poids économique. Pour les Misratis, leur éloignement de 
la capitale et l’affaiblissement des Zintan plus proche, laisserait libre cours à celui 
des Amazighs. Toutes deux par ailleurs se méfiant des minorités notamment chez 
les Zintan où le courant nationaliste arabe est influent, représenté par Djouili, 
actuel commandant militaire de la région Ouest où se trouve précisément le pays 
Amazigh. Les islamistes et le « conseil de notable et sages », menés par l’ancien 
secrétaire régional du PJD, dorénavant dissident, ont alors violemment attaqué ce 
rapprochement avec les Zintan et criminalisé le conseil municipal. Mais dans un 
retournement complet, trois ans après, au mois de mars de cette année, ils prennent 
de court le conseil municipal et ses alliés pour les devancer chez les Zintan avec 
une offre de réconciliation plus ouverte. Au-delà de la stratégie islamiste cherchant 
à se désenclaver à tout prix, l’enjeu est le rapport de force dans une ville dont le 
désarroi relance les compétitions entre acteurs politiques. Mais il n’est pas exclu 
que ces reconvertis de la dernière heure de la réconciliation, préparent en fait une 
autre guerre pour mettre en difficultés Serradj et le processus onusien. Exclu de 
Tripoli par les milices soutenant Serradj, les islamistes et radicaux misratis 
pourraient être tentés de chercher une nouvelle alliance militaire avec les Zintanes 
dont le retour à Tripoli bute sur le refus ferme de la milice de Ghenioua El Kikli, 
soutien de Serradj et originaire de Kikla qui a été détruite par les Zintan. 
 
Serradj, l’inconnu et ses nouveaux réseaux de pouvoir citadins tripolitains 
L’émergence inattendue de Serradj comme président est une autre illustration de 
la perversion du processus de transition, dès ses débuts, par les élites censées le 
conduire. Serradj ne fut jamais imposé par l’ONU à Skhirat comme le prétendent 
aujourd’hui ses détracteurs. Beaucoup de négociateurs en témoignent. Serradj a fini 
par émerger car chaque camp s’est évertué à récuser ses propres candidats potentiels 
dans une bataille d’ambitions personnelles se neutralisant. Tous les candidats 
potentiels ayant été éliminés dans un jeu de massacre par les rivaux de leur propre 
camp, la candidature de Serradj, non prévue dans le casting, a alors été glissée par un 
vieux routier de la diplomatie pour trouver une issue. Dépourvu de traits saillants et 
de charisme, non identifié politiquement par ses pairs, descendant d’une vieille 
famille urbaine, qualité rassurante alors que les identités dites tribales sont mobilisées 
dans la compétition politique, Serradj passera par effet de surprise dans ce qui était 
devenu un champ de ruines d’ambitions. 
Décrié par ses adversaires et une partie importante de l’opinion comme un 
homme sans charisme, n’arrivant ni à prendre des décisions ni à les imposer, il est 
assurément un homme non préparé à une telle fonction mais cette représentation 
qui en est faite tient aussi à ce qu’il s’applique à éviter les positionnements clivant. 
Il aura en tout cas eu pour mérite de ne pas participer à aggraver les clivages d’un 
pays et d’une société fragmentés et pour défaut d’être mesuré mais sans savoir ou 
pouvoir porter une telle parole dans l’atmosphère de conflictualités violentes qui 
domine le pays. Mais lui aussi, maintenant, peut-être à défaut de pouvoir gérer une 
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transition, s’est attelé à son tour à se construire un pouvoir à partir de sa position 
dans cette transition. Il s’est créé autour de lui un réseau de solidarité socio-
territoriale basé sur les vieilles familles citadines de la capitale et que les 
Tripolitains nomment « El Haya’a etarabloussia » et qu’on pourrait traduire par 
l’establishment tripolitain. C’est une sorte de lobby des élites urbaines de la 
capitale, sur le mode des beldis tunisois, et qui croise, dans une solidarité trans-
partisane, bourgeois lettrés et fortunés sans rattachement partisan ou anciennement 
inscrits dans les réseaux de l’époque royale, des dignitaires kadhafistes, des adeptes 
soufis et bien sûr des FM. Ces derniers, du fait de l’accaparement de structures 
postrévolutionnaires, se sont posés à la confluence d’alliances d’intérêts entre ces 
élites qu’ils fructifient pour élargir leur influence dans des milieux qui ne leur sont 
pas acquis. Le FM Sadat El Badr, président du premier conseil local de la ville à sa 
libération, en était un des principaux pivots jusqu’à sa mort il y a deux ans. La 
chambre de commerce et d’industrie de Tripoli, vieille institution datant de 1928, 
présidée par l’adepte soufi Salem El Garoui, en est un des lieux symboliques au 
point qu’une des plus grosses fortunes de Tripoli mais originaire de Misrata, le 
richissime Mohamed El Raït, n’a pu y trouver la place qu’il convoitait et qu’il a dû 
créer une union de toutes les chambres à l’échelle nationale qu’il préside, pour faire 
contrepoids à la chambre tripolitaine. L’actuel Ministre des affaires étrangères 
Mohammed Siala est un des plus représentatifs de ce faisceau d’intérêts entre ces 
élites. Haut fonctionnaire kadhafiste et un des concepteurs des fonds 
d’investissements libyens, c’est lui qui, pendant l’insurrection, sera mandaté par 
Kadhafi pour tenter d’engager la discussion avec l’Otan. Pourtant, à la chute de 
celui-ci, il ne subira aucune déconvenue et son fils continuera à diriger la banque 
libyenne au Qatar, bénéficiant de la protection des FM et de Sadat El Badr 
particulièrement, au titre de cette solidarité des élites urbaines tripolitaines mais 
aussi des stratégies islamistes de clientélisation de personnalités indépendantes. 
Ces réseaux ont, en tout cas, insufflé un brin de vie culturelle à cette ville qui en 
était désertée depuis le règne de Kadhafi, en organisant vernissages et concerts de 
malouf. Par ailleurs, depuis la fin de l’opération « Fajr » en été 2014, la vie à 
Tripoli, en dehors des actes de délinquance qui se multiplient à la périphérie, est 
normale. On y veille même bien plus et bien plus bruyamment qu’à Alger. Cafés et 
places publiques sont animés jusqu’au petit matin alors que les écrans géants y 
diffusent les plus importants matchs internationaux. Il y a une proportion, plus 
qu’élevée de cafés, restaurants et salons de thé dans les nouveaux commerces qui 
foisonnent. Leur dense fréquentation et leur tout relatif mais tout nouveau 
raffinement, traduit une véritable frénésie de vie. Tripoli n’a rien d’une ville 
« islamisée ». Elle est même beaucoup moins austère que du temps de Kadhafi. On 
rencontre dans les salons de thé, aux côtés des hommes, des femmes en groupe et 
des couples avec des jeunes filles non voilées. Dans le quartier de Souk El 
Djouma’a, c’est une milice islamiste réputée pour son rigorisme qui surveille un 
des plus huppés restaurants de la ville où officient chefs et serveurs marocains et où 
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se pressent les familles dans leur diversité. Sur les tables trônent des bouteilles qui 
pastichent tout le design des bouteilles de champagne et qu’on ouvre pareillement 
en faisant sauter le bouchon. Sauf qu’elles ne contiennent que du jus de fruit. Elles 
disent à elles seules cette ambivalence entre un conservatisme toujours très 
fortement prégnant et la frénésie de vie qui saisit les libyens, notamment les jeunes, 
et comme l’argent est le liant accommodant entre les deux. 
 
Les milices, un rapport d’interdépendance avec les acteurs politiques locaux et 
les puissances étrangères 
Serradj reste certes, comme tous ceux qui l’ont précédé d’ailleurs, sous 
l’hypothèque des milices. Mais il a réussi à transformer en sa faveur le rapport de 
force milicien dans la capitale en expulsant les milices islamistes radicales qui le 
contestaient. Bien sûr cela le rend probablement plus dépendant des milices acquises 
à sa cause. Mais il serait plus juste de parler d’interdépendance. Les milices n’ont pas 
de puissance par elles-mêmes, elles prospèrent et déclinent en fonction du contexte 
politique et de l’appui des acteurs politiques locaux et puissances étrangères, 
notamment régionales, qui les mobilisent et les instrumentalisent. Elles ne font pas 
l’agenda politique, elles contribuent à le réaliser. Les mutations du paysage 
sécuritaire de la capitale ont ainsi vu des milices balayées quand elles se mettaient au 
travers d’un processus politique et d’autres se renforcer quand elles l’épousaient. 
Aucune milice, quel que soit son importance, n’a de poids par elle-même mais pèse 
seulement au travers d’un système d’alliance. Et s’il y a bien eu un processus de 
concentration des milices qui a abouti à quatre formations miliciennes qui dominent 
la scène sécuritaire de la capitale, chacune des grandes formations miliciennes qui 
ont dominé ou dominent actuellement Tripoli, est elle-même un conglomérat de 
petites milices qui n’ont pas forcément la même sensibilité. Sentir l’odeur de l’herbe 
à un carrefour tenu par des miliciens affiliés à une formation milicienne islamiste ou 
en rencontrer qui sont ivres, n’est pas exceptionnel. Une des deux plus importantes 
milices, celle de Kara, « El Rada’e » est en fait constituée d’au moins 23 milices 
identifiables qui ne partagent pas toutes l’orientation salafiste madkhaliste de Kara. 
L’autre milice importante, « les révolutionnaires de Tripoli », a toujours une 
direction bicéphale (Haitem Etajouri et Hachem Bichri). Toutes les recompositions 
d’alliances restent ainsi possibles et les milices restent très perméables aux contextes 
et pressions politiques. 
Les milices qui s’opposaient aux négociations de Skhirat, une partie essentielle 
des islamistes, une fois l’accord conclu, ont été contraintes, sous sa dynamique, a 
en prendre acte et surtout à accepter l’entrée de Serradj et conclure un « pacte de 
non-agression » avec les milices le soutenant. La mise en demeure de l’ONU et les 
sanctions de l’UE contre les présidents des deux parlements8 qui s’étaient 
                                                          
8 Le CNG élu en 2012 et basé à Tripoli et la Chambre du Parlement élue en 2014 et basée à 
Tobrouk. 
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rencontrés à Tunis pour dénoncer cet accord, avaient tonné comme un coup de 
semonce et semé la panique au sein des milices. La majorité des chefs des milices 
de base s’était sentie menacée et a fait pression sur ses chefs pour souscrire une 
sorte de charte d’honneur garantissant un pacte de non-agression entre milices. 
C’est ce qui a permis à Serradj de rentrer en toute sécurité à Tripoli alors que les 
milices qui lui étaient hostiles semblaient les plus fortes. Cela montre que les 
pressions et poursuites judiciaires internationales peuvent affaiblir les seigneurs de 
guerre rétifs et pousser leurs relais à s’en éloigner. 
Bien que les milices islamistes radicales disposaient d’une occupation de 
terrain et d’un rapport de force militaire initialement plus favorables, et même si 
elles ont pu mettre en difficulté les milices soutenant Serradj en fin 2016, elles 
ont fini par être balayées et disparaitre complètement de Tripoli. L’effacement 
progressif du gouvernement Ghweil et l’épuisement de ses ressources mais 
surtout la baisse des tensions et interventions extérieures grâce à l’intensification 
des concertations internationales et régionales et les difficultés et le repli sur la 
scène internationale du Qatar dont les liens sont avérés avec ces milices depuis 
2011, ont affaibli progressivement ces dernières. Le coup de grâce leur a été 
donné avec une facilité déconcertante au milieu de l’année 2017. La plupart de 
ces chefs qui tenaient le verrou sécuritaire de la ville sont aujourd’hui réfugiés en 
Turquie. Le déplacement de ressources a également favorisé des retournements 
d’alliance qui ont facilité la défaite de ces milices comme le passage de la milice 
de Bougra du côté des milices soutenant Serradj. C’est elle qui, estimant n’avoir 
pas eu le juste butin dans la nouvelle alliance victorieuse, va attaquer, vainement, 
l’aéroport en janvier 2018. C’est le jeu d’alliance qui fait les rapports de force 
miliciens, aucune milice ne dispose aujourd’hui à Tripoli de suffisamment de 
force pour avoir une stratégie indépendante.  
L’effondrement totale et sans résistance du groupe de Abdelkrim Belhadj, le 
GCIL (Groupe Combattants Islamiques de Libye), dont le poids sécuritaire a 
longtemps été dominant dans la capitale, même face aux puissants Misratis, alors 
que sa force propre est très faible, illustre comment ce sont les positions 
institutionnelles arrachées dans la transition et le jeu d’alliances qui façonnent la 
puissance milicienne. Ce groupuscule qui n’était même pas audible dans les 
milieux islamistes radicaux depuis son ralliement à Kadhafi au début 2000 et qui a 
encore moins réussi à avoir un ancrage social, y compris après la révolution, avait 
réussi pourtant à s’emparer des principaux appareils sécuritaires. Belhadj est 
devenu gouverneur militaire de Tripoli, Khaled Cherif vice-ministre de la défense 
et surtout dirigeant de la « garde nationale » qui quadrillait tout le centre de Tripoli 
alors que Abdelwahab Gaïd contrôlait au Sud un corps de « Grades Frontières ». 
C’est à partir de ces positions et soutenus par le Qatar et la Turquie, qu’ils ont 
réussi à tisser un système d’alliance avec des milices et à les clientéliser. Face aux 
urnes pourtant, aucun du groupe ne réussit à se faire élire et Belhadj a été battu de 
façon humiliante en ne récoltant que quelques dizaines de voix dans l’est de la 
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capitale supposé être son fief. Abdelwahab Gaïd, l’exception, s’est fait élire dans le 
fief de sa tribu au Fezzan où le critère tribal a été partout déterminant. Le groupe a 
certes soutenu la réconciliation, mais la sienne, celle du statu quo d’une transition 
figée en sa faveur pour sécuriser les prédations permises par la guerre. Ce 
groupuscule réduit qui n’a pas su se reproduire et dont la combativité s’est 
émoussée dans l’accumulation de fortunes, n’a même pas su exfiltrer et garder son 
précieux trésor de guerre, les trente personnalités de l’ancien régime qu’il détenait 
(parmi lesquelles l’ex premier ministre et le responsable des services, Senouci). 
Faible et sans forces propres, ce groupuscule a tenu d’une main de fer Tripoli et 
mystifié chancelleries et acteurs politiques locaux qu’il a terrorisés grâce à la 
perpétuation de structures sécuritaires transitoires qu’il s’est accaparées et 
transformées en réseau d’influence.  
Le rapport de forces milicien n’en est pas encore pour autant figé entre les 
quatre milices victorieuses. Une fracture, non encore active, se dessine d’ores et 
déjà entre les deux milices qui ont bénéficié le plus des largesses de Serradj, 
« Rada’e » de Kara et « les révolutionnaires de Tripoli » d’une part et de l’autre 
« Ennaouassi » et la milice de Ghenioua El Kikli. Les quatre puisent directement 
dans les ressources de l’État pour se servir et pour élargir leur influence. Haitem 
Ettajouri a ainsi pris en charge en Europe ses blessés pour deux millions d’euro et 
offert le pèlerinage aux parents des victimes en se servant directement dans le 
budget et les quotas réservés à cet effet par les ministères concernés. Cette 
distribution de générosités puisées dans les structures étatiques est indicatrice de la 
capillarité entre milices et État et de son infiltration par celles-ci, présageant ainsi 
d’une possible évolution mafieuse. Mais dans un double mouvement, elles 
cherchent également à se doter d’une interface politique, indiquant la probabilité de 
leur intention de jouer un rôle politique autrement que par l’usage direct des armes. 
Ghenioua El Kikli a ainsi une sorte de porte-parole et des représentants civils, non 
issus de sa milice, parmi lesquels son beau-frère. La milice « Ennaouassi » 
multiplie les affichages publics avec des personnalités de l’AFN (Alliance des 
Forces Nationales) qui se font le relai de ses intentions.9 C’est Haithem Tajouri qui, 
fort de son capital de prisonniers dignitaires de l’ancien régime ravis à Belhadj, 
tente de jouer sur les rapports de force politiques en les liant au devenir de ses 
prisonniers et se fait ainsi utile à Serradj et à lui-même. Depuis le Ramadan de 
l’année dernière où il a multiplié les réceptions des dignitaires de la tribu des 
Megherha, il est engagé dans un long processus de négociation avec cette tribu 
pour obtenir, si ce n’est son ralliement, au moins sa neutralité vis-à-vis de Serradj. 
Il s’agit de la tribu dont est issu Senouci le puissant patron des services de Kadhafi, 
tribu importante par sa démographie et surtout par l’extension de son terroir au 
Fezzan notamment sur les routes de transit entre Sahel et rivages méditerranéens. 
La complexité tient à ce qu’elle est également la tribu dont est issu Benaï, le plus 
                                                          
9 Alors que cette milice s’affiche comme salafiste et que l’AFN est identifiée comme « libérale ». 
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important relai militaire de Haftar au Sud, les deux, Senouci et Benaï, sont même 
issus de la même fraction, les Brakis. Un basculement de ceux-ci bouleverserait le 
rapport de force au Sud et plus globalement entre Haftar et Serradj et permettrait à 
Haitem d’accéder ainsi à un rôle politique et à une position dans l’État 
déterminants. Cela interroge sur la position de Serradj vis-à-vis des milices. En est-
il otage ? S’il fallait répondre oui, il ne le serait pas plus, voire il le serait moins 
que son rival de l’Est, Haftar. On peut en faire la mesure comparative par le poids 
de chacune des milices Madkhali, dans chacun des deux camps. La milice 
« Rada’e » de Kara qui est la milice Madkhali à Tripoli, connait une grande 
ascension. Efficace et intransigeante contre le crime et l’insécurité, elle a gagné de 
l’estime chez les Tripolitains, sur laquelle elle capitalise pour s’imposer sur le 
terrain de la moralisation de la vie publique et des mœurs et investir le champ 
religieux. Celui-ci reste toujours très diversifié à Tripoli. Les Madakhila à l’Est ont 
au contraire obtenu de Khalifa Haftar, contre leur engagement, un monopole 
formel sur les mosquées qui explique que ces dernières soient devenues à Benghazi 
la cible des attentats des islamistes radicaux. La milice Madkhali « El Tawhid » est 
une pièce maitresse du dispositif militaire de Haftar. Auto-dissoute formellement 
pour conforter l’image d’« Armée Nationale », elle a en fait essaimé dans toutes les 
unités tout en conservant sa structure et a surtout étendu son influence jusqu’à la 
hiérarchie de la dite armée. La saisie en janvier 2017 d’une cargaison d’ouvrages 
venus de l’Égypte alliée et contenant notamment des ouvrages du Nobel égyptien 
Naguib Mahfouz, au motif d’une « invasion culturelle », « contraire aux valeurs 
islamiques », puis en février 2017, l’interdiction faite aux femmes de voyager 
seules et de leur imposer un tuteur homme, ont révélé l’influence acquise par cette 
milice. 
L’état de « transition permanente » a également permis aux milices à la fois de 
s’enraciner et de connaitre pour une part une évolution criminelle qui les détache 
graduellement de leur identité originelle quand celle-ci avait pu être politique ou 
idéologique. Elles imposent ainsi un contrôle autoritaire de leur territoire pour en 
faire une base de négociation de positions de pouvoir et pour y puiser directement 
des ressources. Mais elles construisent également, dans leur intérêt, des réseaux de 
clientèle qui facilitent l’accès aux ressources e leur assurent des appuis et des 
relais, en contrepartie du maintien d’une forme d’ordre et de sécurité voire de 
services et de redistribution de prébendes. Des milices négocient ainsi des postes 
de travail et des services pour les territoires qu’ils « protègent » en usant de leur 
force auprès du gouvernement. Même si c’est sur le mode mafieux, elles se 
construisent une légitimité dans un contexte où la difficile émergence d’une 
autorité centrale laisse la primauté aux légitimités locales. Elles participent ainsi de 
ce localisme surtout dans les petites localités mais aussi dans les grandes villes. Si 
les milices de Misrata ont dû quitter la capitale en novembre 2013 alors que leur 
force et leur degré d’organisation étaient supérieurs à celui des autres milices, ce 
n’est pas par la force militaire mais sous la pression de manifestations pacifiques 
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des populations locales où elles n’avaient pas d’ancrage.10 Toutes les milices sont 
aujourd’hui tripolitaines et même enracinées dans des quartiers spécifiques, en 
rapport souvent avec leur chef, y compris quand elles rayonnent en dehors. Pour 
Kara de « Rada’e », c’est Souk El Joumoua, pour Ghenioua El Kikli c’est Bou 
Slim et pour Haitem Tajouri des « Révolutionnaires de Tripoli », c’est Tajoura. A 
Tajoura même, c’est un assemblage de 5 milices, chacune contrôlant une partie du 
quartier. Il y a donc un enracinement local, de solides clientèles, des réseaux de 
relais et une légitimité locale aussi pervertie soit-elle. Si les milices sont également 
un produit pervers de cette transition prolongée, une sortie de transition ne peut les 
ignorer et il serait illusoire de vouloir les effacer. Il s’agirait plutôt de contenir cette 
légitimité et de la réduire à sa réalité de réseau en la contournant, en l’érodant et en 
la transformant. 
La nomination à la tête de la région militaire de l’ouest (de Tripoli jusqu’aux 
frontières tunisiennes) et celle du centre (de Tripoli à Adjedabia), de deux chefs, à 
la fois militaires de carrière et appartenant aux deux puissantes villes militaires 
(Zintan et Misrata), qui ont été tous deux partisans de la réconciliation notamment 
entre les deux villes11 et leur apparente maîtrise du terrain,12 pourrait, sans affronter 
les milices, initier un processus de réinstitutionnalisation militaire qui encerclerait 
celles-ci de fait. Le « recyclage » de beaucoup d’entre-elles, notamment les milices 
de base qui alimentent les grandes formations miliciennes, est possible. Déjà on en 
voit qui se reconvertissent dans le marché juteux de la sécurité et de la protection 
qui aura de beaux jours devant lui surtout en cas de stabilisation politique comme 
ça l’est d’ailleurs un peu partout dans le monde y compris dans les pays stables 
d’occident. Ce processus s’était d’ailleurs engagé spontanément au lendemain de 
l’insurrection, même à échelle réduite, mais c’est les acteurs politiques qui, devant 
l’aiguisement des luttes de pouvoir, en leur faisant appel, ont renflouées les 
milices. 
Enfin l’expérience en Libye a montré que chaque fois que la communauté 
internationale adoptait des positions fermes accompagnées de mesure, elle faisait 
reculer politiques et seigneurs de guerre belliqueux. S’il y a chez les libyens, quasi-
unanimement, une phobie de l’intervention étrangère, les institutions internationales, 
                                                          
10 Revenues à Tripoli en 2014 lors de la campagne militaire « Fajr », les milices de Misrata ont 
gardé une présence discrète à Tripoli : une partie de la milice Halbous (la brigade 301) est en dehors 
de la ville à sa limite sud-ouest, face aux Ouerchefanah qui constituaient une menace sur Tripoli, une 
partie de la milice Mahdjoub, est fondu dans le corps de protection des ministères. 
11 Le Zintani Djouili, gouverneur de la région Ouest a été ministre de la défense du premier 
gouvernement nommé par le CNT (Conseil National de Transition) et le misrati Haddad avant de 
participer à la direction du corps militaire chargé de la libération de Syrte, a été le chef de la puissante 
milice El Halbous dont il a démissionné pour protester contre l’opération « Fajr ». 
12 L’opération pour la libération de Syrte a été menée avec un grand professionnalisme ; 
l’élimination rapide de la milice Ouerchefenah par Djouili et sa prise en charge de la frontière 
tunisienne quoiqu’accompagnée d’exactions à l’égard des Amazighs et non dénuée de calculs de 
prédation sur les ressources transfrontalières. 
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particulièrement l’ONU, gardent une crédibilité, probablement parce que manque un 
recours national. L’ONU reste une figure morale y compris pour les acteurs qui 
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Cet article s’intéresse à la transition en Libye. Il aborde comment celle-ci, en se 
prolongeant excessivement, est devenue, de ce fait, génératrice de rentes pour des acteurs 
qui, à la faveur du contexte d’incertitudes, ont conquis des structures de transition, s’y sont 
enkystés et en ont fait des instruments pour tenter de prolonger leur pouvoir. 
L’article explique comment l’état de « transition permanente » a également permis aux 
milices de s’enraciner, que celles-ci ne sont pas des acteurs complètement autonomes mais 
sont dans un rapport d’interdépendance avec les acteurs politiques locaux et puissances 
étrangères et qu’elles restent très perméables aux contextes et pressions politiques.  
























nəḥne kull-na yad wāḥda: The Mobilization  
of Amazigh Libyans in Revolutionary Rap 
 
 
Introduction: social media and protest music during the Arab Spring 
Recent years have witnessed an increased attention toward the expression of 
political dissent and mobilization in Arab youth culture, especially in the aftermath 
of the spectacular events that took place in 2010-2011 and were collectively 
labelled as the “Arab Spring”. In the aftermath of those events, special journal 
issues were devoted to Arab graffiti,1 and forms of poetry performed during the 
uprising also received some attention.2 But in addition to these more traditional 
ways of expressing dissent, the importance of the role played by social media in the 
events of 2011 was stressed to the point that the Arab spring was sometimes 
defined as a “Facebook Revolution”. The risk that an uncritical focus on the role of 
new media might replicate old orientalist stereotypes was felt by a number of 
concerned scholars in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring: 
 
And it is here once more that the focus on “new media”, instead of helping break up 
orientalist bias, might provide them with a new nest, this time located right at the 
core of the latest discussions within the sociology of media and communication. 
This development is reflected in the idea itself of a “Facebook revolution” that has 
been coined and propagated to define the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt […]3 
 
Academia was torn between cyber-utopians, who insisted on the idea of a 
Facebook revolution, and cyber-skeptics, who denied the role of social media 
altogether.4 While the question, posed in such way, is probably of limited interest, 
                                                 
1 Romano-Arabica XV. Graffiti, Writing and Street Art in the Arab World, Editura universităţii din 
bucureşti, Bucharest, 2015. 
2 R. Bassiouney, Language and Identity in Modern Egypt, Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, 2015, 317-325. 
3 A. Salvatore, New Media and Collective Action in the Middle East. Can Sociological Research 
Help Avoiding Orientalist Traps?, Sociologica, 3/5, 2011, 2. 
4 Idem, 6. 
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the role of social media should be framed within a broader sociological 
perspective, which also takes into consideration the role of more traditional 
networks (mosques, universities, trade unions).5 
In the years that immediately followed the events of 2010-2011, the theoretical 
framework in which the Arab Spring and the role of social media were analyzed 
and understood was further refined. Comunello and Anzera suggest a useful 
Decalogue that summarizes the knowledge we have gained from sociological 
research so far: 
1) Social media cannot cause a revolution, but may become useful tools for 
recruitment and organization. 
2) The actual role of social media depends on their accessibility to the 
population. 
3) Inspiration to hit the streets and confront the repressive machine of the regime 
cannot come from the media. 
4) The hierarchical nature of leadership cannot easily adapt to the horizontal 
architecture of social media networking. 
5) Social media are a useful means to organize protest movements, but they are 
also employed by the regimes. 
6) Shutting down internet services and cellphone coverage is usually a bad 
choice for authoritarian regimes. 
7) While cyber-enthusiasm is probably scientifically groundless, it is important 
to continue researching the role of social media in political activism and the 
struggle against dictatorial regimes. 
8) In the countries that went through political upheavals of 2011, the role of 
social media will probably be crucial in the coming years. 
9) Social media are reshaping the public sphere. 
10) When analyzing the role of social media in a revolutionary event, it would be 
wise to analyze their influence on the single components of the revolutionary 
arc.6 
 
Compared to the attention given to social media, the role played by music in 
shaping the imaginary of the Arab Spring has been, for the most part, neglected,7 
even though “studying the role of song and music in political struggles is crucial to 
                                                 
5 Ibidem. 
6 F. Comunello - G. Anzera, Will the revolution be tweeted? A conceptual framework for 
understanding the social media and the Arab Spring, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 23/4, 
2012, 465-466. 
7 According to Valassopoulos and Mostafa, popular music, together with movies, poetry and 
theatre, contributed to shape the “word” and “image” of the Egyptian Revolution (A. Valassopoulos - 
D. S. Mostafa, Popular Protest Music and the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, Popular Music and Society, 
37/15, 2014, 642). 
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understand how the popular and political interact”.8 This is even more surprising if 
we consider the fact that during the Egyptian Revolution, for instance, protestors 
started chanting the slogans of Tahrir Square almost immediately. In Egypt, the 
early months of 2011 witnessed a flourishing of new politically committed bands 
and a return to the stage of older artists (or of their patriotic songs), resulting in the 
emergence of the popular musician as a political actor.9 
According to Valassopoulos and Mostafa, popular music in Egypt during the 
Arab Spring followed a two-way path: “the events on the ground impact[ed] the 
music and the music respond[ed] and articulat[ed] the story and progress of the 
revolution and its influence on people’s lives”.10 Egyptian protest music did not 
break with the past; on the contrary, the songs and slogans of the 1952 Revolution 
were successfully adapted to the new circumstances, as is made evident from the 
number of old patriotic songs that were rearranged and sung in Tahrir Square and 
throughout the country.11 A similar phenomenon was not completely absent in 
Libya, where, for instance, the song yā blād-ī (Oh country of mine) by Fuad Gritly 
recalls the title of the Libyan national anthem.12 The Libyan music scene during the 
2011 Revolution presented, however, some original traits with respect to Egypt 
(the best-studied case), which will be the object of the present paper. Thus, the next 
section analyzes the case study of Ibn Thabit (Ibn Ṯābit) and his revolutionary rap. 
The following section provides an analysis of the structure and topoi of Ibn 
Thabit’s songs, while the last section before the conclusions focuses on the way in 
which Libyan Amazigh are referred to and addressed in his songs, in an attempt to 
mobilize them for the revolutionary cause. As a partial disclaimer, it should be 
pointed out that the present paper deals with the way in which rap music was used 
to mobilize the Libyan Amazigh in the fight against Gaddafi. This implies the 
presentation of quite a binary contrast between a right and a wrong side, the latter 
being, of course, Gaddafi. In describing the different strategies used by the rapper 
to achieve this goal, his words will be reported and translated verbatim, even 
though they offer a simplified version of a much more complex reality, an analysis 
of which is beyond the aim of this paper. 
                                                 
8 J. Massad, Liberating Songs: Palestine Put to Music, in R. L. Stein - T. Swedenburg (eds.), 
Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Popular Culture, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2005, 
177. 
9 A. Valassopoulos - D. S. Mostafa, op. cit., 650. 
10 Idem, 650-651. 
11 Idem, 645. 
12 Gritly’s song is not, however, a protest song, but it was composed as part of the theme of the 
Libyan TV show Dragunov (2014) (see L. D’Anna, Dialectal Variation and Identity in Post-
Revolutionary Libyan Media. The Case of Dragunov (2014), in R. Bassiouney, Identity and Dialect 
Performance. A study of Communities and Dialects, Routledge, London-New York, 2018, 321-340). 
The Libyan national anthem we refer to is the pre-Gaddafi one, which was readopted by the country 
after the fall of the regime. 
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“The revolution will be live”: the case of Ibn Thabit (Libya) 
Ibn Thabit represents an interesting case study of a talented rapper who was also 
active on social media (such as Facebook and Twitter) during the Libyan 
Revolution. Not many personal details are known about him. Ibn Thabit describes 
himself as an ordinary Libyan, not as a leader of the Revolution, who simply puts 
into music what his fellow citizens are afraid or not allowed to say.13 The massive 
employment of social media by the protagonists of the political and musical scene 
in 2011 allows us to retrieve the original feelings that moved their actions by just 
scrolling down their public profiles. Ibn Thabit, in an interview published by The 
Guardian, said: “I put out my first revolutionary song one week after Ben Ali fled 
Tunisia; it asked whether the revolution would spread to Libya. My answer in the 
song, and the answer from Libyans on the ground, was yes, the revolution was 
coming”.14 On his Facebook page, his first song is dated January 27th, 2011, and is 
accompanied by this brief comment, written in Libyan Arabic: 
 
 كانهم الليبيين ما يقلبوهاش على معمر قلت فكره اندير منها أغنيه سئلني واحد
Someone asked me whether the Libyans will revolt against Muʕammar [i.e. 
Gaddafi], I said this is an idea for a song15 
 
The song he speaks of above is as-suʔāl (The Question), in which Ibn Thabit 
voices the question asked by an anonymous interlocutor and then rewords it 
beautifully, asking whether his fellow citizens will show the same courage shown 
by their ancestors in their struggle against the Italian invaders and by Tunisians and 
Egyptians in the recent revolutionary events. Thus, from the very beginning, there 
is, an important difference between Libyan protest music and its Egyptian 
counterpart. While the Egyptian songs were born out of the protests in Tahrir 
Square, Ibn Thabit released his first song three weeks before the outbreak of 
demonstrations in Libya. In doing so, he openly defies the repressive machine of 
Gaddafi’s regime and actually tries to directly influence the events himself. He 
places the upcoming Libyan revolution in a natural sequence with the Tunisian and 
Egyptian ones, the echoes of which are particularly evident in his first song. In the 
following verses, for instance, the memory of Libya’s past resistance against the 
Italian aggression is blended with the revolutionary struggle then was happening in 
Tunisia: 
                                                 
13 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/01/rapping-against-gaddafi-hip-hop-libya, 
last accessed on April, 7th 2018. Ibn Thabit had allegedly released an anti-Gaddafi song, The Coward, 
in 2008, but in this case the date on the YouTube video does not confirm his claim (the song, 
however, might just have been deleted and uploaded again). 
14 Ibidem. 
15 Translations from Arabic are not always literal, due to the difficulty of rendering some concepts 
and constructions in English. 
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hal sa-iqāwmū l-aʕdā zeyy-mā qāwmū ždūd-na? 
hal sa-yuḍḥū zeyy-mā ḍḥū fī ġarb əḥdūd-na? 
 
Will they resist the enemies as our ancestors did? 
Will they sacrifice, as they did at our Western borders (i.e. in Tunisia)? 
 
awwəl ḥāža igūl-l-ək əḥməd ṛabb-ī kān-ək ḥayy 
əḥməd ṛabb-ī, law mūš li-n-nafṭ əl-blād mā-fī-hā šey 
u-yumkən hīkkī xēr bāš yəgallbū-hā ʕalā ṛās-hā 
zeyy-mā dārū fī tūnəs, taḥiyya hādi xāṣṣa! 
 
First they tell you thank God that you’re alive 
Thank God, if it weren’t for oil there would be nothing in this country 
Maybe it would’ve been better if there hadn’t, we would’ve rebelled sooner 
As they did in Tunis, special hail to them! 
 
ʕa-l-aqall ʕand-nā l-xubza u-l-xubza rxīṣa 
ṣūm! damm əš-šahīd mā-təgdər-š tgīs-a 
šinu ʕuḏr-ək, təstanna fī sayyəd-nā ʕīsa 
u-d-dawla əllī žanb-nā lazzət raʔīsa?16 
 
At least we have bread, and bread is cheap 
Fast! The martyrs’ blood has no price 
What’s your excuse, are you waiting for our Lord Jesus 
While the nation next to us ousted its president? 
 
After his first appearance on YouTube, Ibn Thabit released a second song on 
February 14th 2011, three days before the outbreak of the Revolution. The song, 
Nidāʔ li-šabāb Lībyā (Calling the Libyan youth), explicitly calls upon Libyans to 
hit the streets and start a revolution (the structure of Ibn Thabit’s song will be 
analyzed in next section). In this case also, the Egyptian and Tunisian examples are 
clearly referred to by the rapper, who ironically capsizes one of the catchphrases 
that could be heard in the Libyan streets in the days preceding February 17th, 
namely “Libya is not like Egypt and Tunisia”: 
 
gāl-ək Lībyā mūš zeyy Maṣr u Tūnəs 
ēh lā š-šuhadā əllī mātū sābiqan akṯər min Māṣr u Tūnəs 
nisbət əl-baṭāla akṯər min Maṣr u Tūnəs 
nisbət ʕadad əl-fuqarā fī Lībyā akṯər min Maṣr u Tūnəs17 
                                                 
16 The three excerpts are from Ibn Thabit, as-Suʔāl (The question),  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c_9pBiwS2lI, last accessed on April, 8th 2018. 
17 Ibn Thābit, Nidāʔ li-šabāb Lībyā (Calling the Libyan youth),  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aojjN96r2dk&t=33s, last accessed on April 8th, 2018. 
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They tell you Libya is not like Egypt and Tunisia 
Yeah no, the martyrs more martyrs died than in Egypt and Tunisia 
The unemployment rate is higher than in Egypt and Tunisia 
The poverty rate is higher than in Egypt and Tunisia 
 
The song ends with the call 
 
gēr maṭlūb yā xū-y ənn-ak ətdīr əllī ʕalē-k 
[…] 
hādī hīya l-furṣa əllī tmannēt bi-tžīk 
bāš tʕīš ʕalā rižlē-k u mūš ʕalā rkābī-k 
 
It is required, my brother, that you do what you have to do 
[…] 
This is the chance you hoped would come to you 
To live standing on your feet, and not on your knees. 
 
These songs, especially since they were released before the outbreak of the 
demonstrations, showing considerable courage, consecrated Ibn Thabit as the 
rapper of the Revolution. It is at this point that, as anticipated in the title of this 
paragraph, the Revolution goes live in Ibn Thabit’s rap, which sometimes 
comments upon the events, sometimes tries to anticipate them. As he admitted in 
the interview mentioned above, the artist was in close contact with the 
revolutionaries fighting against Gaddafi’s regular army, who even told him which 
of his songs they would play before each battle. The timing of Ibn Thabit’s musical 
production, thus, is of great interest: his songs either provide support for the 
ongoing battles or try to pave the ground for the upcoming ones, as in the case of 
al-Ǧabal al-Ġarbī (The Western Mountain), which will be analyzed later. 
Analyzing the different levels of artistic expression in Middle Eastern and North 
African popular culture, El Hamamsy and Soliman make the following 
distinctions: 
 
1) artistic street engagement, 2) artistic street assimilation, and 3) artistic street 
mobilization… In the first category, art is produced by the people and for the people, 
spontaneously and reflexively, to address a certain need as it arises. In the second 
category, the street is deployed by an artist-agent in an attempt to engage with the 
people, empower them, and document the moment… In the third category, art is 
taken to a higher level of consciousness-raising, mobilization, and social criticism, 
and the goal here is to ensure the continuation of the revolution, constantly 
reminding the masses that what was achieved is considerable but not yet complete.18 
                                                 
18 W. El Hamamsy - M. Soliman (eds.), Popular Culture in the Middle East and North Africa: A 
Postcolonial Outlook, Routledge, New York-London, 2013, 252. 
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There is, of course, a clear difference between the Egyptian and Libyan case. In 
Egypt, the artists were part of the street movement that ousted the regime. In Libya, 
the demonstrations soon degenerated into civil war, so that the artist, while being 
(by his own admission) an ordinary Libyan, producing music that engaged with the 
people, met their needs and documented the Revolution, did not actually take part 
in the events (until July, when he was deployed on the Ǧabal Nafūsa).19 El 
Hamamsy and Soliman’s third category, that of social criticism aimed at ensuring 
the continuation of the revolutionary process, is only sketched in Ibn Thabit’s 
production. The song Lā šakk (No doubt), released with the Benghazi rapper MC 
SWAT on September 28th 2011 (when Tripoli had already been conquered by the 
revolutionary forces but Gaddafi was still continuing the fight from Sirt), warns 
Libyans against those who want “to steal the revolution”. Soon after Gaddafi’s 
death, however, Ibn Thabit announced his withdrawal from the scene. Not a 
professional singer, he motivated his decision by saying that his goal had been met 
and his part in the fight fulfilled, although he continued to be active on his official 
Twitter profile.20 It was the Benghazi rapper MC SWAT who continued to describe 
the painful contradictions of post-2011 Libya. The song Istiġlāl (Exploitation), 
released on April 17th 2017, painted a disenchanted image of a country moved by 
self-interest and torn apart by infighting.21 Following the release of the video for 
the song, the artist received a number of death threats, forcing him to leave the 
country as an undocumented migrant. Ironically, it was Ibn Thabit, from his 
Twitter profile, who divulgated the news, posting a picture of MC SWAT on the 
boat that would get him to Italy, on August 5th 2018. 
Following this concise and partial description of the Libyan rap scene during 
and immediately after the 2011 Revolution, the next section analyzes in more detail 
the typical structure of Ibn Thabit’s songs. 
 
Notes on the structure of Ibn Thabit’s rap 
As explained above, after having been consecrated as the rapper of the 
Revolution, Ibn Thabit continued to provide support for the revolutionary cause 
through his music, released on different platforms, but mainly on YouTube, where 
everyone could listen to it and download it for free. His songs, at this point, began 
echoing the main developments on the battlefield. The sequence of the three songs 
Benghazi II (April 7th 2011), Misrata (April 18th 2011) and al-Ǧabal al-Ġarbī (The 
                                                 
19 Ibn Ṯābit, however, did not actually take part in the armed fight against Gaddafi’s regime. His 
role in the military effort to bring down Gaddafi’s regime is not clear from the sources at our disposal, 
yet it appears that he did not limit himself to songwriting. 
20 http://revolutionaryarabrap.blogspot.com/2011/12/ibn-thabit-libyas-leading-rapper.html, last 
accessed on April 12th, 2018. 
21 MC SWAT, Istiġlāl, last accessed on April 9th, 2018.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=apKxg1moN-U  
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Western Mountains, May 2nd 2011), for instance, loosely follows the slow 
progression of the revolutionaries from Eastern Libya to Tripolitania. 
United by a common purpose, most of Ibn Thabit’s songs also share many 
similarities in their inner structure, with a series of recurring themes: 
1) An initial statement, in which the addressee (whom the song intends to 
support) is mentioned and praised. The addressee is usually either a town 
(Benghazi, Misrata, Tripoli) or a section of Libyan society (e.g. Libyan 
women, the Libyan youth). 
2) Mention of the crimes or vexations committed by Gaddafi against the 
addressees. 
3) Praise of the addressees, with a mention of their qualities and the 
contributions they made to the Libyan society. 
4) (Call to action). 
5) Videos containing graphic content, as the songs were released after the 
outbreak of the Revolution, when footage from the battlefields and the 
resisting towns began to be available. 
 
Let us compare, for instance, the incipits from three songs, namely Benghazi II, 




xēr yā Benġāzī? l-ġunyā l-axīra mūš sādd-nā, ndīrū wāḥda ždīda nšīlu mən əl-klām 
əl-awwəl23 
Benghazi part two (in English) 
(Rapping) 
Benġāzī yā Benġāzī ənti gāʕda ʕa-lsān-i, tawwa əd-dənyā kull-hā taʕrəf əl-maqāṣid 
wa-l-maʕānī 
 
What’s up Benghazi? The first song was not enough, let’s make another one, 
quoting our first words 
Benghazi part two 
Benghazi oh Benghazi you are still on my tongue, now the entire world knows the 





                                                 
22 Ibn Thabit, Benghazi II, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hFdTYSdAr_A, last accessed on 
April 10th 2018. 
23 The reference is here to a previous rap song by Ibn Thabit, called Benghazi, released in 2009. 
The music of the new song is the same, and the lyrics often refer to the old ones. 
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Misrata24 
(Speaking) 
yā ʕbād Lībyā, nəbbī nəḥkī-l-kum ʕalā mdīna yā rāžəl ḥəlwa zeyy əs-sukkər zeyy l-
ʕsəl zeyy š-šəklāta ʕa-l-galb 
yā Mʕammar əṭlaʕ mən Miṣṛāta yā kalb! 
əllī təbbī-h təlgā-h fī Miṣrāta: tārīx-ha maʕrūfa, ʕulamā-ha maʕrūfīn, abraz təžāra l-
əl-blād, ašhar mužāhidīn, aḥlā tanḍīm, kull-a təlgā-h fī Miṣṛāta. 
(Rapping) 
hādī əllī nəbbi nətkalləm ʕalē-ha fi galb-ī ḥāṭṭ-hā 
glūb əš-šaʕb əl-lībī kull-hā tawwa fī Miṣṛāta 
 
Libyans, I want to talk to you about a town, oh man, sweet to the heart like sugar, 
like honey, like chocolate 
Muʕammar leave Misrata, you dog! 
Whatever you want, you can find it in Misrata: its history is known, its ʕulamāʔ are 
known, the most prominent commerce in the country, the best organization, all of it 
you find in Misrata. 
This (city) of which I want to talk, I have placed it in my heart 




wāḥda li-l-marʔa l-lībiyya, bāš əl-ʕālam kull-a yaʕrəf gīmət-hā, u-šinu gaddmət li-t-
tawra 
lā mā-nsēnā-kum-š, Rabb-ī yəʕəzz-kum u-yaḥfaḍ-kum u-igawwīkum, Allāh ibārək fī-
kum 
(Rapping) 
xallī nabdā bi-taḥiyya kbīra li-ummahāt aš-šuhadā əlli damm-hum kān daxīra li-l-
ḥurriyya […] 
 
One for the Libyan woman, so that the entire world may know her worth, and what 
she brought to the Revolution. 
No we haven’t forgotten you, God exalt you and protect you and strengthen you, 
God bless you 
Let’s start with a warm greeting to the mothers of the martyrs, whose blood was the 
ammunition of freedom. 
 
As is made evident from the brief excerpts quoted and translated above, the songs 
share a very similar structure, which is not usually limited to the incipit. Going back 
                                                 
24 Ibn Thabit, Misrata, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JkUcGhoy6RI&t=6s, last accessed on 
April 10th 2018. 
25 Ibn Thabit, Anisat aṯ-ṯuwwār (Ms. Revolution),  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylrZ0JzjQr8&t=67s, last accessed on April 11th 2018. 
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to one of Ibn Thabit’s most famous songs, Nidāʔ li-šabāb Lībyā (Calling the Libyan 
youth), its opening lines describe in detail the situation of Libya, while the final call 
invites young Libyans to hit the streets. In the middle of the song we can find the 
other typical elements of Ibn Thabit’s songs. Gaddafi’s crimes against his own 
people, for instance, are vividly portrayed in the following lines: 
 
əl-klām əllī txarrəf fī-h u l-āyāt əlli tḥarrəf fī-həm 
bi-mawādd ət-taʕlīm ət-talāmīd txarrəb fī-həm 
fulūs əš-šaʕb tharrəb fī-həm hādī sulṭat əš-šaʕb? 
muḥāḍarāt l-əṣ-ṣbāyā, tšawwəh fī sumʕət əš-šaʕb! 
 
The words you make up, the verses (of the Quran) you twist, 
With didactic materials you ruin (our) students 
You steal the people’s money, is this the power of the people? 
Conferences for girls? You ruin the people’s reputation! 
 
From this perspective, the memory of the Abū Salim massacre is evoked in 
most of Ibn Thabit’s songs and it is, for the artist, the chief among all of the crimes 
committed by Gaddafi.26 The final call to action reported above, thus, starts with 
these powerful words: 
 
əllī nāwī išūf nihāyət-a fī ḥyāt-a 
lā budda ikūn mustaʕidd an yuḍḥī əḥyāt-a 
yuḍḥi damm-a bāš yətxalləs mən hamm-a 
zey š-šahīd əllī fī Bū Slīm əllī šinu danb-a? 
əllī māt fī l-fāḍī, əllī māt yā nār-ī 
ʕala mmālī-h tī-lā šuhādā yā ġālī! 
 
He who wants to see his [Gaddafi’s] end in his lifetime 
must be willing to sacrifice his life, 
to sacrifice his blood to rid himself of his torment, 
like the martyr in Abū Salim. What was his sin? 
He who died in vain, he who died - how awful for his parents! 
No, they are martyrs, my dear! 
 
                                                 
26 Abū Salīm is a maximum-security prison in Tripoli, which mostly housed political prisoners 
during Gaddafi’s regime. After repeated human rights violations, approximately 1.270 political 
prisoners were killed there in 1996, and their bodies were never returned to the families. The families 
of the victims created a number of associations. In 2011, shortly after the Tunisian and Egyptian 
revolutions, a human rights lawyer who was negotiating with the government, Fathi Terbil, was 
arrested in Benghazi and charged of plotting against the regime. The demonstrations that followed his 
arrest started what would then become the 17th February Revolution. 
Luca D’Anna 245 
The last missing element, i.e. the praise for the addressee, is also exemplified in 
Nidāʔ li-šabāb Lībyā. In this case, the addressee is the Libyan youth and, by 
extension, the entire Libyan people: 
 
əš-šaʕb əl-lībī šərīf, əš-šaʕb əl-lībī nḍīf 
əš-šaʕb əl-lībī lammā yətšannəž iwəllī rdīf 
iwəllī mahbūl. əš-šaʕb əl-lībī dū uṣūl 
əš-šaʕb əl-lībī iṣallī u-isalləm ʕala r-rasūl 
 
The Libyan people are noble, the Libyan people are clean 
the Libyan people, when they get angry, become terrible, 
become crazy. The Libyan people have roots 
the Libyan people pray and send peace to the Prophet. 
 
Nidāʔ li-šabāb Lībyā thus perfectly exemplifies the format of Ibn Thabit’s 
songs. The rapper, despite his attention to the artistic form of his message, aims 
primarily to move his audience and involve them in the ongoing struggle, which 
explains his meticulous attention to details, especially when enumerating the 
injustices suffered at the hands of Gaddafi. 
 
Calling the Amazigh 
Having analyzed in detail the structure of Ibn Thabit’s songs, in this paragraph 
we will now focus on a particular case study that of a specific song addressed to the 
Libyan Amazigh. In doing so, we are not going to investigate the Amazigh’s own 
perception of the ongoing conflict, but rather the way in which Libyan Arabs 
(exemplified through a popular rapper, Ibn Thabit) described Amazigh. The 
Amazigh perspective, here, is seen through the eyes of the Arab other, with all the 
implied risks of misrepresentation and cultural assimilation. The context in which 
the song was composed and released must also be taken into account, since it 
undoubtedly influenced its genesis and overall tone. The song, al-Ǧabal al-Ġarbī 
(The Western Mountain), was released on May 2nd 2011. The reference in the title 
is, of course, to Ǧabal Nafūsa, in Tripolitania, where the most Libyan Amazigh 
(excluding the Tuareg) are concentrated. The genesis of the song can be placed at a 
particularly delicate stage during the Libyan military conflict that followed the 
demonstrations in February 2011: 
 
By April, a stalemate had developed, and there was concern that rather than a democratic 
revolution, the civil war might yield a Libya that was permanently divided and in an 
ongoing conflict, much like Korea. The stalemate was broken by the entrance of a new 
group into the anti-Gaddafi coalition: the Berbers of southwest Libya, who in early June 
began a rebel offensive in the Nafusa Mountains. By mid-June, these rebels had taken 
several key towns in the mountains, and were advancing on Tripoli from the west, with 
the support of NATO. A month later, the rebels were only 50 miles from Tripoli, and by 
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the end of July, after intensifying their attacks, the western rebel forces had taken every 
one of Gaddafi’s outposts and strongholds in the western mountains.27 
 
Ibn Thabit thus addresses the Libyan Amazigh in a historically delicate 
moment, in which their contribution is deemed necessary to win a war that risked 
otherwise to be perceived as a conflict between Eastern and Western Libya. All 
these elements need to be taken into consideration when analyzing the lyrics of the 
song, reported and translated below:28 
 
mā ʕand-ī wa-lā farg bēn əš-šarg wa-l-ġarb 
əllī idāfəʕ ʕala arḍ-a ʕand-a l-ḥagg fī-l-ḥarb 
swā ənn-a kān mən Nālūt, mən al-Gəlʕa mə-z-Zəntān 
əl-Amāzīġī fī Yefrən aw l-ʕarbī fī-r-Rəžbān. 
 
ər-riyānī əlli lagb-a əš-šībānī kull-ha nafs əl-klām 
lammā iṭayyrū quwwāt əl-gəddāfi nafs əl-aʕlām 
ḥattā gəddām əš-šāša dīma nafs əl-aʕlām 
 
neḥne kull-nā yad wāḥda gədd-mā iḥāwəl ifattən fī-nā 
wagfa wāḥda ṭalʕa wāḥda əš-šaʕb əl-lībi Allāh iʕīn-a 
u əlli iḥārəb fī-nā u-yəštəm fī-nā Allāh ihīn-a 
u əlli igūl-l-ək hādī fitna gūl-l-a: šīn daxl-ək fī-nā? 
 
mā yəsəmʕu fī-ž-žbəl li-lə-ṛṣāṣ u-ṣ-ṣyāḥ 
u-ənta mgaʕməz fī-l-marbūʕa mādd rižlē-k u murtāḥ 
mūš bʕīd b-nəktešfū-h 
baṛṛā ənta tzagzəg li-muʔammar tawwa nžū-k 
 
Yefrən w-Allāh, mūš ġāyəb ʕalē-hum al-gatəl 
āxər ḥāža alfēn u-tmānya əllī yəbbī idawwər əḷ-maṯəl 
lammā inūḍu inūḍu marra wāḥda yā āna l-aʕyūn-ī  
mā-tatwaqqaʕ-š aqall mən hīkkī mən aḥfād əl-Bārūnī. 
bi-n-nisba l-hum nafs əl-ḥāža əd-dəbbāba wa-d-daww 
mā-yagdəru izaʕzʕū ḥattā šāʕra fī Kābāw 
nafs əl-qəṣṣa fī-r-Rəžbān, nafs əl-qəṣṣa fī-z-Zəntān, 
nafs əl-qəṣṣa žīb-l-i žəbəl Nəfūsa fī ayyin kān 
 
arāḍī-ha səmḥa tuzraʕ fī-hā l-kərmūs 
u tuzraʕ fī-hā t-trīs əlli ḥārbū zey lə-wḥūš 
                                                 
27 J. A. Goldstone, Cross-class Coalitions and the Making of the Arab Revolts of 2011, Swiss 
Political Science Review, 17, 2011, 460. 
28 The song also contains some brief parts in Tamazight, the text of which has not been possible to 
establish and which are not reported here. 
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ət-tyūs yəbbū yarkbu əž-žbəl u mā-gədrū-š 
u rā-h taḥsəbū-ha sahla ʕārfīn-kum mā-taʕrfū-š? 
 
škūn qbīlat əb-Bxābxa, škūn əl-Grādiyyīn, 
škūn ət-Tāġma u lə-Mʕāni, škūn əm-Mšušiyyīn? 
mūš bṣāra lammā igūlū-l-ək nantaṣir aw namūt 
gūl-ī-l-a l-əlli ʕa-l-burkān žāy mən žəbəl taʕ Nālūt? 
 
[...] bi-tamsaḥ bī-nā?  
gūl əlli bi-tgūl-a […] wa-l-mayya rā-hu hne r-ružūla 
bi-n-nisba li-klāb muʕammar šinu mā-zāl bi-tžū-na? 
tawwa iṣīr fī-ku zeyy mā-ṣār fi-maʕrakət əṭ-ṭāḥūna 
 
bi-llāhi nibbī wēn-kum yā Tarhūna u Ġaryān 
əllī imūtū hādū xūt-kum kēf tgūlu žərdān? 
 
əlli yəbbi yəfham-a fətna xallī nwaḍḍəḥ əṣ-ṣūra 
əl-fatwā žət mən Ġaryānī āmā ṣādəq fī Tāžūra29 
mmāla šīnu tgūlū ʕalā l-xaṭəf u-l-iġtiṣāb 
bālki mā-təndrū-š ġēr ifūt əḍ-ḍabāb 
mā-fī-š əllā l-Gərdāfi30 əlli nibbū nantaqmū mənn-a 
əlli tədʕī-l-nā bi-n-naṣər hādī akīd yā ḥənna 
aṣəl šīn mā-zāl mən sənn-a  
mūš bʕīd tawwa iṭīḥ 
yā-rēt ižībū-h ḥəyy u nəžəldū-h mlīḥ 
ənḥākmū u-nəšənngū-h u-nḥuṭṭū rāṣ-a fī ṣūniyya 
yugʕud ġēr rās zeyy Wādi r-Rūmiyya.31 
 
I make no difference between East and West (of Libya), 
Whoever defends his land has the right to wage war. 
Whether he is from Nalut, from al-Gelʕa, from Zintan, 
The Amazigh in Yefren, or the Arab in al-Rejban. 
The same goes for ər-Riyānī, whose last name is əš-Šībānī, 
When they chase Gaddafi’s forces [they share] the same flags, 
In front of the screen, the flags are also the same. 
                                                 
29 The reference is here to the famous fatwa by al-Ṣādiq al-Ġaryānī in which he declared that 




%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A8, last accessed on April 15th 2018. 
30 The name Gaddafi was often distorted in Gərdāfi (gərd “monkey”) by the revolutionaries. 
31 Ibn Thabit, Western Mountains (of Libya),  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mfeixCk2XLo&t=123s last accessed on April 12th 2018. 
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We are all one hand, no matter how he [Gaddafi] tries to divide us, 
One stand, one fight, God help the Libyan people, 
and humiliate whoever fights us and insult us, 
and to those who say this is fitna, say, what do you have to do with us? 
The sound of bullets and cries they hear on the Mountain, 
While you are stretching your legs in your sitting room, relaxed, 
We will discover it soon 
Skip over to Muʕammar, we are coming for you! 
 
Yefren, I swear, they are not strangers to death, 
The last time was in 2008, for those seeking examples, 
When they rise, they rise once, oh what I have seen, 
Don’t expect less than that from the descendants of al-Bārūnī. 
For them, the tank and the Dāyū32 are the same, 
They (i.e. Gaddafi’s forces) couldn’t unsettle even a hair in Kābāw, 
Same story in al-Rejban, same story in Zintan, 
Same story in – give me any place on Ǧabal Nafūsa. 
 
Their land is beautiful, and the fig tree is grown there, 
And men are raised there also, who fight like wild beasts. 
Fools wanted to climb the mountains and they couldn’t, 
Do you think it’s easy, we know you don’t know. 
 
Who is the tribe of the Bxābxa, who the Grādiyyīn, 
who the Tāġma and the Mʕāni, who the Mšušiyyīn? 
It’s no joke when they tell you we either win or die33 
Tell it to those who are riding the explosion down the Mountain of Nalut!  
 
Do you really think you will wipe us out? 
Say what you have to say […] and water, we have courage. 
As far as Muʕammar’s dogs are concerned, are you still coming at us? 
Now you will be faced with the same fate as in the battle of Ṭāḥūna. 
 
By God, I want you, Tarhuna and Gharyan, 
Those who are dying are your brothers, how can you call them rats?34 
For those who want to understand this as fitna, let me explain the picture, 
the fatwa came from al-Gharyani, the trustworthy, in Tajura. 
So, what do you say of kidnappings, of rapes, 
maybe you don’t know, let the fog clear away. 
                                                 
32 The reference is here to cheap Daewoo cars still used in Libya (the Korean company closed in 
2000 due to bankruptcy). 
33 This is the famous motto of Omar al-Mukhtar (1861-1931), hero of the Libyan Resistance 
against the Italian invaders. 
34 The term žerḏān “rats” was often employed by Gaddafi to designate the revolutionaries. 
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It’s only Gaddafi from whom we seek revenge, 
to those who pray for our victory we say, it is certain, grandma, 
how long can still be left of his age, 
he will fall soon, 
I wish they would bring him alive and so we could whip him good, 
So that we could judge him and hang him and put his head on a plate, 
And so that he remains headless, like the statues of Wadi Rumiyya. 
 
The opening lines of the song allow us to situate it, as mentioned above, in a 
particularly delicate context, in which the author perceives the risk of the 
emergence of a divided Libya as one that must be avoided at all costs. Thus Ibn 
Thabit opens his song by saying that he makes no difference between East and 
West, advocating for a united Libya.35 From there, the discourse of unity 
transcends the traditional division between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and 
embraces the two main ethnic groups of the country, Arabs and Amazigh. The 
“sameness” of the Libyan Arabs and Amazigh, then, constitutes the main theme of 
the first part of the song. From this perspective, the idea that the Revolution might 
constitute a fitna “trial, temptation”36 is repeatedly rejected, not only in this song. 
In a previous (and less famous) song, Lībyā hiya (Libya is), in fact, the same call to 
unity and rejection of the idea that the Revolution is a fitna is spelled out in 
different words: 
 
Lībyā fī-hā šuʕūb u-qabāʔil lākən rāfʕīn nafs əl-aʕlām 
kān ʕa-l-Gəddāfi rā-h əyyām-a maʕdūdāt 
əlli yəbbī ifattən fī-nā rā-h mā-fī-š imkāniyyāt 
lā žihawiyya lā ʕunṣuriyya lā qabaliyya 
āh nwaḍḍəḥ-ḥā l-ək bi-l-luġa l-amāziġiyya… 
 
Libya has different peoples and tribes but when they fly the same flag 
Gaddafi’s days are numbered,  
Those who want to divide us have no chances 
No regionalism, no racism, no tribalism 
I’ll explain it to you in Tamazight…37 
 
                                                 
35 It is worth reminding the reader that the geographical area we call Libya was politically unified 
by the Ottomans only at the beginning of the 20th century. D. Vandewalle, A History of Modern 
Libya, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 21. 
36 The term gradually acquired the sense of a seduction or enticement that brings division in the 
community of believers (see D. B. Cook, Fitna in early Islamic history, in K. Fleet - G. Krämer - D. 
Matringe - J. Nawas - E. Rowson (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. Last accessed on April 12th 
2018 http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_27151). 
37 This sentence is followed by lines in Tamazight (Ibn Thabit, Lībyā hiya (Libya is), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Axcbkzx2kIA, last accessed on April 13th 2018 ). 
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From this theme, Ibn Thabit switches to another topos of the narration 
concerning the Amazigh Resistance, i.e. their military prowess. The rapper, who 
was deployed in a non-combat position on the Ǧabal Nafūsa two months after the 
release of this song, vividly depicts the courage and military strength of the Libyan 
Amazigh. Ibn Thabit then skillfully links their bravery to the heritage of Sulaymān 
al-Bārūnī (1870-1940), hero of the early resistance against the Italian invasion. 
Though Al-Bārūnī, an Amazigh born in Ǧabal Nafūsa and belonging to an Ibadi 
family,38 the heritage of his deeds is nonetheless considered to be shared between 
Libyan Arabs and Amazigh. Mentioning him thus serves to strengthen the idea of 
unity between the two ethnic groups, especially in confronting a common enemy. 
The establishment of a connection between past and present, moreover, is a 
defining trait of protest music. Valassopoulos and Mostafa, commenting on this 
phenomenon in the Egyptian musical scene, write that “It is precisely at the 
crossroads where music both articulates and memorializes the connection between 
past and present injustices that it becomes dangerous and revolutionary”.39 Ibn 
Thabit makes great use of this rhetorical device in his songs, starting from the first 
one (as-Suʔāl - The question), in which he asks hal sa-iqāwmū l-aʕdā zeyy-mā 
qāwmū ždūd-na? “Will they resist the enemies as our ancestors did?”. And trying 
to stimulate the pride of the Libyan people, in his second song (Nidāʔ li-šabāb 
Lībyā - Calling the Libyan youth) he tells his addressees not to call themselves 
descendants of muǧāhidīn if they do not join the fight against Gaddafi (mā-tgūl-š 
aḥfād əl-mužāhidīn “Don’t say (we are) grandsons of the muǧāhidīn”). 
The song al-Ǧabal al-Ġarbī (The Western Mountain) revolves around the two 
themes of unity and of the military prowess of the Libyan Amazigh. In Lībyā hiya, 
an additional element is sketched, namely the fact that the Amazigh people have 
been in Libya for centuries (even though Ibn Thabit does not venture to say that 
their presence precedes the Arab one), as proved by the very existence of their 
language: 
 
ḥnē aškāl u alwān lākən kull-nā lībiyyīn 
əllī ihīn min-nā wāḥəd rāh ihīn əl-malāyīn 
yəbbi igūl mā-fī-š amāzīġ hādū lī-hum snīn 
suʔāl ʕa-s-sarīʕ hādī l-kalimāt mənnīn?40 
 
We have different looks and different colors but we are all Libyans 
and whoever insults one among us insults millions. 
                                                 
38 A. Baldinetti, Italian Colonial Rule and Muslim Elites in Libya: a Relationship of Antagonism 
and Collaboration, in M. Hatina (ed.), Guardians of Faith in Modern Times: ʿUlamaʾ in the Middle 
East, Brill, Leiden / Boston, 2009, 96. 
39 A. Valassopoulos - D. S. Mostafa, op. cit., 647. 
40 This verse is then followed by lines in Tamazight. 
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He says there are no Amazigh when they have lived here for years. 
A quick question: where are these words from then? 
 
After presenting the two songs in which the Libyan Amazigh are directly (al-
Ǧabal al-Ġarbī) or indirectly (Lībyā hiya) addressed, it is possible to evaluate the 
perspective from which Ibn Thabit creates his perception of them and on which he 
builds his discourse. In order to do so, however, it is useful first to remind the 
reader of the situation of the Libyan Amazigh under Gaddafi’s regime. The regime 
portrayed Libya as an ethnically homogeneous country,41 where the discussion of 
minority issues was not allowed in public. According to the official discourse of 
Gaddafi’s regime, the contemporary “Berbers” were an Arab tribe who had reached 
Northern Africa a long time ago and whose Arabic language had been particularly 
corrupted through the centuries. According to Gaddafi, the authentic Amazigh 
tribes had long ceased to exist, while the contemporary Berbers were Arab tribes 
arrived over land (barr barr, whence the name “Berber”) from Yemen.42 The 
existence of the Amazigh / Berber ethnic group, thus, was an invention of Western 
colonialism, the aim of which was to divide Libya (and other North African 
countries).43 Even representatives of the Libyan Academy of the Arabic Language 
(Maǧmaʕ al-luġa al-ʕarabiyya al-lībiyya), with whom I was able to discuss the 
question of Tamazight, upheld (or were forced to uphold) the same version. The 
denial of the very existence of an ethnically distinct group in Libya (apart from the 
Tebu in the southern part of the country) translated into extremely restrictive 
measures against the employment of Tamazight in public. The infamous Law 24 
forbade the Libyan Amazigh from using their language in public and giving their 
children Amazigh names for a quarter of a century, until it was lifted in 2007 under 
the influence of Gaddafi’s son, Sayf al-Islām.44 From that moment and until the 
outbreak of the February 17th Revolution, Gaddafi’s attitude toward the Libyan 
Amazigh was fickle to say the least, alternating harsh attacks (which described 
Amazigh activists as traitors) and shy attempts at reconciliation. 
This brief introduction is interesting because it helps us to put Ibn Thabit’s 
words in perspective. The aim of this analysis is not to question the genuine good 
intentions of the rapper, who later joined the Amazigh themselves on the Ǧabal 
Nafūsa in their fight against the regime. The discourse of homogeneity offered by 
Lībyā hiya and al-Ǧabal al-Ġarbī, on the contrary, specifies that Libya is indeed 
one, but it includes different šuʕūb wa qabāʔil “peoples and tribes”. In al-Ǧabal al-
                                                 
41 B. Maddy-Weitzman, The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North African 
States, University of Texas Press, Austin, 2011, 140. 
42 Idem, 141. 
43 http://mediterraneanaffairs.com/ethnic-minorities-the-main-challenge-for-the-libyan-
stabilization, last accessed on April 14th 2018.  
44 B. Maddy-Weitzman, op. cit., 141. 
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Ġarbī, moreover, he says that everyone has the right to fight the regime, əl-Amāzīġī 
fī Yefrən aw l-ʕarbī fī-r-Rəžbān “the Amazigh in Yefren or the Arab in al-Rejban”. 
These points were amongst the greatest points of controversy between Gaddafi and 
the activists of the CMA (Congrès Mondial Amazigh). In a letter addressed to the 
Libyan dictator by the CMA leader Lounès, the Libyan Amazigh are said to have 
been let down precisely by the fact that Gaddafi imagined a “Libya for Libyans”, 
but the only identity he was willing to include in this “Libyanness” was the Arab 
one.45 
Where Ibn Thabit’s discourse falls short is in recognizing the injustices suffered 
by the Libyan Amazigh at the hands of the regime and their general 
marginalization within the Libyan society. In a politically charged rap that aims to 
stir the conscience of its listeners, thus, a recognition of the Amazigh presence in 
Libya is little more than a long overdue act. The act itself, however, does not stem 
from the recognition of the specific kind of repression and persecution suffered by 
the Libyan Amazigh within their own country. This is especially true if we 
compare the two songs quoted above with the rest of Ibn Thabit’s production, 
which is usually extremely detailed in listing the crimes committed by Gaddafi 
against the addressees of his songs. A discourse of unity and homogeneity that does 
not seek reconciliation through the acknowledgement of past injustices, thus, risks 
to be an involuntary attempt at cultural assimilation. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper provided an analysis of one of the most prominent rappers that 
animated the Libyan scene throughout the February 17th Revolution, with a 
particular focus on his approach to the issue of Amazigh in Libya. As evident from 
the moment in which Ibn Thabit’s al-Ǧabal al-Ġarbī (The Western Mountain) was 
released, his dealing with the Amazigh question in Libya is, at the very least, 
partially instrumental to bringing about their auspicated role in the then ongoing 
conflict. In other words, Ibn Thabit composes this song and releases it at a moment 
in which the help of the Amazigh was desperately needed to win the war, but he 
includes them in his vision of a culturally diverse post-Gaddafi Libya, although he 
does so with all of the shortcomings highlighted at the end of the previous section. 
One of the limitations of the present paper consists in the fact that it only offers 
one point of view, namely that of Ibn Thabit. It would be extremely interesting to 
investigate how the Libyan Amazigh received his message. During the conference 
at which this paper was originally presented, for instance, the discussion that 
followed my presentation was extremely interesting. Some of the Libyan Amazigh 
in attendance, in fact, showed a certain disappointment, stating that their help was 
requested and promises were made during the war, yet the Arab ethnic majority 
                                                 
45 Idem, 142. 
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tried to marginalize them again soon after Gaddafi’s fall. The inclusive discourse 
of a common “Libyanness”, thus, was accused of opportunism, even though 
statistical surveys would be needed to ascertain whether these opinions are really 
representative of the feelings of the Libyan Amazigh in post-Gaddafi Libya. 
At the same time, politically connoted rap and hip-hop music in the MENA 
region and its contribution to the Arab Spring also deserves the attention of 
researchers, in order to understand an important aspect of the multifaceted social 
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Songs quoted 
Gritly, Fuad, Yā blād-ī (Oh country of mine); 
Ibn Thabit, Anisat aṯ-ṯuwwār (Ms. Revolution);  
Ibn Thabit, Benghazi II; 
Ibn Thabit, al-Ǧabal al-Ġarbī (The Western Mountain); 
Ibn Thabit feat. MC SWAT, lā šakk (No doubt); 
Ibn Thabit, Lībyā hiya (Libya is); 
Ibn Thabit, Misrata; 
Ibn Thabit, Nidāʔ li-šabāb Lībyā (Calling the Libyan youth); 
Ibn Thabit, as-Suʔāl (The question); 





This paper investigates one of the lesser-known expressions of political dissent and 
revolutionary thinking during the Arab Spring, rap music. It focuses on the Libyan musical 
scene and its most famous revolutionary rapper, Ibn Thabit, whose songs were the 
soundtrack of the February 17th Revolution. Composed and sung in Libyan dialect, Ibn 
Thabit’s rap is a call to action addressed to all Libyans, including the Amazigh ethnic 
minority. The second part of the paper focuses on the way in which the Libyan Amazigh, 
who were subjected to violent repression under Gaddafi’s rule, were portrayed and 
addressed by an ethnically and linguistically Arab singer, in an attempt to involve them in 













This article is intended as a non-technical introduction to internal variation in 
Libyan Berber1 and its broader implications. Like Arab identity, Amazigh identity 
tends to be closely bound up with language. However, like Arabic, Berber is far 
from homogeneous, and mutual comprehensibility across different regions can be 
very limited. Understanding this cross-regional linguistic variation is important in 
order to predict, or plan, the future of Berber in Libya in a context of increasing 
institutionalisation and urbanisation. 
 
                                                 
1 A terminological note may be necessary here. “Berber” is the most widely used term in Western 
academic literature both for the language and for the ethnic grouping. In Arabic, the term (barbar) has 
acquired negative connotations, including a perceived (and perhaps etymologically correct) link with 
“barbarian”, and is generally considered unacceptable in modern contexts; in English, it does not have 
the same connotations. “Amazigh” or “Mazigh” is the ethnonym traditionally used by many but not 
all Berber-speaking groups, and promoted by activists; it is increasingly accepted even in areas where 
it had not been used in the pre-colonial period, and will be used here consistently to refer to ethnic 
identity or political activity and its results. “Tamazight”, the feminine of “Amazigh”, is often used to 
refer to the language as a whole, or specifically to the varieties of central Morocco; however, most 
Libyan varieties put language names in the masculine, so this term will be used here only in reference 
to other countries. 
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Distribution 
Except for some Tubu areas in the far south, it is probable that every habitable 
part of Libya has been the domain of Berber speakers at some point (Múrcia 
Sànchez 2010; 2011). By the time Arabic speakers first reached power, in the 7th 
century, the language had already begun its long retreat; the coastal towns were 
largely Latin or Greek-speaking, with possible survivals of Punic in some areas. 
The interior of the country, however, remained largely Berber-speaking at least 
until the arrival of the Banu Sulaym in the 11th century. As a result of the uneven 
course of language shift and conquest, Berber-speaking communities were 
gradually reduced to an archipelago of language islands, often with little mutual 
contact, in a sea of Arabic. 
Within modern Libya, Berber-speaking communities are concentrated primarily 
along the western edge of the country; see Figure 1. Demographically, the most 
important traditionally Berber-speaking region in Libya is the western part of the 
Nefusa Mountains, southwest of Tripoli (Beguinot, 1942; Ashammakhi, 2017). 
This consists of a 200-km-long chain of dozens of predominantly Berber-speaking 
settlements, running from Wazzin on the Tunisian border in the west via Nalut 
(Lalut) and Jadu to Yefren and Al-Qalaa in the east, sporadically interrupted by 
Arabic-speaking settlements of which the largest is Zintan. Geographically and 
linguistically, the Nefusa Mountains are continued across the Tunisian border by 
the Matmata range, whose Berber-speaking villages are fewer and more scattered 
(Hamza, 2007; Gabsi, 2003; Ben Mamou, 2005). On the coast 100 km to its north, 
the port of Zuwara preserves Berber in an otherwise Arabic-speaking region 
(Mitchell, 2009; Serra, 1970; Gussenhoven, 2017); it is the only coastal town in 
Libya to have done so. Further inland, 250 km southwest of Nalut, a smaller, more 
isolated Berber-speaking town is found: the oasis of Ghadames, and its satellite 
Tunen (Lanfry, 1968; Lanfry, 1973; Kossmann, 2013). 
The next most important is the vast but sparsely populated Tuareg area of 
southwestern Libya, starting around Ghadames itself and continuing south to the 
Niger border. The largest settlements of the region are Ghat (Nehlil 1909), on the 
Algerian border, and Ubari further east; smaller Tuareg settlements are scattered 
through the Akakus Mountains near Ghat. This area represents the northeastern 
edge of a much larger Tuareg sphere extending as far east as Mali and as far south 
as Burkina Faso. The continuity of Tuareg has been partly interrupted since the 
early 20th century by colonial powers’ imposition of fixed national borders; 
nevertheless, substantial immigration of Tuaregs from Mali and Niger during the 
Qaddafi era has helped maintain mutual connections. 
Further east, only scattered remnants attest to the formerly country-wide 
distribution of Berber. In central Libya, Berber survived into the early twentieth 
century in two oases of the Jufra district: Sokna, near Waddan, and El-Fogaha 
further south (Sarnelli, 1924; Souag, fc; Paradisi, 1961a). It is, however, 
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effectively extinct today; only a few elderly semi-speakers remain at Sokna (Sɛid 
n Yunes, 2010). In Cyrenaica, the town of Awjila in the Jalu oasis stands alone as 
the only long-term Berber-speaking settlement (Paradisi, 1960; Paradisi, 1961b; 
van Putten, 2013). While language loss is clearly ongoing, some younger 
members of the community are attempting to maintain the language (Souag - van 
Putten, 2015). The much younger settlement of Jaghbub, on the Egyptian border, 
includes some traditionally Berber-speaking families with roots in nearby Siwa 
(Souag, 2013: 16); it is unclear whether the language they brought with them is 
being maintained. 
An ethnographically oriented focus on Berber-speaking communities in their 
traditional lands, however, paints a misleading picture of the present. Modern-day 
Libya is one of the most heavily urbanized countries in Africa, and a very substantial 
number of Berber speakers today live in cities outside these areas. It remains to be 
seen whether the language will be maintained for long periods in predominantly 
Arabic-speaking larger cities, but in neighbourhoods with strong concentrations of 
Berber speakers, its survival is at least a possibility. A map of the distribution of 
Berber today can hardly be considered complete if it leaves out Tripoli. 
 
Understanding variation 
The patchy distribution and long history of Berber across Libya has led to 
substantial variation. Even within the relatively compact region of the Nefusa 
Mountains, the central dialects of Jadu and Lalut show some striking – and 
inadequately documented – differences from the peripheral varieties of Yefren 
and Wazzin, despite a long history of mutual interaction. A much greater gap 
separates this dialect group from Tamahaq (Tuareg) further south, linguistically 
much closer to other Tuareg varieties beyond Libya’s borders. Smaller varieties 
limited to individual oases – Ghadames, Awjila, formerly Sokna and El-Fogaha – 
carry little political or demographic weight, but diverge drastically from the 
norms of either dialect group in ways that reflect a long history of linguistic 
conservatism. 
A pioneering attempt to quantify these differences was made by Blažek (2010), 
who examined lexicostatistical cognacy rates between Berber varieties on the 100-
word Swadesh list, yielding the tree in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 2. Berber lexicostatistical family tree according to Blažek (2010) 
 
He found that Zuwara and Beguinot’s Nefusi shared about 91% of these words, 
as did Sokna and El-Fogaha – a level of divergence comparable to French vs. 
Italian. The different Tuareg varieties inside and outside Libya shared an average of 
about 86% of their Swadesh vocabulary – less than Romance. The common 
ancestor of all Libyan Berber varieties would date back to 130 BC or so, making 
them as different from one another – on this particular measure – as the Germanic 
languages. However, despite its usefulness as an indicative measure, this method is 
a misleading guide to synchronic similarity, whose results should not be taken to 
characterise the present-day situation as a whole. It takes no account of 
morphology, a relatively conservative domain in Berber. Within the lexicon, Arabic 
loans are specifically excluded due to Blažek’s diachronically oriented interests, 
although such loans are frequent even within basic vocabulary and have the effect 
of increasing mutual intelligibility. Even for diachronic purposes, the tree model 
Blažek imposes on the data is misleading, since no effort is made to identify or 
isolate the effects of intra-Berber contact. 
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By supplementing published data (cited above) with “grey data” from social 
media – notably, the invaluable resources found on Facebook groups for Libyan 
Amazigh youth (Halasa, 2015) – it is now possible to form a general picture of 
Berber-internal variation not only across Libya but even, to a significant extent, 
within the northwest, an area whose diversity is very poorly described in existing 
literature. This variation is far from negligible, as illustrated by the following table 
(retranscribed, sometimes with ambiguities caused by the use of an Arabic-script 
transcription): 
 
 Ghat Ghadames Nalut Kabaw Jadu Yefren Zuwara Wazzin Awjila 
hand ăfus ofəss ufəs ufəs ufəs fus əfus fus afus 
sun tafukk tofət tufut tufut tufut tfuyt tfuyt tfuyt tafut 
son rur tarwa təṛwa təṛwa təṛwa məmmi məmmi məmmi iwi 




suggəs asəggʷas asəggas asəggʷas ašəwwaš 
donkey ižiḍ aẓeḍ (a)ziṭ (a)ziṭ aziṭ aɣyul aɣyul aɣyul aziṭ 




iməṭkən imətšan iṃətšan iməṭšən ? 
Table 1. Lexical variation across Libya 
 
Inspection of Table 1 (as well as Table 3) reveals a clear lexical divide within 
the Nefusa Mountains area between two main dialect groups, portrayed in Fig. 3: 
“core” Nefusi, in Nalut, Kabaw, and Jadu (blue), vs. “peripheral” Nefusi, in Yefren 
to the east, Wazzin to the west, and beyond the mountains proper in Zuwara to the 
north (green). Ghadames aligns with “core” Nefusi in many respects, despite 
important grammatical differences, while “peripheral” Nefusi rather closely 
matches the Matmata varieties of southern Tunisia (not shown in the table) and the 
Zenati subgroup of Berber more generally, notably including Tashawit (Chaouia) in 
Algeria and Tarifit (Rif) in Morocco. Ghat, standing in for Libyan Tuareg, is 
naturally much closer to non-Libyan Tuareg than to any non-Tuareg Libyan Berber 
variety, while Awjila stands out as not especially close to any other Libyan or non-
Libyan variety. 
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Fig. 3. Linguistic variation in the Nefusa Mountains 
 
Viewed in a historical perspective, this situation mostly seems to reflect two 
major linguistic expansions: Zenati and Tuareg (Souag 2017). The relative 
homogeneity of Zenati varieties in Morocco and Algeria, and the much greater 
variation among varieties with Zenati characteristics further east, suggests that 
the Zenati expansion started somewhere in southern Tunisia or northern Libya 
and proceeded westwards. Nevertheless, traits shared with Zenati are prominent 
as far east as Sokna and Siwa; at least in Siwa, these traits are unlikely to reflect 
continuous transmission since antiquity (Souag, 2013: 27), suggesting that 
speakers of Zenati or some close relative may have moved east as well. The 
Tuareg expansion likewise seems to have proceeded from southwestern Libya 
and southern Algeria towards the south and west, although over the past few 
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decades immigration has mainly been in the other direction. Apart from these two 
expansions, however, Libya has at least two main relict areas where traces of 
earlier Berber-internal diversity survive. A variety ancestral to Awjila must have 
split from all the rest very early on, although even in the middle of inland 
Cyrenaica its isolation was not complete (traces of later Zenati influence can be 
observed in Awjili). The traits shared by core Nefusi with Ghadames reflect early 
shared developments in a region then as now somewhat insulated by its 
geography from exogenous linguistic changes; however, the later arrival of 
Zenati varieties along the periphery of the Nefusa Mountains would lead to 
substantial restructuring of core Nefusi, bringing it closer to other northern 
Berber varieties. Tuareg has similarly had an impact on Ghadames, though a 
much less prominent one. 
Viewed synchronically, however, it is more convenient to reduce the variation 
within modern Libyan Berber to a one-dimensional diagram, in which each variety 
listed is, by and large, more similar to the ones preceding and following it than to 
any variety further afield, and more likely to be mutually intelligible: 
 
 Fezzan (Sokna, El Fogaha) – effectively extinct 
 “Peripheral” Nefusi = Zenati (Zuwara, Yefren, Wazzin) 
 “Core” Nefusi (Nalut, Kabaw, Jadu) 
 Ghadames 
 Tuareg = Tamahaq/Tamajeq/Tamasheq (Ghat, Ubari…) 
 Awjila 
 
The division drawn here between “peripheral” and “core” Nefusi, while clearly 
justified by lexical data, is not so clearly reflected in terms of identity or folk 
classification. Even prior to the Amazigh identity movement of the 20th century, 
speakers of both shared the traditional glottonym and ethnonym Maziɣ, 
corresponding to “Amazigh” elsewhere, and cognate to Tuareg Amahăɣ; this term 
is not documented as a language label in the smaller varieties of Ghadames, Awjila, 
or the Fezzan towns. Moreover, their frequent contact with one another assures a 
greater degree of mutual comprehensibility than found between more widely 
scattered varieties. To some extent, their long-standing contact has worked to erase 
the deep-rooted genetic differences between them, making it more feasible to 
conceptualize the varieties of the Nefusa Mountains as a single language than a 
diachronic perspective would suggest. 
 
Demographics 
There is no census data on languages spoken in Libya today or within the past 
several decades. An initial approximation can be produced by looking at population 
data for Libyan towns known to be predominantly Berber-speaking (World 
Lameen Souag 263 
Gazetteer 2012) and combining this with best guesses as to the proportion of 
Berber-speaking population in these towns. The basis for the figures given by 
Ethnologue 21 (Simons - Fennig 2018) is unclear, but presumably not entirely 
arbitrary. Side by side, these two methods yield the following: 
 
 Extrapolated from 2012 town 
populations 
Ethnologue 21 (mixes data from 2001 
and 2016) 




Core Nefusi 70,000 
Ghadames 8,500 10,000 
Tuareg 47,000 17,000 
Awjila 5,000 2,000 
Total 200,500 241,000 
Table 2. Population data 
 
While the specific figures differ substantially, the ranking of varieties is the 
same: Nefusi > Tuareg > Ghadames >> Awjila. Both sets of figures, however, 
should probably be considered as substantial underestimates, since no usable data 
is available on the situation in Tripoli and other large urban centres; as noted above, 
a substantial proportion of Libyan Amazigh live in such cities, outside of their 
traditional territory, like most Libyans. 
 
Towards institutionalisation 
In the past, interregional linguistic differences had little practical impact. The 
fall of Qaddafi in 2011, however, made it possible to seriously envision an 
institutionalisation of Amazigh as a language of the state, and Amazigh activists’ 
demands for this have become increasingly influential. At the same time, 
independently of the much-contested state apparatus, activists have taken their own 
measures to introduce their language to broadcasting, to the classroom, and to local 
administration. Their progress has been fairly rapid. In 2012, a textbook was 
privately published for use in primary schools, Adlis nnu (Madi 2012), and 
Amazigh radio stations were launched in Zuwara and Yefren, while Berber-
language broadcasts featured on the Qatar-based rebel satellite station Libya Al 
Ahrar TV. The next year, a specifically Amazigh station, Ibraren TV, was launched. 
In 2013, the General National Congress passed Law No. 18 (Ministry of Justice 
2013), giving “all linguistic and cultural components” (specified as Amazigh, 
Tuareg, and Tubu) the right to optional classes for their language, and requiring the 
264 Linguistic Unity and Diversity in Libyan Berber (Amazigh) 
Ministry of Education to provide textbooks and teachers for this purpose, and the 
Ministry of Higher Education to establish research-focused and historical centres 
and councils dedicated to preserving and developing their cultural and linguistic 
identity. As of 2018, Amazigh classes are still expanding in the northwest, and even 
Awjila has occasional Berber-language local radio broadcasts. One question that 
this raises is standardization: given the linguistic variation found across the country, 
to what extent are books and media created in one area accessible elsewhere? 
Comparing Adlis nnu to the available data on this variation illustrates that the 
difference between the language to be taught at school and the language spoken by 
the pupils is far from negligible, even in the Amazigh heartlands of the northwest.  
 
 
Fig. 4: Adlis nnu, p. 35 
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Lexical standardization 
Examining p. 35 of Adlis nnu for concreteness, we find only three words or 
morphemes that appear to be common to all documented Libyan Berber varieties: 
sl “hear, listen”, d “and, with”, n “of”. Another eight vary across the country but 
seem to be consistent across the northwest, although data on lexical variation is 
limited there: t-...-d “you sg. (subj.)”, ɣs “want”, rni “add”, sn (f. snt) “two”, 
aqqa “piece”, ifarisn “pears”, tiẓurin “grapes”, tiyni “dates”. At least another 
eight words, however, are known to vary even within the northwest: ẓr “see” (vs. 
Jadu ecbeḥ), fk “give” (vs. Zuwara, Yefren uc), ijjn f. ijjt “one” (vs. Jadu udjun), 
way “yes” (vs. Jadu hi, Zuwara a), adffu “apple” (vs. Jadu tteffaḥ < Arabic), 
imṭkan “figs” (see above), tiznbaɛ “oranges” (< Arabic, like Jadu burdgan and 
Yefren llim, but less immediately recognizable as such). Even at a first grade 
level, it can safely be assumed that all readers of this textbook will encounter 
words unfamiliar to them and probably to their parents too. Standardizing Libyan 
Amazigh – or even creating enough familiarity with each other's varieties to 
ensure full mutual comprehensibility – is a non-trivial task. While students in the 
northwest could be familiar with as much as 79% of the words on this page, 
depending on their town, Tuareg ones will recognize only 46%, and Awjili ones 
no more than 30%. 
Geographical variation, however, is not the only source of unfamiliarity. Three 
words on this page are likely to be equally unfamiliar to all Libyan readers not 
exposed to usage in other countries: tagzzumt “lesson”, tis 7 “seventh”, agadz 
“market”. Another two were chosen despite being unfamiliar to all readers in the 
most populous regions of the northwest: kraḍ “three”, sḍiṣ “six”. The motivation in 
each case is clear: avoidance of Arabic loans (all higher numerals are borrowed 
from Arabic in Zuwara and the Nefusa Mountains). As in Algeria and Morocco, the 
creation and promotion of neologisms has been seen as an essential part of 
language planning, primarily intended to replace words recognizable as Arabic 
borrowings. In the words of Intissar Younes Issa, an instructor at Yefren (Thorne 
2014), “before we would say ‘hammam’ (bathroom), from Arabic, but now people 
are saying ‘abdus.’ Even ‘cugina’ (kitchen), which comes from Italian (‘cucina’); 
now we say ‘anwal’”. The choice of which words to avoid is motivated largely by 
whether they are recognizable as Arabic, but how are their replacements chosen? In 
Adlis nnu, the neologisms are often clearly recognizable as Moroccan rather than 
Algerian, as with both agadz and tagzzumt; this reflects the author’s lengthy stays 
in Morocco, but perhaps also the greater accessibility of Moroccan Amazigh 
materials in Arabic (Algerian Amazigh dictionaries are usually in French, which is 
less widely spoken in Libya). Nevertheless, both Algerian and Moroccan Amazigh 
teachers have been recruited in places such as Zuwara; it remains to be seen which 
set of neologisms will win out. 
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For the time being, the linguistic purism observed in Libyan Amazigh texts is 
hardly reflected in spoken discourse, even in formal settings. Amazigh public 
speeches – frequently uploaded on YouTube – more often show massive use of 
Arabic lexical items in a Berber grammatical matrix. The desire to avoid 
borrowings, if present, seems to be outweighed by the desire to ensure audience 
comprehension, in a country where political life was obligatorily in Arabic until 
rather recently. In a speech made by the ex-fighter Anwar Najaa at the opening of a 
hotel in Kabaw, for example, the following passage is not too unrepresentative 
(Arabic words italicized): 
 
Elqahwet meckelet basiṭa; assu, ma ca Allah, tedwel funduq, yaɛni funduq af 
elmestwa n lmenṭqet… 
The cafe was a simple matter; today, what God has willed!, it has become a hotel, ie 
a hotel at the level of the area...... (Damja 2014, 13:46) 
 
Time will tell whether this is to change as education makes people more 
familiar with the proposed replacements. 
 
Grammatical standardization 
Lexical variation, however, is far from being the only issue at stake. All Libyan 
varieties share a substantial core of common grammar (modulo some phonetic 
variation), including:  
 Gender markers: m. sg. a-, f. sg. ta- 
 Plural suffixes: m. -n, f. –in/-en 
 Core subject agreement: 
• 1sg. -ɣ/-ʕ, 2sg t-...-d/t, 3msg y-, 3fsg t-, 1pl n-, 2mpl t-...-m, 2fpl t-...-mət, 
3mpl -n, 3fpl -nət 
 Core prepositions: genitive n, dative i, inst. s 
 3-way division of core aspect/mood system: 
• unmarked, perfective, imperfective (aorist, preterite, intensive) 
 
Yet the varieties spoken in different regions vary significantly in some basic 
functional items and their selectional properties, presenting textbook writers with 
some hard choices. Several of the personal pronouns vary significantly, as do 
demonstratives. Negation poses a particularly complex set of issues. In most 
varieties further west, negated verbs are marked not only by a preverbal negator, 
but also by a special negative form of the stem; in many varieties, a postverbal 
negative marker also follows. None of these three traits applies uniformly across 
Libyan varieties, as illustrated in Table 3. 
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 2mpl 2fpl negation 
Sokna kəniw kən-iti ngi + plain verb 
El-Fogaha əkni əkni nk + plain verb 
Zuwara nə-knim nə-knim-at (wə) + negative verb + š 
Yefren knim / kənniw kamm-itin mi + plain verb 
(Core) Nefusi šək-wən šək-wənt / šək-mət wəl + plain verb + š 
Ghadames šək-wen šək-maten ak + negative verb 
Tuareg kăw-ăn-ed kăm-ănătš-ed wər + negative verb 
Awjila kəmm-im kəmm-im-ət plain verb + ka 
Adlis nnu ? ? ul + plain verb 
Table 3. Functional item variation across Libya 
 
Happily for intercomprehensibility, Adlis nnu was able to avoid the 2nd person 
plural pronoun, but negation could hardly be avoided. For the latter, surprisingly 
enough, Adlis nnu opts for a combination not attested in any spoken Libyan variety 
– a compromise between attested Nefusi usage (wəl + plain verb + š) and Standard 
Moroccan's ul + negative verb. 
Variation in core morphology is also found, notably at the level of case (“state”) 
marking through nominal prefixes. Most Berber varieties in Algeria and Morocco 
have a minimal case system, with the marked case (état d’annexion) appearing for 
postverbal (in situ) subjects, objects of prepositions, and in some varieties also 
right-dislocated topics. In Libya, only Tuareg retains the full system, and most 
regions have lost it entirely: 
 Zuwara (probably also Yefren2): segmental – only objects of prepositions, not 
postverbal subjects 
• Forms: m.sg. a- vs. wə-, f.sg. ta- vs. tə-, m.pl. i- vs. i-, f.pl. ti- vs. tə- 
 Tuareg: vowel only – both objects of prepositions and postverbal subjects 
• Forms: a- vs. ă-, ta- vs. tă-, i- vs. ə-, ti- vs. tə- 
 All other documented varieties (Jadu, Sokna, El-Fogaha, Awjila, probably 
Wazzin3): no segmental case marking 
                                                 
2  F. Buzakhar, Netc d tidt mak jujfxt, Yefren, Ifran Media, 2007, a partly bilingual 
autobiographical text from Yefren, provides a number of clear examples of case marking after 
prepositions; contrast e. g. fesrexten assa “I hung them out today” (p. 12) with teẓṛid aṭu wwassa 
“have you seen the wind of today?” (p. 11). Postverbal subjects do not seem to show any marking, e.g. 
ygur aṭu “the wind is gone” (p. 13), d teqqim tajujeft “and the dream remains” (p. 59), but no 
unambiguous minimal pairs have been observed in the text. 
3  I thank “Wazen24” (on Facebook) for the following examples: yused anẓaṛ “rain came”, 
eqqimeɣ swadd n anẓaṛ “I sat under the rain”. The latter appears to contain a fossilized state marker 
on “under”, but “rain” is left unmarked for case. 
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 Adlis nnu: segmental case marking for objects of prepositions, strongly SVO 
basic order (making the situation of postverbal subjects unclear) 
 
From a strictly Libyan perspective, case marking is very much a minority 
feature, difficult for speakers from other areas to learn and unlikely to form part of 
a bottom-up koine. From a wider perspective, however, its usage is favoured by its 
predominance in Algeria and Morocco, in both of which it appears as part of the 
standard language; it also seems to be present in the textbook author’s own (Yefren) 
variety. Adlis nnu accordingly makes use of case marking; but textbook usage 




The survival of Berber in western Libya is not in question. In the Nefusa 
Mountains and the port of Zuwara, it not only remains widely spoken at home, but is 
rapidly expanding to more public domains from which it had been excluded in 
Qaddafi’s time. Among the Tuareg, it appears to be broadly stable, although more 
data would be desirable. In Ghadames, the situation is less clear, but no immediate 
indications of endangerment seem to be reported. Further east, however, Berber's 
prospects are grim. The small varieties of the central Fezzan have to all intents and 
purposes already disappeared. In Awjila, its transmission from parents to children has 
already been interrupted, and ongoing efforts to revitalise it may well have come too 
late to be effective. The massive differences between Awjila Berber and the varieties 
of the northwest – along with the political disputes separating east from west – make 
it difficult for this region to take advantage of textbooks published elsewhere. 
In the northwest, however, the shift from a language forcibly confined to the 
home to a language of public communication has been progressing steadily since 
2011, although its long-term future depends on wider political trends across Libya 
and internationally. In Morocco and Algeria, the officialization of Tamazight has 
consisted mainly of the use of the largest Berber varieties of each country 
(Tashelhiyt and Kabyle, respectively), combined with the massive use of 
neologisms intended to replace Arabic or French loanwords. Adlis nnu suggests 
that Libya is on a similar path, with an emergent “official Amazigh” language 
consisting essentially of peripheral Nefusi (Zenati), somewhat adjusted in the 
direction of compromise with Moroccan linguistic norms and liberally sprinkled 
with puristic neologisms. Demographically, northwesterners form a clear majority 
of Libyan Berber speakers, to a much greater extent than speakers of Tashelhiyt in 
Morocco or Kabyle in Algeria; it may safely be assumed that this area will play the 
key role in developing any Libyan standard. If Berber speakers further south decide 
to make greater use of their language in the public sphere (and if the opportunity to 
do so remains open), there may be some prospects in Libya for a polycentric 
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Amazigh language rather than a unified standard, as suggested by the wording of 
the GNC's Law No. 18, which distinguishes “Amazigh” from “Tuareg”; both 
Morocco and Algeria make some room for the use of region-specific varieties, and 
Libya today is substantially less centralized than either. In such an event, however, 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This article is intended as a non-technical introduction to internal variation in Libyan 
Berber and its broader implications. Like Arabic, Berber is far from homogeneous, and 
mutual comprehensibility across different regions can be very limited. Libya’s current 
situation makes linguistic fieldwork rather difficult to undertake. Nevertheless, by 
supplementing published data with “grey data” from social media, it is now possible to 
form a general picture of Berber-internal variation across the country. After 2011, such 
interregional linguistic differences, formerly of little practical importance, raise questions 
of standardization in the context of efforts to make Amazigh a language of the state. By 
looking at how textbooks produced in this context fit into the documented linguistic 
variation on the ground, it becomes clearer how emergent standards are likely to be 
received across different regions. 
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A Literary and Linguistic Analysis of Nafusi Berber  




This article analyses the variety of Berber spoken in the Jebel Nafusa, Libya, 
and illustrates how past sources can be used as a starting point for further analysis, 
especially if more audio recordings of this language are made available. 
The paper is structured as follows: after a brief introduction on the language of 
the Nafusi people and on the region they inhabit, we will offer an analysis of the 
texts (both narrative and descriptive) at our disposal. Most of these texts have been 
used here to conduct a linguistic analysis on the forms and functions of 
demonstratives as found in the variety spoken in Fassato. We will discuss some 
potential avenues for the linguistic and literary implementation of this study in the 
conclusion. 
In North Africa today, Berber, or Amazigh (Afro-asiatic phylum) is spoken – 
alongside dialectal Arabic – by almost half of the population of Morocco, by 30% 
of Algerians, and by small communities spread across different countries, including 
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania. Berber is characterized by a 
great internal diversity, which has led many scholars to argue for the existence of 
different Berber “languages”, insisting on the diversity of each of them relative to 
others. 
The Berber linguistic area is not continuous, as it is characterized by small 
communities of speakers who often live in relatively isolated locations near 
Arabic-speaking areas. Moreover, migration and, more recently, growing 
urbanization have caused changes in the linguistic distribution in some regions of 
North Africa. 
In this paper, we will analyze the variety of Berber spoken in the Jebel Nafusa, 
in Tripolitania (Libya), where the Berber speaking area is known to have featured a 
significant degree of linguistic continuity until 2011. After that year, when 
                                                          
1 This contribution has been written by A. M. Di Tolla from  p. 273  to p. 278  and Valentina 
Schiattarella from  p. 278 to p. 290  
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Qaddafi’s longstanding regime came to an end and the – still ongoing – civil war 
began, many Berbers from the Jebel moved to Tripoli or to South Tunisia. It is thus 
very difficult to get a clear picture of the current situation of the Berber community 
living there today. Chaker and Ferkal (2012)2 estimate, with caution, that the 
overall Berber population in Libya constitutes 10% of the country’s population, 
with a large concentration in Zwara on the coast and in the Jebel Nafusa in the 
interior. 
The Jebel Nafusa is a mountainous area that extends from the region of 
Matmata, near Gabes in Tunisia, and reaches the coast not far from Misrata, in 
Tripolitania.3 To the West, the territory is quite arid, while there are watercourses 
that run down into the main valley. Olive cultivation represents a major source of 
income for the region’s economy. The name of the region refers to the ancient 
populations who had settled this territory, the Nafusa. The toponym of Jebel 
Nafusa (Drar n Infusən) has also been extended to the area between Wazzin and 
Yefren since the Nafusa were also dominant among the tribes that lived in that 
area. This region gained a modicum of fame through Ibrahim b. Sliman aš-
Šammakhi’s manuscript Iɣasra d ibridən di Drar n Infusən (Villages and itineraries 
of the Jebel Nafusa), published between 1884 and 1885, and which described the 
territories of Yefren, Fassato and Nalut (as attested by de Calassanti Motylinski).4 
Today, when talking of the Jebel Nafusa, we refer primarily to the main centers 
of Nalut (or Lalut), Kabaw, Fassato, Yefren and Wazzin. Fassato (in Berber 
Fasaṭu), located 225 km south-west of Tripoli, includes the capital Jadu and the 
villages of Mezzu, Jemmari, Termisa, Ušbari (which is near Talat Numiran), 
Indebas, Timezɣura (located on the range’s summit), Wifat, Regreg and Temezda 
(these last five villages lie along the same road), Ujlin, Tmuget (the latter is 
uninhabited today, but is visited often due to the water source located there), 
Igennawen, Šekšuk (located at the foot of the mountain range). 
A network of Berber villages and some small towns forms a single block, 
traditionally unified by language ties and by the Ibadi tradition. The Jebel Nafusa is 
a region with a high concentration of ancient mosques, many of which are partially 
built underground. Their distinctive feature is the absence of minarets; in this 
regard, they resemble the Ibadi mosques in the Mzab villages in Southern Algeria. 
In Ibadi writings, the region is described as being full of sacred sites and 
sanctuaries, and numerous books were written as guides to pilgrims. The area is 
also characterized by fortified warehouses, known as iɣərm, which are made up of 
agglomerates of citadels, with granaries placed inside a defensive wall. 
                                                          
2 S. Chaker Salem - M. Ferkal, Berbères de Libye : un paramètre méconnu, une irruption politique 
inattendue, Politique Africaine, 1, 2012, 105-126. 
3 J. Despois, Le Djebel Nefousa. Tripolitaine. Étude géographique, Larose, Paris, 1935. 
4 G. A. de Calassanti Motylinski, Le Djebel Nefousa. Transcription, Traduction Française et 
notes avec une étude grammaticale, Leroux, Paris, 1898. 
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Before the arrival of Islam, the area was inhabited mainly by Jews and 
Christians. Following the adoption of Ibadism, the local Berbers became separated 
from the Sunni Arabs around them, and, at the same time, came into contact with 
the other Ibadi communities found in the Mzab (Algeria), Jerba (Tunisia), and 
Oman. Not only did the Jebel Nafusa Berbers play an important role in the 
development of Ibadi theology, but they also integrated the practices of Islam into 
many aspects of their culture, developing a rich literature and creating a distinctly 
Ibadi identity in North Africa. A number of religious poems, orally composed in 
the region around the beginning of the nineteenth century, have survived until the 
present day, such as, for instance, those collected by Serra in Mezzu and published 
in 1986, as we will see in more depth later.  
A number of important Berber manuscripts played a key role in the 
development of the Ibadi literary tradition. Furthermore, the translation into Arabic 
of these manuscripts constituted an important contribution to the commentaries on 
Ibadi catechism (‘aqīda), a combination of faith and basic education.5 
During the period of Italian occupation, the Nafusi people were quick to display 
their hostility towards the colonizers. Although Ottoman rule came to an abrupt 
end with the Treaty of Lausanne, which granted sovereignty over Libya to the 
Italians, the Berber population of the Jebel Nafusa continued to resist the latter. 
One of the leading figures of the resistance who distinguished himself in the 
struggle against Italian colonialism was the Berber Sulayman al-Baruni (1870-
1940). The strong pressure exercised by the Italians on the Berber leaders and the 
populations of Tripolitania caused disunity and rivalry between Arabs and Berbers, 
and the resistance in the Jebel Nafusa was eventually annihilated.6 
Both during Italian colonial rule and after independence in 1951, the Berber 
language was not given official status. Following Qaddafi’s rise to power in 1969, 
state repression of the language intensified, especially after the Cultural Revolution 
of 1973. The use, teaching, and dissemination of Berber through the media were 
constitutionally forbidden and considered as attempts to deny the Arab identity of 
the State, thus qualifying as betrayal, a capital offense. Until the 2011 revolution, 
the language was not openly spoken: it remained absent from the country’s public 
culture, as well as from education and the government, and could not be taught, 
printed or transmitted. 
In Libya, in recent years the development of research on the Nafusi language 
and literature is thus of course due to scholarly interest, but it has also, in large 
part, been enabled by the dynamism of the cultural associations active in the 
territory of the Jebel. 
                                                          
5 A. M. Di Tolla, Ibāḍī ‘aqīdas in Berber, in E. Francesca (ed.), Ibadi Theology. Rereading Sources 
and Scholarly Works. Studies on Ibadism and Oman 4, Georg Olms Verlag Hildesheim, Zürich / New 
York, 2015, 115-128. 
6 A. Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Libia, Laterza, Rome / Bari, 1986-1988. 
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The Nafusi Language 
Nafusi, like many other varieties of Berber, does not present a linguistic unity, 
but instead features phonetic, morphological, syntactic and lexical differences from 
one village to another. 
When it comes to the classification of varieties of Berber into subgroupings, 
placing Nafusi proves to be somewhat problematic, because, on the one hand, it 
retains very archaic features, and, on the other hand, it also shares certain 
characteristics with the Zenata group and with the variety spoken in Ghadames 
(Libya). For this reason, Kossmann (forthcoming) proposes to consider Nafusi as a 
non-Zenatic language, which was nonetheless certainly influenced by neighboring 
Zenati varieties, and that can be probably linked to the variety of Berber spoken in 
Ghadames. 
As mentioned before, Nafusi can in turn be further divided into two main 
subgroups: on the one hand, the variety spoken in Fassato, Nalut and Kabaw, and 
the other, the variety spoken in Yefren. The Yefren variety seems to share more 
features with the variety of Berber spoken in Zwara and, in general, with the 
languages that are usually considered to be part of the Zenata group.7 
19th and 20th century research on Nafusi 
The most indicative sources on Libyan Berber focus mostly on linguistic 
aspects. Francesco Beguinot was the first Italian scholar to publish an extensive 
grammar on the variety spoken in Fassato, the first edition of which was published 
in Rome in 19318 and then republished in 1942. 
While the Berber dialects of Algeria, Morocco and the Sahara area have been 
the subject of extensive research, with a number of important works on these 
varieties having been published over time, Nafusi, which holds a crucial place in 
Berber linguistics, is still not very well known, especially in the case of the variety 
spoken in the Eastern part of the region. Several works on the language have 
nevertheless made it to the present day and are still the objects of study. 
In 1890, René Basset provided a rich collection of folktales in his Loqman 
Berbère:9 each tale is included in different versions and in different varieties of 
Berber (for a total of 23 covered varieties). These folktales were for the most part 
collected by the author during his visits to the region, but the collection also 
includes material provided to the author by other scholars. That is why Basset’s 
Loqman also contains ten folktales collected by de Calassanti Motylinski, which 
were translated by aš-Šammakhi in Nafusi (tales n. 3, 9, 11, 17, 22, 26, 30, 36). 
                                                          
7 K. Naït-Zerrad, Djebel Nefousa / Adrar n Infusen : Langue, Encyclopédie berbère, XXXIII, 
Peeters, Paris / Leuven, 2012, 5363-5368. 
8 F. Beguinot, Il Berbero Nefûsi di Fassâṭo. Grammatica, testi raccolti dalla viva voce, 
vocabolarietti, Rome, Istituto per l’Oriente, 1931 [2nd edition revised, 1942]. 
9 R. Basset, Loqman berbère, Leroux, Paris, 1890. 
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In addition to the tales included in this collection, in 1898, de Calassanti 
Motylinski, encouraged by R. Basset, also asked his friend aš-Šammakhi to write 
an overview on the Jebel Nafusa. A first version, using Arabic characters, was 
published in 1885. In 1898, Motylinski published a version of the manuscript using 
Latin characters and translated it into French. In his work, he also included some 
grammatical notes at the beginning, and a glossary at the end. 
Buselli, Beguinot’s pupil, was the first to publish texts collected through the 
oral telling of a speaker from Jemmari. The same speaker was later also consulted 
by Beguinot. Buselli’s first seven texts are short folktales where the protagonists 
are animals,10 while the other seven11 are texts related to religion. These texts tell of 
the healing powers of sheikhs and holy women who live in the region. From among 
these holy women, who were often associated with prodigies and magical powers, 
Buselli collected the story of Nanna Tala. A different episode of Nanna Tala’s life 
is also present amongst the texts collected by Provasi.12 
The collection of texts put together by Beguinot is the longest: it contains ten 
folktales of different kinds (featuring human characters associated with magical 
powers, or animals which represent the vices and virtues of men). The final text in 
the collection13 is divided into five parts and contains a description of the region, its 
economy, geography, mosques, and resources. These texts were collected by 
Beguinot based on his work with two speakers: one from Jadu and one from 
Jemmari (the latter being the same speaker consulted by Buselli). 
The texts collected by Cesàro14 consist solely of folktales transcribed from the 
same speaker, years before they were published. They were part of a collection of 
texts Cesàro had prepared and then lost. The two tales in his collection are 
introduced by some brief notes by Cesàro on the style and contents of the tales, 
which follow the traditional patterns of North African folktales, where the message 
conveyed has a clear pedagogical aim. 
Provasi collected his texts in 1969, recording four native speakers of Nafusi. 
The texts he presented were followed by a glossary that included both words found 
in the collected texts and others obtained though questionnaires. Provasi’s 
collection is comprised of twelve narrative texts and twelve ethnographical texts. 
The former include short songs (the first of which was composed in Yefren, but 
according to the author was known throughout the region) and folktales. Most of 
                                                          
10 G. Buselli, Testi berberi del Gebel Nefûsa, L’Africa Italiana, Bollettino della Società Africana 
d’Italia, 1, 1921, 26-34.  
11 G. Buselli, Berber texts from Jebel Nefûsi (Žemmari dialect), Journal of the African Society, 
23, 1924, 285-93. 
12 E. Provasi, Testi berberi di Žâdu, Annali dell’Istituto Orientale di Napoli, 23, 1973, 503–505. 
13 F. Beguinot, op. cit., 202-206. 
14 A. Cesàro, Due racconti berberi in linguaggio nefûsi, Annali dell’Istituto Universitario 
Orientale di Napoli, 3, 1949, 395-404. 
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these tales have also been found in Arabic15 or belong to the Hausa oral tradition.16 
The ethnographic texts found in the collection are shorter and concern mainly 
agriculture, house chores and traditional ceremonies (wedding, birth, 
circumcision). 
Finally, in 1986 Serra17 published two short Ibadi poems by the Berber poet 
Abu Falgha, which he had collected years earlier following Beguinot’s indications 
as to the existence of these short compositions. The two qaṣīda were narrated by 
Ḥaji Musa ben Sasi, who knew them by heart. Their contents are about religion, the 
loss of values and faith, and the author’s disappointment. They also contain 
exhortations to follow the precepts of Islam in order to benefit of the joy of the 
afterlife. The second qaṣīda is dedicated to the five pillars of Islam. 
A text-based analysis of Nafusi: demonstratives in old and new data 
The following analysis focuses on the form and functions of demonstratives. It 
will be based on the varieties of Nafusi spoken in Jadu and in Jemmari. 
At the end of this section, we will take a very brief look at the variety spoken in 
Yefren, where demonstratives differ from those found in the Western varieties. 
For the aims of this paper, we will only consider narrative texts, taken from the 
collections published by Beguinot (which includes data from Jadu and Jemmari), 
Buselli (Jemmari), Cesàro (Jadu) and Provasi (Jadu). 
The manuscript transcribed by de Calassanti Motylinski, though interesting 
from a linguistic point of view, will not be taken into account here, due to the 
uncertainty of its origin. It is likely that the author, aš-Šammakhi, used terms from 
different varieties, to create a language which could be as pure as possible, but de 
facto, not understandable by most speakers from the region.18 Aš-Šammakhi’s brief 
folktales included in the Loqman Berbère have not been considered partly for the 
same reason, but also the shortness of each text does not allow for a study of the 
use of demonstratives. 
Following a brief overview of the general functions of demonstratives, and 
some notes on demonstratives as they are specifically used in Berber, we will 
analyze the functions of “proximal” and “distal” adnominal and pronominal 
demonstratives in the written texts mentioned above. 
 
 
                                                          
15 E. Provasi, op. cit., 504. 
16 Idem, 509. 
17 L. Serra, Su due poemetti berberi ibāḍiti, in L. Serra (ed.), Gli interscambi culturali e socio-
economici fra l’Africa Settentrionale e l’Europa Mediterranea, Atti del Congresso Internazionale di 
Amalfi, 5-8 dicembre 1983, Istituto Universitario Orientale, Napoli, 1986, 521-539. 
18 F. Beguinot, op. cit., Preface. 
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Demonstratives and their functions 
Demonstratives serve different functions in various languages: “First 
demonstratives are deictic expressions serving specific syntactic functions… Second, 
demonstratives generally serve specific pragmatic functions. They are primarily used 
to focus the hearer’s attention on objects and locations in the speech situation… but 
they may also function to organize the information flow in the ongoing discourse”.19 
All languages have at least two contrasting demonstratives,20 one used to 
indicate the proximity of an entity that is close to the deictic center, and one that 
instead marks the distance of the referent, which is positioned far from the speaker. 
Some languages are “person-oriented”, where the position of the addressee is 
considered the reference point. Demonstratives sometimes serve to mark the 
determination of a referent, especially in languages without definite articles, and 
some use the same form when the demonstrative functions as a pronoun or as an 
“adjective”. This might make it difficult to argue that they belong to two different 
categories: “all demonstratives are referential in their own right, although they may 
be semantically coreferential with the adjacent noun”.21 
Clitics are very common in a number of languages across the world, while 
pronominal demonstratives are almost always independent, even though sometimes 
the presentative can be a clitic.22 
From a pragmatic point of view, demonstratives serve to focus the attention of 
the addressee on the situation of the speakers, especially when they function as 
anaphoric devices, where they are used to follow the participants from the previous 
discourse.23  
The use of demonstratives to point to elements in the discourse is also 
important. These referents sometimes do not exist in the exterior world, they only 
exist in discourse, such as, for example: “that’s false” where “that” refers to the 
proposition that has been uttered24 and not to a specific referent. Finally, 
demonstratives can have a “recognitional use”, usually possible with adnominal 
demonstratives that have no referents in discourse or in the situation. They are 
“specifically used to mark information that is discourse new, hearer old and 
private. Private information is information that speaker and hearer share due to 
common experience in the past”.25 
                                                          
19 H. Diessel, Demonstratives: form, function, and grammaticalization, Typological studies in 
language, John Benjamins, Amsterdam / Philadelphia, 1999, 2. 
20 Ibidem. 
21 M. Mithun, The Grammatical Nature and Discourse Power of Demonstratives, Proceedings of 
the Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society, 13, 1987, 187. 
22 H. Diessel, op. cit., 23. 
23 Idem, 96. 
24 Idem, 101. 
25 Idem, 106. 
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Demonstratives sometimes function as a way “to focus the attention of the 
audience on a specific event, time, place, or character”, as explained by Mithun26 
for Tuscarora. Distal demonstratives, on the contrary, are used to refer to important 
entities, far from the reference point. When characters are presented, 
demonstratives can be used to link them, as well as to provide more information on 
a precise entity.27 
 
Demonstratives in Berber 
Demonstratives in Berber languages are quite different in their forms and 
functions, with some elements found in almost all languages.  
In Kossmann’s28 overview on Berber, demonstrative pronouns are listed as 
belonging to one of two kinds: those referring to definite entities and those which 
refer to non-definite identities. 
For adnominal demonstratives, Berber mostly uses clitics that mark a difference 
between proximity and distance, such as in Western Tarifit (-u: proximal; -in: 
distal) or Figuig (-u: proximal, -ənn: distal and anaphoric). Touareg Iwellemmeden 
features two types of determination, one where the clitic is attached to the noun (1) 
and one where a demonstrative pronoun, with a deictic, follows the noun (2):29 
 
(1) aləs=di “The man, close to you” 
(2) aləs w-a “The man here” 
 
Most Berber languages also feature an anaphoric demonstrative, like in 
Ghadamsi: anṭfa̱ l-ị “le garçon en question” (the aforementioned boy); əddrari-yi̱d 
“les garçons en question” (the aforementioned boys)30 or in Kabyle: argaz-nni “this 
man” (aforementioned).31 
In the case of Kabyle, a more thorough analysis has shown that -nni does not 
serve a solely anaphoric function, because it can appear after a noun cited for the 
first time.32 Mettouchi’s analysis suggests that demonstratives play an important 
                                                          
26 M. Mithun, op. cit., 188. 
27 Idem, 192. 
28 M. Kossmann, Berber, in Z. Frajzyngier - E. Shay (eds.), The Afroasiatic languages, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012. 
29 Idem, 73. 
30 J. Lanfry, Ghadamès : étude linguistique et ethnographique, Fichier de documentation berbère, 
Algeria, 1968, 355. 
31 A. Mettouchi, Démonstratifs et construction de la référence en kabyle, in A. Mettouchi (ed.), 
Parcours berbères, Mélanges offerts à Paulette Galand-Pernet et Lionel Galand pour leur 90e 
anniversaire, Berber Studies, 33, Köppe, Köln, 2011, 471. 
32 A. Mettouchi, Anaphoricité et appel à l’attention partagée dans un conte oral en kabyle 
(berbère), in P. -G. Borbone - A. Mengozzi - M. Tosco, Loquentes Linguis, Studi linguistici e 
orientali in onore di Fabrizio A. Pennacchietti, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 2006, 499-507. 
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role in discourse and that sometimes what is usually referred to as anaphora, is 
instead a way to mark shared attention between the speaker and the hearer, on a 
specific referent. 
Some languages (namely, Siwi but probably also Sokna, El Fogaha and 
Awjila33) also include special suffixes that agree according to the gender and 
number of the addressee. 
 
Demonstratives in Nafusi 
The system of demonstratives in Nafusi (mainly as presented in different 
sections of Beguinot’s grammar), is the following:  
 
 Proximal Distal 
















Manner siha, sih, sah, saha, sahen  
Locative dah, daha dus 












For the purposes of this article, we will mainly focus on the functions of 
adnominal and pronominal demonstratives. Pronominal demonstratives agree in 
                                                          
33 See L. Souag, 2014a, Siwi addressee agreement and demonstrative typology, in Catherine 
Taine-Cheikh (ed.), StuF, 67/1, Berber in typological perspective, 2014, 25-34 and L. Souag, The 
development of addressee agreement on demonstratives, Diachronica, 31/4, Benjamins, Amsterdam / 
Philadelphia, 2014b, 535-563. 
34 The presence of two different forms (with or without the ending -a) seems to be linked to 
dialectal variation: if we consider the texts by Beguinot collected from a speaker from Jemmari (texts 
n. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12) and those by Buselli, we can notice that, apart from some occurrences in 
Beguinot’s text n. 7, only the form with -a is used. This data should be nevertheless confirmed by 
other speakers, for two reasons: 1) the speaker consulted by Beguinot and Buselli is the same, so we 
only have data from the same person, 2) Cesàro’s texts collected from a speaker from Jadu also show 
a predominance of the form with -a over the form without this suffix. Beguinot’s texts from Jadu, on 
the contrary, show a striking preference of the use of the demonstrative without -a. 
35 G. A. de Calassanti Motylinski (1989, 20) also gives the forms: aiouh “ceci”; aih: “cela”, but 
does not mention the forms with -a. 
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gender and number with the noun they refer to, while adnominal demonstratives 
are invariable. As for the presentative demonstratives, in Beguinot’s texts the only 
attested form is the singular masculine (proximal and distal).36 
 
Provasi notices the presence of distal and proximal demonstratives with a suffix 
-n: ihən for the adnominal demonstrative; wuhən; tihən for the pronominal 
demonstrative. 
He remarks that, with the exception of the manner demonstrative sahən, these 
forms were not recorded by Beguinot.37 The n is an infix with plural forms: ainyuh 
/ ainhuha / ainyiha.  
Examples of such demonstratives are very rare and only found in one of his 
texts.38 The author states that these forms are only used by younger generations and 
considers them as innovations (his texts were collected in 1969): 
 
u_táli əlmalə́k ihə́n aɣr-ə́s agnáw 
then king.SG.M DEM.DIST at-3SG slave.SG.M 
That king had a slave.39 
 
More data is needed to verify whether there are functional differences with 
respect to the forms without -n. 
 
Functions of the proximal demonstrative uh / uha 
Proximal demonstratives in Nafusi are uh / uha and do not agree in gender and 
number with the noun they refer to. Deictic proximity is only one of the possible 
functions coded by this demonstrative, as its use in discourse demonstrates how the 
deictic center sometimes is no longer the location of the speaker and the hearer but 
shifts to the referents in discourse. 
 
uh / uha are often used in the texts for exophoric function, where “the hearer’s 
attention [is] on entities in the situation surrounding the interlocutors”.40  
 
In the following example, the city is not visible, but the demonstrative makes 
clear that the protagonist is referring to the place where she and her addressees are. 
                                                          
36 We wish to thank here Ismail Duga, Mohammed Shinnib and Madghis Bouzakhar for the data 
they gave us on demonstratives in the variety of Jadu and Yefren. Transcription, glosses and 
translation of the examples have been adapted by the authors. 
37 E. Provasi, op. cit., 510. 
38 Idem, 509-512. 
39 Idem, 512. 
40 H. Diessel, op. cit., 95. 
Anna Maria Di Tolla - Valentina Schiattarella 283 
In this case, the referent is not visible but is anchored in the speech situation of the 
referents (symbolic use41): 
 
tə-ml-ás nəč bába lḥákəm 
3SG.F-say.PFV-IO.3SG IDP.1SG father.SG.M governor.SG.M 
 
n ləmdínət uh 
of city.SG.F DEM.PROX 
She said: “My father was the governor of this city”.42 
 
Even if accompanied by a demonstrative, the referent is not necessarily present 








tuḥ taẓunít af ššəríʕat 
DEM.PROX.F division.SG.F on law.SG.F 
Who taught you this good way? This is a division based on the law.43 
 
Moreover, especially in narrations, this demonstrative refers to “a location that 
only exists in the imagination of the interlocutors”44, and is referred to as “deictic 
projection” using Lyons’s terminology:45 
 
aya a-n-ugur-út d brid úha 
come_on IRR-1PL-go.AOR-PL with road.SG.M DEM.PROX 
 
d iyidí mlu-n-ás aya a-n-ugúr 
and others say.PFV-PL-IO.3SG come_on IRR-1PL-go.PFV 
 
d brid úha 
with road.SG.M DEM.PROX 
                                                          
41 Idem, 94-95. 
42 F. Beguinot, op. cit., 189. 
43 Idem, 196. 
44  H. Diessel, op. cit., 95. 
45 J. Lyons, “Deixis and Anaphora”, in T. Myers (ed.), The Development of Conversation and 
Discourse, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1979, 88-103. 
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“Let’s go towards this road” and the others replied: “Let’s go towards this 
road”.46 
 
ɣámmaṭ taṭṭawin-ə́nn-ək ad-ʕazzm-áɣ ɣəf-ə́k 
close.IMP eye.PL.F-of-2SG.M IRR-make_magic.PFV-1SG on-2SG.M 
 
a-t-áf-əd iman-ə́nn-ək s 
IRR-2SG-find.AOR-2SG REFL-of-2SG.F with 
 
də́nnəg əlžəzírət uh 
on island.SG.F DEM.PROX 
Close your eyes. I will perform some magic, you will find yourself on this island.47 
 
The same happens with other types of referents, as in the following example 
where the snake is clearly present only in the frame of the narration: 
 
mammó a-y-ks-ə́n ttuεabán úha 
who IRR-SBJ.REL-take.AOR-SBJ.REL snake.SG.M DEM.PROX 
 
af yəll-ís n əlmúlk 
on daughter.SG.F-POSS.3SG.M of king.SG.M 
 
ad-as-yə́-fk zəgní n əlmaḥkəmt-ə́nn-əs 
IRR-IO.3SG-3SG.M-give.PFV half of empire.SG.F-of-3SG 
The one who will take this big snake from the king’s daughter, he will give him half 
of his empire.48 
 
Pronominal proximal demonstratives are often used as discourse deictics: the 
co-reference is not of the same kind as that of anaphoric demonstratives with an 
aforementioned noun. In fact, in this case, demonstratives refer to an entire 
proposition.  
They usually appear at the end of a text, when the speaker is offering a 
summary or comment on what he has said before: 
 
túha tanfúst n Nánna Zúra 
DEM.PROX story.SG.F of Nanna Zura 
 
                                                          
46 F. Beguinot, op. cit., 170. 
47 Idem, 165. 
48 Idem, 174. 
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d limám n Tihárt 
and imam.SG.M of Tihart 
This is the story of Nanna Zura and the Imam of Tihart.49  
 
In this tale, the fox suffers from an injustice on the part of the jackal, so it takes 
revenge and asks the lion to break the jackal’s leg. wuha refers to this episode, 





wə́lli a-y-gg əlxér 
REL IRR-3SG-M-do.PFV good.SG.M 
 
ad-t-i-láqa əlxér d 
IRR-DO.3SG.M-3SG.M-meet.AOR good.SG.M and 
 
wə́lli á-y-gg əššárr 




This is your reward. Those who do good things, will find good things. Those who 
do bad things, will find bad things.50 
 
Functions of the distal demonstrative ih / iha 
As is the case with proximal demonstratives, distal demonstratives do not agree 
in gender and number with the noun they refer to. Apart from indicating distance 
from the speaker, distal demonstratives also have other functions within discourse. 
 
The main function of ih / iha is to mark anaphora, when a referent has already 
been mentioned before. 
In this example, the use of the demonstrative indicates that the speaker is 
referring to the aforementioned camel: 
 
yə-ml-ás alɣə́m ih bárra 
3SG.M-say.PFV-IO.3SG camel.SG.M DEM.DIST outside 
 
                                                          
49 G. Buselli, 1924, 289. 
50 F. Beguinot, op. cit., 196. 
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ad-t-šə́bəḥ-əd aktwí di birg(ə)n-ə́nn-əs 
IRR-2SG-see.AOR-2SG PRES in tent.SG.M-of-3SG 
That camel told him: “Go see him, there he is in his tent”.51 
 
Distal demonstratives are usually used not only to mark co-reference, but also in 
cases when the storyteller wishes to keep track of the characters52 and when a 
particular given referent is crucial for what follows. In the example above, several 
animals are introduced by the storyteller and they all interact with one another, but 
the camel is the only animal that shows the protagonist what he is looking for. 
The demonstrative can also refer to a noun which can be deduced from the 
context. In the following example, meat appears for the first time, but it is a 
referent that one can easily deduce from the context, as the lion is slaughtering a 
goat for his meal:  
 
si i-ɣə́rrəs di-s i-šbə́h-t 





baʕd ə́lli i-tɣádda s isán ih 
the REL 3SG.M-have_lunch.PFV with meat.PL.M DEM-DIST 
While the lion was slaughtering it, (the porcupine) looked at how he was doing it. 
After he had eaten from that meat…53 
 
The variety of Nafusi spoken in Yefren: some preliminary notes 
As a first attempt to provide some information on the variety of Nafusi as 
spoken today in Yefren,54 we will present some additional data, through a brief 
comparison, which will mainly concern demonstratives. 
The following data comes from a six-minute-long recording of a speaker from 
the Yefren region and from an elicitation session with another speaker. Though 
data is very scarce, it is already possible to underline some interesting differences, 
such as, for example, a partially different set of independent pronouns: 
 
                                                          
51 Idem, 152. 
52 H. Diessel, op. cit., 103. 
53 F. Beguinot, op. cit., 152. 
54 In this article, we have decided to focus only on data collected starting from the 19th century. 
For a brief overview and some references on the language spoken in the Middle Ages, see K. Naït-
Zerrad, op. cit., 5368-5369. 
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Independent pronouns 
 Yefren Fassato 
1 nəč / nəš nəč 
2M čək šək 
2F čəm šəm 
3M nətta nit 
3F nəttat niyət 
1M nəččin nəččən 
1F nəčəntin nəččənt 
2M knim / 
kənniw 
šəkwən 
2F kəmmitin šəkmət / 
šəkwənt 
3M nətnin nitən 




And the residual presence, in Yefren55, of the state opposition in nouns, which is 
still visible in some contexts, namely when a noun follows most prepositions: 
 
g ammas n tməzgida “in the middle of the mosque” (ABS: taməzgida) 
s wawal-ənsən “in their language” (annexed state) (ABS: awal) 
udi n uzəmmur “the oil of the olive” (ABS: azəmmur) 
taddart n tməṭṭut “the house of the woman” (ABS: taməṭṭut) 
taddart n tsədnan “the house of the old women” (ABS: tisədnan) 
 
It seems that the state alternation is only visible in some contexts and no longer 
productive for the arguments of a clause. 
 
More importantly for our discussion, demonstratives also display different 
forms in Yefren, and they maintain a distinction between genders in the singular 
and (except for the presentative) in the plural: 
 
                                                          
55 K. Naït-Zerrad, op. cit., 5367. 
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wəd / wədha 
təd / tədha 
ayəd 
yidha / yidhat 














wəd / wədha 
təd / tədha 
ayəd 
yidha / yidhat 







Manner sa / saha / sahat  
Locative da / daha / dahat din 














Demonstratives can follow a noun with a possessive clitic: 
 
taməzgid-ə́nn-aɣ təd  
mosque.SG.F-of-1PL DEM.SG.F  
This (our) mosque. 
 
A suffix -ha, which recalls the presentative h(a) present in many Berber 
varieties (see Souag 2014b for an overview) is only used with proximal adnominal 
and pronominal demonstratives, as well as with manner and locative 
demonstratives. According to the speakers, the difference when -ha is suffixed is 
linked to the fact that the speaker puts emphasis on that particular entity, but we do 
not have enough data to confirm his intuitions with linguistic evidence. In this 
regard, Mettouchi analyses the presence of h in distal demonstratives (dihin, 
dihinna) in Kabyle as opposed to the forms without it (dinna) when the addressee 
is taken as a witness: “Le formant ‘h-’ est sans doute le même qui entre dans la 
composition des présentatifs (h-i-t, h-a-t, ‘voici!’), et qui apporte la dimension de 
prise à témoin”.56 Further data are thus needed for Nafusi, in order to understand 
whether this opposition also occurs in this variety of Berber. 
 
                                                          
56 A. Mettouchi, 2011, 472. 
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When alone, the adnominal or pronominal demonstrative is opposed to the same 
demonstrative followed by din to express distance: 
 
atə́rras wə́d(ha) yə-ččú 
man.SG.M DEM.SG.M 3SG.M-eat.PFV 
This man ate. 
 
atə́rras wə́d-din yə-ččú 
man.SG.M DEM.SG.M-DIST 3SG.M-eat.PFV 
That man ate. 
 
When pronominal, the demonstrative is followed by the predicative particle d, 
no longer attested in Fassato: 
 
wəd d uwwa-k 
DEM.SG.M PRED brother.SG.M-POSS.2SG.M 
This is your brother. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper constitutes a first attempt at a reanalysis of old sources for Nafusi 
Berber, with the aim of valorizing the data we already possess, and, at the same time, 
understand what is still missing and thus what needs to be done for further research. 
The paper has also had the objective of raising awareness of the lack of adequate 
documentation on many Berber varieties, especially those spoken in Libya. 
From a literary point of view, in the first part of the paper we described the 
sources in our possession and the kind of texts they include. While we do have 
material in Nafusi, this is mostly comprised of folktales and descriptive narrations. 
A broader selection of texts, belonging to different genres, would undoubtedly 
benefit our knowledge of Nafusi, not only from a linguistic point of view. 
As for the linguistic part of the paper, we chose to focus our attention on 
demonstratives, taking into account the fact that information on many other aspects 
is still lacking, especially with regard to syntax and pragmatics; these are parts of a 
language’s grammar that need to be researched through the use of audio 
recordings. The lack of audio recordings is a major obstacle when working on 
prosody and intonation, for example. 
Together with other devices, demonstratives play an important role in discourse, 
when it comes to managing how information is conveyed to the addressee and how 
referents are presented or reactivated by the speaker on the basis of shared 
knowledge and shared imagination between the speaker and the addressee. 
Based on written texts provided by different authors, the paper has illustrated 
the entire system of demonstratives in Nafusi Berber, focusing mainly on the 
functions of adnominal and pronominal demonstratives. 
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The system of demonstratives in Nafusi seems to be quite simplified when 
compared to other languages, where specific medial/anaphoric demonstratives are 
present: in Nafusi, only proximal and distal demonstratives are attested. Thanks to 
the analysis of narrative texts, we have been able to list some functions of proximal 
and distal demonstratives. Proximal demonstratives serve for exophoric use, when 
the speaker refers to something which is external from the discourse, or is found in 
the imagination of both the speaker and the addressee. Proximal demonstratives 
also function in discourse deixis, where they refer to a proposition, rather than a 
noun. Distal demonstratives are, on the contrary, mainly used for anaphora. Not all 
mentioned referents are reactivated by the anaphoric demonstrative: this suggests 
that their function is also that of establishing a new topic or of promoting that 
particular referent to a special status for the continuation of the narration. The final 
section of the paper constitutes a very brief introduction to demonstratives as they 
are encountered in Yefren, which seem to be quite different from those found in the 
West. 
 
List of Abbreviations 
ABS  Absolute state 
AOR  Aorist 
DEM  Demonstrative 
DIST  Distal 
DO  Direct object 
F  Feminine 
IDP  Independent pronoun 
IMP  Imperative 
IO  Indirect object 
IPFV  Imperfective 
IRR  Irrealis 
M  Masculine 
P  Plural 
PASS  Passive 
PFV  Perfective 
PL  Plural 
POSS  Possessive 
PRES  Presentative 
PROX  Proximal 
REFL  Reflexive 
SBJ.REL Subject relative clause verbal form 
SG  Singular 
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This article analyses the variety of Berber spoken in the Jebel Nafusa, Libya, and 
illustrates how past sources can be used as a starting point for further analysis, especially if 
more audio recordings of this language are made available. 
The introduction to the article offers a brief account of the history and geography of the 
Jebel Nafusa and of the texts that are currently available to scholars of the language. The 
second part of the article offers a linguistic analysis of demonstratives and their functions in 
Nafusi. The aim of the article is to show how more in-depth studies can be carried out 
based on texts collected in the past, but also to underline the necessity to learn more about 
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The International Conference Libya between History and Revolution: Resilience and New Narrations of 
Berber Identity convened at the University of Naples “L’Orientale” from the 15th to the 17th January 
2018, was dedicated to the contemporary history of Libya. Its purpose was to understand a reality that 
is for the most part little known to the vast majority of the Italian public, and this despite colonization, 
its consequences, and the relations that have always existed between the two countries. Conversely, 
first the promotion of the colonizers’ rationale, then the rhetoric of Qadhafi’s regime, and finally the 
current representations closely related to terrorist emergencies, immigration, and war within and 
outside the Islamic world, are all well-known and documented.
 This volume Libya between History and Revolution: Resilience, New Opportunities and Challenges for 
the Berbers brings together papers by the scholars (from both Italy and abroad) who took part in the 
conference. The aim of this collection is to provide insights into a range of crucial issues that affected 
the country as a consequence of its colonial history and informed the uprisings of 2011; the volume 
looks in particular at the role of the Berbers in Libya through the prism of the new opportunities 
and challenges that face them today and which were discussed during the three-day international 
conference. 
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